13 found
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  1.  44
    Varieties of Failure of Monotonicity and Participation Under Five Voting Methods.Dan S. Felsenthal & Nicolaus Tideman - 2013 - Theory and Decision 75 (1):59-77.
    In voting theory, monotonicity is the axiom that an improvement in the ranking of a candidate by voters cannot cause a candidate who would otherwise win to lose. The participation axiom states that the sincere report of a voter’s preferences cannot cause an outcome that the voter regards as less attractive than the one that would result from the voter’s non-participation. This article identifies three binary distinctions in the types of circumstances in which failures of monotonicity or participation can occur. (...)
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  2.  24
    Postulates and Paradoxes of Relative Voting Power - A Critical Re-Appraisal.Dan S. Felsenthal - 1995 - Theory and Decision 38 (2):195-229.
  3.  58
    The Bicameral Postulates and Indices of a Priori Voting Power.Dan S. Felsenthal, Moshé Machover & William Zwicker - 1998 - Theory and Decision 44 (1):83-116.
    If K is an index of relative voting power for simple voting games, the bicameral postulate requires that the distribution of K -power within a voting assembly, as measured by the ratios of the powers of the voters, be independent of whether the assembly is viewed as a separate legislature or as one chamber of a bicameral system, provided that there are no voters common to both chambers. We argue that a reasonable index – if it is to be used (...)
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  4.  51
    A Priori Voting Power : What is It All About?Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover - unknown
    In this account, we explain the meaning of a priori voting power and outline how it is measured. We distinguish two intuitive notions as to what voting power means, leading to two approaches to measuring it. We discuss some philosophical and pragmatic objections, according to which a priori (as distinct from actual) voting power is worthless or inapplicable.
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  5.  41
    Misreporting Rules.Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover - unknown
    In the voting-power literature the rules of decision of the US Congress and the UN Security Council are widely misreported as though abstention amounts to a `no' vote. The hypothesis (proposed elsewhere) that this is due to a specific cause, theory-laden observation, is tested here by examining accounts of these rules in introductory textbooks on American Government and International Relations, where that putative cause does not apply. Our examination does not lead to a conclusive outcome regarding the hypothesis, but reveals (...)
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  6.  33
    Effects of Fixed Costs in Two-Person Sequential Bargaining.Amnon Rapoport, Eythan Weg & Dan S. Felsenthal - 1990 - Theory and Decision 28 (1):47-71.
  7.  54
    A Note on Measuring Voters' Responsibility.Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover - unknown
    We consider a singular event of the following form: in a simple voting game, a particular division of the voters resulted in a positive outcome. We propose a plausible measure that quantifies the causal contribution of any given voter to the outcome. This measure is based on a conceptual analysis due to Braham [1], but differs from his solution to the problem of measuring causality of singular events.
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  8.  36
    Microcosms and Macrocosms: Seat Allocation in Proportional Representation Systems.Amnon Rapoport, Dan S. Felsenthal & Zeev Maoz - 1988 - Theory and Decision 24 (1):11-33.
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  9. Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate: Proving Their (in)Vulnerability to Various Voting Paradoxes.Dan S. Felsenthal & Hannu Nurmi - 2018 - Springer Verlag.
    This book deals with 18 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid paradoxical outcomes. Together with a companion volume by the same authors, Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate, published by Springer in 2017, this book aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the most important advantages and disadvantages of procedures thereby assisting decision makers in the (...)
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  10. Voting Procedures Under a Restricted Domain: An Examination of the (in)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Five Main Paradoxes.Dan S. Felsenthal & Hannu Nurmi - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.
    This book deals with 20 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid five important paradoxes in a restricted domain, viz., when a Condorcet winner exists and is elected in the initial profile. Together with the two companion volumes by the same authors, published by Springer in 2017 and 2018, this book aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the most (...)
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  11.  30
    Analysis of QM Rule Adopted by the EU Inter-Governmental Conference Brussels, 18 June 2004.Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover - unknown
    We analyse and evaluate the qualified majority (QM) decision rule for the Council of Ministers of the EU adopted at the EU Inter-Governmental Conference, Brussels, 18 June 2004 [1]. We compare this rule with the QM rule prescribed in the Treaty of Nice, and the rule included in the original draft Constitution proposed by the European Convention in July 2003. We use a method similar to the one we used in [3] and [4].
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  12.  52
    Analysis of QM Rules in the Draft Constitution for Europe Proposed by the European Convention, 2003.Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover - unknown
    We analyse and evaluate the qualified majority (QM) decision rules for the Council of Ministers of the EU that are included in the Draft Constitution for Europe proposed by the European Convention [5]. We use a method similar to the one we used in [9] for the QM prescriptions made in the Treaty of Nice.
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  13.  11
    Voting Power in the UN Security Council: Presentation of Detailed Calculations.Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover - unknown
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