This paper considers the phenomenon of lying and the implications it has for those subjects who are capable of lying. It is argued that lying is not just intentional untruthfulness, but is intentional untruthfulness plus an insincere invocation of trust. Understood in this way, lying demands of liars a sophistication in relation to themselves, to language, and to those to whom they lie which exceeds the demands on mere truth-tellers.

This paper considers the phenomenon of lying and the implications it has for those subjects who are capable of lying. It is argued that lying is not just intentional untruthfulness, but is intentional untruthfulness plus an insincere invocation of trust. Understood in this way, lying demands of liars a sophistication in relation to themselves, to language, and to those to whom they lie which exceeds the demands on mere truth-tellers.

The four coauthors describe the twenty-five-year history of efforts of the Council of Learned Societies in Education (CLSE) to represent the interests of the social foundations of education in the National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE), including the evolution of CLSE into the Council for the Social Foundations of Education and its recent departure from NCATE after a quarter century of successful involvement. The coauthors, each personally supportive of foundational involvement in national accreditation, delineate advantages gained by both (...) CLSE and NCATE during the quarter century of involvement, while also describing concerns and arguments that have led to the current disassociation of the Council for Social Foundations of Education (CSFE) fromNCATE. The article concludes with suggestions for the future and the coauthors' hope that this history and chronicle will provide incentive for reinvolvement of the foundations in national accreditation circles. (shrink)

Financially significant relationships between corporations and non-profit organizations have increased in recent years. NPOs offer access to interests and ideologies that are lacking within most for-profit organizations. These partnerships form a unique bridge between for-profit and non-profit goals and offer significant potential to produce innovative ways of “doing business by doing good.” Exploration of the structural implications of these relationships, however, has been limited. The potential for ideological imbalance in these relationships, particularly for the NPO, has been poorly described. We (...) explore the structure of Corporate–NPO relationships from the NPO's perspective under high pressure conditions such as large relational investments or negative pressure from stakeholders. Using data collected from 20 NPOs in Australia, we identified the use by NPOs of both formal and informal governance mechanisms within their partnerships. These mechanisms acted to align and defend important goals of the NPO. They allowed the NPO and their corporate partners to be simultaneously “together and apart.” Our study offers important insight toward the study of cross-sector relationships and the role of governance mechanisms. (shrink)

I address the assumption that communicative interaction is made possible by knowledge of a language. I argue that this assumption as it is usually expressed depends on an unjustified reification of language, and on an unsatisfactory understanding of ‘knowledge’. I propose instead that communicative interaction is made possible by (Rylean) know-how and by the development of (Davidsonian) passing theories. We then come to see that our focus ought to be, not on propositional knowledge of a language which we internally represent, (...) but on the practical application of know-how in our understanding and interpretation of others. (shrink)

Even those aware of Nietzsches ambivalent (rather than purely negative) attitude to Plato, tend to accept Nietzsches account of Plato and himself as occupying the poles of philosophy. Much that Nietzsche says supports this view, but we need not take him at his word. I consider Nietzsche and Plato on three planes: their view of truth, their view of philosophy, and their use of certain emblematic figures (the New Philosopher, the Philosopher King) as the bearers of philosophys future. On these (...) planes Nietzsche and Plato can be seen to be remarkably close, and to stand together outside much of the tradition that separates them. In defence of these claims, (1) I draw a distinction in Plato between an absolutist theory of truth and one that treats truth as situated and partial; (2) I interpret Nietzsches perspectivism as an ethical theory of truth (a theory which is, like Platos situated theory, both non-substantive and not equivalent to pragmatism); (3) I claim that both the Philosopher-King and the New Philosopher are given the task of balancing between absolutism and nihilism; (4) and I draw from these tensions an image of philosophy as an inherently unstable process. (shrink)

