Results for 'David Sanford Horner'

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  1. Cyborgs and cyberspace. Personal identity and moral agency.David Sanford Horner - 2001 - In Sally Munt (ed.), Technospaces: Inside the New Media. Continuum.
     
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  2.  75
    Moral luck and computer ethics: Gauguin in cyberspace. [REVIEW]David Sanford Horner - 2010 - Ethics and Information Technology 12 (4):299-312.
    Issue Title: Moral Luck, Social Networking Sites, and Trust on the Web I argue that the problem of 'moral luck' is an unjustly neglected topic within Computer Ethics. This is unfortunate given that the very nature of computer technology, its 'logical malleability', leads to ever greater levels of complexity, unreliability and uncertainty. The ever widening contexts of application in turn lead to greater scope for the operation of chance and the phenomenon of moral luck. Moral luck bears down most heavily (...)
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  3. Using Factor Analysis to Test a Measure of Student Metacognitive Ability Related to Critical Thinking and Intellectual Humility.Jeff Roberts, David E. Wright & Glenn M. Sanford - 2017 - Intersection of Assessment and Learning 2017 (Fall):31-37.
    Locally-developed measures represent great tools for institutions to use in assessing student outcomes. Such measures can be easy to administer, can be cost-effective, and can provide meaningful data for improving student learning. However, many institutions struggle with questions surrounding the quality of their locally-developed assessments. Are their instruments reliable? Are their instruments valid? Can the data generated from these instruments be trusted to drive change and improvement? The good news for faculty, staff, and assessment professionals is that there are steps (...)
     
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  4.  24
    Hume and the Problem of Causation.David H. Sanford - 1983 - Noûs 17 (3):502-508.
  5. Being Human: Groundwork for a Theological Anthropology for the Twenty-First Century.David Kirchhoffer, Robyn Horner & Patrick McArdle (eds.) - 2013 - Preston: Mosaic Press.
    What does it mean to be human? The traditional answers from the past remain only theoretical possibilities unless they come to mean something to today's generation. Moreover, in light of new knowledge and circumstances, a new generation may call these old answers into question, and seek to reinterpret, or, indeed, provide alternatives to them. In the 1960's, the Catholic Church's Second Vatican Council attempted such a reinterpretation, an aggiornamento, for the post-war generation of the mid-twentieth century by proposing, in Gaudium (...)
     
