We argue for a relevance-guided learning mechanism to account for both innovative reproduction and faithful imitation by focusing on the role of communication in knowledge transmission. Unlike bifocal stance theory, this mechanism does not require a strict divide between instrumental and ritual-like actions, and the goals they respectively fulfill (material vs. social/affiliative), to account for flexibility in action interpretation and reproduction.

David Pietraszewski's theory of social groups offers a developmentally plausible account of how we reason about group membership, as it delineates clear boundaries to the hypothesis space that children must navigate. Merits notwithstanding, the account remains silent with respect to the arbitration problem: It does not explain how children can appropriately select among competing frames when interpreting social interactions.

Boyer's model posits that ownership intuitions are delivered by combining input representations of resource conflict and cooperative value, necessary to solve coordination dilemmas over resource access. Here I evaluate the implications of this claim for early social cognition and argue that cognitively frugal possession concepts can be leveraged to the same inferential end, making the ascription of ownership proper unnecessary.