I argue that Donald Davidson's rejection of the notion of language, as commonly understood in philosophy and linguistics, is justified. However, I argue that his position needs to be supplemented by an account of the development and nurture of pre-linguistic communicative skills. Davidson argues (in 'A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs' and elsewhere) that knowledge of a language (conceived of as a set of rules or conventions) is neither sufficient nor necessary for 'linguistic' communication. The strongest argument against the initial formulation (...) is that while Davidson may have shown that knowledge of a language is not sufficient, he failed to show that it is not necessary. Subsequently, Davidson has invoked his 'triangulation' thesis, to show that understanding can rest on the apprehension of mutuality in a shared objective world, and does not presuppose the sharing of rules or practices. I argue that the starting position arrived at from the triangulation thesis itself presupposes the possibility of communication. The triangulation thesis needs, therefore, to be supplemented by a (non-reductive) naturalistic account of non-linguistic communicative skills. In such an account we must posit shared practices (practices of mutual engagement with a shared world), but not an account of practices conceived on the model of rules or conventions. I note, finally, that by adopting such an approach we offer a way of explicating the formulation of passing theories, which in Davidson's account are the point at which communicative understanding occurs. (shrink)

The question of whether lies by those who govern are acceptable receives a clear focus and an ideal case in the Republic. Against C. D. C. Reeve, and T. C. Brickhouse and N. D Smith, I argue that the Republic’s apparent recommendation of administrative lies is incoherent. While lies may be a necessary part of the City’s administration, the process and practice of lying undermines that nature which is necessary for any suitable ruler – rendering the ideal impossible. I argue (...) that this analysis, while concerned with an ideal case, also applies to the political realist’s regrettable-but-necessary defence of such practices. (shrink)

Wittgenstein constantly invokes teaching, training and learning in his later work. It is therefore interesting to consider what role these notions play for him there. I argue that their use is central to Wittgenstein’s attempt to refute cognitivist assumptions, and to show how normative practices can be understood without the threat of circularity, grounded not in a kind of seeing, but in doing, and the natural reactions of an organism. This can generate a worry that Wittgenstein’s position is quietist and (...) anti-critical: critique, as a challenge to the taken-for-granted grammar of our language game, is technically meaningless. I argue that Wittgenstein does not rule out critique. His own practice demonstrates that critique is possible, but takes place within a language game, and its status as critique is always subject to challenge in the agora of a discourse. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Donald Davidson's rejection of the notion of language, as commonly understood in philosophy and linguistics, is justified. However, I argue that his position needs to be supplemented by an account of the development and nurture of pre-linguistic communicative skills. Davidson argues (in ‘A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs' and elsewhere) that knowledge of a language (conceived of as a set of rules or conventions) is neither sufficient nor necessary for 'linguistic' communication. The strongest argument against (...) the initial formulation is that while Davidson may have shown that knowledge of a language is not sufficient, he failed to show that it is not necessary. Subsequently, Davidson has invoked his Triangulation' thesis, to show that understanding can rest on the apprehension of mutuality in a shared objective world, and does not presuppose the sharing of rules or practices. I argue that the starting position arrived at from the triangulation thesis itself presupposes the possibility of communication. The triangulation thesis needs, therefore, to be supplemented by a (non-reductive) naturalistic account of non-linguistic communicative skills. In such an account we must posit shared practices (practices of mutual engagement with a shared world), but not an account of practices conceived on the model of rules or conventions. I note, finally, that by adopting such an approach we offer a way of explicating the formulation of passing theories, which in Davidson's account are the point at which communicative understanding occurs. (shrink)

Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts has offered a fruitful way of focussing the relation between language and communication. In particular, by adopting the distinction we attend to linguistic and communicative subjects as actors, not just processors or conduits of information. Yet in many attempts to explicate the constitution of illocutionary acts the subject as actor is subsumed within the role of linguistic rules or conventions. I propose an account of illocutionary acts in which rules or conventions are secondary (...) to what I call communicative skills. These skills are taken as the primary component of communicative competence. They are derived from the principle that linguistic communication is not ultimately a linguistic matter, but relates instead to the way a communicator uses language. This principle is found in the work of Donald Davidson, but Davidson has tended to concentrate on semantics, and leaves the details of linguistic communication for pragmatics. The aim of this paper is to defend the general principle and supply some pragmatic details. (shrink)

