Sydney Shoemaker has been arguing for more than a decade for an account of the mind–body problem in which the notion of realization takes centre stage. His aim is to provide a notion of realization that is consistent with the multiple realizability of mental properties or events, and which explains: how the physical grounds the mental; and why the causal work of mental events is not screened off by that of physical events. Shoemaker's proposal consists of individuating properties in terms (...) of causal powers, and defining realization as a relation of inclusion between sets of causal powers. Thus, as the causal powers that define a mental property are a subset of the causal powers that characterize a physical property, it can be said that physical properties realize mental properties. In this paper we examine the physicalist credentials of Shoemaker's mind–body theory in relation to three important issues: the direction of the relation of dependence that the theory is committed to; the possibility of mental properties existing without being anchored by physical properties; and the compatibility of the theory with the causal closure of the physical world. We argue that Shoemaker's theory is problematic in all three respects. After that we consider whether the theory should count as a mind–body theory at all, given that it seems to be committed to a distorted view of mental properties. (shrink)

In a series of influential articles (Kim 1989b, 1992b, 1993a and 1998), Jaegwon Kim has developed a strong argument against nonreductive physicalism as a plausible solution to mental causation. The argument is commonly called the ’causal exclusion argument’, and it has become, over the years, one of the most serious threats to the nonreductivist point of view. In the first part of this paper I offer a careful reconstruction and detailed discussion of the exclusion argument. In the second part I (...) show why some important objections to it actually fail. (shrink)

The article is divided into two parts. The first part offers a careful reconstruction and detailed discussion of the argument of causal exclusion, as well as of the implications it has for physicalism. In its second part the article examines two important objections to the causal exclusion argument: the generalization objection, which holds that the argument is unacceptable since it confers causal efficacy only to ultimate basic properties, which arguably might not exist; and Yablo’s objection, according to which underlying the (...) argument of causal exclusion there is a principle of causal parsimony which leads to strong counterintuitive results and should therefore be abandoned. The article offers grounds for rejecting both objections as well as a new diagnosis of the problem for mental causation generated by the causal exclusion argument. (shrink)

Physicalism is usually understood as the claim that every empirical entity is or is determined by physical entities. The claim is however imprecise until it is clarified what are the physical entities in question. A sceptical argument in the form of a dilemma tries to show that this problem of formulation of physicalism cannot be adequately met. If we understand physical entities as the entities introduced by current physics, the resulting claim becomes most probably false. If we instead understand physical (...) entities as those entities introduced by some future ideal physics, the claim then becomes indeterminate in content. Both horns seem equally bad. In the first part of the paper, I survey the strengths and weaknesses of different proposed solutions to this problem of formulation. In the second part, I lay out a new formulation of physicalism, partly based on a mereological principle, which overcomes the dilemma, and argue that it is a correct formulation of physicalism to the extent that it rules out clear antiphysicalist scenarios and is compatible with clear physicalist scenarios. (shrink)

The recent philosophical literature on emotional action is divided between Humeans, who think that emotional action, for all its peculiarities, can in fact be explained along Humean lines, that is, with belief–desire pairs; and emotionists, who think that emotional actions can only be explained by appealing to emotions and some of their special features. After reviewing this philosophical discussion, I will argue, first, that none of the philosophical accounts of emotional action analysed, whether Humean or emotionist, is satisfactory enough. Second, (...) I will argue that this philosophical debate has reached a stalemate, which does not allow further progress and which has not been able to provide us with a compelling account of such emotional actions where it is not obvious which is the goal involved. Third, I will argue that in order to overcome this stalemate, we need to approach emotional action in a radically different way. Drawing on ideas from some psychologists, I will suggest that the relevant philosophical issue should be whether emotional action is, or is not, goal-directed. Finally, I will suggest how emotional actions, particularly the most puzzling ones, can be accounted for according to this new approach. (shrink)

La teoría perceptiva de las emociones que Jesse Prinz ha defendido recientemente mantiene la tesis jamesiana según la cual la emoción es un efecto causal del conjunto de cambios corporales que aparecen típicamente durante los episodios emotivos, y es, por tanto, posterior a dichos cambios. Prinz defiende también que las emociones encierran valoraciones del estímulo emotivo, pero a la vista de sus razones a favor de la tesis jamesiana, sostiene que tales valoraciones son corporeizadas. En este trabajo, en primer lugar (...) presento tres objeciones a la teoría de Prinz y, en segundo lugar, ofrezco una teoría alternativa, la teoría valorativa multidimensional de las emociones. Mi argumento es que esta alternativa puede responder a los argumentos de Prinz sin necesidad de adoptar la tesis jamesiana. (shrink)

