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Daniel C. Dennett [340]Daniel Clement Dennett [12]
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  1. Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Penguin Books.
    Little, Brown, 1992 Review by Glenn Branch on Jul 5th 1999 Volume: 3, Number: 27.
  2. The Intentional Stance.Daniel Clement Dennett - 1981 - MIT Press.
    Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, Daniel Dennett asserts in this first full scale presentation of...
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  3. Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.
    This collection of 17 essays by the author offers a comprehensive theory of mind, encompassing traditional issues of consciousness and free will.
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  4. Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology.Daniel C. Dennett (ed.) - 1978 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: Bradford Books.
    Intentional explanation and attributions of mentality -- International systems -- Reply to Arbib and Gunderson -- Brain writing and mind reading -- The nature of theory in psychology -- Skinner skinned -- Why the law of effect will not go away -- A cure for the common code? -- Artificial intelligence as philosophy and as psychology -- Objects of consciousness and the nature of experience -- Are dreams experiences? -- Toward a cognitive theory of consciousness -- Two approaches to mental (...)
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  5. From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds.Daniel C. Dennett - unknown
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  6.  7
    Content and consciousness.Daniel Clement Dennett - 1969 - New York,: Humanities P..
    A pioneering work in the philosophy of mind, Content and Consciousness brings together the approaches of philosophers and scientists to the mind--a connection that must occur if genuine analysis of the mind is to be made. This unified approach permits the most forbiddingly mysterious mental phenomenon--consciousness--to be broken down into several distinct phenomena, and these are each given a foundation in the physical activity of the brain. This paperback edition contains a preface placing the book in the context of recent (...)
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  7. Content and Consciousness.Daniel C. Dennett - 1968 - New York: Routledge.
  8. Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.
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  9. Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting.Daniel Clement Dennett - 1984 - London, England: MIT Press.
    Essays discuss reason, self-control, self-definition, time, cause and effect, accidents, and responsibility, and explain why people want free will.
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  10. Real patterns.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.
    Are there really beliefs? Or are we learning (from neuroscience and psychology, presumably) that, strictly speaking, beliefs are figments of our imagination, items in a superceded ontology? Philosophers generally regard such ontological questions as admitting just two possible answers: either beliefs exist or they don't. There is no such state as quasi-existence; there are no stable doctrines of semi-realism. Beliefs must either be vindicated along with the viruses or banished along with the banshees. A bracing conviction prevails, then, to the (...)
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  11. Quining qualia.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.
    " Qualia " is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us. As is so often the case with philosophical jargon, it is easier to give examples than to give a definition of the term. Look at a glass of milk at sunset; the way it looks to you--the particular, personal, subjective visual quality of the glass of milk is the quale of your visual experience at the (...)
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  12.  81
    Freedom evolves.Daniel Clement Dennett - 2003 - New York: Viking Press.
    Daniel C. Dennett is a brilliant polemicist, famous for challenging unexamined orthodoxies. Over the last thirty years, he has played a major role in expanding our understanding of consciousness, developmental psychology, and evolutionary theory. And with such groundbreaking, critically acclaimed books as Consciousness Explained and Darwin's Dangerous Idea (a National Book Award and Pulitzer Prize finalist), he has reached a huge general and professional audience. In this new book, Dennett shows that evolution is the key to resolving the ancient problems (...)
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  13. Intentional systems.Daniel C. Dennett - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (February):87-106.
  14. Conditions of personhood.Daniel C. Dennett - 1976 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.
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  15. Intentional systems in cognitive ethology: The 'panglossian paradigm' defended.Daniel C. Dennett - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):343-90.
    Ethologists and others studying animal behavior in a spirit are in need of a descriptive language and method that are neither anachronistically bound by behaviorist scruples nor prematurely committed to particular Just such an interim descriptive method can be found in intentional system theory. The use of intentional system theory is illustrated with the case of the apparently communicative behavior of vervet monkeys. A way of using the theory to generate data - including usable, testable data - is sketched. The (...)
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  16.  97
    Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (7):384-389.
  17. Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain.Daniel C. Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):183-201.
    _Behavioral and Brain Sciences_ , 15, 183-247, 1992. Reprinted in _The Philosopher's Annual_ , Grim, Mar and Williams, eds., vol. XV-1992, 1994, pp. 23-68; Noel Sheehy and Tony Chapman, eds., _Cognitive Science_ , Vol. I, Elgar, 1995, pp.210-274.
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  18. Kinds of Minds.Daniel C. Dennett - 1996 - Basic Books.
  19.  30
    Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology.Gilbert Harman & Daniel C. Dennett - 1980 - Philosophical Review 89 (1):115.