“Let me tell you where I'm coming from...”—so begins many a discussion in contemporary U.S. culture. Pressed by an almost compulsive desire to situate ourselves within a definite matrix of reference points in both scholarly inquiry and everyday parlance, we seem to reject adamantly the idea of a universal human subject. Yet what does this rhetoric of self-affiliation tell us? What is its history? David Simpson’s _Situatedness_ casts a critical eye on this currently popular form of identification, suggesting that, far (...) from being a simple turn of phrase, it demarcates a whole structure of thinking. Simpson traces the rhetorical syndrome through its truly interdisciplinary genealogy. Discussing its roles within the fields of legal theory, social science, fiction, philosophy, and ethics, he argues that the discourse of situatedness consists of a volatile fusion of modesty and aggressiveness. It oscillates, in other words, between accepting complete causal predetermination and advocating personal agency and responsibility. Simpson’s study neither fully rejects nor endorses the present-day language of self-specification. Rather it calls attention to the limitations and opportunities of situatedness—a notion whose ideological slippage it ultimately sees as allowing late-capitalist liberal democracies to function. Given its wide scope and lively rendering, _Situatedness_ will attract a range of scholars in the humanities and legal studies. It will also interest all those for whom the politics of subjectivity pose real problems of authority, identity, and belief. (shrink)

Albert Camus Albert Camus was a French-Algerian journalist, playwright, novelist, philosophical essayist, and Nobel laureate. Though he was neither by advanced training nor profession a philosopher, he nevertheless made important, forceful contributions to a wide range of issues in moral philosophy in his novels, reviews, articles, essays, and speeches—from terrorism and political violence to … Continue reading Camus, Albert →.

Albert Camus Albert Camus was a French-Algerian journalist, playwright, novelist, philosophical essayist, and Nobel laureate. Though he was neither by advanced training nor profession a philosopher, he nevertheless made important, forceful contributions to a wide range of issues in moral philosophy in his novels, reviews, articles, essays, and speeches—from terrorism and political violence to … Continue reading Camus, Albert →.

Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) Blaise Pascal was a French philosopher, mathematician, scientist, inventor, and theologian. In mathematics, he was an early pioneer in the fields of game theory and probability theory. In philosophy he was an early pioneer in existentialism. As a writer on theology and religion he was a defender of Christianity. Despite chronic ill […].

Except under extraordinary circumstances, most of us do not look forward with any eagerness to our own deaths. That said, one of the few positive thoughts that can accompany the prospect of dying is the possibility of being remembered with affection or respect. Those of us living ordinary lives out of the public eye would expect to be lamented by our loved ones and commemorated in their living memories and perhaps by some modest headstone or plaque in a place that (...) had meant something to us or to those we leave behind. Few of us anticipate a future in which there are no memories of who we were and no record of at least our names. (shrink)

