Four essays, three on the philosopher Jacques Derrida, whose writings have so influenced our time (one on his breakfast, one on his cat, one on his relationship with a snake, and one (on the killing of doves) on the great early twentieth century poet Rilke - each of them examining key failures and challenges in the relationship of poetry, philosophy and 'the animal', and each entertaining, absorbing, and thought-provoking well beyond its given subject. A book that crosses with apparent ease (...) the boundaries of philosophy, literary criticism (there are passages on Coleridge, on D.H. Lawrence, on Henry Lawson) and human-animal relations, by a writer recently described as 'one of the most skilful, unusual and versatile of Australian writers' (Sydney Morning Herald, January 2016). (shrink)

The attack on the US Capitol on 6 January 2021 was a tragic illustration of the existential threat that the viral spread of disinformation poses in the age of social media and twenty-four-hour news. From climate change denialism to the frenzied conspiracy theories and racist mythologies that fuel antidemocratic white nationalist movements in the United States and abroad, What Would Cervantes Do? is a lucid meditation on the key role the humanities must play in dissecting and combatting all forms (...) of disinformation. David Castillo and William Egginton travel back to the early modern period, the first age of inflationary media, in search of historically tested strategies to overcome disinformation and shed light on our post-truth market. Through a series of critical conversations between cultural icons of the twenty-first century and those of the Spanish Golden Age, What Would Cervantes Do? provides a tour-de-force commentary on current politics and popular culture. Offering a diverse range of Cervantist comparative readings of contemporary cultural texts – movies, television shows, and infotainment – alongside ideas and issues from literary and cultural texts of early modern Spain, Castillo and Egginton present a new way of unpacking the logic of contemporary media. What Would Cervantes Do? is an urgent and timely self-help manual for literary scholars and humanists of all stripes, and a powerful toolkit for reality literacy. (shrink)

David Spurrett, David Papineau; A note on the completeness of ‘physics’, Analysis, Volume 59, Issue 1, 1 January 1999, Pages 25–29, https://doi.org/10.1093/anal.

Topics in Cognitive Science, Volume 13, Issue 1, Page 128-141, January 2021.

This outline for a paper, which develops a compatibilist analysis of abilities, was completed by David Lewis during his sabbatical in the Fall semester of 2000 and is dated 20 January 2001. Starting from the claim that it’s a “Moorean fact” that we are often able to do otherwise, Lewis provides a “simple proof of compatibilism.” He then presents his own account of abilities: S is able to A if and only if there are no obstacles to their (...) A-ing, where an obstacle is a “robust preventer”: something that would cause S not to A, and which “wouldn’t go away if things were just a little different.”. (shrink)

In January 2019 the Faculty of Philosophy of the Lomonosov Moscow State University held the round table “Problems of Consciousness: Research Opportunities.” It was dedicated to problems of interdisciplinary studies of consciousness. Many famous Russian specialists whose academic interests include consciousness, brain and mind took part in this event: K.V. Anokhin, D.I. Dubrovsky, T.V. Chernigovskaya, M.A. Piradov, A.A. Potapov, V.Y. Sergin, V.V. Vasil’ev, Z.A. Zorina and others. At the round table, the following problems were discussed: the specificity of consciousness (...) problem, its relevance in various academic disciplines, contemporary research possibilities for consciousness studies to solve the problems that specialists actually face. Much attention was paid to the problems of neurobiology, empirical research of consciousness. Nonetheless, participants showed in their speeches that the problem of consciousness is also a philosophical problem. Hence it requires thoughtful consideration of philosophers. Participants decided that to progress in solving this problem researches from various disciplines have to cooperate. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 104, Issue 1, Page 250-255, January 2022.

