Wittgenstein hérite de Frege l’idée d’une égalité de statut entre affirmation et négation, mais au lieu d’en tirer la thèse d’une absence de force de la négation, il en restaure au contraire la force alors même qu’il ne lui correspond aucune objectivité. D’où vient cette force? Cette force serait d’expression. Dans cet article, je montre que Wittgenstein n’est finalement pas intéressé par la question sémantique de la négation, mais plutôt par cette attitude propre au philosophe consistant à ne pas faire (...) cas de son symbolisme opératoire, ce qui l’entraîne indûment à s’interroger sur son essence cachée. S’agissant du cas de la négation, Wittgenstein montre comment s’attaquer à la source de notre errement plutôt qu’à la source de la signification justifiant son usage. Il « traite » ainsi ce qu’il appelle dans une de ses Dictées le « problème de Socrate ». L’impasse sur le symbolisme de la négation est un symptôme d’aveuglement au symbolisme. Reste donc à saisir l’articulation du signe avec le symptôme, soit entre deux espèces de traits que Wittgenstein tient pour hétérogènes. Pourtant, dans son combat contre les préjugés grammaticaux, Wittgenstein entend bien redonner à l’expression du signe une importance qui permet de comprendre en même temps son action sur le symptôme (sa disparition). Dans la « résolution », une certaine concomitance freudienne entre les deux est donc présupposée. Nous examinons ce point de rencontre avec Freud tout en distinguant leurs conceptions respectives du grammatical. (shrink)

La présente étude propose une relecture de trois théoriciens dont les investigations continuent à servir de pierre angulaire à la théâtrologie : celles d'Aristote dont La Poétique, outre le fait qu'elle consacre le théâtre occidental, sert de fondement à l'esthétique dramatique et celles, plus récentes, d'Antonin Artaud et de Bertolt Brecht qui, bien qu'ils aient réfuté radicalement les théories aristoté- liciennes, ne se sont pas moins distingués l'un de l'autre pour donner les deux grandes voies que l'on sait à la (...) réflexion dramaturgique contemporaine. Ces spéculations seront envisagées sous l'éclairage décisif de la mimèsis et de la catharsis qui ne se posent pas chez eux comme des notions distinctes, mais comme l'avers et l'envers d'un même travail sur un réel à chaque fois redéfini, qu'il s'agisse de l'obéissance aristotélicienne à une stricte logique narrative, de l'utopique déculturation artaudienne ou de l'engagement brechtien.The author proposes a review of three major theoreticians whose works are considered to be the corner-stones of theatrical studies : Aristotle, whose Poetics, the first reflexion on Occidental theatre, also serve as the foundation of the aesthetics of drama, and, closer to us, Antonin Artaud and Bertolt Brecht who, although unanimous in rejecting the Aristotelian theory, have quite different views on contemporary theatre. Their definitions are analyzed in the light of mimesis and catharsis, which are not taken here as separate notions, but rather as a mean of grasping the fluctuant outlines of the concept of "reality", be it Aristotle's obedience to a strict narrative structure, Artaud's denial of culture or Brecht's political commitment. (shrink)

The paper analyzes the nature and scope of Moore’s paradox, articulates the desiderata of a successful solution and claims that psychological expressivism best meets these desiderata. After a brief discussion of prominent responses to Moore’s paradox, the paper offers a solution based on a theory of expressive acts: a Moorean utterance is absurd because the speaker expresses mental states with conflicting contents in commissive versions of the paradox and conflicting states of mind in omissive versions. The paper presents a theory (...) of expressivism for self-ascriptions of mental states. In addition, it introduces the idea of expressive denegation—the speaker’s expressing the absence of a mental state—as an analysis of negative self-ascriptions of mental states. Some of the consequences of expressivism for avowals are explored. (shrink)

Recent research has shown that the superlative quantifiers at least and at most do not have the same type of truth conditions as the comparative quantifiers more than and fewer than. We propose that superlative quantifiers are interpreted at the level of speech acts. We relate them to denegations of speech acts, as in I don’t promise to come, which we analyze as excluding the speech act of a promise to come. Calling such conversational acts that affect future permissible speech (...) acts “meta-speech acts,” we introduce the meta-speech act of a GRANT of a proposition as a denial to assert the negation of that proposition. Superlative quantifiers are analyzed as quantifiers over GRANTS. Thus, John petted at least three rabbits means that the minimal number n such that the speaker GRANTs the proposition that John petted n rabbits is n = 3. We formalize this interpretation in terms of commitment states and commitment spaces, and show how the truth conditions that are derived from it are partly entailed and partly conversationally implicated. We demonstrate how the theory accounts for a wide variety of distributional phenomena of superlative quantifiers, including the contexts in which they can be embedded. (shrink)

"Philosopher, c'est chercher, c'est impliquer qu'il y a des choses à voir et à dire. Or, aujourd'hui, on ne cherche guère. On revient à l'une ou l'autre des traditions, on la «défend». Nos convictions se fondent moins sur des valeurs ou des vérités aperçues que sur les vices ou les erreurs de celles dont nous ne voulons pas. Notre pensée est en retraite ou en repli. Dans ce monde où la dénégation et les passions moroses tiennent lieu de certitudes, on (...) ne cherche surtout pas à voir, et c'est la philosophie, parce qu'elle demande à voir, qui passe pour impiété."Maurice Merleau-Ponty. "Les philosophes n'ont de leçons à donner à personne. La philosophie s'arrête, en effet, où commence la certitude de savoir. La leçon inaugurale de Maurice Merleau-Ponty pour son entrée au collège de France, publiée en tête de ce recueil, est donc en son principe paradoxale. Occuper une chaire pour un professeur de philosophie, ce n'est pas transmettre à ses auditeurs des vérités acquises mais plutôt leur apprendre à poser les bonnes questions.Cet éloge de la philosophie, à l'instar des autres essais publiés sous ce titre, est ainsi frappé du sceau de l'ironie socratique. Vivant témoignage d'un homme qui a su marquer son temps sans jamais se prendre pour un maître à penser, ce texte est rédigé dans un style limpide, accessible à un large public. L'auteur nous y fait simplement saisir, souvent de manière imagée, en quoi consiste l'exercice philosophique.Ce qui fait la philosophie, c'est le mouvement qui reconduit sans cesse du savoir à l'ignorance, de l'ignorance au savoir, et une sorte de repos dans ce mouvement."Paul Klein. (shrink)

Poor Eliza -- Pax Americana : the case of Show boat -- National brands, national body : Imitation of life -- Uncle Sam needs a wife : citizenship and denegation -- Remembering love, forgetting everything else : Now, voyager -- "It's not the tragedies that kill us, it's the messes" : femininity, formalism, and Dorothy Parker -- The compulsion to repeat femininity : Landscape for a good woman and The life and loves of a she-devil.

