A growing literature has focused on understanding how to detect and deter unethical consumer behavior. In this work, we focus on a particularly important type of unethical consumer behavior, consumer insurance fraud, and we analyze a unique dataset to understand how experts investigate suspicious claims. Two separate but related literatures inform the process of investigating suspicious insurance claims. The first literature is grounded in field research and emphasizes the importance of secondary sources. The second literature is grounded in laboratory studies (...) that emphasize the importance of interpersonal interactions. Here we draw upon both literatures to consider the importance of claimant interviews within the context of many investigative actions and the potential for claimants to avoid interviews. In an empirical study using qualitative and quantitative data from auto insurance claim investigations, we analyze investigative chronologies conducted by skilled experts. In doing so, we find that even when investigators can access information from a variety of sources such as witnesses, databases, and physical evidence, claimant interviews are the most important step in determining whether or not claims are denied or paid. Furthermore, we identify interpersonal avoidance as an important signal of unethical claimant behavior. Our findings inform deception detection theory and practice. We identify implications for deception detection in business, particularly for consumer unethical behavior and insurance fraud investigations. (shrink)

The effectiveness of professional sanctions against violations rests upon the severity of sanctions and detection of violations. Here we examine perceptions of professional violation detection in auditing where the professional standards may conflict with the interests of the auditor’s firm. Using a sample of future and experienced auditors, we test the relationship between professional violations and auditors’ perceptions of the likelihood that severely-sanctioned violations will be discovered by the audit profession, and by the auditor’s firm. In our study, an auditor’s (...) belief that professional bodies are likely to detect professionalviolations relates positively to auditor professionalism. However, we find beliefs that the audit firm will detect severely-sanctioned professional violations negatively affect auditor professionalism. In our study, the lowest level of professionalism occurs when auditors believe that their own audit firm, but not the audit profession, will detect a professional violation. We also find that auditors’ internalization of professional standards relates positively to auditor professionalism. Implications for future research and practice are discussed. (shrink)