What are we to make of the "Parecon" phenomenon? Michael Albert 's book made it to number thirteen on Amazon.com a few days after some on-line promotion.1 Eight of the twelve Amazon.com reviewers had given the book five stars. It has been, or is being, translated into Arabic, Bengali, Telagu, Croatian, Czech, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Spanish, Swedish and Turkish.2 The book has been endorsed by Noam Chomsky, who says it "merits close attention, debate and action," by (...) Arundhati Roy, who calls it "a brave argument for a much needed alternative economic vision," by Ben Bagdikian, who finds it "a compelling book for our times," and by Howard Zinn, who sees it as "a thoughtful, profound meditation on what a good society can be like."3 Yet it is a terrible book. (shrink)

Locke thought it was a necessary truth that no two material bodies could be in the same place at the same time. Leibniz wasn't so sure. This paper sides with Leibniz. I examine the arguments of David Wiggins in defense of Locke on this point (Philosophical Review, January 1968). Wiggins’ arguments are ineffective.

*[[I wrote this paper in January of 1990, but did not publish it because I was never entirely happy with it. My ideas on consciousness were in a state of flux, ultimately evolving into those represented in my book _The Conscious Mind_ (Oxford University Press, 1996). I now think that some parts of this paper are unsatisfactory, especially the positive theory outlined at the end, although a successor to that theory is laid out in the book. Nevertheless, I think (...) the paper raises issues that need to be addressed. ]]. (shrink)

David Denz; Bioethics and the Literature of Pluralism, Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality, Volume 7, Issue 3, 1 January 2001, Pages.

The first of two commentaries on "Respecting Donors to Biobank Research," from the January-February 2013 issue. © 2013 by The Hasti.

In September 2012, Gilles-Eric Séralini and seven coauthors published an article in Food and Chemical Toxicology claiming that rats fed Roundup©-resistant genetically modified maize alone, genetically modified maize with Roundup©, or Roundup© for 2 years had a higher percentage of tumors and kidney and liver damage than normal controls. Shortly after this study was published, numerous scientists and several scientific organizations criticized the research as methodologically and ethically flawed. In January 2014, the journal retracted the article without the authors’ (...) consent on the grounds that the research was inconclusive. In June 2014, Environmental Sciences Europe published a slightly modified version of the retracted paper. The publication, retraction and subsequent republication of the Séralini study raise important scientific and ethical issues for journal editors. Decisions to retract an article should be made on the basis of well-established policies. Articles should be retracted only for serious errors that undermine the reliability of the data or results, or for serious ethical lapses, such as research misconduct or mistreatment of animal or human subjects. Inconclusiveness, by itself, is not a sufficient reason for retracting an article, though a flawed study design might be. Retracted articles that are submitted for republication should undergo scientific review to ensure that they meet appropriate standards. Republished articles should be linked to the original, retracted publication. Journals that are reviewing studies with significant scientific and social implications should take special care to ensure that peer review is rigorous and fair. (shrink)

As will be argued in what follows, the central question of the death penalty is the question of time. That question begins, in the present case, with the time of a writing that attempts to address what we call current events, particularly an academic writing—as distinct, for example, from journalistic writing—whose rhythms of composition and publication obey particular protocols and render problematic the specifics of what we call political intervention, the relevance or efficacy of which is normally determined by a (...) certain “punctuality.” Hence Zola’s “J’accuse,” a paradigm within the genre of public intellectual intervention, published in L’Aurore on 13 January 1898. I do not know how to resolve the tension .. (shrink)

BackgroundThe demand for peer reviewers is often perceived as disproportionate to the supply and availability of reviewers. Considering characteristics associated with peer review behaviour can allow for the development of solutions to manage the growing demand for peer reviewers. The objective of this research was to compare characteristics among two groups of reviewers registered in Publons.MethodsA descriptive cross-sectional study design was used to compare characteristics between individuals completing at least 100 peer reviews from January 2018 to December 2018 as (...) and a control group of peer reviewers completing between 1 and 18 peer reviews over the same time period. Data was provided by Publons, which offers a repository of peer reviewer activities in addition to tracking peer reviewer publications and research metrics. Mann Whitney tests and chi-square tests were conducted comparing characteristics of mega peer reviewers to the control group of reviewers.ResultsA total of 1596 peer reviewers had data provided by Publons. A total of 396 M peer reviewers and a random sample of 1200 control group reviewers were included. A greater proportion of mega peer reviews were male as compared to the control reviewers. Mega peer reviewers demonstrated a significantly greater average number of total publications, citations, receipt of Publons awards, and a higher average h index as compared to the control group of reviewers.ConclusionsMega peer reviewers registered in the Publons database also had a higher number of publications and citations as compared to a control group of reviewers. Additional research that considers motivations associated with peer review behaviour should be conducted to help inform peer reviewing activity. (shrink)

