11 found
Deborah Perron Tollefsen [9]Deborah P. Tollefsen [2]
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Deborah Tollefsen
University of Memphis
  1.  49
    Groups as Agents.Deborah Perron Tollefsen - 2015 - Malden, MA: Polity.
    In the social sciences and in everyday speech we often talk about groups as if they behaved in the same way as individuals, thinking and acting as a singular being. We say for example that "Google intends to develop an automated car", "the U.S. Government believes that Syria has used chemical weapons on its people", or that "the NRA wants to protect the rights of gun owners". We also often ascribe legal and moral responsibility to groups. But could groups literally (...)
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  2. Collective intentionality and the social sciences.Deborah Perron Tollefsen - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (1):25-50.
    In everyday discourse and in the context of social scientific research we often attribute intentional states to groups. Contemporary approaches to group intentionality have either dismissed these attributions as metaphorical or provided an analysis of our attributions in terms of the intentional states of individuals in the group.Insection1, the author argues that these approaches are problematic. In sections 2 and 3, the author defends the view that certain groups are literally intentional agents. In section 4, the author argues that there (...)
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  3. WIKIPEDIA and the Epistemology of Testimony.Deborah Perron Tollefsen - 2009 - Episteme 6 (1):8-24.
    In “Group Testimony” (2007) I argued that the testimony of a group cannot be understood (or at least cannot always be understood) in a summative fashion; as the testimony of some or all of the group members. In some cases, it is the group itself that testifies. I also argued that one could extend standard reductionist accounts of the justification of testimonial belief to the case of testimonial belief formed on the basis of group testimony. In this paper, I explore (...)
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  4. Epistemic Reactive Attitudes.Deborah Perron Tollefsen - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4):353-366.
    Although there have been a number of recent discussions about the emotions that we bring with us to our epistemic endeavors, there has been little, if any, discussion of the emotions we bring with us to epistemic appraisal. This paper focuses on a particular set of emotions, the reactive attitudes. As Peter F. Strawson and others have argued, our reactive attitudes reveal something deep about our moral commitments. A similar argument can be made within the domain of epistemology. Our "epistemic (...)
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  5. Alignment, Transactive Memory, and Collective Cognitive Systems.Deborah P. Tollefsen, Rick Dale & Alexandra Paxton - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (1):49-64.
    Research on linguistic interaction suggests that two or more individuals can sometimes form adaptive and cohesive systems. We describe an “alignment system” as a loosely interconnected set of cognitive processes that facilitate social interactions. As a dynamic, multi-component system, it is responsive to higher-level cognitive states such as shared beliefs and intentions (those involving collective intentionality) but can also give rise to such shared cognitive states via bottom-up processes. As an example of putative group cognition we turn to transactive memory (...)
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  6. Challenging Epistemic Individualism.Deborah Perron Tollefsen - 2002 - ProtoSociology 16:86-117.
    Contemporary analytic epistemology exhibits an individualistic bias. The standard analyses of knowledge found in current epistemological discussions assume that the only epistemic agents worthy of philosophical consideration are individual cognizers. The idea that collectives could be genuine knowers has received little, if any, serious consideration. This individualistic bias seems to be motivated by the view that epistemology is about things that go on inside the head. In this paper I challenge this type of epistemic individualism by arguing that certain groups (...)
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  7. Group deliberation, social cohesion, and scientific teamwork: Is there room for dissent?Deborah Perron Tollefsen - 2006 - Episteme 3 (1-2):37-51.
    Recent discussions of rational deliberation in science present us with two extremes: unbounded optimism and sober pessimism. Helen Longino (1990) sees rational deliberation as the foundation of scientific objectivity. Miriam Solomon (1991) thinks it is overrated. Indeed, she has recently argued (2006) that group deliberation is detrimental to empirical success because it often involves groupthink and the suppression of dissent. But we need not embrace either extreme. To determine the value of rational deliberation we need to look more closely at (...)
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  8.  28
    Rejecting Rejectionism.Deborah Perron Tollefsen - 2003 - ProtoSociology 18:389-405.
    There is a small, but growing, number of philosophers who acknowledge the existence of plural subjects – collective agents that act in the world and are the appropriate subject of intentional state ascriptions. Among those who believe in collective agency, there are some who wish to limit the types of intentional state ascriptions that can be made to collectives. According to rejectionists, although groups can accept propositions, they cannot believe them. In this paper I argue that, given the centrality of (...)
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  9. Interpreting Organizations.Deborah Perron Tollefsen - 2002 - Dissertation, The Ohio State University
    In everyday discourse we often attribute intentional states to groups. These attributions are found not only in colloquial speech but also in the context of legal, moral, and social scientific research. Contemporary accounts of group intentionality have attempted to analyze these ascriptions in terms of the intentional states of individuals in the group. Although these accounts acknowledge that group intentional ascriptions are something more than mere metaphors, they do not typically acknowledge groups as genuine intentional agents. I challenge these contemporary (...)
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  10.  34
    An integrative pluralistic approach to phenomenal consciousness.Rick Dale, Deborah P. Tollefsen & Christopher T. Kello - 2012 - In Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.), Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience. John Benjamins. pp. 88--231.
  11.  36
    Review of Daniel D. Hutto, Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons[REVIEW]Deborah Perron Tollefsen - 2008 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (3).
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