When libertarian political philosophy attracted wide public notice in the 1970s, a common view was that the distinctive individual rights advocated in libertarian theory required grounding in a theory of ethics. Recently, this view has come under challenge. It has been argued that resort to such grounding in ethical theory is unneeded. An appeal to common sense intuitions suffices to justify libertarianism. First, a brief account of libertarianism will be presented. Then, some examples of the older, pro-grounding position will be (...) discussed. Then, the principal defense of the newer view, Michael Huemer’s The Problem of Political Authority, will be examined. This discussion constitutes the substance of the present paper. The principal contention of the present article will be that the argument to libertarianism from intuitions does not succeed. In conclusion, it will be suggested that a return to the earlier, grounding view is indicated for philosophers who wish to defend libertarianism. (shrink)

The last two decades have seen Marxism's academic renascence. In fields as diverse as law, literary criticism, history, and philosophy, Marxism once again captivates no small number of scholars. In part, this reassessment is driven by the efforts of a group of philosophers and economists to reconstruct Marx from the ground up on a more rigorous basis. The work of these "Analytical Marxists" -- who include G.A. Cohen, Jon Elster, and John Roemer -- is given a sustained examination and critique (...) in David Gordon's Resurrecting Marx. The charge of the Analytical Marxists that capitalism is inherently exploitative and unjust is the primary subject of Gordon's book. Gordon takes issue with that contention; he argues that the Analytical Marxists' withering criticism of classical Marxism is essentially correct, but that they fail to replace it with a superior theoretical edifice. Gordon also analyzes the Analytical Marxists' reformulation of the Marxian notion of exploitation, the implications of their rejection of the labor theory of value, their differences over what rights people have, and their arguments for the compatibility of markets with socialism. (shrink)

David Gordon; The Concept of the Hidden Curriculum, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 16, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 187–198, https://doi.org/10.1111/.

David Gordon; The Concept of the Hidden Curriculum, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 16, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 187–198, https://doi.org/10.1111/.

Robert M. Adams has written a fairly short book, but into it he has packed a lifetime of rigorous analytic thought, and, what is rarer, deep insight into the nature of things. The book expands and recasts Gifford Lectures that Adams delivered in 1999, as well as other lectures and papers, and though it addresses difficult issues, Adams's clear style, retaining the informality of lectures, considerably eases the task of the reader; and the book is not without an occasional touch (...) of humour, e.g. ‘As metaphysicians we may wish to assign a certain oomph to one side or the other in such lawgoverned relations; but it is not clear that the concept of oomph is at home in fundamental physics’ (p. 12).I cannot cover all the many and various topics in the book, but I shall endeavour in what follows to present a central thread of argument in it, the distinction between what is and what is in itself (the centrality of which is indicated by its presence in the book's title) and to show how this distinction leads to the theistic and idealist metaphysics to which the author is inclined. (shrink)

Raw (pragmatic) and potential (theoretical) power is seen as the key to press freedom in various global settings. Because the locus of power determines the locus of freedom, the authors suggest a model to understand where the raw and potential power resides within a matrix consisting of the State, the Media Elite, the Journalists, or the People. Numerous questions concerning accountability and ethics are raised concerning the practical application of a model that purports to overcome cultural biases inherent in traditional (...) theories of press and society. (shrink)

Anja Jauernig here addresses with great scholarship and philosophical insight a central issue in the interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason: ‘The project of this book is to develop a comprehensive account of Kant's theoretical views in his theoretical critical philosophy or, perhaps more accurately, of the ontological implications of his theoretical critical philosophy. More specifically, my aim will be to sort out Kant's views on the nature of appearances, the nature of things in themselves, and the relation between (...) them as presented and hinted in the Critique of Pure Reason…and associated writings’ (p. 1).This project, she thinks, is of more than historical interest, as Kant's ontological position, ‘critical idealism’, has great philosophical merit and may very well be in its main lines true (a thesis she does not claim to demonstrate in this book, though a sequel to it is planned). In taking this stance, she sharply dissents from the view, most closely associated in Anglo-American analytic philosophy with Peter Strawson, that Kant's transcendental idealism must either be rendered innocuous or disregarded altogether. ‘…Strawson's two-world reading of transcendental idealism, and his claim that Kant's more valuable philosophical insights can, fortunately, be “disentangled” from the doctrine of transcendental idealism, inspired legions of Kant scholars to either follow him in setting transcendental idealism to one side—or engage in the business of saving Kant from his bad reputation by devising readings that do not present him as a two-world theorist after all…’ (p. 24). (shrink)

