What role does birth play in the debate about elective abortion? Does the wrongness of infanticide imply the wrongness of late-term abortion? In this paper, I argue that the same or similar factors that make birth morally significant with regard to abortion make meaningful viability morally significant due to the relatively arbitrary time of birth. I do this by considering the positions of Mary Anne Warren and José Luis Bermúdez who argue that birth is significant enough that the wrongness of (...) infanticide does not imply the wrongness of late-term abortion. On the basis of the relatively arbitrary timing of birth, I argue that meaningful viability is the point at which elective abortion is prima facie morally wrong. (shrink)

Can one consistently deny the permissibility of abortion while endorsing the killing of human embryos for the sake of stem cell research? The question is not trivial; for even if one accepts that abortion is prima facie wrong in all cases, there are significant differences with many of the embryos used for stem cell research from those involved in abortion—most prominently, many have been abandoned in vitro, and appear to have no reasonably likely meaningful future. On these grounds one might (...) think to maintain a strong position against abortion but endorse killing human embryos for the sake of stem cell research and its promising benefits. I will argue, however, that these differences are not decisive. Thus, one who accepts a strong view against abortion is committed to the moral impermissibility of killing human embryos for the sake of stem cell research. I do not argue for the moral standing of either abortion or the killing of embryos for stem cell research; I only argue for the relation between the two. Thus the conclusion is relevant to those with a strong view in favor of the permissibility of killing embryos for the sake of research as much as for those who may strongly oppose abortion; neither can consider their position in isolation from the other. (shrink)

Seemingly ever improving medical technology and techniques portend the possibility of prenatally enhancing otherwise healthy, normal children—seamlessly enhancing or adding to a child’s natural abilities and characteristics. Though parents normally engage in enhancing children, i.e., child rearing, these technologies present radically new possibilities. This sort of enhancement, I argue, is morally problematic for the parent: the expectations of the enhancing parent necessarily conflict with attitudes of acceptance that moral parenting requires. Attitudes of acceptance necessitate that parents are open to the (...) essentially-individual choices of the child that will determine the kind of person he or she becomes. However, the intentional act of enhancing contradicts this openness by setting expectations on who the child becomes. Because of this, there is strong moral weight against parents’ prenatally enhancing their children. (shrink)

Some recent views of action have claimed that a correct conceptual account of action must include second-order motivational states. This follows from the fact that first-order motivational states such as desires account for action or mere behavior in which the agent's participation is lacking; thus, first-order motivational states cannot by themselves account for action in which the agent participates, so-called full-blooded action. I argue that representing the agent's participation by means of second-order states is bound to fail because it misrepresents (...) what an agent is doing when acting in the full-blooded sense. I begin by characterizing full-blooded action and explaining the failure of first-order accounts to explain it. I next show that while second-order accounts have some success in explaining full-blooded action, they fail to distinguish it from action which exhibits motivational alienation. I then argue that even if this problem were resolved, the second-order accounts more fundamentally misrepresent full-blooded action by depicting such action in an introverted manner. I conclude by considering a sketch of agency and full-blooded action that does not rely on second-order states and by addressing a primary concern thought to favor the second-order accounts, the concern of agent causation. (shrink)

One potentially morally justified use of torture is found in philanthropic torture of a perpetrator (PTP): scenarios in which a perpetrator has instigated significant pending suffering against innocents and in which the suffering can be prevented by means of the perpetrator’s cooperation. These situations involve a clash of two intuitions: that torture is in some strong and obvious sense absolutely morally wrong, and that torture or harm of an immoral perpetrator may be permissible to prevent equally abhorrent, if not greater, (...) moral wrongs. My view is that a dually grounded view—permissible on theoretical grounds but wrong on practical grounds—can do justice to the conflicting intuitions we have about torture in cases of PTP. Further, I hold that practical “absolutism” will only be “mostly” or “likely” absolute, but that we should accept as adequate this “near absolutism”—it will give us the practical result we seek while also satisfying the intuition that we may act in otherwise untoward ways to prevent horrific moral harms. (shrink)