This article claims that attempts to define the language of new media as a unique linguistic phenomenon face problems stemming from a definition of language that takes knowledge of linguistic rules to be essential for understanding. I suggest that Davidson's later philosophy of language, as outlined in his 1986 paper 'A nice derangement of epitaphs', and especially his rejection of traditional definitions of language and understanding, offers an enlightening and important insight to the question of how understanding is achieved by (...) the LNM. Although preceding the digital era, I argue that Davidson's redefinition of linguistic understanding as not necessarily rule dependent enables us to better understand our linguistic time in general and the LNM in particular. (shrink)

Controversy: Reading. Darwin. Through. Dascalian. Eyes. Anna Carolina K.P. Regner Abstract Marcelo Dascal has ... In the present text, I explore the impact of his approach on the analysis of Charles Darwin's 'one long argument', as Darwin calls his theory of the origin of species. ... Perspectives on Theory of Controversies and the Ethics of Communication, Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning 2, DOI ...

The Rei(g)n of Rule is a study of rules and their role in language. Rules have dominated the philosophical arena as a fundamental philosophical concept. Little progress, however, has been made in reaching an accepted definition of rules. This fact is not coincidental. The concept of rule is expected to perform various, at times conflicting, tasks. Analyzing key debates and rule related discussions in the philosophy of language I show that typically rules are perceived and defined either as norms or (...) as conventions. As norms, rules perform the evaluative task of distinguishing between correct and incorrect actions. As conventions, rules describe how certain actions are actually undertaken. As normative and conventional requirements do not necessarily coincide, the concept of rule cannot simultaneously accommodate both. The impossibility to consistently define rule has gone unnoticed by philosophers, and it is in this sense that rule has also blocked philosophical attempts to explain language in terms of rules.". (shrink)

Ever since David Lewis’s publication of Convention: A Philosophical Study his definition of a convention has been widely accepted and marginally challenged. Andrei Marmor’s book Social Conventions: From Language to Law is both a continuation and a critical response to Lewis’s work. “Convention”, alongside “rule” and “norm”, is one of the most important and fundamental philosophical concepts. We tend to think of our behavior as human beings, of our linguistic and social actions, as largely conditioned by conventions. Marmor examines the (...) role and significance of conventions in language, in the moral sphere, and in the legal system. His definition of convention renders language less conventional than we had thought it is and morality more so. In this review article I present Marmor’s concept of convention and follow the book’s main arguments. I then point to what I think is amiss in his account of convention, namely, the idea that some norms are conventional, which yields a conflation of norms and conventions. (shrink)