Most philosophers of mind nowadays espouse two metaphysical views: Nonreductive Physicalism and the causal efficacy of the mental. Throughout this work I will refer to the conjunction of both claims as the Causal Autonomy of the Mental. Nevertheless, this position is threatened by a number of difficulties which are far more serious than one would imagine given the broad consensus that it has generated during the last decades. This paper purports to offer a careful examination of some of these difficulties (...) and show the considerable efforts that one has to undertake in order to try to overcome them. The difficulties examined will concern only metaphysical problems common to all special science properties but not specific of mental properties. So, in proposing a functionalist version of Nonreductive Physicalism in what follows, I will not attempt to answer to well known objections such as the absent qualia argument and the like. This should not be interpreted as a limitation! in the scope of this work. On the contrary, in dealing with more general objections we will try to evaluate a position which entails (under common assumptions) the Causal Autonomy of the Mental, namely: Nonreductive Physicalism plus the causal efficacy of special science properties. (shrink)

It has been suggested in the literature about actions that one can honour the philosophical intuition lying behind Davidson’s argument for the Anscombe Thesis (the claim that by-sentences --sentcnccs used to report actions of the general form: ‘A X-ed by V-ing’-- involve two descriptions of the same action) without accepting the argument’s conclusion. The suggestion in question is to interpret by-sentences as referring to two synchronous but different actions of the same agent. I argue that this suggestion, together with two (...) plausible semantic principles about the naming of events and a reasonable metaphysical principle about the constitution of events, leads to certain ontological commitments which are hardly acccptable. My conclusion is then that in order to deny the Anscambe Thesis what must be done is to show that Davidson’s intuition is wrong. (shrink)

In this brief note I claim that, contrary to what Esfeld argues in his paper in this same volume, Kim's position with respect to the problem of causal exclusion does indeed commit him to the causal heterogeneity of realized properties.

One of the aims of “Mental Causation and Mental Properties” is to argue that Kim's position with respect to the problem of causal exclusion does not entail the causal heterogeneity of higher‐level properties pace Kim himself. I find that Esfeld's argument misses the point of Kim's position. In what follows I shall briefly try to explain why.

Most philosophers of mind nowadays espouse two metaphysical views: Nonreductive Physicalism and the causal efficacy of the mental. Nevertheless, this position is threatened by a number of serious difficulties. In this paper, I propose a metaphysical account of functional properties and show how this proposal is able to overcome some of these difficulties, in particular, some recent arguments against the causal efficacy of multiply realized properties. However, in the second part of the paper an objection against this proposal is raised (...) and, after a detailed discussion of it, the conclusion reached is that the prospects for a functionalist nonreductive metaphysics of the mind which affords causal powers to the mental seem certainly dim. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss critically Stalnaker's views on content.

El presente texto es un experimento: el de leer la Novela del curioso impertinente con el fin de encontrar en ella modelos diversos de argumentación práctica. Persigo allí -particularmente en el diálogo inicial entre Anselmo y Lotario- la forma como se ofrecen tres formas básicas de razonamiento moral, según el conflicto pueda ser objeto de acuerdo y negociación, se dé entre principios del buen vivir y sentimientos que nos desbordan, o se presente entre deberes morales y las pautas elementales de (...) una acción razonable. Cada uno de estos conflictos da lugar a formas de argumentación bastante diferentes, pero ninguna de ellas se presenta como forma única o absoluta de conducir la reflexión moral. Sugiero que la "curiosidad impertinente" de Anselmo obedece a la absurda pretensión de pretender alcanzar en cuestiones morales más precisión que aquella que la materia consiente. Me apoyo para mi lectura del texto de Cervantes en pasajes de la Ética Nicomaquea de Aristóteles y algunos escritos de Martha Nussbaum. (shrink)

Some causal explanations are non-committal in that mention of a property in the explanans conveys information about the causal origin of the explanandum even if the property in question plays no causal role for the explanandum . Programme explanations are a variety of non-committal causal (NCC) explanations. Yet their interest is very limited since, as I will argue in this paper, their range of applicability is in fact quite narrow. However there is at least another variety of NCC explanations, causal (...) orientation explanations, which offer a plausible model for many explanations in the special sciences. (shrink)

En este artículo exploro el compatibilismo, el punto de vista según el cual la tesis del hiato o hueco explicativo entre lo fenoménico y lo físico es compatible con una metafísica fisicista. Defiendo que el argumento del dualismo de propiedades es un argumento incompatibilista más fuerte que el argumento de Jackson-Chalmers o el de Kripke y exploro críticamente algunos intentos recientes de replicar al mismo. La conclusión a la que llego es que una posición compatibilista capaz de dar una respuesta (...) adecuada al argumento del dualismo de propiedades sigue todavía pendiente de articulación. In this paper I explore compatibilism, the view that the claim that there is an explanatory gap between the phenomenal and the physical is compatible with an overall physicalist metaphysics. I argue that the property dualism argument is an incompatibilist argument which is stronger than the Jackson-Chalmers argument or Kripke's argument and I critically explore some recent attempts in the literature to deal with it. The conclusion is that a compatibilist view, one able to cope with the property dualism argument, is still pending. (shrink)