Être vu, nu, par un chat ; essayer de savoir quel effet cela fait d’être une chauve-souris ; penser les modes de cohabitation et de compagnonnage que nous formons avec les animaux, en dépit de toutes les violences que nous leur faisons subir, constituent autant d’expériences de pensée limites qui ont ponctué le discours philosophique sur l’animalité au xxe siècle. Il n’est pas étonnant que Cora Diamond fasse un cas de toutes ces expériences : ce qu’elle nomme « une difficulté (...) de la réalité », c’est-à-dire un point d’achoppement entre la pensée et ce qu’elle essaye de saisir, le réel, qui est susceptible de nous faire perdre nos concepts. Je me propose dans ce texte d’explorer les voies de cette difficulté, qui sont souvent des voies contournées ou des déviations. L’idée est aussi de réfléchir aux moyens dont la philosophie dispose pour affronter cette difficulté, sans dénégation et sans déviation. (shrink)

Ce qui a fait naitre l'emerveillement des premiers penseurs grecs, c'est qu'il y a quelque chose plutot que rien, et c'est la ce qui a donne le coup d'envoi a cette pensee de l'etre qui s'est developpee de Parmenide a Aristote et qui constitue le fondement de la philosophie occidentale. On trouve cependant, deja dans la pensee grecque, une denegation de la possibilite d'un discours sur l'etre, d'abord chez Gorgias, contemporain de Socrate, puis chez le fondateur de l'ecole sceptique, (...) Pyrrhon. Et a l'epoque meme ou Parmenide ecrivait son poeme, une pensee de la vacuite et du neant commencait a se developper en Orient dans le cadre du bouddhisme, laquelle met profondement en question la notion meme d'ontologie. Or c'est precisement cette pensee du rien qui resurgit en Occident a la fin de l'age classique, avec ce premier philosophe veritablement moderne qu'est Kant, dans son Essai sur les grandeurs negatives et cette Table du Rien qui, dans La Critique de la raison pure, clot l'Analytique transcendantale. Et c'est le concept de negativite qui va former chez Hegel la matrice meme de la pensee dialectique, alors que celui du neant constituera le coeur de la critique du nihilisme qu'entreprendra Nietzsche, avant de redevenir, avec le Heidegger de Qu'est-ce que la metaphysique?, avec le Sartre de L'Etre et le neant, et avec le dernier Merleau-Ponty, auteur de ce livre inacheve qu'est Le Visible et l'Invisible, un theme fondamental de la pensee de l'apparaitre.Une telle pensee du neant et de la negation traversant la frontiere qui separe l'Orient de l'Occident, il s'agira donc, en prenant comme reference majeure la pensee heideggerienne, d'en interroger les diverses figures, d'abord chez Gorgias et Pyrrhon, puis chez Nagarjuna, le plus grand penseur du bouddhisme indien (ii-iiie siecle) et chez Nishida (1870-1945), representant fameux de l'ecole de Kyoto et du bouddhisme zen, avant d'en venir a l'idealisme allemand avec Kant et Hegel, a la question du nihilisme europeen avec Schopenhauer, Nietzsche et Heidegger, puis a la phenomenologie avec Husserl, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty et Maldiney. (shrink)

Speech acts have sometimes been considered as unembeddable, for principled reasons. In this paper, I argue that speech acts can be embedded under certain circumstances. In particular, I consider denegation and conjunction of speech acts, quantification into speech acts, conditionalization of speech acts, the embedding of speech acts by verbs like say and wonder, speechact-modifying adverbials like frankly, clauses commenting on speech acts, like certain uses of because-clauses, parentheticals, and appositive relative clauses. A crucial distinction is made between speech (...) acts and speech act potentials, linguistic objects that can be used to perform speech acts when applied in a specific communicative situation. I develop a semantic theory in which speech act potentials are captured as semantic functions that change a world-time index, reflecting the nature of speech acts as events that happen in the world. As index changers, speech act potentials become nearly regular semantic objects, with a proper semantic type on which other semantic objects can operate on. In this way, speech acts (or rather, speech-act potentials) become part of the recursive structure of language. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore the connections between meta-ontological and meta-philosophical issues in two of Nāgārjuna’s primary works, the Mūlamadhyamakārikā and the Vigrahavyāvartanī. I argue for an interpretative framework that places Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka as a meta- and ultimately non-philosophical evaluation of philosophy. The paper’s primary argument is that an interpretative framework which makes explicit the meta-ontological and meta-philosophical links in Nāgārjuna’s thought is both viable and informative. Following Nāgārjuna, I start my analysis by looking at the positions that exist within (...) the ontological debate and show that the Mādhyamika should be understood as an ontological deflationist who aims to discredit ontological questions altogether. I argue, however, that the Mādhyamika does not wish to engage in meta-ontological debates either and that Nāgārjuna’s ontological deflationist arguments necessarily lead to a position of philosophical deflationism: the rejection of all philosophical and meta-philosophical debates. Further on, I provide a sketch of denegation, the language operator in Madhyamaka that allows Nāgārjuna to make seemingly philosophical claims while not having the commitments that traditional philosophical claims do. I conclude with a defense of my interpretation of Madhyamaka as weak philosophical deflationism compared to other deflationist construals, an explicit discussion of the ways in which my understanding differs from contemporary western interpretations that prima facie resemble weak philosophical deflationism, and an identification of weak philosophical deflationism with dequitism, a variant of quetism. (shrink)

