In this article, I will pursue three aims. First, I would like to demonstrate the non-transcendental character of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, namely, his claim that a strict division between a priori and a posteriori is an abstraction that derives from a more primordial unity that is given in our lived experience. I will criticize authors such as H. Dreyfus and T. Carman who treat the body and bodily character of our existence as a classical Kantian a priori that functions as a (...) condition of experience without itself being a part of the experience. The claim I would like to defend in this regard is that reflections on the conditions of our experience must themselves be a part of our experience. The second task is to show how Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of temporality helps him to avoid this strict division between a priori and a posteriori. Based on this, I will elucidate some of the most obscure passages of Phenomenology of Perception. Finally, I will claim that the notion of optimal grip can neither be explained by the reference to our body, as Carman claims, or to brains, organisms and their copings with the environment, as Dreyfus argues. Instead, I will claim that the maximal grip is rather a consolidation or intensification of the temporal ecstasy. (shrink)

In this article, I will argue that while Marion’s criticism of Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology is in many ways sound, Marion remains bound to the conceptual opposition that existential phenomenology has successfully overcome. Namely, I will argue that Marion remains dependent upon the transcendental dilemma according to which we must rely on the strict differentiation between explanans and explanandum. Marion sees no way of departing from Heidegger’s project other than reversing the order of explanation and switching the places of (...) the explanans and explanandum, which means that phenomena start appearing as explanans. I will demonstrate how existential phenomenology has overcome this conceptual dilemma, and then I will argue that we could make a much better account of saturated phenomena, if we ground our insights in the idea of being-in-the-world. (shrink)

In this paper, I will investigate the possible impact of weak artificial intelligence (more specifically, I will concentrate on deep learning) on human capability of action. For this goal, I will first address Arendt’s philosophy of action, which seeks to emphasize the distinguishing elements of action that set it apart from other forms of human activity. According to Arendt, action should be conceived as _praxis_, an activity that has its goal in its own very performance. The authentic meaning of action (...) includes the “passion” for articulation of one’s own individuality; I can only manifest myself as a distinct personality insofar as I introduce myself as a novel beginning to the web of human interactions demonstrating both my relevance and distinction from others. From this Arendtian standpoint, I will analyse the impact of deep learning in modern AI from two possible angles. First, I will argue that _the direct interaction_ between AI and action is impossible. Since AI operates on the principle of efficiency, it can neither suggest certain goals for action for us nor overtake their implementation because action is not guided by the instrumental need to be efficient but by the existential desire to be someone. Second, I will also analyse the possibility of _the indirect impact_ of AI on action. More specifically, I analyse neural network’s ability to circulate actions among individuals based on mathematical calculation. As I will argue, the efficiency of this circulation that surpasses human cognitive capacities can potentially organize a broader network of interaction among individuals and serve as a catalyst for the ability to act. (shrink)

In this paper, I will argue that J. Patočka’s conception of three movements of human existence can be considered a contribution to the “pragmatic turn” in phenomenology. In order to demonstrate this contribution, I will first recapitulate the context of pragmatic turn, outlining both Heidegger’s original position and its consequent pragmatic interpretation offered by H. Dreyfus and other scholars. The core of the pragmatic interpretation is based on a modification of the Primacy of Praxis thesis that can be described as (...) the Primacy of Practic_es_ thesis, according to which our background practices, i.e., the ‘contingent ways of acting and judging,’ operate as a “source” of intelligibility. Based on Patočka’s criticisms, I will further argue that Heidegger-inspired pragmatism is hampered by the opposition between authentic and inauthentic disclosure, leading to both the rigidification of everyday practices and rendering authentic disclosure formal and empty. In the final section, I will demonstrate that Patočka’s own conception of the three movements of existence can be seen as committed to the Primacy of Practices thesis and that this version of the Primacy of Practice thesis is more acceptable because it does not share the disdainful attitude in regards of the public world. (shrink)