40 found
David P. Hunt [38]David Paul Hunt [2]
See also
David P. Hunt
Whittier College
  1. Moral responsibility and unavoidable action.David P. Hunt - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 97 (2):195-227.
    The principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), making the ability to do otherwise a necessary condition for moral responsibility, is supposed by Harry Frankfurt, John Fischer, and others to succumb to a peculiar kind of counterexample. The paper reviews the main problems with the counterexample that have surfaced over the years, and shows how most can be addressed within the terms of the current debate. But one problem seems ineliminable: because Frankfurt''s example relies on a counterfactual intervener to preclude alternatives to (...)
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  2. Moral responsibility and buffered alternatives.David P. Hunt - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):126–145.
  3.  29
    Fatalism for Presentists.David P. Hunt - 2020 - In Per Hasle, David Jakobsen & Peter Ohstrom (eds.), The Metaphysics of Time: Themes on Prior. Aalborg, Denmark: Aalborg University Press. pp. 299-316.
  4. Divine Providence and Simple Foreknowledge.David P. Hunt - 1993 - Faith and Philosophy 10 (3):394-414.
  5. Frankfurt Counterexamples: Some Comments on the Widerker-Fischer Debate.David P. Hunt - 1996 - Faith and Philosophy 13 (3):395-401.
    One strategy in recent discussions of theological fatalism is to draw on Harry Frankfurt’s famous counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) to defend human freedom from divine foreknowledge. For those who endorse this line, “Frankfurt counterexamples” are supposed to show that PAP is false, and this conclusion is then extended to the foreknowledge case. This makes it critical to determine whether Frankfurt counterexamples perform as advertised, an issue recently debated in this journal via a pair of articles by (...)
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  6. Perils of the Open Road.William Lane Craig & David P. Hunt - 2013 - Faith and Philosophy 30 (1):49-71.
    Open theists deny that God knows future contingents. Most open theists justify this denial by adopting the position that there are no future contingent truths to be known. In this paper we examine some of the arguments put forward for this position in two recent articles in this journal, one by Dale Tuggy and one by Alan Rhoda, Gregory Boyd, and Thomas Belt. The arguments concern time, modality, and the semantics of ‘will’ statements. We explain why we find none of (...)
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  7.  30
    Theological Fatalism as an Aporetic Problem.David P. Hunt - 2017 - In Free Will and Classical Theism: The Significance of Freedom in Perfect Being Theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 23-41.
  8.  94
    On Augustine’s Way Out.David P. Hunt - 1999 - Faith and Philosophy 16 (1):3-26.
    This paper seeks to rehabilitate St. Augustine’s widely dismissed response to the alleged incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and free will. This requires taking a fresh look at his analysis in On Free Choice of the Will, and arguing its relevance to the current debate. Along the way, mistaken interpretations of Augustine are rebutted, his real solution is developed and defended, a reason for his not anticipating Boethius’s a temporalist solution is suggested, a favorable comparison with Ockham is made, rival solutions (...)
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  9.  83
    John Martin Fischer on the Puzzle of Theological Fatalism.David P. Hunt - 2017 - Science, Religion and Culture 4 (2):15-26.
    This is a contribution to an Author Meets Critics special issue on John Martin Fischer's _Our Fate: Essays on God and Free Will_.
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  10. Thomas P. Flint, divine providence: The molinist account. [REVIEW]David P. Hunt - 1998 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47 (1):62-64.
  11.  28
    The Providential Advantage of Divine Foreknowledge.David P. Hunt - 2009 - In Arguing about Religion. New York: Routledge. pp. 374-385.
  12.  88
    Omniprescient Agency.David P. Hunt - 1992 - Religious Studies 28 (3):351 - 369.
    The principle that one cannot deliberate over what one already knows is going to happen, when suitably qualified, has seemed to many philosophers to be about as secure a truth as one is likely to find in this life. Fortunately, it poses little restriction on human deliberation, since the conditions which would trigger its prohibition seldom arise for us: our knowledge of the future is intermittent at best, and those things of which we do have advance knowledge are not the (...)
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  13.  74
    Two Problems with Knowing the Future.David P. Hunt - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (2):273 - 285.
  14. Swinburne on the Conditions for Free Will and Moral Responsibility.David P. Hunt - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (2):39--49.
  15. The Sleeper Awakes: Gnosis and Authenticity in The Matrix.David P. Hunt - 2007 - In Faith, Film, and Philosophy: Big Ideas on the Big Screen. Downers Grove, IL, USA: InterVarsity Press. pp. 89-105.
    I first argue that the Matrix trilogy is a Gnostic cyber-epic; I then use this interpretive lens to review the films' treatment of fundamental questions in epistemology, metaphysics, and value theory.
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  16. What Is the Problem of Theological Fatalism?David P. Hunt - 1998 - International Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1):17-30.
    I distinguish between a _metaphysical_ problem generated by the argument for theological fatalism, and a _theological_ problem posed by the argument. Some responses to the argument, including ones associated with Boethius, Aquinas and Ockham, address only the theological problem. Even if such responses succeed in showing that God's foreknowledge doesn't threaten human freedom, they fail to take the full measure of the argument for theological fatalism, since the metaphysical problem remains to be solved.
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  17.  93
    The Compatibility of Divine Determinism and Human Freedom: A Modest Proposal.David P. Hunt - 2002 - Faith and Philosophy 19 (4):485-502.
  18.  39
    What Does God Know? The Problems of Open Theism.David P. Hunt - 2009 - In Paul Copan & William Lane Craig (eds.), Contending with Christianity's Critics. Nashville, TN: B&H Publishing. pp. 265-282.