Being Reconfigured presents some of the most brilliant and audacious theses in recent phenomenological research. Challenging so much post-Heideggerian doxa, it argues against contemporary phenomenology’s denegation of Being, but suggests, as well, that phenomenology itself can provide a viable and fruitful alternative to this impasse. -/- Specifically, Being Reconfigured delineates the source of phenomenology’s ‘refusal’ of Being, in Husserl; the main strands it demonstrates, in Marion and Levinas; and the fundamental problems its entails—in Marion, the necessary retention of a (...) ‘metaphysical’ subject, and in Levinas, the necessary revival of Kantian dualisms and diremptions. Beyond this critical survey, however, Leask also provides an alternative perspective, through a reassessment of Edith Stein’s ‘generous ontology.’ This reassessment involves: delineating Stein’s Patristic and Scholastic sources; amplifying her suggestions, through the work of Michel Henry, Merleau-Ponty and Levinas himself; and demonstrating the contemporary significance of Stein’s phenomenology of Being-sustained and Being-safe(ty). By considering Being in these Steinian terms of support, safety and charity, Leask concludes, we might begin to overcome the difficulties described in the book’s earlier chapters—and to do so by radically reassessing the ‘nature’ of the Being that we take for granted. (shrink)

Quand Heidegger dénonce dans les Cahiers noirs le «complot juif mondial» et développe des thèmes nazis, il dépasse l’engagement politique personnel pour compromettre la philosophie. Ouvertement crypté, son langage mêle des éléments de l’ontologie classique et de l’idiome national-socialiste, dont il radicalise et renouvelle la dimension prophétique. Comment alors le lire, sans égard pour les traditions lénifiantes? En France notamment, les apologies redoublent, alors que les dénégations font place aux affirmations : on applaudit la radicalité de Heidegger, sa critique de (...) la modernité, sa «grandeur» indispensable pour comprendre l’Extermination. La responsabilité de la pensée et la reconstruction de l’éthique seront-elles alors éludées au profit des propagandes identitaires les plus agressives? (shrink)

Rosso: Can you say something more about the differences between your work and Derrida’s?De Man: I’m not really the right person to ask where the difference is, because, as I feel in many respects close to Derrida, I don’t determine whether my work resembles or is different from of Derrida. My initial engagement with Derrida—which I think is typical and important for all that relationship which followed closely upon my first encounter with him in Baltimore at the colloquium on “The (...) Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man”—had not to do with Derrida nor with me, but with Rousseau. It happened that we were both working on Rousseau and basically on the same text, by sheer coincidence. It was in relation to Rousseau that I was anxious to define, to try to work out some … not discrepancies … but some change of emphasis between what Derrida does and what I’m doing. And there may be something in that difference between us that remained there, to the extent that in a very genuine sense—not as denegation or as false modesty —my starting point, as I think I already told you, is not philosophical but basically philological and for that reason didactical, text-oriented. Therefore I have a tendency to put upon texts an inherent authority, which is stronger, I think, than Derrida is willing to put on them. I assume, as a working hypothesis , that the text knows in an absolute way what it’s doing. I know this is not the case, but it is a necessary working hypothesis that Rousseau knows at any time what he is doing and as such there is no need to deconstruct Rousseau. In a complicated way, I would hold to that statement that “the text deconstructs itself, is self-deconstructive” rather than being deconstructed by a philosophical intervention from the outside of the text. The difference is that Derrida’s text is so brilliant, so incisive, so strong that whatever happens in Derrida, it happens between him and his own text. He doesn’t need Rousseau, he doesn’t need anybody else; I do need them very badly because I never had an idea of my own, it was always through a text, through the critical examination of a text … I am a philologist and not a philosopher: I guess there is a difference there … I think that, on the other hand, it is of some interest to see how the two different approaches can occasionally coincide, at the point that Gasché in the two articles he as written on this topic says that Derrida and myself are the closest when I do not use his terminology, and the most remote when I use terms such as deconstruction: I agree with that entirely. But, again, I am not the one to decide on this particular matter and I don’t claim to be on that level … Stephano Rosso teaches English literature at the University of Verona and is writing a dissertation in comparative literature at SUNY—Binghamton. Among other works, he has coedited, with Naurizio Ferraris, Decostruzione tra filosofia e letteratura and Estetica e decostruzione. He is presently translating Paul de Man’s Resistance to Theory into Italian. (shrink)

Many things are frightening in the process by which people identify against and resist oppressions. One of the worst is how easy it is for people to be made to feel, by some intervention from another, that their own identity and their standing from which to resist that oppression have been foreclosed or annihilated: their voices delegitimated, the authority of their grounding in an indispensable identity threatened with erasure. Anyone who has worked in feminist groups, for instance, knows the moment (...) when a woman or group of women announce that they have sat silent through a discussion, not because they had nothing to say, but because they felt silenced, felt radically denegated by some act or speech or some perceived dynamic of the group. These announcements make shifty moments in the power relations of a group. They bring to the surface, by rupturing it, how far from impartial or inclusive is the normal, “neutral” decorum of conversational exchange, and how far from detached are the needs and dreads that people have invested in it. The fabric of trust that gives a nominally egalitarian texture to activist interactions is—it is always shocking to have once more to learn—a fragile one that a multitude of unacknowledged presumptions can suddenly leave gaping. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick is professor of English at Duke University. She is the author of Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire and the forthcoming Epistemology of the Closet. Her most recent contribution to Critical Inquiry is “Sexualism and the Citizen of the World: Wycherley, Sterne, and Male Homosocial Desire”. (shrink)

