BackgroundAt present, adherence to antipsychotic treatment is often poor, leading to the recurrence of symptoms. This increases the likelihood of the patient experiencing disability and thus increases the disease burden for the patient, their family, and society as a whole. However, to date, there is no clear evidence regarding the effect of medication adherence interventions on outcomes for patients with schizophrenia. Moreover, the traditional intervention methods are limited by manpower and resources in low- and middle-income countries. Recent studies have demonstrated (...) that increasing a patient’s level of self-compassion may improve their treatment adherence. Online mental health care interventions have advantages in terms of feasibility and acceptability for patients with schizophrenia. In this regard, a WeChat-based self-compassion training protocol to improve patient treatment adherence was designed in this study and will be evaluated in the future to determine its impact on patients with schizophrenia.MethodsThe protocol for the randomized controlled trial is based on the SPIRIT 2013 statement. This parallel RCT will aim to recruit 392 patients with schizophrenia who will be randomized at a 1:1 ratio into a 3-week intervention or control group. Both groups will receive routine care. The intervention group will also receive WeChat-based self-compassion training, which requires participants to complete three tasks every day, including a reading task, a meditation task, and a self-compassion journal task. The control group will receive WeChat-based psychological health education, which will only require participants to read positive articles about psychological health every day. Medication adherence, self-compassion, stigma, and social support will be measured at baseline, immediately after the intervention, and 3 weeks after the intervention. Program feasibility will be evaluated throughout the course of the study, and acceptability will be measured immediately after the intervention.Expected results:The intervention described here will address the barriers to accessing mental health care for people with schizophrenia, including patients’ desire for independent management, difficulty accessing providers, and concerns about privacy and stigma. The current study provides guidance for clinical nurses to carry out psychological intervention, with the ultimate aim of addressing the problems associated with a shortage of psychological professionals in low- and middle-income countries. (shrink)

According to the rumor mill in China: "The Central Discipline Inspection Commission is considering internal party disciplinary action against Song Renqiong and others ." I am truly happy for the CCP—by taking this stand there is still hope it can continue with its mission and transform China into a modern society.

This paper is devoted to explicating Dai Zhen’s defense of self-interested desires, over and against a tradition that sets strict limits to their range and function in moral agency. I begin by setting the terms of the debate between Dai and his opponents, noting that the dispute turns largely on the moral status of directly self-interested desires, or desires for one’s own good as such. I then consider three of Dai’s arguments against views that miscategorize or undervalue directly self-interested (...) desires. I begin with the most widely recognized line of defense, which holds that the suppression of such desires makes those in positions of authority less sensitive to the mistreatment of those with whose interests they are entrusted. I call this the “Pity for the Powerless” argument. I then explore an argument that Dai offers in the form of a multi-faceted metaphor, which likens the suppression of desires to attempts to block or dam natural waterways. I call this is the “Damming the Desires” argument. I conclude with a brief summary of a third and fundamental defense implied by structural features of ethics as Dai understands them. On my reading, Dai thinks ethics is concerned first and foremost with the character traits and resultant behavior that allow us to participate in relationships, and the relationships in question are mutually beneficial, not one-sided or reciprocal. I call this the “Argument from Mutual Fulfillment.” On the view spelled out here, directly self-interested desires are not just morally tolerable, nor is the possession of them merely a necessary condition for the possession of moral virtue; instead, moral virtue is constituted in part by self-interested desires. This is the strong position that Dai endorses when he characterizes the Confucian path as the “way of mutual fulfillment.”. (shrink)

The article discusses Dai Zhen's views on pattern. For Dai, pattern has to do with ensuring that the means by which one attains one's emotional propensities and satisfies one's desires will not prevent others from doing the same. The heart/mind has the capacity to know pattern on such basis and such knowledge will guide action. Ethical failure is due to a deficiency in knowledge, and self-cultivation involves developing one's capacity to know so that one can grasp the pattern in (...) any affair one encounters. (shrink)

I argue that Dai Zhen’s account of sympathetic concern is distinguished from other accounts of sympathy (and empathy) by several features, the most important of which are the following: First, he sees the awareness of our similarities to others as a necessary condition for sympathy but not a constituent of it. Second, the relevant similarities are those that are grounded in our common status as living creatures, and not in our common powers of autonomy or other traits that are (...) often taken to be distinguishing features of persons. Finally, Dai thinks that when we properly sympathize with others, we value their well-being in a way that mimics the way we value our own. This last feature helps to explain two important claims about the place of sympathy in moral action: that it necessarily requires perspective-taking (at least with respect to most other human beings), and that it provides indirect motives to be virtuous, which even imperfect moral agents can draw upon. In the course of making my argument, I identify salient differences between Dai’s variant of sympathy and some of its closest relatives, including Aristotelian pity and Buddhist compassion. (shrink)

Encyclopedia entry on the Confucian philosopher Dai Zhen 戴震 (1724-1777).

An overview of Dai's ethics, highlighting some overlooked or misunderstood theses on moral deliberation and motivation.

戴震（1723—1777），字东原，休宁隆阜（今安徽黄山屯溪）人，清代著名思想家。全书考察了戴震心理学思想的历史背景及其来源，探讨了戴震心理学思想的基本观点，阐述了戴震的认知心理、人格心理、教育心理以 及品德心理等方面的基本思想和历史影响。戴震的心理学思想植根于中国历史与文化，具有理论的基础性、思想的民族性和时代的传承性，对中国心理学研究具有重要意义和启示。本书是目前国内第一本对戴震心理学思想全面系 统研究的学术著作。.

