In American legal journals over the last decade there were hundreds of pages of articles worrying over threats to justice and freedom arising from the power to withhold benefits. Government officials have tremendous discretion to offer or withhold foreign aid, ration-books, government contracts and jobs, welfare subsidies, public housing, tariff protection, academic grants, alien resident status, paroles, or exemption from conscription or combat, from arrest or prosecution or imprisonment. Right-wing economists have worried about welfare-state emphasis on administrative discretion rather than (...) the rule of law. And left-wing economists have worried about the rich man's power to intimidate the poor man by threatening to cut off his productive work. (shrink)

Animal research in the United Kingdom is regulated by the Animals Act 1986, which requires a government minister to weigh the expected suffering of animals against the expected benefits of a proposed animal research project—the “cost-benefit assessment”—before licensing the project. Research into the implementation of this legislation has been severely constrained by statutory confidentiality. This paper overcomes this hindrance by describing a critical case study based on unprecedented primary data: pig-to-primate organ transplantation conducted between 1995 and 2000. It reveals that (...) researchers and regulators significantly underestimated the adverse effects suffered by the animals involved, while overestimating the scientific and medical benefits likely to accrue. Applying dynamic policy network analysis to this case in the context of the evolution of animal research policy indicates that an elitist, policy community type network has persisted since shortly after the network’s formation in 1876. Animal research interests have repeatedly withstood pressure for change from animal protection groups because of their greater resources, structural advantages, and a culture of secrecy that facilitates an implementation gap in animal research regulation. (shrink)

?Achievement is doing what well?? A competitive democracy tends to repress this question as inegalitarian; it uses the slogan ?Whatever you do, do well?. But this slogan could not be taken seriously, nor is it really egalitarian. Our actual hierarchy of activities is based on an unargued and arbitrary consensus; it is an example of the way audiences control performers. Doubts about ?true achievement? are not merely ?philosophical?. Noting repressed concern about this issue suggests hypotheses to help explain some social (...) tensions, e.g., over women's liberation. The love of competition might or might not make achievement more likely. (shrink)

General opposition to 'progress' is often seen as involving a personification of technology as an evil spirit. One version of 'luddism' is defended here as worthy of serious debate. ('Luddism' is an attempt to justify a general presumption that technical progress is bad for us, so technical innovations should not count as true achievement.) Our luddite says, 'If technical powers, misused, will cause more harm than good, these powers should count as bad. And such harmful misuse is likely, since the (...) dramatic, half-blind changes resulting from technology will shortly damage world systems, swamping their adjustment-mechanisms. “Superhuman”; powers go sour with merely human wisdom. “Know-how”; tends inherently to pull ahead of “know-whether”; '. This version of luddism is contrasted with various caricatures; luddite research priorities are outlined. Serious discussion is invited of the dangers inherent in further empowering fallible humanity. (shrink)

A dozen philosophers have recently groped for a formula to pick out coercive offers: when P proposes to give a benefit or withhold a harm for Q’s compliance, when does p’s proposal count as coercive? Five formulae are analyzed here. One account is completely “moralized,” claiming that we can’t pick out coercive offers without first settling questions of rights. Two accounts are completely “non-moral,” using as criterion a baseline of “What would in fact have happened” if P had not wanted (...) Q’s compliance. Finally, two accounts offer “two-baseline” accounts, asking “What should have happened?” and/or “What would have happened otherwise?” four accounts are found quite inadequate; the fifth account (my own earlier formula) is threatened by two odd counter cases. Finally, an alternative to “defining coercion” is sketched. (shrink)

H. L. A. Hart's new book of essays rejects any theory of the classic retributive type for justifying legal punishment. Hart denies that useless punishments can be justified even of fully guilty men; he rejects as the justifying aim of punishment the hope of crowning wickedness with the suffering it deserves; he denies that great guilt could justify a more severe punishment than utility-considerations would call for. We will be concerned here with only one of his arguments supporting this rejection: (...) the objection that mere human judges cannot measure wickedness accurately enough to see that each degree of wickedness gets the appropriate amount of suffering. And of course modern fashions of determinist thinking have brought home to us even more vividly the absurdity of trying to measure wickedness, since determinism makes us wonder if we know how much any offender could have helped doing what he did. (shrink)

I'd like to trace here a great rhetorical-philosophical project which runs through the writings of Plato – his attempt to moralize norms of honor and glory, his attempt to harness the powerful feelings of shame and glory to the ineffectual norms of justice.

A dozen philosophers have recently groped for a formula to pick out coercive offers: when P proposes to give a benefit or withhold a harm for Q’s compliance, when does p’s proposal count as coercive? Five formulae are analyzed here. One account is completely “moralized,” claiming that we can’t pick out coercive offers without first settling questions of rights. Two accounts are completely “non-moral,” using as criterion a baseline of “What would in fact have happened” if P had not wanted (...) Q’s compliance. Finally, two accounts offer “two-baseline” accounts, asking “What should have happened?” and/or “What would have happened otherwise?” four accounts are found quite inadequate; the fifth account (my own earlier formula) is threatened by two odd counter cases. Finally, an alternative to “defining coercion” is sketched. (shrink)