La philosophie analytique contemporaine reste confinée à quelques attitudes paradigmatiques: croyance, savoir, désir et intention. Comment élaborer une théorie plus générale des attitudes? Descartes dans Les passions de l’âme analyse les attitudes en termes de croyances et de désirs. Selon mon analyse, les modes psychologiques ont d’autres composantes que leur catégorie de base cartésienne de cognition ou de volition. Les modes d’attitudes comme l’attente, le savoir et l’intention ont une façon propre de croire ou de désirer, des conditions propres sur (...) leur contenu propositionnel ou des conditions préparatoires particulières. Grâce à pareilles composantes je définirai récursivement l’ensemble de tous les modes psycho­logiques possibles d’attitudes propositionnelles. Comme Descartes l’avait anticipé, les deux modes de croyance et de désir sont primitifs. Les autres modes plus complexes sont obtenus en leur ajoutant des composantes nouvelles. De par leur nature, les attitudes, qui sont dirigées vers des objets et faits du monde, ont des conditions de possession et de satisfaction. Les croyances sont satisfaites quand elles sont vraies et les désirs quand ils sont réalisés. Quiconque possède une attitude est dans un certain état mental: il représente comment les choses doivent être dans le monde pour que son attitude soit satisfaite. Le but principal de cet article est d’analyser systématiquement les conditions de possession et de satisfaction des diffé­rences espèces d’attitudes individuelles des agents humains, qu’il s’agisse des attitudes propositionnelles, des sommes d’attitudes comme le doute, des dénégations d’attitudes comme le mécontentement et des attitudes conditionnelles comme l’intention de vendre en cas d’offre inté­ressante. J’utiliserai les ressources d’une théorie de la vérité selon la prédi­cation qui distingue les propositions ayant les mêmes conditions de vérité mais différentes valeurs cognitives. Je traiterai logiquement des possibilités aussi bien subjectives qu’objectives afin d’expliquer pourquoi les agents hu­mains qui sont parfois incohérents restent toujours minima­lement rationnels. (shrink)

In this paper, we study dialogue as a game, but not only in the sense in which there would exist winning strategies and a priori rules. Dialogue is not governed by game rules like for chess or other games, since even if we start from a priori rules, it is always possible to play with them, provided that some invariant properties are preserved. An important discovery of Ludics is that such properties may be expressed in geometrical terms. The main feature (...) of a dialogue is “convergence”. Intuitively, a dialogue “diverges” when it stops prematurely by some disruption, or a violation of the tacit agreed upon conditions of the discourse. It converges when the two speakers go together towards a situation where they agree at least on some points. As we shall see, convergence may be thought of through the geometrical concept of orthogonality . Utterances in a dialogue have as their content, not only the processes (similar to proofs) which lead to them from a monologic view, but also their interactions with other utterances. Finally, any utterance must be seen as co-constructed in an interaction between two processes. That is to say that it not only contains one speaker’s intentions but also his or her expectations from the other interlocutor. From our viewpoint, discursive strategies like narration , elaboration , topicalization may derive from such interactions, as well as speech acts like assertion, question and denegation. (shrink)

The superlative quantifiers, at least and at most, are commonly assumed to have the same truth-conditions as the comparative quantifiers more than and fewer than. However, as Geurts & Nouwen have demonstrated, this is wrong, and several theories have been proposed to account for them. In this paper we propose that superlative quantifiers are illocutionary operators; specifically, they modify meta-speech acts.Meta speech-acts are operators that do not express a speech act, but a willingness to make or refrain from making a (...) certain speech act. The classic example is speech act denegation, e.g. I don't promise to come, where the speaker is explicitly refraining from performing the speech act of promising What denegations do is to delimit the future development of conversation, that is, they delimit future admissible speech acts. Hence we call them meta-speech acts. They are not moves in a game, but rather commitments to behave in certain ways in the future. We formalize the notion of meta speech acts as commitment development spaces, which are rooted graphs: The root of the graph describes the commitment development up to the current point in conversation; the continuations from the root describe the admissible future directions.We define and formalize the meta-speech act GRANT, which indicates that the speaker, while not necessarily subscribing to a proposition, refrains from asserting its negation. We propose that superlative quantifiers are quantifiers over GRANTs. Thus, Mary petted at least three rabbits means that the minimal number n such that the speaker GRANTs that Mary petted n rabbits is n = 3. In other words, the speaker denies that Mary petted two, one, or no rabbits, but GRANTs that she petted more.We formalize this interpretation of superlative quantifiers in terms of commitment development spaces, and show how the truth conditions that are derived from it are partly entailed and partly conversationally implicated. We demonstrates how the theory accounts for a wide variety of phenomena regarding the interpretation of superlative quantifiers, their distribution, and the contexts in which they can be embedded. (shrink)

This is a paper about trauma and ineloquence, violence and banality, and the utopian conventions of self‐expression in liberal mass society: the U.S. is the scene of the case. The essay pursues relations among the post‐traumatic reparative contexts of the law, religion, therapy and popular culture, all under the sign of autobiography. These domains articulate generic conventions of self‐expressivity with the formalism of self‐reflective liberal personhood. They link norms of expressive denegation to genres that conventionalize, and make false equivalents (...) among, diverse traumatic consequences. When scenes of post‐traumatic ineloquence morph into modes of transformative‐style rhetoric, does the eloquent form distract from, become a mask for, or intensify the unreachable or inarticulable thought that wants to change the norms of negation? A short history of the soundtrack as a site that marks the centrality of ineloquence to traumatic expression condenses the paradox of the moment, where a post‐traumatic desire to become undefensive meets up with pop banality and therapeutic cliche. (shrink)

Ce livre developpe une theorie de la negation qui rend compte de maniere complete des trois significations naturelles et fondamentales de la negation: rejet, absence et denegation. L'auteur adopte une theorie intuitionniste de la negation, parce qu'il considere que celle-ci offre une comprehension a la fois plus riche et plus fine de la negation que celle qui est donnee par la logique classique. La premiere partie de l'ouvrage commence avec des remarques qui relevent de la psychologie, la seconde traite (...) de la negation d'un point de vue logique, et la troisieme donne un apercu critique sur quelques metaphysiques de la negation, c'est-a-dire sur certains systemes philosophiques (ceux de Platon, de Spinoza et de Hegel) qui ont tire des consequences ontologiques a partir d'une definition specifique de la negation. Cette troisieme partie trouve une suite naturelle dans le commentaire des reflexions sur la question de la negation developpees par Spinoza (proposition 49 de la seconde partie de l'Ethique) et par Kant (Essai pour introduire en philosophie le concept de grandeur negative). Ces deux commentaires sont respectivement prolonges par une critique de l'analyse spinoziste de la negation et par l'explication de l'interet que presente la logique intuitionniste a la fois pour la comprehension de l'analyse kantienne et pour les lecons que l'on peut tirer du celebre carre des oppositions logiques, ou la negation joue un role crucial. (shrink)

