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David O. Brink [75]David Owen Brink [6]
  1. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.David Owen Brink - 1989 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    This book is a systematic and constructive treatment of a number of traditional issues at the foundation of ethics, the possibility and nature of moral knowledge, the relationship between the moral point of view and a scientific or naturalistic world view, the nature of moral value and obligation, and the role of morality in a person's rational life plan. In striking contrast to many traditional authors and to other recent writers in the field, David Brink offers an integrated defense of (...)
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  2.  20
    Fair Opportunity and Responsibility.David O. Brink - 2021 - Oxford University Press.
    Brink analyzes responsibility and its relations to desert, culpability, excuse, blame, and punishment. He argues that an agent is responsible for misconduct if and only if it is not excused, and that responsibility consists in agents having suitable cognitive and volitional capacities, and a fair opportunity to exercise these capacities.
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  3. Fairness and the Architecture of Responsibility.David O. Brink & Dana K. Nelkin - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 1:284-313.
    This essay explores a conception of responsibility at work in moral and criminal responsibility. Our conception draws on work in the compatibilist tradition that focuses on the choices of agents who are reasons-responsive and work in criminal jurisprudence that understands responsibility in terms of the choices of agents who have capacities for practical reason and whose situation affords them the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. Our conception brings together the dimensions of normative competence and situational control, and we factor normative (...)
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  4. Moral realism and the sceptical arguments from disagreement and queerness.David O. Brink - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):111 – 125.
  5. Externalist moral realism.David O. Brink - 1986 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):23-41.
    SOME THINK THAT MORAL REALISTS CANNOT RECOGNIZE THE PRACTICAL OR ACTION-GUIDING CHARACTER OF MORALITY AND SO REJECT MORAL REALISM. THIS FORM OF ANTI-REALISM DEPENDS UPON AN INTERNALIST MORAL PSYCHOLOGY. BUT AN EXTERNALIST MORAL PSYCHOLOGY IS MORE PLAUSIBLE AND ALLOWS THE REALIST A SENSIBLE EXPLANATION OF THE ACTION-GUIDING CHARACTER OF MORALITY. CONSIDERATION OF THE PRACTICAL CHARACTER OF MORALITY, THEREFORE, DOES NOT UNDERMINE AND, INDEED, SUPPORTS MORAL REALISM.
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  6. Moral motivation.David O. Brink - 1997 - Ethics 108 (1):4-32.
  7.  35
    Mill’s Progressive Principles.David O. Brink - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.
    David O. Brink offers a reconstruction and assessment of John Stuart Mill's contributions to the utilitarian and liberal traditions. Brink defends interpretations of key elements in Mill's moral and political thought, and shows how a perfectionist reading of his conception of happiness has a significant impact on other aspects of his philosophy.
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  8. Prospects for Temporal Neutrality.David O. Brink - 2011 - In Craig Callender (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time. Oxford University Press.
  9. Moral conflict and its structure.David O. Brink - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (2):215-247.
  10. Realism, Naturalism, and Moral Semantics.David O. Brink - 2001 - Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):154.
    The prospects for moral realism and ethical naturalism have been important parts of recent debates within metaethics. As a first approximation, moral realism is the claim that there are facts or truths about moral matters that are objective in the sense that they obtain independently of the moral beliefs or attitudes of appraisers. Ethical naturalism is the claim that moral properties of people, actions, and institutions are natural, rather than occult or supernatural, features of the world. Though these metaethical debates (...)
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  11. Normative Perfectionism and the Kantian Tradition.David O. Brink - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.
    Perfectionism is an underexplored tradition, perhaps because of doubts about the grounds, content, and implications of perfectionist ideals. Aristotle, J.S. Mill, and T.H. Green are normative perfectionists, grounding perfectionist ideals in a normative conception of human nature involving personality or agency. This essay explores the prospects of normative perfectionism by examining Kant’s criticisms of the perfectionist tradition. First, Kant claims that the perfectionist can generate only hypothetical, not categorical, imperatives. But insofar as the normative perfectionist appeals to the normative category (...)
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  12. Situationism, Responsibility, and Fair Opportunity.David O. Brink - 2013 - Social Philosophy and Policy (1-2):121-149.
    The situationist literature in psychology claims that conduct is not determined by character and reflects the operation of the agent’s situation or environment. For instance, due to situational factors, compassionate behavior is much less common than we might have expected from people we believe to be compassionate. This article focuses on whether situationism should revise our beliefs about moral responsibility. It assesses situationism’s implications against the backdrop of a conception of responsibility that is grounded in norms about the fair opportunity (...)
