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  1.  20
    There Is No Door.Darren Domsky - 2004 - Journal of Philosophy 101 (9):445-464.
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  2.  12
    There Is No Door.Darren Domsky - 2004 - Journal of Philosophy 101 (9):445-464.
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  3.  9
    Tossing the rotten thing out: Eliminating bad reasons not to solve the problem of moral luck.Darren Domsky - 2005 - Philosophy 80 (4):531-541.
    Solving the problem of moral luck—the problem of dealing with conflicting intuitions about whether moral blameworthiness varies with luck in cases of negligence—is like repairing a dented fender in front of two kinds of critic. The one keeps telling you that there is no dent, and the other sees the dent but keeps warning you that repairing it will do more harm than good. It is time to straighten things out. As I argue elsewhere, the solution to the problem of (...)
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  4.  16
    Evaluating Callicott's Attack on Stone's Moral Pluralism.Darren Domsky - 2001 - Environmental Values 10 (3):395-415.
    J. Baird Callicott is well known in environmental philosophy for his attack on Christopher D. Stone's moral pluralism. Although his attack has drawn attention from critics and has been labelled problematic for various reasons, I argue that it fails entirely. Each of Callicott's three distinct criticisms proves to be not only weak on its own terms, but, perhaps surprisingly, as effective against Callicott's own communitarian position as it is against Stone's pluralist one. I show that Callicott's attack is not only (...)
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  5.  6
    Keeping a Place for Metaethics: Assessing Elliot's Dismissal of the Subjectivism/Objectivism Debate in Environmental Ethics.Darren Domsky - 2004 - Metaphilosophy 35 (5):675-694.
    Robert Elliot claims that the metaethical distinction between subjectivism and objectivism is unimportant in environmental ethics. He argues that because a sufficiently sophisticated subjectivist can accommodate all the intrinsic value an objectivist can, even in apparently problematic situations where humans either do not exist or do not have the relevant values, and because metaethical commitments fail to have any normative or motivational impact on rational debate, it makes no difference whether an environmental ethicist is a subjectivist or an objectivist. Elliot's (...)
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  6. Mcginn's Theory Of Consciousness, and Searle's Indignant Response.Darren Domsky - 2001 - Gnosis 5 (1):1-17.
     
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  7.  14
    No such luck.Darren Domsky - 2011 - The Philosophers' Magazine 55 (55):82-86.
    People who suffer survivor’s guilt reason that, if they survived while others didn’t, then this must be because of the choices that they made, and that others did not make. People with survivor’s guilt feel just the way they would feel if they did not really believe in luck.
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  8.  7
    No such luck.Darren Domsky - 2011 - The Philosophers' Magazine 55:82-86.
    People who suffer survivor’s guilt reason that, if they survived while others didn’t, then this must be because of the choices that they made, and that others did not make. People with survivor’s guilt feel just the way they would feel if they did not really believe in luck.
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  9.  3
    The Inadequacy of Callicott’s Ecological Communitarianism.Darren Domsky - 2006 - Environmental Ethics 28 (4):395-412.
    J. Baird Callicott defends a communitarian environmental ethic that grounds moral standing in shared kinship and community. This normative theory is unacceptable because it is out of synch with our considered moral judgments as environmental philosophers. Ecological communitarianism excludes in advance entities that would obviously qualify for moral standing, and scuttles itself in the process.
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  10.  8
    Why Callicott’s Ecological Communitarianism Is Not Holistic.Darren Domsky - 2008 - Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (3):389-396.