This paper attempts to outline the logical structure of imperatives. It criticizes the prevailing view that this structure is isomorphic with that for indicatives. For "mixed" imperatives with constituents in both indicative and imperative moods (e.G., Conditional imperatives with indicative antecedents) there are features unique to imperatives. These features are specified, And consequences of them are traced. Finally, Formation rules for imperatives are stated.
This introduction to the basic forms of deductive inference as evaluated by methods of modern symbolic logic is designed for sophomore-junior-level students ready to specialize in the study of deductive logic. It can be used also for an introductory logic course. The independence of many sections allows the instructor utmost flexibility. The text consists of eight chapters, the first six of which are designed to introduce the student to basic topics of sentence and predicate logic. The last two chapters extend (...) the procedures of the first six to alethic modal logic, the logic of imperatives, and deontic logic. Throughout the text there is an attempt to relate symbolic techniques to issues in the philosophy of logic. (shrink)
This is a criticism of quine's treatment of mass terms such as "water", "gold", Etc. In word and object. Instead of becoming singular terms referring to a "scattered object", It is argued that they either become general terms as subjects of sentences or retain their unique status as ascribed to an indicated place.
Deductive Logic is designed as an intermediate-level text directed at upper-division students from philosophy and the humanities. Its focus is exclusively on deductive logic, avoiding altogether topics such as informal reasoning and scientific method normally included in introductory logic courses. Its exposition of logical topics is informal, with emphasis on explaining the basic concepts and procedures of modern symbolic logic in the simplest and most intuitive manner possible rather than on developing a rigorous formal system and providing proofs of its (...) properties. The fact that the text presupposes a course offered to philosophy students and serves to introduce them to logic as the "language of philosophy" has strongly influenced the selection of topics. The topics here are controversial, and the problems not easily resolved, but this text strives to relate the formal logical structures introduced to issues of philosophic interest. (shrink)
The term 'consciousness' has not been consistently used in the history of philosophy and psychology. It has been taken to stand for the mental activity in which all of us are engaged during our waking lives, whether absorbed in the solving of a task or in calm moments of contemplation. It has also been allied with the term 'introspection' to stand for a self-monitoring activity, one in which we are not simply engaged, but in which we aware of the succession (...) of mental items that constitute our experiences. In Consciousness and the Computational Mind, Ray Jackendoff opts for this second sense and exploits it to criticize the "central processing" theory of consciousness. The background assumption for all such theories is that the human mind is to be conceived on the model of a computer whose central processor controls in accordance with programmed instructions the reception of inputs, delegation of tasks to secondary processors carrying out sub-routines, storage and retrieval of information, and finally the production of outputs. The central processing theory identifies consciousness with the activities of those areas of the brain which function as central processor as defined by this model. Jackendoff's alternative theory correlates consciousness with intermediate-level informational structures operated on by secondary processors. Of the higher-level structures and the processes operating on them, the level we refer to with such terms as 'conceptualization' and 'understanding,' we are, he contends, unconscious. (shrink)
In Some Pragmatist Themes, D. S. Clarke shows the relevance of classical pragmatism to recent American philosophy. He outlines pragmatism's two central claims and then demonstrates how these claims generate views on issues dominating contemporary discussions including the nature of truth, the structure of moral reasoning, and the social role of philosophy.
This book provides an introduction to semiotic through readings from classic works in the field. In contrast with descriptions of communication systems based on the methods of empirical linguistics and interpretive studies of artistic means of communication, this text delimits semiotic as a logical study with its foundations in the theories of Greek and medieval logicians and the classifications of Charles Peirce. Clarke defines semiotic as the general theory that attempts to specify the logical features of signs and the similarities (...) and differences among the great variety of forms they can take. He samples readings from the field and explains their role in the development of the subject. His discussion begins with the treatment of signs in the early Greek period, starting with Aristotle and ending with Sextus Empiricus. He proceeds through an examination of the works of the medieval philosophers Augustine and Ockham, of post-Cartesians Arnauld, Reid, and Berkeley, and of the founder of modern semiotic, Charles Peirce. Final chapters cover the major writings of those who have shaped the development of the field in the twentieth century: Morris, Skinner, and Carnap of the behavioral school of semiotic; Saussure, Hjelmslev, Barthes, and Jakobson of the Continental school; and the analytic philosophers Strawson, Bennett, Lewis, and Goodman. Each selection, accompanied by Clarke’s commentary, works to restore the links between semiotic and medieval discussions of signs that inform this work. Throughout, Clarke offers students a history that is also an aid for charting a course through the present-day maze of divergent approaches and conflicting methodologies. (shrink)
This Tractatus-style sequence of propositions describes logical features of natural language discourse, pre-linguistic levels of signs interpreted in associative learning and animal communication, and the specialized discourses of the institutions of science, religion, law, politics, and the arts. Its comprehensive scope is designed to help overcome the compartmentalization of philosophy into its branches of epistemology, ethics, political philosophy, and aesthetics. The general perspective is that of pragmatic naturalism as developed by the classical pragmatists Peirce, James, Schiller, and Dewey. Central to (...) pragmatism is its emphasis on the use of practical inferences combining descriptive and expressive premisses with prescriptive “ought” conclusions guiding conduct. I argue that by making such inferences its focus, pragmatism enables contemporary philosophy to offset the effects of social specialization. (shrink)
