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  1. Multifractal Dynamics in the Emergence of Cognitive Structure.James A. Dixon, John G. Holden, Daniel Mirman & Damian G. Stephen - 2012 - Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (1):51-62.
    The complex-systems approach to cognitive science seeks to move beyond the formalism of information exchange and to situate cognition within the broader formalism of energy flow. Changes in cognitive performance exhibit a fractal (i.e., power-law) relationship between size and time scale. These fractal fluctuations reflect the flow of energy at all scales governing cognition. Information transfer, as traditionally understood in the cognitive sciences, may be a subset of this multiscale energy flow. The cognitive system exhibits not just a single power-law (...)
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    Interactions Dominate the Dynamics of Visual Cognition.Damian G. Stephen & Daniel Mirman - 2010 - Cognition 115 (1):154-165.
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    Is Cognitive Science Usefully Cast as Complexity Science?Guy Van Orden & Damian G. Stephen - 2012 - Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (1):3-6.
    Readers of TopiCS are invited to join a debate about the utility of ideas and methods of complexity science. The topics of debate include empirical instances of qualitative change in cognitive activity and whether this empirical work demonstrates sufficiently the empirical flags of complexity. In addition, new phenomena discovered by complexity scientists, and motivated by complexity theory, call into question some basic assumptions of conventional cognitive science such as stable equilibria and homogeneous variance. The articles and commentaries that appear in (...)
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    Searching for General Principles in Cognitive Performance: Reply to Commentators.Damian G. Stephen & Guy Van Orden - 2012 - Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (1):94-102.
    The commentators expressed concerns regarding the relevance and value of non-computational non-symbolic explanations of cognitive performance. But what counts as an “explanation” depends on the pre-theoretical assumptions behind the scenes of empirical science regarding the kinds of variables and relationships that are sought out in the first place, and some of the present disagreements stem from incommensurate assumptions. Traditional cognitive science presumes cognition to be a decomposable system of components interacting according to computational rules to generate cognitive performances (i.e., component-dominant (...)
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