It has been suggested in the literature about actions that one can honour the philosophical intuition lying behind Davidson’s argument for the Anscombe Thesis (the claim that by-sentences --sentcnccs used to report actions of the general form: ‘A X-ed by V-ing’-- involve two descriptions of the same action) without accepting the argument’s conclusion. The suggestion in question is to interpret by-sentences as referring to two synchronous but different actions of the same agent. I argue that this suggestion, together with two (...) plausible semantic principles about the naming of events and a reasonable metaphysical principle about the constitution of events, leads to certain ontological commitments which are hardly acccptable. My conclusion is then that in order to deny the Anscambe Thesis what must be done is to show that Davidson’s intuition is wrong. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss, on behalf of the materialist, a consideration against the modal or conceivability argument against materialism which was first voiced in the third lecture of Naming and Necessity. This consideration is based on intertheoretic identities, statements in which both terms flanking the identity sign are theoretical. I argue that the defender of the conceivability argument has trouble to account for the appearance of contingency in those types of necessary identities. In fact, intertheoretic identities pose a formidable (...) dilemma for the defender of the modal argument and actually force the antimaterialist to say more about the semantics of theoretical terms than is implicit in standard discussions of the argument. I myself consider several options in this regard, the upshot being, however, that none of the alternative semantics for theoretical terms available to the antimaterialist is good enough to achieve the twofold aim which her modal argument requires, namely, to account for the a posteriori necessity of identities of this sort and, at the same time, to preserve her antimaterialist argument. Finally, in the last part of the paper, I argue that my defense of materialism can withstand some worries coming from David Chalmers’ recent views on a priori scrutability. (shrink)

An argument is offered which purports to show that Davidson's argument for Physical Monism is inconsistent with the thesis of Anomalism of the Mental.

Lo que me propongo presentar en este texto no son más que algunas observaciones y reflexiones, algunas de ellas incluso un poco marginales, a un trabajo mucho más amplio que vengo realizando desde hace más de seis años: la traducción y adaptación cultural para el mundo de habla hispana de la novela filosófica Suki, de Matthew Lipman, y de su correspondiente manual de apoyo para el profesor, que tiene por título Escribir: ¿cómo y por qué? Me ocuparé, en primer lugar, (...) de clarificar el origen y las características de este trabajo de traducción y adaptación cultural, en orden a mostrar algunos de los criterios generales que para ello fui elaborando a medida que desarrollaba mi trabajo. A continuación presentaré algunas experiencias de escritura con niños y jóvenes que me han servido de punto de referencia en mi reflexión sobre la dimensión filosófica del acto de la escritura. Lo esencial en el esfuerzo por generar en otros el interés y las habilidades para desarrollar la composición poética está muchas veces en ayudarles a expresarse nuevamente en términos sencillos, pero evocadores. Concluiré con algunas reflexiones generales, inspiradas en Matthew Lipman, sobre la relación existente entre la reflexión filosófica y la escritura poética. En el trabajo de adaptación del manual Escribir: ¿cómo y por qué? he hecho, entonces, una recopilación bastante amplia de poemas de grandes autores de muchísimos países hispanoamericanos. Hay allí poemas de autores como Miguel Hernández, Antonio Machado o Federico García Lorca, y otros , del mexicano Octavio Paz, del nicaragüense Rubén Darío, del peruano César Vallejo, o del chileno Pablo Neruda, o incluso canciones del panameño Rubén Blades, del cubano Silvio Rodríguez, del argentino Piero o hasta del brasileño Vinicius de Moraes. Pero he incluido también poemas escritos por niños de mi país. (shrink)

The reasonableness is a basic ideal of a philosophical education. Such ideal is especially expressed in “Philosophy for Children” by the notion, still open to multiple interpretations, of “good reasons”. “Being reasonable” means, in its widest sense, the trend, the finely cultivated habit, of giving, asking and evaluating reasons for our thoughts, feelings, actions, words, actions, or wishes. What is demanded of those who participate in a community of inquiry is the permanent effort of searching for the best reasons for (...) what we are, feel, think, say or wish to do. Why are good reasons necessary? How are those reasons to be evaluated? What allows us to distinguish between a good and a bad reason? What are the main characteristics of a good reason? These are some of the main questions I aim to examine in this paper. I begin by trying to clarify what gives rise to the need to give, ask and evaluate reasons. Then I try to answer the question I consider to be central: what is a good reason, or what does one consist of? I conclude my thoughts with some notes on the possibility and meaning of a “logic of good reasons” and on the role it plays in the P4C project. I show the diversity of reasons that can be offered according to the circumstances and the circles of interest in which we move. Since we live simultaneously in different worlds , the kind of reasons we must offer in each case may be entirely different. Therefore, the criteria according to which we can evaluate the reasons offered in each context may also be very different. I emphasize that good reasons are, in a great number, intuitive. They are immediate, that is, not mediated by long analysis, but ‘emerge’ in our minds rather ‘spontaneously’. Though good reasons may show up in a rather intuitive way, in general they are supported by a long process of analysis. Good reasons would not be such if they were not timely; therefore, they cannot take too long to show up; pressing circumstances require them to show up swiftly. Nonetheless, they are not produced casually or by chance. As a matter of fact, they are prepared in our permanent exercise of making good judgments, that is, careful, relevant and well enlightened judgments. This implies a process of decomposing a problematic situation into its constitutive parts , which happens too fast in our minds and shows up finished in those who permanently strive to reason in a sensible and coherent way when confronted with different situations. (shrink)