Résumé — Hegel refuse qu’une représentation politique des individus puisse donner lieu à un État concret, et lui préfère une représentation des divers « états » sociaux, dont la fonction serait d’assurer la médiation entre État et société. Dans sa Critique du droit politique hégélien, Marx dénonce ce qu’il considère comme une dénégation de leur radicale déliaison moderne. Cet article commence par analyser cette scission, dont la politique est le nom. Il étudie ensuite le détail de la critique marxienne. Il (...) montre enfin que Marx rejette ici la conception hégélienne de la dialectique, au motif que l’abstraction de l’effectivité exige celle de la conceptualité.— Hegel refuses that the political representation of individuals could produce a concrete State, and prefers a representation of the different social « estates », which provides the mediation between State and society. In his Critique of Hegelian Public Law, Marx denounces what he considers as a denial of their modern radical separation. This paper starts with an analysis of this division, the name of which is « politics ». It then studies the detail of Marx’s critique. It finally shows that Marx rejects here the Hegelian conception of dialectics, on the grounds that abstract actuality requires abstract conceptuality. (shrink)

"The aim of this paper is to accentuate the distinction between the ineffable, the unrepeatable and the conceptually ungraspable. These are to be considered as three modalities of the ungraspable language that enable us to understand Derrida’s attitude to negative theology. While he distanced himself from an apophasis of negative theology Comment ne pas parler. Dénégations, in Différance he stated that différance is not a concept, not a word – it is an inexpressible. Therefore, there are at least three modalities (...) of “ungraspable” language: “inexpressible,” “conceptually ungraspable,” “unrepeatable” as non-iterable. Keywords: Jacques Derrida, Conceptually Ungraspable, Inexpressible, Ungraspable, Iterability, Intertwinement, Deconstruction of Negative Theology ". (shrink)

L'auteur propose un parcours a la fois modeste et ambitieux. Apres avoir dessine, dans plusieurs ouvrages (Lumiere, commencement, liberte, Construction d'un chateau, Les Actes de la joie, La Jouissance d'etre, La Nacre et le Rocher) une doctrine du sujet qui fonde une ethique du bonheur, l'auteur se retourne sur la culture qui l'a precede et presente quelques textes qui font echo a ses propres recherches. Les specificites de chaque auteur sont si patentes qu'elles permettent d'ecarter l'idee de redondances. Mais la (...) similitude des preoccupations, evidente en chaque etape existentielle, permet de souligner la parente profonde de tous les humains. L'auteur nous devoile ainsi un universel concret et un nouvel humanisme. A cette modestie philosophique s'ajoute une ambition, elle aussi philosophique. Car il s'agit, pour Robert Misrahi, d'organiser son regard retrospectif (la suite et l'enchainement des textes cites) selon un itineraire precis, a la fois existentiel et logique, un cheminement qui conduit des affirmations de l'angoisse aux constructions de la joie. A travers la nuit des souffrances, la quete du Desir, les denegations du renoncement, la decouverte des deux libertes, le courage de la conversion, les approches de l'accomplissement et l'instauration du bonheur d'etre, l'auteur trace un itineraire ascendant. Cet itineraire, maladroitement suivi par l'humanite au travers d'experiences discontinues, solitaires et mal pensees, est cependant revelateur d'un souci commun et d'un pouvoir partage. Il se pourrait donc que l'experience multiple de la litterature et de la philosophie, a defaut de cautionner entierement une doctrine reflexive de la jouissance de vivre, justifie au moins son mouvement et en confirme la pertinence. (shrink)

Cet essai de présentation générale de la philosophie africaine relève de la grande ambition de répondre aux négateurs de tous bords qui, de Voltaire à Hegel, et de Gobineau à Heidegger, ont toujours proclamé l'inexistence de la philosophie chez les Africains. A cette dénégation appelée "omni-niant crachat" par Césaire, l'ethnophilosophie a tenté d'apporter une réponse par auto-proclamation, qui trahissait tout de même beaucoup de faiblesses méthodologiques. Moment épistémologiquement nécessaire, cette première réaction a fonctionné comme l'aiguillon ayant suscité l'émergence d'une pensée (...) plus technique, qui sert de base à la philosophie africaine contemporaine, objet du présent ouvrage. C'est de ce souci que vient le sous-titre de "présentation générale", qui exprime une honnête prétention à l'exhaustivité malgré des limitations évidentes. Depuis près de vingt-cinq ans en effet, au temps où Internet n'existait pas encore, l'auteur a physiquement voyagé dans plusieurs pays de l'Afrique anglophone (Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Ouganda) et francophone (Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Tchad, Centrafrique), autant qu'il a essayé de saisir, par courrier postal, la quasi-totalité des départements de philosophie africains pour leur faire part de ce projet de totalisation. Cet ouvrage est le résultat de cette longue et patiente activité de collecte, qui expose enfin une synthèse pratiquement complète de la pensée philosophique africaine. (shrink)

Déconstruire le christianisme, c'est demander en quoi et jusqu'où nous tenons à lui. Nullement donc une dénégation, mais l'accomplissement du mouvement de conflit, intérieur au christianisme lui-même, entre intégrité et désintégration. L'A. définit d'abord son concept du christianisme, comme ouverture transcendantale, dimension historique du sens (signification, et passage), et annonce de la fin. Puis il analyse, à la lumière de cette dernière idée, trois thèmes essentiels de la théologie chrétienne: la foi, le péché, le « Dieu-Vivant ». To de-construct Christianity (...) is to ask how, and to what extent, we are attached to it. Hence it is no negation, but the accomplishment of that conflict which takes place within Christianity, between integrity and disintegration. The author first defines his concept of Christianity, as a transcendental openness, historical form of meaningfulness (both as meaning and as leading-way), and foretelling of the end. Then he analyses, in the light of the latter, three essential themes of christian theology: faith, sin, and the « Living-God ». (shrink)