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  20. The rationale of rationalization.Walter Veit, Joe Dewhurst, Krzysztof Dołęga, Max Jones, Shaun Stanley, Keith Frankish & Daniel C. Dennett - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43:e53.
    While we agree in broad strokes with the characterisation of rationalization as a “useful fiction,” we think that Fiery Cushman's claim remains ambiguous in two crucial respects: the reality of beliefs and desires, that is, the fictional status of folk-psychological entities and the degree to which they should be understood as useful. Our aim is to clarify both points and explicate the rationale of rationalization.
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  21.  61
    Real Patterns.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.
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  22. Consciousness cannot be separated from function.Michael A. Cohen & Daniel C. Dennett - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (8):358--364.
    Here, we argue that any neurobiological theory based on an experience/function division cannot be empirically confirmed or falsified and is thus outside the scope of science. A ‘perfect experiment’ illustrates this point, highlighting the unbreachable boundaries of the scientific study of consciousness. We describe a more nuanced notion of cognitive access that captures personal experience without positing the existence of inaccessible conscious states. Finally, we discuss the criteria necessary for forming and testing a falsifiable theory of consciousness.
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  23. True believers : The intentional strategy and why it works.Daniel C. Dennett - 1981 - In Anthony Francis Heath (ed.), Scientific Explanation: Papers Based on Herbert Spencer Lectures Given in the University of Oxford. Clarendon Press. pp. 150--167.
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  24. Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness.Daniel C. Dennett - 2005 - MIT Press.
    In the final essay, the "intrinsic" nature of "qualia" is compared with the naively imagined "intrinsic value" of a dollar in ...
  25. Escape from the cartesian theater. Reply to commentaries on Time and the Observer: The Where and When of Consciousness in the Brain.Daniel C. Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):183-247.
    Damasio remarks, it "informs virtually all research on mind and brain, explicitly or implicitly." Indeed, serial information processing models generally run this risk (Kinsbourne, 1985). The commentaries provide a wealth of confirming instances of the seductive power of this idea. Our sternest critics Block, Farah, Libet, and Treisman) adopt fairly standard Cartesian positions; more interesting are those commentators who take themselves to be mainly in agreement with us, but who express reservations or offer support with arguments that betray a continuing (...)
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  26. Beliefs about beliefs [P&W, SR&B].Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (4):568-570.
  27. The evolution of misbelief.Ryan T. McKay & Daniel C. Dennett - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):493-510.
    From an evolutionary standpoint, a default presumption is that true beliefs are adaptive and misbeliefs maladaptive. But if humans are biologically engineered to appraise the world accurately and to form true beliefs, how are we to explain the routine exceptions to this rule? How can we account for mistaken beliefs, bizarre delusions, and instances of self-deception? We explore this question in some detail. We begin by articulating a distinction between two general types of misbelief: those resulting from a breakdown in (...)
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  28.  48
    Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior.Daniel C. Dennett - 1989 - Journal of the History of Biology 22 (2):361-367.
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  29. The self as a center of narrative gravity.Daniel C. Dennett - 1992 - In Frank S. Kessel, P. M. Cole & D. L. Johnson (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 4--237.
    What is a self? I will try to answer this question by developing an analogy with something much simpler, something which is nowhere near as puzzling as a self, but has some properties in common with selves. What I have in mind is the center of gravity of an object. This is a well-behaved concept in Newtonian physics. But a center of gravity is not an atom or a subatomic particle or any other physical item in the world. It has (...)
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  30. Brainchildren: Essays on Designing Minds.Daniel C. Dennett - 1995 - Cambridge: MIT Press.
    This book brings together his essays on the philosphy of mind, artificial intelligence, and cognitive ethology that appeared in inaccessible journals from 1984...
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  31.  23
    Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior.Daniel C. Dennett - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (3):540-543.
  32.  53
    Just Deserts: Debating Free Will.Gregg D. Caruso & Daniel C. Dennett - 2021 - 2021: Polity. Edited by Gregg D. Caruso.
    Some thinkers argue that our best scientific theories about the world prove that free will is an illusion. Others disagree. The concept of free will is profoundly important to our self-understanding, our interpersonal relationships, and our moral and legal practices. If it turns out that no one is ever free and morally responsible, what would that mean for society, morality, meaning, and the law? Just Deserts brings together two philosophers – Daniel C. Dennett and Gregg D. Caruso – to debate (...)
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  33. Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting.Daniel C. Dennett - 1986 - Mind 95 (377):127-129.
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  34. Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting.Daniel C. Dennett - 1986 - Philosophy 61 (238):547-550.
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  35. Are we explaining consciousness yet?Daniel C. Dennett - 2001 - Cognition 79 (1):221-37.