Questions could and should be raised about the political profile of English Romanticism both in particular and in general. Wordsworth’s poetry is especially useful to me here because of the way in which, through formal discontinuities, it dramatizes political conflicts. Reacting against these discontinuities, aesthetically minded critics have simply tended to leave out of the canon those poems which have the greatest capacity to help us become aware of a political poetics. In this respect it may well be that Wordsworth (...) is the most stylistically perverse of the Romantic poets. Not the most difficult to read, necessarily—Percy Bysshe Shelley’s breath-suspending songs and William Blake’s determination to produce “variety in every line” with the aim of unfettering poetry surely make more aggressive and obvious demands on the reader.1 But in these cases we can be reasonably sure that the difficulties are part of a conscious and coherent intention to set imagination to work in kindling sparks from ashes. Wordsworth also set out to do this, and we can agree that he did so with some success in some poems. But critics from Samuel Taylor Coleridge onward have rightly questioned the unity of Wordsworth’s canon in this respect. In Biographia Literaria, Coleridge notices the “inconstancy of the style,” an unevenness and a general inability to satisfy the demands of “good poetry” conceived as something possessing an organic form.2 This concern with a wholeness and consistency of artifice is more Coleridge’s than Wordsworth’s, and it seems to me that it is precisely the disjunctions in the poems that embody some of their most original and historically urgent meanings. The blemishes recorded by Coleridge—alternating and dissimilar states of feeling, overminuteness in description, and obsession with “accidental circumstances” , overuse of the dramatic mode, disproportion of thought to event, and so forth—can in fact serve as eloquent signals for discerning the complexities of the poems as they address a historical crisis in consensus embodied exactly in the unstable vehicle of the Wordsworthian speaker.3 3. I have explored the “formal” implications of this crisis in Irony and Authority in Romantic Poetry , and the terms of its historical discourse in Wordsworth and the Figurings of the Real . David Simpson is professor of English at Northwestern University. He is the author of Irony and Authority in Romantic Poetry , Wordsworth and the Figurings of the Real , and Fetishism and Imagination: Dickens, Melville, Conrad and editor of German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism: Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Hegel. (shrink)

This work investigates the complexity of ethics as a field of inquiry and practice across a principal's career. Fully contextualized, and thus carrying the contradictions and requirements of any school, the issues realistically do not usually lead to a single, beat-all answer, as any solution will likely have positive and negative consequences. Drawn from the authors' experiences and studies of schools over decades, the central figure is a fictional principal of a magnet school, whose dilemmas reflect the questions educators must (...) be prepared for. Each decision takes into account the principal's and staff's identities and values because they are all human and their opinions influence the outcomes. The work injects analytic, virtue, feminist, care, deontological, and critical theory insights as Deweyan ethics provides a lens for examining dilemmas. This accessible work blends reflective theory, the ordinary worlds of schools, and engaging pedagogical practice to guide those planning to enter the education sector. (shrink)

_Expertise, Pedagogy and Practice_ takes as its focus recent work on situated and embodied cognition, the concepts of expertise, skill and practice, and contemporary pedagogical theory. This work has made important steps towards overcoming traditional intellectualist and individualist models of cognition, group interaction and learning, but has in turn generated a number of important questions about the shape of a model that emphasizes learning and interaction as situated and embodied. Bringing together philosophers, cognitive scientists and education theorists, the collection asks (...) and explores a variety of different questions. Can a group learn? Is expertise distributed? How can we make sense of a normative dimension of expertise or skill? How situation-specific is expertise? How can groups shape or generate expert practice? Through these lenses, this collection advances a more experientially holistic approach to the characterisation and growth of human expertise. This book was originally published as a special issue of _Educational Philosophy and Theory. _. (shrink)

_Expertise, Pedagogy and Practice_ takes as its focus recent work on situated and embodied cognition, the concepts of expertise, skill and practice, and contemporary pedagogical theory. This work has made important steps towards overcoming traditional intellectualist and individualist models of cognition, group interaction and learning, but has in turn generated a number of important questions about the shape of a model that emphasizes learning and interaction as situated and embodied. Bringing together philosophers, cognitive scientists and education theorists, the collection asks (...) and explores a variety of different questions. Can a group learn? Is expertise distributed? How can we make sense of a normative dimension of expertise or skill? How situation-specific is expertise? How can groups shape or generate expert practice? Through these lenses, this collection advances a more experientially holistic approach to the characterisation and growth of human expertise. This book was originally published as a special issue of _Educational Philosophy and Theory. _. (shrink)