Volumes 1 and 2 of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, first published in January 1739, were soon after publication the subject of five notices and four reviews. Volume 3, published at the end of October 1740, received no notices and was reviewed only in the Bibliothèque raisonnée. This anonymous review of vol. 3 is of interest not only for David Norton is Professor of Philosophy Emeritus, McGill University, and Adjunct Professor of Philosophy, University of Victoria. His address is (...) 8-4305 Maltwood Lane, Victoria, BC, Canada V8X 5G9. what it says about Hume’s views as set out in the third book of the Treatise, but also because of questions that have arisen about the authorship of this and an earlier review of vol. 1 of the Treatise published in the same journal. In Part I of this paper we begin by reviewing the grounds for attributing to Pierre Des Maizeaux the notice of vols. 1 and 2 of the Treatise published by the Bibliothèque raisonnée in its April–June, 1739 issue. We then focus principally on the question of the authorship of the review of vol. 3 of the Treatise published by the Bibliothèque raisonnée in its April–June, 1741 issue, but we also consider in passing the grounds that have been offered for attributing to Francis Hutcheson the critical components of the Bibliothèque raisonnée review of vol. 1 of the Treatise. In Part II of the paper we present a transcription of the French text, never before reprinted, of this review. Part III is a new English translation of this text. In an effort to show the differences between the sense of the Treatise presented by translated quotations of it and Hume’s original texts, Part IV offers some three-column comparisons of three relatively lengthy French “quotations” of Treatise 3 found in the review, our back-translations of these texts, and the versions of these texts found in the Treatise. It then offers in a similar format, comparisons of the present and earlier translations of passages of the review of vol. 3. (shrink)

To introduce an archival protocol of a ‘Debate about methods in the social sciences, especially the conception of social science method represented by the Institute’, held on 17 January 1941 at the Institute of Social Research in New York, the article focuses on certain conflicts in substance and terms of discourse among members of the Institute, with special emphasis on Franz Neumann’s distinctive approaches, notwithstanding his professed loyalty to Max Horkheimer’s theory. These are seen to arise not only from (...) Neumann’s assignment as bargaining agent for the Institute and his distinctive relations with American colleagues, but also from their different orientations to the conflicted legacies of Weimar. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:HUME, THE CAUSAL PRINCIPLE, AN'D KEMP SMITH When we say of a proposition that it is possible, we sometimes mean no more than that it is logically possible, that is, consistent with itself. A proposition can be possible in stronger senses than this, but not in any weaker one. For a sense of "p is possible" that did not entail "p is self-consistent, "would have to be a sense (...) of "p is possible" which was consistent with "p is self-inconsistent" And it is obvious that there can be no such sense as that. One of the stronger senses in which a proposition can be possible is this: consistent (with itself and in addition) with every observation-statement. (I mean by an observationstatement, a proposition which, if it were true, could in principle be discovered by experience to be true.) If a proposition? is contingent, (that is, neither necessarily true??t necessarily false), then its negation (its contradictory) not-p is contingent too; and since contingent, not necessarily false; and since not necessarily false, consistent with itself. So, given any contingent propositions, its falsity is among those propositions which are possible in the first and weak sense mentioned above. If a proposition? is not only contingent but unverifiable,(that is, not deducible from any observation- statement), then not-p is consistent both with itself and with every observation -statement. So, given any unverifiable contingent proposition, its falsity is among those propositions which are possible in the second and stronger sense mentioned above. Some stock examples. "Whatever is a raven is black" is contingent, and its falsity therefore possible in the first sense; so too is its contradictory "There are such things as non-black ravens" contingent, and its falsity possible in the first sense. But the latter proposition is not unverifiable, since there are observation-statements from which it is deducible. ("There are such things as green ravens", for example; or "A green raven was in captivity at Taronga Park Zoo in January 31st 1975".) The former proposition, on the other hand, is not only contingent but unverifiable; since there are no observation -statements from which it is deducible. Hence, "whatever is a raven is black" is a proposition the falsity of which is possible both in the first and in the second sense noticed above. A third and still stronger sense in which a proposition can be possible is the following:? is possible if and only if (p is consistent with itself,every observation-statement is consistent with p, and in addition)? is neither more nor less probable in relation to the conjunction of e and n, where e is any observation-statement and? any necessary truth, than it is in relation to? alone. The last condition may be expressed, symbolically, as "P(p/n.e) » P(p/n) for all necessarily true? and all observation-statements e"; or in Carnap' s phrase as, "every observation- statement is initially irrelevant to p." Some examples will quickly make the idea of initial irrelevance, and its opposite, more familiar; and hence will make the third sense of "p is possible" more familiar. Let? be any necessary truth and e any observation-statement. Now let? be, for- example,some necessarily false proposition; then, since P(p/n) « o = P(p/n.e), e is initially irrelevant to p. Or let? be necessarily true; then, since P(p/n) ¦ 1 = P(p/n.e), e is again initially irrelevant to p. Again, let? be "Whatever is a raven is black": then some observation- statements e are initially relevant to p. For if e is "This raven is black," for example, P(p/n.e)>P(p/n) ; or at any rate, that is what we think if we are not inductive sceptic?. Again, if? is "The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son", it is at least very plausible to say that every observational e is initially irrelevant to p; since there appears to be no observational e such that P(p/n.e)>P(p/n), or P(p/n.e). (shrink)