    Theorists are converging from quite different quarters on a version of the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness, but there are residual confusions to be dissolved. In particular, theorists must resist the temptation to see global accessibility as the cause of consciousness (as if consciousness were some other, further condition); rather, it is consciousness. A useful metaphor for keeping this elusive idea in focus is that consciousness is rather like fame in the brain. It is not a privileged medium of (...)
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  36.  23
    Intuition pumps and other tools for thinking.Daniel C. Dennett - 2013 - New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
    One of the world’s leading philosophers offers aspiring thinkers his personal trove of mind-stretching thought experiments. Over a storied career, Daniel C. Dennett has engaged questions about science and the workings of the mind. His answers have combined rigorous argument with strong empirical grounding. And a lot of fun. Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking offers seventy-seven of Dennett’s most successful "imagination-extenders and focus-holders" meant to guide you through some of life’s most treacherous subject matter: evolution, meaning, mind, and (...)
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  37. Are Dreams Experiences?Daniel C. Dennett - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (2):151.
  38.  90
    What is the Bandwidth of Perceptual Experience?Michael A. Cohen, Daniel C. Dennett & Nancy Kanwisher - 2016 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 20 (5):324-335.
    Although our subjective impression is of a richly detailed visual world, numerous empirical results suggest that the amount of visual information observers can perceive and remember at any given moment is limited. How can our subjective impressions be reconciled with these objective observations? Here, we answer this question by arguing that, although we see more than the handful of objects, claimed by prominent models of visual attention and working memory, we still see far less than we think we do. Taken (...)
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  39.  54
    Inside Jokes: Using Humor to Reverse-Engineer the Mind.Matthew M. Hurley, Daniel Clement Dennett & Reginald B. Adams - 2011 - MIT Press.
    Why do we spend so much of our time passing on amusing anecdotes, making wisecracks,watching The Simpsons? In Inside Jokes, Matthew Hurley, DanielDennett, and Reginald Adams offer an evolutionary and cognitive perspective.
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  40. How to study human consciousness empirically or nothing comes to mind.Daniel C. Dennett - 1982 - Synthese 53 (2):159-80.
  41. Elbow Room: The Varities of Free Will worth Wanting.Daniel C. Dennett - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (3):408-412.
     
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  42. Precis of the intentional stance.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):495-505.
    The intentional stance is the strategy of prediction and explanation that attributes beliefs, desires, and other states to systems and predicts future behavior from what it would be rational for an agent to do, given those beliefs and desires. Any system whose performance can be thus predicted and explained is an intentional system, whatever its innards. The strategy of treating parts of the world as intentional systems is the foundation of but is also exploited in artificial intelligence and cognitive science (...)
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  43. Kinds of Mind.Daniel C. Dennett - 2000 - Mind 109 (436):883-890.
     
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  44.  90
    Content and Consciousness.Daniel C. Dennett - 1969 - New York: Routledge.
    _Content and Consciousness_ is an original and ground-breaking attempt to elucidate a problem integral to the history of Western philosophical thought: the relationship of the mind and body. In this formative work, Dennett sought to develop a theory of the human mind and consciousness based on new and challenging advances in the field that came to be known as cognitive science. This important and illuminating work is widely-regarded as the book from which all of Dennett’s future ideas developed. It is (...)
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  45. The unimagined preposterousness of zombies.Daniel C. Dennett - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):322-26.
    Knock-down refutations are rare in philosophy, and unambiguous self-refutations are even rarer, for obvious reasons, but sometimes we get lucky. Sometimes philosophers clutch an insupportable hypothesis to their bosoms and run headlong over the cliff edge. Then, like cartoon characters, they hang there in mid-air, until they notice what they have done and gravity takes over. Just such a boon is the philosophers' concept of a zombie, a strangely attractive notion that sums up, in one leaden lump, almost everything that (...)
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  46. Where am I?Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - In Brainstorms. MIT Press.
     
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  47. Why not the whole iguana?Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (1):103-104.
  48.  43
    The Mind's I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul.Douglas R. Hofstadter & Daniel Clement Dennett (eds.) - 1981 - Basic Books.
  49. Two contrasts: Folk craft vs folk science and belief vs opinion.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - In John D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology. Cambridge University Press. pp. 135--148.
    Let us begin with what all of us here agree on: folk psychology is not immune to revision. It has a certain vulnerability in principle. Any particular part of it might be overthrown and replaced by some other doctrine. Yet we disagree about how likely it is that that vulnerability in principle will turn into the actual demise of large portions--or all--of folk psychology. I am of the view that folk psychology is here for the long haul, and for some (...)
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  50. Why You Can’t Make a Computer that Feels Pain.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - Synthese 38 (3):415-449.
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