Nous montrons comment Quine hérite de Hume certains aspects de sa conception de l’objet physique. L’un et l’autre, examinant l’étendue de la garantie empirique de nos concepts, soutiennent que l’identité de l’objet n’est pas suffisamment déterminée par l’expérience. Chez Quine, cette thèse est fondée sur l’indétermination de la référence, chez Hume sur une analyse de l’identité comme fiction de l’imagination. Quine, déterminant ainsi sa situation propre dans une histoire subjective de l’empirisme, voit cette analyse comme la perception confuse du fait (...) que l’identité apparaît dans le système conceptuel seulement lors de l’acquisition de la référence divisée. Nous montrons comment les deux philosophes font alors face à une même tension, entre les exigences d’une construction empiriste des concepts à partir du matériau empirique et la dénégation d’une détermination complète. Nous montrons ainsi comment le rejet quinien du dogme du réductionnisme trouve une de ses racines dans le Traité de Hume. (shrink)

The essay reconstructs the political discourses of Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, concerning communism and its actuality for the contemporary debate. Both philosophers have a main role in the global philosophical scene in which they maintain different but partially complementary positions. Except for some philosophical divergences, they both affirm the necessity to reopen a theoretical effort, which could eventually develop an idea of communism and communist practices able to face new challenges imposed by capitalistic globalization. Badiou intends to spread the (...) idea of communism through a theoretical and political procedure called "ideation", which should create new militants and followers to the communist revolutionary event. According to this view the State remains the main enemy to this possibility. Žižek, on the contrary, seems to look with favour on the Lacanian dynamic of denegation which could recreate the necessary conditions for the repetition of the communist revolution; which, this time, instead of ending up in tragedy or in farce, should produce a sort of enlightened new statism. (shrink)

Il est proposé une réflexion épistémologique sur la posture que l'historien des sciences humaines peut adopter vis-à-vis de ses objets d'investigation. La théorie du « criminel-né » de Cesare Lombroso, produite dans le dernier tiers du x1xe siècle est prise ici comme exemple et support pour la discussion parce qu'elle apparaît comme un cas limite, presque caricatural, tant par sa formulation initiale que par son traitement dans la mémoire disciplinaire. Les approches normatives ou « présentistes » ne pouvant rendre compte (...) de la logique du discours de Lombroso que sur le mode de la dénégation, il a semblé préférable - sans qu'il soit nécessaire de devenir lombrosien - de suivre un autre fil directeur. On suggère de substituer à une posture épistémologique présentiste les concepts de « rationalité contextuelle » et de « présupposé cognitif». Ces concepts, combinés à une plus grande sensibilité aux différentes durées pourraient initier une approche qui serait à la fois plus spécifiquement historique et ouverte aux apports des autres sciences humaines. (shrink)

"La philosophie occidentale s'est toujours pensée comme quête de vérité. Pour Socrate et les Mégariques cette quête relève du logos, mieux de la pratique du dialogue. Mobilisant les outils analytiques de la logique et de la philosophie du langage contemporaine, on propose ici de : 1-définir pragmatiquement les actes véridictionnels d'assertion, de dénégation qui ensemble constituent des actes d'estimation, mais aussi celui de désengagement qu'est la simple considération, en axiomatisant leurs relations mutuelles d'opposition ; 2-construire une logique dialogique de la (...) véridicité apte à rendre compte aussi bien de la démonstration de la validité formelle que de l'élaboration conjointe de la vérité "matérielle" prosaïque ; 3-déterminer les conditions praxéologiques d'établissement du vrai propres aux différents registres de véridicité. Ce faisant, on construit une alternative résolument actionnelle à l'antique traitement représentationnel et correspondantiste de la vérité"--P. [4] of cover. (shrink)

The article argues the need to rehabilitate the concept of alienation within the post-Fordist model of production, insofar as it is the concept which – if we leave aside the general analysis of wage-labour within capitalist social structures – is best able to explain how the newly devised tools for the management of labour and, most importantly, for the mobilisation of the subjectivities of salaried workers, lead to a reduction both of their autonomy in work and of their opportunities for (...) escape from the stipulated behavioural norms. Finally, it is argued that the procedures for the organisation of production and labour, along with the mechanisms intrinsic to the mobilisation of labour, establish, to an unprecedented degree, the conditions for a denegation of alienation, thus consolidating it. (shrink)

Interactive media arts offer us new approaches to the role of theatrical representation. Nowadays, digital technology allows us to explore self-representation in systems that cross over between installation art, theatre and performance. By confronting the subject with his or her own image, these devices question the mechanisms of identification and denegation. Both the theatrical creations and the interactive forms that are examined here invite the spectator to explore the relationship between identification and denegation. All the artistic productions that (...) are studied in this article call for a virtual double that the immersant meets: Liquid Views (1992) and Rigid Waves ([1993] 2008) by Monika Fleischmann and Wolfgang Strauss, Telematic Dreaming ([1992] 2007) by Paul Sermon and Eux (2008) by the Crew company and Sensorama (2009) by the Andwhatbeside(s)death company. In all of these artworks, the participant is encouraged to give less importance to his or her cognitive senses in order to allow his or her sensations to create a representation of himself or herself. The overlap between identity and otherness is therefore to be found at the very heart of the sensitive body. (shrink)

In his works Chora [Derrida, Jacques. 1993. Khôra. Paris: Galilée] and “Comment ne pas parler? Denegations” Derrida used the metaphor chora from Plato’s Timaeus (49a and following) to continue his struggle with the metaphysics of presence. In 1926 Nishida, the founder of the Japanese Kyōto School, used the same metaphor to create a new foundation of philosophy. Nishitani, a disciple of Nishida, developed the work of Nishida in close connection to Zen Buddhist experiences. Derrida tries to show the limits of (...) language within the game of language, whereas Nishitani starts from an experience beyond language, but tries to make it clear in the game of language. Derrida tries to destroy the limits of Western thinking within the dimension of language, whereas Nishitani tries to open up the Zen Buddhist tradition for philosophy. Both try to open up a new dimension of thinking which is not bound to substantialized truth. (shrink)