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  6.  21
    From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief.David H. Sanford - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (1):149-154.
  7.  6
    Perception, Common Sense, and Science.David H. Sanford - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (1):163-165.
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  8.  3
    Experience and the Objects of Perception.David H. Sanford - 1987 - Noûs 21 (3):435-438.
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  9.  47
    The Direction of Causation and the Direction of Time.David H. Sanford - 1984 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):53-75.
    I revise J L Mackie's first account of casual direction by replacing his notion of "fixity" by a newly defined notion of "sufficing" that is designed to accommodate indeterminism. Keeping Mackie's distinction between casual order and casual direction, I then consider another revision that replaces "fixity" with "one-way conditionship". In response to the charge that all such accounts of casual priority beg the question by making an unjustified appeal to temporal priority, i maintain that one-way conditionship explains rather that assumes (...)
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  10.  11
    Causal Asymmetries. [REVIEW]David H. Sanford - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):243-246.
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  11.  36
    Review of R eal Time.David H. Sanford - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (2):289.
  12.  47
    Causation and Intelligibility.David H. Sanford - 1994 - Philosophy 69 (267):55 - 67.
    Hume, in "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding", holds (1) that all causal reasoning is based on experience and (2) that causal reasoning is based on nothing but experience. (1) does not imply (2), and Hume's good reasons for (1) are not good reasons for (2). This essay accepts (1) and argues against (2). A priori reasoning plays a role in causal inference. Familiar examples from Hume and from classroom examples of sudden disappearances and radical changes do not show otherwise. A (...)
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  13.  20
    Causal Dependence and Multiplicity.David H. Sanford - 1985 - Philosophy 60 (232):215-230.
    In "Causes and "If P, Even If X, still Q," Philosophy 57 (July 1982), Ted Honderich cites my "The Direction of Causation and the Direction of Conditionship," journal of Philosophy 73 (April 22, 1976) as an example of an account of causal priority that lacks the proper character. After emending Honderich's description of the proper character, I argue that my attempt to account for one-way causation in terms of one-way causal conditionship does not totally lack it. Rather than emphasize the (...)
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  14.  51
    McTaggart on Time.David H. Sanford - 1968 - Philosophy 43 (166):371 - 378.
    McTaggart argues that the A series, which orders events with reference to past, present, and future, involves an inescapable contradiction. The significant difference between the earlier version of his argument (Mind, 1908) and the version in The Nature of Existence, Volume II, Chapter 33 (1927), has often gone unnoticed. His arguments are all invalid; the conclusion can be rejected without rejecting any premiss. It is therefore unnecessary to adopt any philosophical thesis about time (e.g., that some token-reflexive analysis of tensed (...)
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  15.  59
    If P, Then Q: Conditionals and the Foundations of Reasoning.David H. Sanford - 1989 - New York, NY, USA: Routledge.
    This new edition includes three new chapters, updating the book to take into account developments in the field over the past fifteen years.
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  16. The problem of the many, many composition questions, and naive mereology.David H. Sanford - 1993 - Noûs 27 (2):219-228.
    Naive mereology studies ordinary, common-sense beliefs about part and whole. Some of the speculations in this article on naive mereology do not bear directly on Peter van Inwagen's "Material Beings". The other topics, (1) and (2), both do. (1) Here is an example of Peter Unger's "Problem of the Many". How can a table be a collection of atoms when many collections of atoms have equally strong claims to be that table? Van Inwagen invokes fuzzy sets to solve this problem. (...)
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  17. Begging the Question.David H. Sanford - 1972 - Analysis 32 (6):197-199.
    A primary purpose of argument is to increase the degree of reasonable confidence that one has in the truth of the conclusion. A question begging argument fails this purpose because it violates what W. E. Johnson called an epistemic condition of inference. Although an argument of the sort characterized by Robert Hoffman in his response (Analysis 32.2, Dec 71) to Richard Robinson (Analysis 31.4, March 71) begs the question in all circumstances, we usually understand the charge that an argument is (...)
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  18. Monitoring and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony.Sanford Goldberg & David Henderson - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):600 - 617.
    One of the central points of contention in the epistemology of testimony concerns the uniqueness (or not) of the justification of beliefs formed through testimony--whether such justification can be accounted for in terms of, or 'reduced to,' other familiar sort of justification, e.g. without relying on any epistemic principles unique to testimony. One influential argument for the reductionist position, found in the work of Elizabeth Fricker, argues by appeal to the need for the hearer to monitor the testimony for credibility. (...)
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  19.  8
    Begging the question.David H. Sanford - 1972 - Analysis 32 (6):197-199.
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  20.  15
    The portable panopticon: morality and mobile technologies.Martin De Saulles & David S. Horner - 2011 - Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society 9 (3):206-216.
    PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to explore ethical issues arising from the mass deployment and take‐up of mobile technologies.Design/methodology/approachThe ethical dimensions of mobile technologies and their use among the general population are considered within a conceptual framework drawing on James Moor's belief in a need for “better ethics” for emerging technologies and Michel Foucault's development of Jeremy Bentham's panopticon as a tool of surveillance.FindingsIt is found that the mass deployment and use of mobile technologies amongst the general population raise (...)
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  21. Determinates vs. determinables.David H. Sanford - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Everything red is colored, and all squares are polygons. A square is distinguished from other polygons by being four-sided, equilateral, and equiangular. What distinguishes red things from other colored things? This has been understood as a conceptual rather than scientific question. Theories of wavelengths and reflectance and sensory processing are not considered. Given just our ordinary understanding of color, it seems that what differentiates red from other colors is only redness itself. The Cambridge logician W. E. Johnson introduced the terms (...)
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  22.  28
    Impartial Perception.David H. Sanford - 1983 - Philosophy 58 (225):392 - 395.
    Wittgenstein remarks in the "Tractatus" that the eye is not in the visual field. I question the claim of Michael Dummett and P T Geach that reflection on this remark helps one conceive of an observer perceiving objects in space without having any location in that space. The literal meaning of "point of view" is illustrated by the visual field. Reflection on the fact that the point of view is not itself normally an object of sight is no help in (...)
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  23. If P then Q Conditionals and the Foundations of Reasoning.David Sanford - 1991 - Behavior and Philosophy 19 (2):103-107.
     