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  13.  28
    Utilitarian Morality and the Personal Point of View.David O. Brink - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (8):417.
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  14. Mill's deliberative utilitarianism.David O. Brink - 1992 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 21 (1):67-103.
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    Situationism, responsibility, and fair opportunity.David O. Brink - 2013 - Social Philosophy and Policy 30 (1-2):121-149.
    The situationist literature in psychology claims that conduct is not determined by character and reflects the operation of the agent's situation or environment. For instance, due to situational factors, compassionate behavior is much less common than we might have expected from people we believe to be compassionate. This article focuses on whether situationism should revise our beliefs about moral responsibility. It assesses the implications of situationism against the backdrop of a conception of responsibility that is grounded in norms about the (...)
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  16. Prolegomena to Ethics.Thomas Hill Green & David O. Brink - 2004 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 66 (2):389-389.
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  17. Rational egoism and the separateness of persons.David O. Brink - 1997 - In J. Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit. Blackwell. pp. 96--134.
  18. The significance of desire.David O. Brink - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:5-45.
  19. Utilitarian morality and the personal point of view.David O. Brink - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (8):417-438.
    Consideration of the objection from the personal point of view reveals the resources of utilitarianism. The utilitarian can offer a partial rebuttal by distinguishing between criteria of rightness and decision procedures and claiming that, because his theory is a criterion of rightness and not a decision procedure, he can justify agents' differential concern for their own welfare and the welfare of those close to them. The flexibility in utilitarianism's theory of value allows further rebuttal of this objection; objective versions of (...)
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  20.  53
    The Nature and Significance of Culpability.David O. Brink - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (2):347-373.
    Culpability is not a unitary concept within the criminal law, and it is important to distinguish different culpability concepts and the work they do. Narrow culpability is an ingredient in wrongdoing itself, describing the agent’s elemental mens rea. Broad culpability is the responsibility condition that makes wrongdoing blameworthy and without which wrongdoing is excused. Inclusive culpability is the combination of wrongdoing and responsibility or broad culpability that functions as the retributivist desert basis for punishment. Each of these kinds of culpability (...)
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  21. Self-Love and Altruism.David O. Brink - 1997 - Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1):122-157.
    Whether morality has rational authority is an open question insofar as we can seriously entertain conceptions of morality and practical reason according to which it need not be contrary to reason to fail to conform to moral requirements. Doubts about the authority of morality are especially likely to arise for those who hold a broadly prudential view of rationality. It is common to think of morality as including various other-regarding duties of cooperation, forbearance, and aid. Most of us also regard (...)
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  22. Prudence and Authenticity.David O. Brink - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (2):215-245.
    Prudence and authenticity are sometimes seen as rival virtues. Prudence,as traditionally conceived, is temporally neutral. It attaches no intrinsic significance to the temporal location of benefits or harms within the agent’s life; the prudent agent should be equally concerned about all parts of her life. But people’s values and ideals often change over time, sometimes in predictable ways, as when middle age and parenthood often temporize youthful radicalism or spontaneity with concerns for comfort,security, and predictability. In situations involving diachronic, intrapersonal (...)
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  23. Principles and Intuitions in Ethics: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives.David O. Brink - 2014 - Ethics 124 (4):665-694.
    This essay situates some recent empirical research on the origin, nature, role, and reliability of moral intuitions against the background of nineteenth-century debates between ethical naturalism and rational intuitionism. The legitimate heir to Millian naturalism is the contemporary method of reflective equilibrium and its defeasible reliance on moral intuitions. Recent doubts about moral intuitions—worries that they reflect the operation of imperfect cognitive heuristics, are resistant to undermining evidence, are subject to framing effects, and are variable—are best addressed by ethical naturalism (...)
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  24. Some Forms and Limits of Consequentialism.David O. Brink - 2006 - In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford handbook of ethical theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
    All forms of consequentialism make the moral assessment of alternatives depend in some way on the value of the alternatives, but they form a heterogeneous family of moral theories. Some employ subjective assumptions about value, while others employ objective assumptions. Some assess the value of alternatives directly, while others assess value indirectly. Some direct agents to maximize value, while others direct agents to satisfice. Some, such as utilitarianism, are impartial and concerned to promote agent-neutral value, while others, such as self-referential (...)
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  25. Millian principles, freedom of expression, and hate speech.David O. Brink - 2001 - Legal Theory 7 (2):119-157.