John Dewey is a well-known proponent of certain aspects of progressive education, including the idea that students and teachers should be reflective co-inquirers, not just acquirers of information.1 Among his many other educational ideas are the continuing need to reconstruct school conditions and environments, pedagogical thinking and practice, curricular planning and development, and educational activities and outcomes.2 In the field of education, however, his ideas of ethical inquiry, thinking, and decision-making are not as widely known as his views of teaching (...) and learning. Moreover, some advocates and critics of his ideas often confuse or blur his ethical deliberations.3 Since we think his ethical... (shrink)

This book illuminates contemporary educational reform discussions regarding teacher education programs and pre-K-12 schools by providing a clear analysis and application of John Dewey's relevant educational writings and ideas. The volume addresses issues of how future teachers should be liberally educated as well as prepared to be professional educators. Pre-K-12 education is evaluated through a Deweyan lens, involving a discussion of such topics as the teacher's responsibilities, charter schools, a common curriculum, professional development schools, new curricula, school administration, and cooperative (...) learning. In the concluding chapter, the authors point out many of the questions and concerns that those who are interested in educational reform are well-advised to ask and discuss. (shrink)

(2000). Expanding Study Support Nationally: Implications from an evaluation of the East Middlesborough Education Action Zone's programme. Educational Studies: Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 503-515.

The present thesis takes its original impetus from the author's conviction that the German philosophy of the "Goethezeit" represents a peak of metaphysical insight and achievement comparable with the original flowering of European philosophical thought in the age of Plato and Aristotle. Until recently, it was fashionable to regard Kant and Hegel as the two 'giants' of this second flowering and to consign other philosophers, such as Fichte and Schelling, to the role of supporting figures. However, in recent years, the (...) pioneer efforts of such scholars as Walter Schulz, plus the interest shown by modern philosophers such as Martin Heidegger, have drawn attention to depths in the philosophy of Schelling which had been ignored by the leading exponents of Idealist philosophy, due to their sympathy for the ideas of Kant and/or Hegel. In addition, again due partly to the insights of Heidegger, there has developed a realisation among ever widening circles that Friedrich Holderlin was also one of these 'giants' of metaphysics. His strictly philosophical works are limited in number and in length. However, his contribution cannot be measured in terms of quantity: I would maintain, and have tried to show in the present work, that it was his original insight and inspiration which formed the basis for all of Schelling's work as of the late 1790's. In the process, I have followed Holderlin 's thought back to what I see as its roots: the ideas of the Presocratics, early Plato and Kant's third "Kritik'.'. (shrink)

The volume comprises selections from the major work of Kant, Schopenhauer, and Hegel, as well as from Fichte and Schelling, some of whose writings are translated here for the first time. The volume comprises selections from the major work of Kant, Schopenhauer, and Hegel, as well as from Fichte and Schelling, some of whose writings are translated here for the first time. It thus provides a much fuller context for the German Idealist movement than has been hitherto available in any (...) comparable form in English. The texts reveal aesthetic philosophy and literary criticism not as abstract of peripheral disciplines but as absolutely central topics in the mainstream of German Idealist thought. Dr Simpson's introduction places the writers and their work in an appropriate intellectual context, and his extensive annotation seeks to clarify and render more accessible their complex and often elusive ideas. (shrink)

Anthology of translated extracts from their works.

Within the philosophy of language, irony is not a terribly popular topic. For the most part its status is that of a peripheral and derivative oddity, and when it has been discussed, it has tended to be as an aside to a discussion of its more popular purported cousin, metaphor. My major goal here is to help drag irony towards the centre of attention, in two ways. First, in the course of sorting through the account of verbal irony I want (...) to show how this phenomenon, to the extent that it is a communicative-interactive phenomenon, challenges a supposed centrality for literal assertion in our accounts of meaning, communication and interaction. Second, I want to show how the ironic process, as a psychological process and as an interactive process, ought to sit at the forefront of attempts to give an account of the self. (shrink)