Solving the problem of moral luck—the problem of dealing with conflicting intuitions about whether moral blameworthiness varies with luck in cases of negligence—is like repairing a dented fender in front of two kinds of critic. The one keeps telling you that there is no dent, and the other sees the dent but keeps warning you that repairing it will do more harm than good. It is time to straighten things out. As I argue elsewhere, the solution to the problem of (...) moral luck is finally revealed. Our task now is twofold: to hold a magnifying glass up to the initial problem, so that all might finally see it; and to dismiss unfounded fears about solving that problem, so that all might finally stop grinning and bearing it. (shrink)

J. Baird Callicott defends a communitarian environmental ethic that grounds moral standing in shared kinship and community. This normative theory is unacceptable because it is out of synch with our considered moral judgments as environmental philosophers. Ecological communitarianism excludes in advance entities that would obviously qualify for moral standing, and scuttles itself in the process.

People who suffer survivor’s guilt reason that, if they survived while others didn’t, then this must be because of the choices that they made, and that others did not make. People with survivor’s guilt feel just the way they would feel if they did not really believe in luck.

People who suffer survivor’s guilt reason that, if they survived while others didn’t, then this must be because of the choices that they made, and that others did not make. People with survivor’s guilt feel just the way they would feel if they did not really believe in luck.