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  24.  22
    Begging the question as involving actual belief and inconceivable without it.David H. Sanford - 1988 - Metaphilosophy 19 (1):32–37.
    This article answers John Biro's "Knowability, Believability, and Begging the Question: a Reply to Sanford" in "Metaphilosophy" 15 (1984). Biro and I agree that of two argument instances with the same form and content, one but not the other can beg the question, depending on other factors. These factors include actual beliefs, or so I maintain (against Biro) with the help of some analysed examples. Brief selections from Archbishop Whatley and J S Mill suggest that they also regard reference (...)
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  25. The direction of causation and the direction of conditionship.David H. Sanford - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (8):193-207.
    I criticize and emend J L Mackie's account of causal priority by replacing ‘fixity’ in its central clause by 'x is a causal condition of y, but y is not a causal condition of x'. This replacement works only if 'is a causal condition of' is not a symmetric relation. Even apart from our desire to account for causal priority, it is desirable to have an account of nonsymmetric conditionship. Truth, for example, is a condition of knowledge, but knowledge is (...)
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  26.  76
    What It Takes to be Great.David A. Horner - 1998 - Faith and Philosophy 15 (4):415-444.
    The revival of virtue ethics is largely inspired by Aristotle, but few---especially Christians---follow him in seeing virtue supremely exemplified in the “magnanimous” man. However, Aristotle raises a matter of importance: the character traits and type of psychological stance exemplified in those who aspire to acts of extraordinary excellence. I explore the accounts of magnanimity found in both Aristotle and Aquinas, defending the intelligibility and acceptability of some central elements of a broadly Aristotelian conception of magnanimity. Aquinas, I argue, provides insight (...)
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  27. Infinite regress arguments.David Sanford - 1984 - In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Principles of Philosophical Reasoning. Rowman & Allanheld. pp. 93--117.
     
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  28. Locke, Leibniz, and Wiggins on being in the same place at the same time.David H. Sanford - 1970 - Philosophical Review 79 (1):75-82.
    Locke thought it was a necessary truth that no two material bodies could be in the same place at the same time. Leibniz wasn't so sure. This paper sides with Leibniz. I examine the arguments of David Wiggins in defense of Locke on this point (Philosophical Review, January 1968). Wiggins’ arguments are ineffective.
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  29. Infinity and vagueness.David H. Sanford - 1975 - Philosophical Review 84 (4):520-535.
    Many philosophic arguments concerned with infinite series depend on the mutual inconsistency of statements of the following five forms: (1) something exists which has R to something; (2) R is asymmetric; (3) R is transitive; (4) for any x which has R to something, there is something which has R to x; (5) only finitely many things are related by R. Such arguments are suspect if the two-place relation R in question involves any conceptual vagueness or inexactness. Traditional sorites arguments (...)
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  30. Buddhism, Its Essence and Development.Edward Conze, I. B. Horner, David Snellgrove & Arthur Waley - 1957 - Philosophy East and West 7 (1):65-69.
     