    Hate speech employs discriminatory epithets to insult and stigmatize others on the basis of their race, gender, sexual orientation, or other forms of group membership. The regulation of hate speech is deservedly controversial, in part because debates over hate speech seem to have teased apart libertarian and egalitarian strands within the liberal tradition. In the civil rights movements of the 1960s, libertarian concerns with freedom of movement and association and equal opportunity pointed in the same direction as egalitarian concerns with (...)
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  26. Common Sense and First Principles in Sidgwick's Methods.David O. Brink - 1994 - Social Philosophy and Policy 11 (1):179-201.
    What role, if any, should our moral intuitions play in moral epistemology? We make, or are prepared to make, moral judgments about a variety of actual and hypothetical situations. Some of these moral judgments are more informed, reflective, and stable than others (call these ourconsideredmoral judgments); some we make more confidently than others; and some, though not all, are judgments about which there is substantial consensus. What bearing do our moral judgments have on philosophical ethics and the search for first (...)
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  27. Moral Realism: Facts and Norms. [REVIEW]David O. BRINK - 1991 - Ethics 101 (3):610-624.
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  28. Rawlsian Constructivism In Moral Theory.David O. Brink - 1987 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):71-90.
    Since his article, ‘Outline for a Decision Procedure in Ethics,’ John Rawls has advocated a coherentist moral epistemology according to which moral and political theories are justified on the basis of their coherence with our other beliefs, both moral and nonmoral. A moral theory which is maximally coherent with our other beliefs is in a state which Rawls calls ‘reflective equilibrium’. In A Theory of Justice Rawls advanced two principles of justice and claimed that they are in reflective equilibrium. He (...)
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  29. A puzzle about the rational authority of morality.David O. Brink - 1992 - Philosophical Perspectives 6:1-26.
  30.  32
    The Rational Foundations of Ethics.David O. Brink - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (4):675.
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  31. Perfectionism and the Common Good: Themes in the Philosophy of T. H. Green.David O. Brink - 2003 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 66 (2):390-390.
  32. Eudaimonism, Love and Friendship, and Political Community*: DAVID O. BRINK.David O. Brink - 1999 - Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (1):252-289.
    It is common to regard love, friendship, and other associational ties to others as an important part of a happy or flourishing life. This would be easy enough to understand if we focused on friendships based on pleasure, or associations, such as business partnerships, predicated on mutual advantage. For then we could understand in a straightforward way how these interpersonal relationships would be valuable for someone involved in such relationships just insofar as they caused her pleasure or causally promoted her (...)
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  33. The Significance of Desire.David O. Brink - 2008 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Iii. Oxford University Press.
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  34. Legal theory, legal interpretation, and judicial review.David O. Brink - 1988 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 17 (2):105-148.
    I argue that disputes within constitutional theory about whether recent supreme court decisions exceed the scope of legitimate judicial review and disputes within legal theory about the nature and determinacy of law are best seen and assessed as disputes over the nature of legal interpretation. I criticize the interpretive assumptions on which these disputes generally depend and defend a theory of interpretation which tends to vindicate the determinacy of law even in hard cases and the style of recent court decisions (...)
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    Ethics, Persuasion and Truth.David O. Brink & J. J. C. Smart - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):290.
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  36. Impartiality and Associative Duties: David O. Brink.David O. Brink - 2001 - Utilitas 13 (2):152-172.
    Consequentialism is often criticized for failing to accommodate impersonal constraints and personal options. A common consequentialist response is to acknowledge the anticonsequentialist intuitions but to argue either that the consequentialist can, after all, accommodate the allegedly recalcitrant intuitions or that, where accommodation is impossible, the recalcitrant intuition can be dismissed for want of an adequate philosophical rationale. Whereas these consequentialist responses have some plausibility, associational duties represent a somewhat different challenge to consequentialism, inasmuch as they embody neither impersonal constraints nor (...)
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    The Status of Morality.David O. Brink & Thomas Carson - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (1):144.
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  38.  53
    Retributivism and Legal Moralism.David O. Brink - 2012 - Ratio Juris 25 (4):496-512.
    This article examines whether a retributivist conception of punishment implies legal moralism and asks what liberalism implies about retributivism and moralism. It makes a case for accepting the weak retributivist thesis that culpable wrongdoing creates a pro tanto case for blame and punishment and the weak moralist claim that moral wrongdoing creates a pro tanto case for legal regulation. This weak moralist claim is compatible with the liberal claim that the legal enforcement of morality is rarely all‐thing‐considered desirable. Though weak (...)
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    Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty.David O. Brink, Stephen Engstrom & Jennifer Whiting - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):576.
