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  1.  55
    Plato’s “Introduction to Philosophy”.Dan Passell - 2000 - Teaching Philosophy 23 (4):315-328.
    This paper argues that Plato’s “what-is-T” questions offer a more instructive method for introducing students to philosophy than his use of the Allegory of the Cave. In supporting this claim, the paper presents a Socratic dialogue that illustrates how what-is-T questions along with an answer to said questions via a list can be used as a starting point for introducing philosophy. However, this Socratic dialogue also reveals that this initial answer cannot succeed and so it motivates Plato’s preferred answer which (...)
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  2.  13
    Friends.Dan Passell - 1980 - Journal of Value Inquiry 14 (1):1-6.
  3.  54
    Kripke’s Contingent A Priori and Necessary A Posteriori.Peter Nicholls & Dan Passell - 1985 - Philosophy Research Archives 11:481-489.
    We think that Kripke’s arguments that there are contingent a priori truths and that there are necessary a posteriori truths about named and essentially described entities fail. They fail for the reasons that there are ambiguities in each of the three eases. In the first ease, what is known apriori is not what is contingent. In the latter two cases, what is necessary or essential is not what is known a posteriori.
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  4. Hume on Probability.Dan Passell - 1964 - Dissertation, Stanford University
  5.  42
    Individuation.Dan Passell - 1988 - Philosophy Research Archives 14:395-403.
    In Sameness and Substance David Wiggins bas indicated difficulties with individuating objects. By confining attention to material objects, I show how spatio-temporal features will do the job for them. I construct the explanation by examining how we coordinate sensations of several senses to produce an apprehension of the three spatial dimensions. I also search out grounds for distinguishing between apprehensions of objects and apprehension of the space in which they reside. Several necessary truths that apply are also distinguished from each (...)
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  6.  21
    What Makes Something Practically Worth Thinking About.Dan Passell - 1996 - Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15 (3):65-73.
  7.  31
    Natural Fact, Moral Reason.Dan Passell - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:463-480.
    In his book Ethics J. L. Mackie says that moral facts would have to be queer facts. I argue that an act’s hurting somebody is necessarily a reason, though not necessarily a conclusive reason, not to do that act; and that such hurting is a natural fact, not a queer fact. I try to defend this externalist position about this particular reason against internalists such as Mackie, and in particular against the position of Stephen Darwall in Impartial Reason.
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  8.  13
    Kripke’s Contingent A Priori and Necessary A Posteriori.Peter Nicholls & Dan Passell - 1985 - Philosophy Research Archives 11:481-489.
    We think that Kripke’s arguments that there are contingent a priori truths and that there are necessary a posteriori truths about named and essentially described entities fail. They fail for the reasons that there are ambiguities in each of the three eases. In the first ease, what is known apriori is not what is contingent. In the latter two cases, what is necessary or essential is not what is known a posteriori.
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  9.  9
    Natural Fact, Moral Reason.Dan Passell - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:463-480.
    In his book Ethics J. L. Mackie says that moral facts would have to be queer facts. I argue that an act’s hurting somebody is necessarily a reason, though not necessarily a conclusive reason, not to do that act; and that such hurting is a natural fact, not a queer fact. I try to defend this externalist position about this particular reason against internalists such as Mackie, and in particular against the position of Stephen Darwall in Impartial Reason.
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  10.  9
    Individuation.Dan Passell - 1988 - Philosophy Research Archives 14:395-403.
    In Sameness and Substance David Wiggins bas indicated difficulties with individuating objects. By confining attention to material objects, I show how spatio-temporal features will do the job for them. I construct the explanation by examining how we coordinate sensations of several senses to produce an apprehension of the three spatial dimensions. I also search out grounds for distinguishing between apprehensions of objects and apprehension of the space in which they reside. Several necessary truths that apply are also distinguished from each (...)
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  11.  40
    Hume’s Arguments for His Sceptical Doubts.Dan Passell - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Research 22:409-422.
    In his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section 4, “Sceptical Doubts concerning the Operations of the Understanding,” Hume offers three conceptual arguments against causes necessitating their effects. These are a difference argument, a logical, or relations of ideas, argument, and a factual argument. I contend that the logical argument rests on the difference argument, and that the factual argument, when seen for what it is, is simply the difference argument. In effect the three arguments reduce to one.
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  12.  41
    On Sommers' Logic of Sense and Nonsense.Dan Passell - 1969 - Mind 78 (309):132-133.
  13.  6
    Hume’s Arguments for His Sceptical Doubts.Dan Passell - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Research 22:409-422.
    In his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section 4, “Sceptical Doubts concerning the Operations of the Understanding,” Hume offers three conceptual arguments against causes necessitating their effects. These are a difference argument, a logical, or relations of ideas, argument, and a factual argument. I contend that the logical argument rests on the difference argument, and that the factual argument, when seen for what it is, is simply the difference argument. In effect the three arguments reduce to one.
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  14.  39
    Duties to Friends.Dan Passell - 1991 - Journal of Value Inquiry 25 (2):161-165.
  15.  12
    Irving Polonoff 1918-1997.Byron Haines & Dan Passell - 1999 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 72 (5):213 - 214.
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