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David DeMoss [6]David J. Demoss [3]David Jay Demoss [1]
  1.  80
    Essence, Existence, and Nominal Definition in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics II 8-10.Daniel Devereux & David Demoss - 1988 - Phronesis 33 (1):133-154.
  2.  2
    Aristotle, Connectionism, and the Morally Excellent Brain.David DeMoss - 1998 - The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 19:13-20.
    Can a mass of networked neurons produce moral human agents? I shall argue that it can; a brain can be morally excellent. A connectionist account of how the brain works can explain how a person might be morally excellent in Aristotle's sense of the term. According to connectionism, the brain is a maze of interconnections trained to recognize and respond to patterns of stimulation. According to Aristotle, a morally excellent human is a practically wise person trained in good habits. What (...)
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  3.  38
    Acquiring ethical ends.David J. Demoss - 1990 - Ancient Philosophy 10 (1):63-79.
  4.  29
    South Park and Philosophy: Bigger, Longer, and More Penetrating. [REVIEW]David DeMoss - 2009 - Teaching Philosophy 32 (2):207-209.
  5.  40
    Connectionist Agency.David Demoss - 2003 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 10 (2):9-15.
    Any mind-brain theory eventually will have to deal with agency. I do not claim that no other theory could do this successfully. I do claim that connectionism is able to handle some key features of agency. First, I will offer a brief account of connectionism and the advantages of using it to account for human agency, comparing and contrasting connectionism with two other mind-brain accounts in cognitive science, symbolicism and dynamicism. Then, since a connectionist account of agency depends on a (...)
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  6.  22
    The connectionist self in action.David DeMoss - 2007 - Mind and Society 6 (1):19-33.
    ObjectiveTo demonstrate that the human brain, as a connectionist system, has the capacity to become a free, rational, moral, agent—that is, the capacity to become a self—and that the brain becomes a self by engaging second-order reflection in the hermeneutical task of constructing narratives that rationalise action. StructureSection 2 explains the connectionist brain and its relevant capacities: to categorise, to develop goal-directed dispositions, to problem-solve what it should do, and to second-order reflect. Section 3 argues that the connectionist brain constitutes (...)
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  7.  41
    Hunting fat gnu: How to identify a proxytype.David DeMoss - 2004 - Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-10.
  8.  6
    A New Aristotle Reader.David J. Demoss - 1988 - Philosophical Books 29 (3):130-130.
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  9.  6
    Acquiring Ethical Ends.David J. Demoss - 1990 - Ancient Philosophy 10 (1):63-79.
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