In his works Chora [Derrida, Jacques. 1993. Khôra. Paris: Galilée] and “Comment ne pas parler? Denegations” Derrida used the metaphor chora from Plato’s Timaeus to continue his struggle with the metaphysics of presence. In 1926 Nishida, the founder of the Japanese Kyōto School, used the same metaphor to create a new foundation of philosophy. Nishitani, a disciple of Nishida, developed the work of Nishida in close connection to Zen Buddhist experiences. Derrida tries to show the limits of language within the (...) game of language, whereas Nishitani starts from an experience beyond language, but tries to make it clear in the game of language. Derrida tries to destroy the limits of Western thinking within the dimension of language, whereas Nishitani tries to open up the Zen Buddhist tradition for philosophy. Both try to open up a new dimension of thinking which is not bound to substantialized truth. (shrink)

A vast literature exists on the concept of “linguistic ideology.” Scholars generally agree on defining it as a set of ideas that the members of a community hold about the role of language in the community. Nevertheless, scholars generally disagree on whether these ideas are explicit or implicit. Different views on this point imply different methodologies: the analysis of explicit considerations on language in the first case, that of a more multifarious material in the second one. However, excluding implicit ideas (...) from the analysis is too restrictive. A better option is to distinguish between explicit beliefs and implicit assumptions. Whereas the first ones must be studied through socio- or ethno-logical methods, the second ones must be studied through semiotics: the discourses that are produced in a community are considered as signs of implicit assumptions that such community holds about language. The paper deals with a case-study: the semiotic ideology behind denegation in the contemporary Italian political discourse. (shrink)

This article contests in detail the use that Eric Santner makes of the writings of Claude Lefort, Merleau-Ponty and Ernest Kantorowicz. Santner conceives of modernity as being haunted by, or one might almost say, poisoned by the Royal Remnants, the body of the king circulating in society as “too muchness.” He uses Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the flesh in order to orchestrate his profoundly anti-modern position. I contend that he has grossly misinterpreted the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, as well as the work (...) of Claude Lefort, in order to elaborate a post-secular position which ends up being a form of an apology for the Trump administration. This is effected through his denegation of the categories of political philosophy and his substitution for them with concepts taken from marketing. My article ends by contesting the notion of messianism, with or without a messiah, which has become current in certain forms of contemporary philosophy and reflecting on the role of messianism in American political culture. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Buddhisms and DeconstructionsFrancis X. Clooney, SJBuddhisms and Deconstructions. Edited by Jin Y. Park, with an afterword by Robert Magliola. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006. Pp. xxii + 290.Buddhisms and Deconstructions originated in a panel on "Buddhism, Deconstruction, and the Works of Robert Magliola" at the twenty-second annual convention [End Page 182] of the International Association for Philosophy and Literature. Half its essays began as conference (...) papers, while the rest (including several published elsewhere) were solicited for the volume. Implicit too are an awareness of other volumes—for example, Harold Coward's Derrida and Indian Philosophy (1990) and (with Toby Foshay) Derrida and Negative Theology (1992)—and the conviction that such volumes, although making a contribution, have not adequately sorted out what can usefully be said with respect to that tantalizingly elusive couple, deconstruction and Buddhism.The volume exemplifies many starting points and avenues for testing the Buddhism-deconstruction relationship, but all of it is clearly mapped. "Buddhism and Deconstruction" (section 1) illumines some basic issues underlying Buddhist-deconstructionist comparisons: "Naming the Unnameable: Dependent Co-arising and Différence" (Jin Y. Park) and "Nagarjuna and Deconstruction" (Ian Mabbett). "Buddhism Deconstructs" (section 2) explores how deconstruction can be analyzed from a Buddhist perspective, and includes "Derridean and Madhyamika Buddhist Theories of Deconstruction" (Zong-qi Cai) and "Indra's Postmodern Net" (David R. Loy). "Deconstructing Buddhism" (section 3), with essays on "Deconstructive and Foundationalist Tendencies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism" (Roger R. Jackson) and "Ji Zang's Sunyata-Speech: Derridean Denegation with Buddhist Negations" (Ellen Y. Zhang), looks in the other direction, still further deconstructing Buddhism. "Chan/Zen Buddhist Deconstruction" (section 4) furthers the critique with another pair of detailed analyses, "The Chan Deconstruction of Buddha Nature" (Youru Wang) and "Sudao: Repeating the Question in Chan Discourse" (Frank W. Stevenson). All these authors stick with cases in order to test the larger Buddhism and deconstruction hypothesis, showing, unsurprisingly, that similarities and differences make comparisons work out in different ways and for different conclusions. It matters which Buddhist tradition is brought into play, how one interprets some particular Buddhist thinker, and (because almost everyone here is thinking of "Derrida" and "deconstruction" at the same time) how someone with Buddhist learning ought to read which early or late essay by Derrida. Altogether, these eight essays illumine specific examples and contribute to the volume's larger topic, as we narrow down and define the Budhism-Deconstructionism conversation. Loy perhaps speaks for many of the authors here:From a Buddhist perspective, the post-structural realization that the meaning of a text cannot be totalized—that language/thought never attains a self-presence which escapes differences—is an important step towards the realization that there is no abiding-place for the mind anywhere within Indra's net. But the textual dissemination liberated by Derrida's deconstruction will not be satisfactory unless the dualist sense-of-self—not just its discourse—has been deconstructed.(p. 80)Or, as Ellen Zhang soberly puts it, [End Page 183]The play of sunyata/denegation implies a movement of thought that sees the surplus of thought, and understanding this surplus sometimes requires the un-thought. The moment of negativity is, therefore, also the moment of construction and creativity. Sunyata/denegation is not simply a nihilistic place of reducing meaning to non-meaning, reality to non-reality. On the contrary, it is the moment of emancipation of meanings, we find in the Chinese traditions from Zhuangzi to Buddhist philosophers and Chan masters. Meanwhile, the experiential dimensions in the process of transforming our thought and consciousness explored by Daoism and Buddhism also offer a possible critique of postmodern discourse.(p. 121)One could well imagine an entire volume made of just these essays with just such insights.But there is more. In "Deconstructing Life-Worlds" (section 5), two essays—"The Veil Rent in Twain: A Buddhist Reading of Robert Magliola's Deconstructive Chiasm" (Jane Augustine) and "Emmanuel, Robert" (Gad Horowitz)—remind us that the volume is indeed a still more complex three-way conversation, including also the writings and personality (evident by the vehicle of an Afterword) of Robert Magliola, a scholar of both Buddhism (which he teaches... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On Deconstructing Life-Worlds: Buddhism, Christianity, CultureRoger CorlessOn Deconstructing Life-Worlds: Buddhism, Christianity, Culture. By Robert Magliola. Preface by Edith Wyschogrod. American Academy of Religion Cultural Criticism Series, edited by Cleo McNelly Kearns, Number 3. Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1997. xxii + 202 pp.How does one review a deconstructionist book—a book that seeks not only to discuss deconstruction but to be deconstructionist, a book that simultaneously takes books seriously and mocks (...) both the author and the reader for imagining there could ever be such a thing as a book, a something that is written and then read, a writing that says that everything is Writing but that all Writing/writing is written under erasure and so is (as p. 202 explicitly, self-reflexively proclaims itself) an empty page that is, by that very emptiness, marked? Derrida derides the Introduction, for, he asks (without speaking, parlant avec dénégations, denying that he is expressing denials) what is being Introduced? What do we think we are doing when we lead a reader into (introducere) something that is not there to be lead into until a reader is lead or leads himself or herself into it? Do we not, thus, need an Introduction to the Introduction, and another Introduction to that Introduction, a regressus ad infinitum introductionum? Edith Wyschogrod writes a Preface. Does she mean us to think that the book has a Face, and that it therefore needs a pre-Face? Does she think that she/we face toward the book, or does the book face toward her/us, or does/do she/we both together face toward the putative subject matter, which itself has two faces, Buddhism and Christianity? And who am I, the reviewer?This cannot be a review (a looking-over), but it might be a re-view (a looking-again), which informs (in-forms, incarnates) itself so that you, dear Introducer of Yourself, can review (look over) your presuppositions about Buddhism, Christianity, life-worlds, and reality in general, and re-view them (re-visit them, look again at them) so as to reform (re-view, see-again, as formless, and thus re-form) them.One draws a circle, says Charles Fort, beginning anywhere. So let us open the book at random. On page 84 we find: “Taiwan has over 25,000 students studying in the United States, the largest foreign contingent in American universities.” This aggressively logocentric sentence is provided with a footnote: “Statistic of 1987. Since then, the proportion of Chinese from the People’ [sic] Republic has become much more noticeable.” Hmm—a little typo, but nevertheless we are, to our surprise, deep in the overheated hotel conference rooms of the annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion. So, why are we told this? It is part of a section that cuts (“Lt. sect-, cut”, we are reminded on p. 175) across (cross-hatches) Magliola’s life/lives run/runs (Curriculum Vitae, Curricula Vitae, Curricula Vitae Novae, Curricula Vitarum, as the chapter headings have it) as an academic, a Catholic, an almost-priest, a Buddhist meditator, a husband, a divorcé, an Italian, an American, [End Page 216] a resident of Taiwan. All these spill out from the overstuffed closet of Magliola’s life/lives, which, without warning, he opens upon us and then sits among the salade challenging the reader to become bricoleur. But if we do, we feel we have missed the point. Or we have seen the point—which is just as bad.Crosshatch: that’s the theme, I think. Cross, “X” (both the Roman character “eks” and the Greek character “chi”), crucifix, saltire, cross-religions, cross-cultures, cross-countries, cross-country, crossing-out (rature), and finally, revelation by relationis oppositio under/through four forks (“Il ne s’écrit que sous la grille des quatre fourches”—p. 177, quoting Derrida).Magliola is on this cross, he is cross (angry/mad), he is crucified by it, he hopes to cross over by means of it. “This book is not written for the arrived by the arrived” (p. xix), yet he is “on the water, not at sea” (p. xx).It may not be incorrect to say that the book is in... (shrink)