Michael Landmann, one of the prominent philosophers and scholars of our time, died in Haifa, Israel on January 25, 1984 at the age of seventy. He has enriched contemporary philosophy through his numerous writings whose principal theme was man's place in the world, or 'philosophical anthropology,' summarized as the conception of man as an individual with knowledge of his place within a historical tradition; man is therefore an expression of subjective and objective spirit at the same time. I.

New Blackfriars, Volume 103, Issue 1103, Page 97-112, January 2022.

All contributions included in the present issue were originally prepared for an “Author Meets Critics” session organized by Carl Sachs for the Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in Savannah, Georgia, on 5th January, 2018.

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 1, Page 35-36, January 2012.

I much appreciated Elizabeth Schier's paper on Frank Jackson's knowledge argument, published in the January 2008 issue of Journal of Consciousness Studies (Schier, 2008) -- in part, I confess, because of resonances with my gestalt argument for free will (Hodgson, 2001; 2002; 2005; 2007a,b). I would like to offer two comments on this paper.

Le cours sur la dialectique (janvier-mai 1956) permet de comprendre l’épilogue des Aventures de la dialectique (janvier 1955) selon lequel « la dialectique se donne (…) la cohésion globale, primordiale, d’un champ d’expérience où chaque élément ouvre sur les autres » (p. 282). Loin de se contenter de l’exégèse des dialectiques historiques constituées (Hegel, Marx), le cours entend en effet retrouver le « plus pur de la dialectique » du côté de l’élaboration, y compris et surtout par des philosophies intuitives, (...) d’un « milieu commun » où«s’échangent les contradictoires ». Par un choc en retour, Merleau-Ponty y trouve également une inspiration pour une lecture renouvelée de Marx. The course on dialectic (January-May, 1956) helps to understand the epilogue of Adventures of the Dialectic (January, 1955), according to which “the dialectic […] provides the global and primordial cohesion of a field of experience wherein each element opens onto the others” (p.204). Far from contenting itself with the exegesis of historically constituted dialectics (Hegel, Marx), the course aims, in effect, to recover the “purest of the dialectic” via the elaboration – mostly through intuitive philosophies – of a “common milieu” where “the contradictories interchange.” Strikingly, Merleau-Ponty therein also finds inspiration for a renewed reading of Marx. Il corso sulla dialettica (gennaio-maggio 1956) ci permette di comprendere l’epilogo delle Avventure della dialettica (gennaio 1955) secondo cui “la dialettica si dà […] la coesione globale, primordiale, d’un campo d’esperienza in cui ogni elemento apre sugli altri” (p. 203). Lungi dall’accontentarsi dell’esegesi delle dialettiche storiche costituite (Hegel, Marx), il corso si propone piuttosto di ritrovare la dialettica nella sua purezza e di farne occasione di elaborazione, anche e soprattutto per le filosofie intuitive, di un “luogo comune” dove i contradditori si scambino. Di contraccolpo, Merleau-Ponty vi trova ugualmente ispirazione per una nuova lettura di Marx. (shrink)