This paper offers an account of an important type of human relationship: relationships based on shared ends. These are an indispensable part of most ethically worthy or valuable lives, and our successes or failures at participating in these relationships constitute a great number of our moral successes or failures overall. While many philosophers agree about their importance, few provide us with well-developed accounts of the nature and value of good shared-end relationships. This paper begins to develop a positive account of (...) such relationships. In the interest of highlighting some strengths and weaknesses of competing approaches, it contrasts the theories that are proposed by the Confucian philosopher Dai Zhen 戴震 (1724–1777) and the influential moral philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). Both philosophers share many of the same core ethical commitments, but as the author shows, Dai Zhen’s approach to thinking about the nature and value of good shared-end relationships is superior to Kant’s because it highlights the fact that such relationships must be motivated by ethically-shaped forms of other-concern and self-interest, whereas Kant does not picture self-interest as an important source of morality or ethically valuable relationships. The author considers clarifications and revisions to Kant’s theory that seem to make more room for the mixture of motives required for good shared-end relationships, but concludes that these ad hoc modifications do not succeed at providing a recognizably Kantian theory that can account for them as well as Dai Zhen’s. (shrink)

本书考察了在特定文化环境下,形成了戴震的特殊心理、性格、及表现思想的特殊形式。戴震哲学思想的产生,是对于中国以往形上学本体论的批判.

本书全面分析了戴震《原善》系列与《孟子字义疏证》系列交互演进的动态进程，精微地勾勒出戴震哲学探索的心路历程，进一步拓展戴震研究的深度和广度。.

Dai Zhen 戴震 criticizes Song-Ming 宋明 Neo-Confucianism, especially Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 dichotomy between principle and desires and his claim that principle is received from Heaven and completely embodied in the heart/mind, as if Zhu advocates asceticism and ultra-intuitionism. This criticism culminates in the accusation of “using principle as a means of killing or persecuting people.” In this paper, I argue that Dai Zhen misunderstands Zhu Xi’s moral theory and does not do him justice. At some point Dai’s criticism (...) is similar to the utilitarian criticism of deontology. However, more interesting are Dai’s unique ideas, especially his arguments for desires that covertly appeal to the immanent-monist trends of thought in the Ming-Qing 明清 period. His own ethical enterprise lies in dismissing Song Confucians’ notion of ethics as revealing principles a priori, and then establishing criteria or procedures that enable common moral deliberation. (shrink)

Dai Zhen’s philosophy of language took the opportunity of a transition in Chinese philosophy to develop a form of humanist positivism, which was different from both the Song and Ming dynasties’ School of Principles and the early Qing dynasty’s philosophical forms. His philosophy of language had four primary manifestations: (1) It differentiated between names pointing at entities and real events and names describing summum bonum and perfection ; (2) In discussing the metaphysical issue of the Dao, it was the (...) first to introduce a syntax analysis of linguistics, clearly differentiating between the different roles of predicate verbs zhi wei and wei zhi in Classical Chinese; (3) In criticizing Confucian thought during the Song and Ming dynasties, it adopted specific philological skills such as the analysis of phraseology, the meaning of sentences and the thread of words in texts; and (4) It re-interpreted the meaning of Confucian classics by studying characters and language, adopting a positivist and philological manner to seek metaphysical sense in philosophy. In this way, his philosophy was different from the scholars of the School of Principles during the Song and Ming dynasties and from the goal of Western linguistic philosophy in the 20th century, which refuted metaphysics. Accordingly, it helped to develop 18th century Chinese philosophy as it turned towards linguistic philology. (shrink)

Dai Zhen’s philosophy of language took the opportunity of a transition in Chinese philosophy to develop a form of humanist positivism, which was different from both the Song and Ming dynasties’ School of Principles and the early Qing dynasty’s philosophical forms. His philosophy of language had four primary manifestations: It differentiated between “names pointing at entities and real events” and “names describing summum bonum and perfection”; In discussing the metaphysical issue of “the Dao,” it was the first to introduce (...) a syntax analysis of linguistics, clearly differentiating between the different roles of predicate verbs “zhi wei” and “wei zhi” in Classical Chinese; In criticizing Confucian thought during the Song and Ming dynasties, it adopted specific philological skills such as the analysis of phraseology, the meaning of sentences and the thread of words in texts; and It re-interpreted the meaning of Confucian classics by studying characters and language, adopting a positivist and philological manner to seek metaphysical sense in philosophy. In this way, his philosophy was different from the scholars of the School of Principles during the Song and Ming dynasties and from the goal of Western linguistic philosophy in the 20th century, which refuted metaphysics. Accordingly, it helped to develop 18th century Chinese philosophy as it turned towards linguistic philology. (shrink)

本書從思想史脈絡的溯源，立足在孟學發展史上之歷史關鍵點，以宋／清孟學發展轉折切入，以朱熹／戴震做為研究對象，探究二家思想的關聯性，並從西方詮釋學的新視野研究兩家詮釋殊異之因；透過朱熹與戴震二位理學大家 ，釐清由宋至清的孟學系譜，勾勒出孟學何以能從宋明理學「向內體證理路」轉而趨向清代義理「向外道德實踐」的不同蘊趣。【秀威資訊科技股份有限公司製作】.