    This collection of essays contains revised versions of papers delivered at a conference entitled “Duty, Interest, and Practical Reason: Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics” that was organized by Stephen Engstrom and Jennifer Whiting at the University of Pittsburgh in 1994. One of the main aims of the conference was to bring together scholars on Aristotle, the Stoics, and Kant to reevaluate the common view that Greek and Kantian ethics represent fundamentally opposed conceptions of ethical theory and the roles of morality (...)
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  40.  59
    The Moral Asymmetry of Juvenile and Adult Offenders.David O. Brink - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (2):223-239.
    Many commentators agree that the trend to try juveniles as adults fails to recognize that there should be an asymmetry in our treatment of juvenile and adult crime such that all else being equal juvenile crime deserves less punishment than does adult crime. This essay explores different rationales for this asymmetry. A political rationale claims that the disenfranchisement of juveniles compromises the state’s democratic authority to punish juveniles in the same way it is permitted to punish adults. A developmental rationale (...)
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  41.  47
    Allan Gibbard, Thinking How to Live. [REVIEW]David O. Brink - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):267-272.
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  42.  60
    Perfectionism and the common good: themes in the philosophy of T.H. Green.David Owen Brink - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    David Brink presents a study of T. H. Green's Prolegomena to Ethics (1883), a classic of British idealism. Green develops a perfectionist ethical theory that brings together the best elements in the ancient and modern traditions and that provides the moral foundations for Green's own influential brand of liberalism. Brink's book situates the Prolegomena in its intellectual context, examines its main themes, and explains Green's enduring significance for the history of ethics and contemporary ethical theory.
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  43. Responsibility, Incompetence, and Psychopathy.David O. Brink - 2013 - In The Lindley Lecture. University of Kansas.
    This essay articulates a conception of responsibility and excuse in terms of the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing and explores its implications for insanity, incompetence, and psychopathy. The fair opportunity conception factors responsibility into conditions of normative competence and situational control and factors normative competence into cognitive and volitional capacities. This supports a conception of incompetence that recognizes substantial impairment of either cognitive or volitional capacities as excusing, provided the agent is not substantially responsible for her own incompetence. This conception (...)
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  44. „The Autonomy of Ethics “.David O. Brink - 2007 - In Michael Martin (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Atheism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 149--65.
  45. Sidgwick's dualism of practical reason.David O. Brink - 1988 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (3):291 – 307.
  46. Legal Interpretation, Objectivity and Morality.David O. Brink - 2001 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), Objectivity in Law and Morals. Cambridge University Press. pp. 12--65.
     
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  47.  15
    Perfect Freedom: T. H. Green's Kantian Conception.David O. Brink - 2024 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 62 (2):289-315.
    This essay explores different conceptions of freedom in Kant, Green, and their critics. Kant introduces three kinds of freedom—negative freedom, positive freedom or autonomy, and transcendental freedom. Sidgwick objects that Kant's conception of positive freedom is unable to explain how someone might be free and responsible for the wrong choices. Though Green rejects transcendental freedom, he thinks Kant's conception of practical freedom can be defended by identifying it with the capacity to be determined by practical reason. Green identifies his own (...)
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  48. Objectivity and dialectical methods in ethics.David O. Brink - 1999 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 42 (2):195 – 212.
    A cognitivist interpretation of moral inquiry treats it, like other kinds of inquiry, as aiming at true belief. A dialectical conception of moral inquiry represents the justification for a given moral belief as consisting in its intellectual fit with other beliefs, both moral and nonmoral. The essay appeals to semantic considerations to defend cognitivism as a default metaethical view; it defends a dialectical conception of moral inquiry by examining Sidgwick's ambivalence about the probative value of appeal to common moral beliefs (...)
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  49.  51
    Aristotelian Naturalism and the History of Ethics.David O. Brink - 2014 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (4):813-833.
    terence irwin’s monumental three-volume The Development of Ethics is a masterful reconstruction and assessment of figures, traditions, and ideas in the history of ethics in the Western tradition from Socrates through John Rawls.1, 2 The three volumes weigh in at over 11 pounds and span 96 substantial chapters and over 2,700 densely formatted pages (large pages, small margins, and small font). The Development of Ethics covers not only familiar figures, such as Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Aquinas, Hobbes, Locke, Hutcheson, Butler, (...)
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    Mill's progressive principles.David Owen Brink - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    David O. Brink offers a reconstruction and assessment of John Stuart Mill's contributions to the utilitarian and liberal traditions.
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