  19.  34
    Form and Flux in the Theaetetus_ and _Timaeus.David P. Hunt - 2002 - In Plato's Forms: Varieties of Interpretation. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books. pp. 151-167.
  20.  32
    Plotinus Meets the Third Man.David P. Hunt - 1997 - In John J. Cleary (ed.), The Perennial Tradition of Neoplatonism. Leuven, Belgium: pp. 119-132.
    The paper explores possible resources available to Plotinus for responding to Plato's famous "Third Man Argument" in the _Parmenides_.
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  21.  25
    Review of Free Will and Theism[REVIEW]David P. Hunt - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2017 (01.09).
  22.  74
    The Compatibility of Omniscience and Intentional Action: A Reply to Tomis Kapitan.David P. Hunt - 1996 - Religious Studies 32 (1):49 - 60.
    The paper that follows continues a discussion with Tomis Kapitan in the pages of this journal over the compatibility of divine agency with divine foreknowledge. I had earlier argued against two premises in Kapitan's case for omniscient impotence: (i) that intentionally A-ing presupposes prior acquisition of the intention to A, and (ii) that acquiring the intention to A presupposes prior ignorance whether one will A. In response to my criticisms, Kapitan has recently offered new defences for these two premises. I (...)
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  23.  21
    Providence, Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Loops: A Reply to Robinson.David P. Hunt - 2004 - Religious Studies 40 (4 (Dec 2004)):485-491.
  24. Prescience and Providence: A Reply to My Critics.David P. Hunt - 1993 - Faith and Philosophy 10 (3):428-438.
  25. God’s Extended Mind.David P. Hunt - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (1):1--16.
    The traditional doctrine of divine omniscience ascribes to God the fully exercised power to know all truths. but why is God’s excellence with respect to knowing not treated on a par with his excellence with respect to doing, where the latter requires only that God have the power to do all things? The prima facie problem with divine ”omni-knowledgeability’ -- roughly, being able to know whatever one wants to know whenever one wants to know it -- is that knowledge requires (...)
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  26.  58
    On a Theological Counterexample to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities.David P. Hunt - 2002 - Faith and Philosophy 19 (2):245-255.
  27. Black the libertarian.David P. Hunt - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (1):3-15.
    The most serious challenge to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) comes in the form of a dilemma: either the counterexample presupposes determinism, in which case it begs the question; or it does not presuppose determinism, in which case it fails to deliver on its promise to eliminate all alternatives that might plausibly be thought to satisfy PAP. I respond to this challenge with a counterexample in which considering an alternative course of action is a necessary condition (...)
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  28.  55
    Against Chronogeometrical Fatalism.David P. Hunt - 2006 - Chronos 8:14-25.
    Can free agency exist within a Minkowskian "block universe"? A negative answer to this question has been labeled 'chronogeometrical fatalism'. I look at five theses associated with Minkowskian space-time which have been thought to entail chronogeometrical fatalism, and argue that none of them delivers the goods.
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  29.  96
    Middle Knowledge and the Soteriological Problem of Evil.David P. Hunt - 1991 - Religious Studies 27 (1):3-26.
    According to the thesis of divine ‘middle knowledge’, first propounded by the Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina in the sixteenth century, subjunctive conditionals stating how free agents would freely respond under counter-factual conditions may be straightforwardly true, and thus serve as the objects of divine knowledge. This thesis has provoked considerable controversy, and the recent revival of interest in middle knowledge, initiated by Anthony Kenny, Robert Adams and Alvin Plantinga in the 1970s, has led to two ongoing debates. One is (...)
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  30.  45
    Heath White: Fate And Free Will: A Defense Of Theological Determinism. [REVIEW]David P. Hunt - 2021 - Faith and Philosophy 38 (3):379-385.
  31. Middle knowledge: The “foreknowledge defense”.David Paul Hunt - 1990 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 28 (1):1 - 24.
  32.  41
    Contemplation and Hypostatic Procession in Plotinus.David P. Hunt - 1981 - Apeiron 15 (2):71 - 79.
  33.  67
    Augustine on Theological Fatalism: The Argument of De Libero Arbitrio 3.1-4.David P. Hunt - 1996 - Medieval Philosophy & Theology 5 (1):1-30.
  34.  40
    The Oxford Handbook of Free Will[REVIEW]David P. Hunt - 2005 - Philosophia Christi 7 (1):213-219.
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  35.  86
    The ‘Problem of Fire’: Referring to Phenomena in Plato’s Timaeus.David P. Hunt - 1998 - Ancient Philosophy 18 (1):69-80.
  36.  99
    Evil and theistic minimalism.David P. Hunt - 2001 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 49 (3):133-154.
  37.  31
    Perfection at Risk?David P. Hunt - 1999 - Philosophia Christi 1 (2):91-96.
  38. Ontological Kinds.David Paul Hunt - 1983 - Dissertation, Vanderbilt University
    This study consists of a series of steps toward the development of a general theory of differences in ontological kind. The first part defines the notion of a "logical individual" and argues for its role as the basic ontological unit. I also take issue with those who hold that 'exist' is equivocal, as well as with those who claim that category-mistakes lack a truth-value. This part concludes with the "existence criterion", according to which a thing exists just in case it (...)
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  39.  60
    The Rationality of Belief and the Plurality of Faith (review). [REVIEW]David P. Hunt - 1998 - Faith and Philosophy 15 (3):387-394.
  40.  1
    Augustine on Theological Fatalism.David P. Hunt - 1996 - Medieval Philosophy & Theology 5 (1):1-30.