Is a Marxist society liable to be an oppressive one? To ask this question is immediately to pose two others: what is meant by Marxism; and what counts as an oppressive society? To take these questions in reverse order, by an oppressive society I shall mean one in which, other things being equal, people do not possess basic civil liberties. Examples of basic civil liberties include, but are not limited to, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and, (...) if the society has a political system, the freedom to participate in that system. An example of what I mean by basic civil liberties is the system of basic liberties discussed by Rawls; the United States Bill of Rights is another example. (shrink)

The Realist Turn: Repositioning Liberalism. By Rasmussen Douglas B., Den Uyl Douglas J..

David Basinger, in ‘Middle Knowledge and Classical Christian Thought’, has claimed that whether the concept of God's middle knowledgeis coherent ‘cannot be dismissed lightly or ignored by those interested in classical Christian thought. For what is at stake is the very coherence of Christian theism itself’.

Philosophy in the 19th century experienced a ‘turn from idealism,’ when idealist philosophies were largely abandoned for materialist ones. Scientific naturalism is now considered by many analytic philosophers to be the new orthodoxy, largely in part due to the success of the scientific method. The New Atheists, such as Daniel Dennett and Richard Dawkins, claim it is Darwin in particular who deserves much of the credit for repudiating the traditional Mind-first world view. Some, like Alvin Plantinga and Michael Behe, maintain (...) the opposite, that evolution casts doubt on naturalism and supports theism. This dissertation seeks to determine just what exactly the logical implications of evolutionary theory are. Is evolution incompatible with theism? Does the acceptance of evolution necessarily entail naturalism and preclude theism? Is it possible, as naturalism maintains, that everything can be reduced to physical processes, or are there too many recalcitrant phenomena that defy reduction? Answering these involves a detailed analysis of the concepts, ‘evolution,’ ‘naturalism,’ and ‘theism.’ Just what exactly does accepting evolutionary theory entail? How is it different from Darwinism? Is evolution guided or unguided? What is naturalism? There are many different types of metaphysical naturalists: eliminative materialists, physicalists, and emergent property dualists. What is the relationship between metaphysical naturalism and methodological naturalism? Theism affirms a creator God who sustains all being, who is transcendent and yet immanent. So if theism posits a God who is active in the world, does this mean that scientific investigation may at times have to admit supernatural explanations when natural ones fail? My general conclusion is a type of mitigated skepticism – that given evolution, neither naturalism nor theism logically follows. As to whether evolution is guided or unguided, the only correct position is ‘undetermined.’ In this instance metaphysical positions may fill in the gaps in knowledge by projection, but cannot fulfill the necessary and sufficient conditions required for knowledge. Metaphysical naturalism and theism are worldviews that an individual adopts as the most overall coherent explanation of the wide variety of experiences, intuitions, and reflections on their life. Whether evolution offers evidence for one and against the other is often based upon one’s prior metaphysical assumptions, since all facts are theory laden. The underdetermination of theory allows for multiple theories to cover the same phenomena, with each offering an epistemically adequate explanation. However, numerous recalcitrant anomalies which defy scientific explanation and reduction present problems for the strict naturalist. While neither naturalism nor theism can be determined to be objectively true, one can offer reasons for choosing one or the other on the basis of overall coherence. (shrink)

David Gordon; Theory and the Teacher's Perspective, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 14, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 31–37, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.

In The Perfectionist Turn, Den Uyl and Rasmussen argue for an ethics of responsibility and oppose the prevailing ethics of respect. Political philosophy must be “tethered” ontologically, and arguments such as Moore’s open question argument that would, if correct, show that tethering is not possible do not succeed.

In their book, Equal Is Unfair, Watkins and Brook argue that equality of income and wealth is not needed in order to engage in the creative work required for human flourishing. One can live a successful life even though others have more resources and opportunities. It is contended here that this argument is convincing, but contrary to Watkins and Brook, it does not suffice to rule out all justifications for redistribution.