Edited proceedings of an interdisciplinary symposium on consciousness held at the University of Cambridge in January 1978. Includes a foreword by Freeman Dyson. Chapter authors: G. Vesey, R.L. Gregory, H.C. Longuet-Higgins, N.K. Humphrey, H.B. Barlow, D.M. MacKay, B.D. Josephson, M. Roth, V.S. Ramachandran, S. Padfield, and (editorial summary only) E. Noakes. A scanned pdf is available from this web site (philpapers.org), while alternative versions more suitable for copying text are available from https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/245189. -/- Page numbering convention for the pdf (...) version viewed in a pdf viewer is as follows: 'go to page n' accesses the pair of scanned pages 2n and 2n+1. Applicable licence: CC Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.0. (shrink)

The Heythrop Journal, Volume 63, Issue 1, Page 128-139, January 2022.

_Derrida_ (2002) Directed by Amy Ziering Kofman and Kirby Dick UK Premiere: 31 January 2003.

The world of science was stunned, and the hopes of many people dashed, when Professor Hwang Woo Suk of Seoul National University was recently found guilty of massive scientific fraud. Until January 2006 he was considered one of the world’s leading experts in cloning and stem cell research. Yet he was found by his own university to have fabricated all of the cell lines he claimed, in articles published in Science in 2004 and 2005, to have derived from cloned (...) human embryos. By the time he was exposed, Hwang had been given the title of leading scientist in Korea by his government. A postage stamp had been issued in his honour, showing a paralysed man leaping out of a wheelchair to embrace his lady love. Schoolchildren read specially produced stories of the indefatigable scientist who supposedly worked 365 days a year for the sake of saving humanity from disease and disability. When I spoke on the ethical wrongness of human embryonic stem cell research at a major conference in San Francisco in 2005, I overheard scientists — professors of high repute and excited graduate students alike — speaking in awed tones of the incredible technical skill that Hwang and his team were thought to have displayed. He told N din re Medicine that his dexterity was a cultural inheritance: "This work can be done much better in Oriental hands. We can pick up very slippery corn or rice with steel chopsticks.'. (shrink)

Publication date: 26 January 2017 Source: Author: Hanna David Many gifted children are “double labeled”, namely in addition of being gifted they are also learning disabled and/or suffer from emotional, social or behavioral problems. This article will present the difficulties gifted children with a double label have to deal with, especially the difficulties in the educational system. Because of the double label the educational team faces a double challenge, in most cases without being equipped with the required knowledge (...) or the support they need. This article will describe three case studies; techniques for intervention with such children and their families will be suggested. (shrink)

Hastings Center Report, Volume 52, Issue 1, Page 3-3, January/February 2022.

Journal of Mass Media Ethics, Volume 27, Issue 1, Page 66-68, January-March.

This collection documents the work of the Hyperuniverse Project which is a new approach to set-theoretic truth based on justifiable principles and which leads to the resolution of many questions independent from ZFC. The contributions give an overview of the program, illustrate its mathematical content and implications, and also discuss its philosophical assumptions. It will thus be of wide appeal among mathematicians and philosophers with an interest in the foundations of set theory. The Hyperuniverse Project was supported by the John (...) Templeton Foundation from January 2013 until September 2015. (shrink)

Philosophical Investigations, Volume 45, Issue 1, Page 98-104, January 2022.

A commentary on “SUPPORT and the Ethics of Study Implementation: Lessons for Comparative Effectiveness Research from the Trial of Oxygen Therapy for Premature Babies,” by John D. Lantos and Chris Feudtner, in the January‐February 2015 issue.