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  31.  42
    Borderline Logic.David H. Sanford - 1975 - American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1):29-39.
    To accommodate vague statements and predicates, I propose an infinite-valued, non-truth-functional interpretation of logic on which the tautologies are exactly the tautologies of classical two-valued logic. iI introduce a determinacy operator, analogous to the necessity operator in alethic modal logic, to allow the definition of first-order and higher-order borderline cases. On the interpretation proposed for determinacy, every statement corresponding to a theorem of modal system T is a logical truth, and I conjecture that every logical truth on the interpretation corresponds (...)
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  32. Fusion confusion.David H. Sanford - 2003 - Analysis 63 (1):1–4.
    Two fusions can be in the same place at the same time. So long as a house made of Tinkertoys is intact, the fusion of all its Tinkertoys parts coincides with the fusion of it walls and its roof. If none of the Tinkertoys is destroyed, their fusion persists through the complete disassembly of the house. (So the house is not a fusion of its Tinkertoy parts.) The fusion of the walls and roof does not persist through the complete disassembly (...)
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  33. Contraries and subcontraries.David H. Sanford - 1968 - Noûs 2 (1):95-96.
    If two statements are contraries if and only if they cannot both be true, but can both be false, then some corresponding A and E categorical statements are not contraries, even on the presupposition that something exists which satisfies the subject term. For some such statements are necessarily true and thus cannot be false. There is a similar problem with subcontraries.
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  34. Causal necessity and logical necessity.David H. Sanford - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 28 (2):185 - 194.
    Myles Brand and Marshall Swain advocate the principle that if A is the set of conditions individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the occurrence of B, then if C is a set of conditions individually necessary for the occurrence of B, every member of C is a member of A. I agree with John Barker and Risto Hilpinen who each argue that this principle is not true for causal necessity and sufficiency, but I disagree with their claim that it is (...)
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  35. The primary objects of perception.David H. Sanford - 1976 - Mind 85 (April):189-208.
    The primary objects of hearing are sounds: everything we hear we hear by hearing a sound. (This claim differs from Berkeley’s that we hear only sounds and from Aristotle’s that we only hear sounds.) Colored regions are primary objects of sight, and pressure resistant regions are primary objects of perception by touch. By definition, the primary objects of perception are physical. The properties of the primary objects of perception are exactly the properties sense-datum theories attribute to sense-data. Indirect Realism holds (...)
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  36.  34
    The Fallacy of Begging the Question: A Reply to Barker.David H. Sanford - 1977 - Dialogue 16 (3):485-498.
    According to John A Barker, whether an argument begs the question is purely a matter of logical form. According to me, it is also a matter of epistemic conditions; some arguments which beg the question in some contexts need not beg the question in every context. I point out difficulties in Barker's treatment and defend my own views against some of his criticisms. In the concluding section, "Alleged difficulties with disjunctive syllogism," I defend the validity of disjunctive syllogism against the (...)
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  37. Causal necessity and logical necessity.David H. Sanford - 1978 - Philosophical Studies 33 (2):185 - 194.
    Hume's arguments for the contention that causal necessity precludes logical necessity depend on the questionable principle that a cause must precede its effect. Hobbes' definition of entire cause, although it fails to account for causal priority, is not refuted by Hume. The objections of Myles Brand and Marshall Swain (Philosophical Studies, 1976) to my counterexample against Hume (Philosophical Studies, 1975) are ineffective. Their other objections to my criticisms of their argument against defining causation in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions (...)
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  38. Disjunctive Predicates.David H. Sanford - 1970 - American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (2):162-170.
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  39.  85
    Nostalgia for the ordinary: Comments on papers by Unger and Wheeler.David H. Sanford - 1979 - Synthese 41 (2):175 - 184.
    Unger claims that we can block sorites arguments for the conclusion that there are no ordinary things only by invoking some kind of miracle, but no such miracle is needed if we reject the principle that every statement has a truth value. Wheeler's argument for the nonexistence of ordinary things depends on the assumptions that if ordinary things exist, they comprise real kinds, and that if ordinary predicates really apply to things, the predicates refer to real properties. If we accept (...)
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  40.  7
    Truth, Love and Immortality: An Introduction to McTaggart's Philosophy.David H. Sanford - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (3):445.
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  41.  64
    Disjunctive Predicates.David H. Sanford - 1993 - American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (2):167-1722.
    Philosophers have had difficulty in explaining the difference between disjunctive and non-disjunctive predicates. Purely syntactical criteria are ineffective, and mention of resemblance begs the question. I draw the distinction by reference to relations between borderline cases. The crucial point about the disjoint predicate 'red or green', for example, is that no borderline case of 'red' is a borderline case of 'green'. Other varieties of disjunctive predicates are: inclusively disjunctive (such as 'red or hard'), disconnected (such as 'grue' on the usual (...)
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  42.  1
    6. Self-Deception as Rationalization.David H. Sanford - 1988 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press. pp. 157-169.
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  43.  35
    Volume and solidity.David Sanford - 1967 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):329 – 340.
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  44. Is aquinas an act-ethicist or an agent-ethicist?David A. Horner - 2006 - The Thomist 70 (2):237-265.
     
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  45. Distinctness and non-identity.David H. Sanford - 2005 - Analysis 65 (4):269–274.
    The following statement (A) is usually abbreviated with symbols: (A) There are items X and Y, each is F, X is not identical to Y, and everything F is identical to X or is identical to Y. (A) is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of exactly two distinct things that are F. Some things are neither identical nor distinct. The difference between distinctness and nonidentity makes a difference in asking questions about counting, constitution, and persistence.
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  46.  74
    Illusions and sense-data.David H. Sanford - 1981 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1):371-385.
    Examples of sensory illusion show the failure of the attempt of traditional sense-datum theory to account for something's phenomenally appearing to be F by postulating the existence of a sense-datum that is actually F. the Muller-Lyer Illusion cannot be explained by postulating two sensibly presented lines that actually have the lengths the physical lines appear to have. Illusions due to color contrast cannot be explained by postulating sense-data that actually have the colors the physical samples appear to have.
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  47.  50
    Negative Terms.David Sanford - 1967 - Analysis 27 (6):201-205.
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  48. Being HumanGroundwork for a Theological Anthropology for the 21st Century.David Kirchhoffer, Robyn Horner & Patrick McArdle (eds.) - 2013
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  49. Chisholm on Brentano's thesis.David H. Sanford - 1997 - In Lewis Edwin Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm. Chicago: Open Court. pp. 25--201.
    Roderick Chisholm provides, in different places, two formulations of Brentano's thesis about the relation between the psychological and the intentional: (1) all and only psychological sentences are intentional; (2) no psychological intentional sentence is equivalent to a nonintentional sentence. Chisholm also presents several definitions of intentionality. Some of these allow that a sentence is intentional while its negation is nonintentional, which ruins the prospects of defending the more plausible and interesting thesis (2). A generalization of the notion of logical independence (...)
     
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  50.  40
    Resemblance and Identity: An Examination of the Problem of Universals. [REVIEW]David Sanford - 1968 - Philosophical Review 77 (3):386-389.
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