A dialogue is a strategic activity characterized by an intentional structure of competition and/or cooperation. The truth of the statements is far from being the most important thing in many dialogical situations. It is a commonplace to stress that many linguistic constructions, even if they provoke agreement or disagreement have nothing to do with truth or falsity.In particular the ≪prescriptive≫ or ≪projective≫ formulas express that an action must be done or that it is forbidden. These statements are not upon the (...) world but upon a project of action that cannot in a strict sense be said to be ≪true≫ or ≪false≫.Nevertheless, it appears to be a permanent or at least a recurrent temptation as well as a strategic attitude for a tenant of the ethical naturalism to maintain that some prescriptions are true or false. Fanaticism can be regarded as the assumption that it is true that certain acts of speech are to be morally condemned or forbidden.I consider that every asserted projective statement can be legitimately denied in four different ways: one can reject the normative dimension, the proposed action, the potential actor, the time table. Leaving aside the last two, I use a simple formula to describe the first two moves: A weak form of negation is to deny that there is a prescription to do: ¬JP ≡ I do not judge prescribed to do ‘A’. A stronger opposition is to judge that there exists a norm commanding not to do the action: JP ≡ I judge prescribed not to do ‘A’.As every judgement is itself a speech act exposed to denegation, the action ‘A’ can very well be another judgement and, in particular, another prescriptive statement. For example: JP≫) ≡ I judge as prescribed that you judge as prescribed that ‘A’. We find here one of the expressions of fanaticism.Following the logical type of judgement exposed to condemnation, — do they belong to the category of prescriptions, evaluations, or observations? — I suggest the following hierarchy: 1a. JP≫) 1b. JP≫) 2a. JP≫) 2b. JP≫) 3a. JP≫) 3b. JP≫) In the most ≪fundamentalist≫ of its forms , fanaticism invests a lot of energy to sanction a series of norms concerning observations.Note the apparent paradox: If you consider that this paper defends the prescription not to speak like a fanatic, does it illustrate a weak expression of fanaticism?Hint: My answer would be NO. (shrink)