In a review published in Vol. XVIII, No. I of Philosophical Books (January, 1977), Jenny Teichman remarks that, as most philosophy books are non-original, it is probably a good idea, now and again, to remind readers of the fact. Of dissertations I suspect that her statement is true with interest. Even so, it is still only the foolhardy or the naive and puf.e of heart who will ask, "Then why write them?" I mention Teichman's observation here so as to (...) be able to place this present dissertation with its fellows. But while only rarely will a book be original, and perhaps even less often a dissertation, this state of affairs need not preclude novelty on a more modest scale. At any rate, whatever may be the claims or disclaims to innovation by an author, it is the reader who, in the final analysis, will judge a work a legitimate pretender to innovation (large or small) and also judge the value of the new step. I have given this study its present title because it seems to me that the question of the extent to which the analytical work of G.E. Moore is consistent. with the disposition to realism inherent in his famous defense~~ ~ common sense is an important one in Moore's philosophy an~ perhaps, a question that has received less critical attention than it might have. In addressing that question here I have tried to show that, while Moore's insistence upon the literal truth of certain "views of common sense" does indeed commit him to a realist framework in metaphysical matters, this framework is flexible and allows for considerable, sometimes possibly surprising, freedom in deciding matters of detail. For instance, Moore's tendency, late in his career, to favor a phenomenalist analysis of material-object propositions forcefully compels us to ask the question of just how much a defense of common sense in philosophy commits the defender to. A similar question arises in regard to Moore's treatment of philosophical puzzles associated with the topic of 'abstract entities.' I will argue that, while Moore's work on metaphysical issues can, when collected, be termed 'realist' his concern was never with the correctness of realism as a system of thought, but rather with the soundness of individual arguments. In this kind of attention to the "small print" of philosophical arguments and in his recognition of the many questions of detail which have to be settled before a general position, whether realism or idealism or a third view, can be said to be either set forth or upheld, lies much of Moore's greatness as a philosopher.And, if there is an element of truth in the suggestion that Moore tended betimes not to see woods for trees, at least he never tended not to see trees for woods. And surely the latter is much the greater philosophical failing. (shrink)

Topics in Cognitive Science, Volume 14, Issue 1, Page 54-77, January 2022.

This volume contains the proceedings of three special sessions: Algebra and Computer Science, held during the Joint AMS-EMS-SPM meeting in Porto, Portugal, June 10–13, 2015; Groups, Algorithms, and Cryptography, held during the Joint Mathematics Meeting in San Antonio, TX, January 10–13, 2015; and Applications of Algebra to Cryptography, held during the Joint AMS-Israel Mathematical Union meeting in Tel-Aviv, Israel, June 16–19, 2014. Papers contained in this volume address a wide range of topics, from theoretical aspects of algebra, namely group (...) theory, universal algebra and related areas, to applications in several different areas of computer science. From the computational side, the book aims to reflect the rapidly emerging area of algorithmic problems in algebra, their computational complexity and applications, including information security, constraint satisfaction problems, and decision theory. The book gives special attention to recent advances in quantum computing that highlight the need for a variety of new intractability assumptions and have resulted in a new area called group-based cryptography. (shrink)

Background: Several countries have recently changed their model of consent for organ donation from opt-in to opt-out. We undertook a systematic review to determine public knowledge and attitudes towards these models in Europe. Methods: Six databases were explored between 1 January 2008 and 15 December 2017. We selected empirical studies addressing either knowledge or attitudes towards the systems of consent for deceased organ donation by lay people in Europe, including students. Study selection, data extraction, and quality assessment were conducted (...) by two or more reviewers independently. Findings: Awareness of the consent model was lower in opt-out countries than in opt-in countries. A majority of the public agrees with opt-in, regardless of the law in their own country. There are ambivalent attitudes regarding the opt-out system. The public tend to prefer opt-in and mandatory choice over opt-out when several options are offered. Interpretation: The assumption that people in opt-out countries are aware of the legal requirements to be excluded from the pool of potential donors is not supported by the results of this review. This is a concern, since ignorance hinders people's autonomy regarding organ donation decision-making. Higher awareness of consent model in opt-in countries may reflect greater efforts to inform the public through campaigns to motivate donation. Legal moves towards opt-out are at odds with people's expressed preferences. Main limitations of this review are the lack of data from some countries, study population heterogeneity, and methodological shortcomings. (shrink)