Richard Rorty thinks that Martin Heidegger is necessarily impaled on the horns of a dilemma in regard to the history and historicity of Being. The thrust of Rorty's criticism of Heidegger is aimed at the supposed vacuity of Heidegger's thought of Being without beings. In order to overcome this vacuity, Rorty thinks that Heidegger has recourse to the history of beings. But the form ordinary history takes for Rorty's Heidegger is the alienated form of the history of philosophy. The criticism (...) thus has three steps. First, Being without being is a vacuous notion. Second, this vacuity is overcome through a consideration of the history of philosophy. That is, Heidegger might be equally unable to determine the truth of Being without recourse to his version of the history of philosophy. Rorty's criticism of Heidegger in regard to the possibility for thinking at the end of philosophy is coordinated with a second criticism. (shrink)

_Nature and Normativity _argues that the problem of the place of norms in nature has been essentially misunderstood when it has been articulated in terms of the relation of human language and thought, on the one hand, and the world described by physics on the other. Rather, if we concentrate on the facts that speaking and thinking are activities of organic agents, then the problem of the place of the normative in nature becomes refocused on three related questions. First, is (...) there a sense in which biological processes and the behavior of organisms can be legitimately subject to normative evaluation? Second, is there some sense in which, in addition to having ordinary causal explanations, organic phenomena can also legitimately be seen to happen _because_ they _should_ happen in that way, in some naturalistically comprehensible sense of ‘should’, or that organic phenomena happen _in order to_ achieve some result, because that result should occur? And third, is it possible to naturalistically understand how human thought and language can be legitimately seen as the normatively evaluable behavior of a particular species of organism, behavior that occurs in order to satisfy some class of norms? This book develops, articulates, and defends positive answers to each of these questions. (shrink)

_Rational Animals: The Teleological Roots of Intentionality_ offers an original account of the intentionality of human mental states, such as beliefs and desires. The account of intentionality in _Rational Animals_ is broadly biological in its basis, emphasizing the continuity between human intentionality and the levels of intentionality that should be attributed to animal actions and states. Establishing the goal-directed character of animal behavior, Mark Okrent argues that instrumentally rational action is a species of goal-directed behavior that is idiosyncratic to (...) individual agents and is distinguished by its novelty and flexibility. He also argues that some nonlinguistic animals are capable of instrumental rationality and that in the first instance, the contents of beliefs and desires are individuated by the explanatory role of those states in rationally accounting for such instrumentally rational behavior. The account of instrumental rationality offered in Rational Animals allows for understanding the practical rationality of linguistically competent human beings as a distinctive capacity of social animals capable of undertaking roles governed by socially sanctioned norms. Rational Animals will be of interest to cognitive scientists, philosophers of mind, philosophers of biology, philosophers of action, ethologists, and those interested in the debates concerning animal intelligence. (shrink)

Heidegger's Pragmatism deals with the relation between Martin Heidegger's early analysis of intentionality and his eventual rejection of metaphysics. Arguing for the essentially pragmatic nature of the early Heidegger's discussion of understanding, Mark Okrent shows that Heidegger's subsequent critique of metaphysics follows directly from his long-held pragmatic understanding of intentionality. Heidegger's Pragmatism is written with a clarity that makes it accessible to analytic and continental philosophers alike. Its boldly original conclusions will engage Heidegger scholars, literary theorists, intellectual historians, and (...) a wide range of philosophers. (shrink)

In this important study D. M. Armstrong offers a comprehensive system of analytical metaphysics that synthesises but also develops his thinking over the last twenty years. Armstrong's analysis, which acknowledges the 'logical atomism' of Russell and Wittgenstein, makes facts the fundamental constituents of the world, examining properties, relations, numbers, classes, possibility and necessity, dispositions, causes and laws. All these, it is argued, find their place and can be understood inside a scheme of states of affairs. This is a comprehensive and (...) rigorously this-worldly account of the most general features of reality, argued from a distinctive philosophical perspective, and it will appeal to a wide readership in analytical philosophy. (shrink)

It has frequently been argued that there must be a necessary and important difference between the methods of the natural and social sciences, or that an empirical method in social science must be supplemented by or is inferior to an interpretative method. Often these claims have been supported by arguments using premises derived from the early Heidegger or the late Wittgenstein. These arguments, in turn, tend either to be transcendental in form or to follow a hermeneutic argument strategy. This paper (...) argues that neither of these types of argument, based on Heideggerian or Wittgensteinian premises, can be used successfully to show an important or essential difference between natural and social science. It does this by examining arguments proposed by Peter Winch and Hubert Dreyfus, showing how they are fallacious and misconstrue the import of the premises upon which they are based, and generalizing these objections to the transcendental and hermeneutic styles of argument in this field as such. The paper concludes with a consideration of Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, which reaches conclusions in this area which are similar to those of this paper but which, it is argued, misconstrues the character of its own argument. (shrink)

In a recent article Richard Rorty has attempted to juxtapose Heidegger and Dewey. While finding significant points of agreement between the two, and by implication praising much of Heidegger’s work, Rorty also suggests a series of criticisms of Heidegger. The problems which Rorty finds with Heidegger can, I think, all be reduced to one basic criticism, which has two main sides. In Rorty’s view Heidegger can not really differentiate between Being and beings in the way that he wants, and thus (...) can give no sense to the word ‘Being’ other than the old metaphysical one. That is, Being and the ontological difference are metaphysical remnants, the last evaporating presence of the Platonic distinction of the real world and the apparent world. This is indicated in two ways. First, Rorty feels that Heidegger can make no real distinction between philosophy, which they both agree has ended, and ‘thinking’ in the specifically Heideggerian sense. Second, Rorty claims that it is impossible to distinguish ontic from ontological becoming. That is, the various epochs of Being which Heidegger distinguishes are, for Rorty, parasitic upon and reducible to the ordinary history of man’s activity in relation to things, material and social. As such, Heidegger’s account of ontological epochs is a species of idealistic reflection upon the history of man’s activity upon things. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Varieties of Difference The Truth of Being and the History of Philosophy The Truth of Being and Epochs of Being Conclusion: Heidegger, Rorty, and Appropriation.

Leibniz used Descartes’ strict notion of substance in “That a Most Perfect being is Possible” to characterize God but did not intend to undermine his own philosophical views by denying that there are created substances. The metaphysical view of substance in this passage is Cartesian. A discussion of radical substance without any sort of denial in the possibility of other substances does not indicate Spinozism. If this interpretation is correct, then the passage is neither anomalous nor mysterious. There is reason (...) to believe that the passage expresses just the beliefs that we should expect Leibniz to hold in his De Summa Rerum period. Furthermore, this interpretation indicates that while Leibniz’s metaphysics during this stage of his career is suggestively similar to Spinoza’s, there is no evidence that Leibniz accepted Spinoza’s pantheistic conclusion. (shrink)

Questo articolo si interroga su ciò di cui i filosofi hanno parlato, o dovrebbero parlare, quando parlano di "una pratica". La questione è complicata per il fatto che, almeno in inglese, esistono diversi sensi piuttosto distinti della parola "pratica", in due dei quali "pratica" è usato come un sostantivo e in altri due sensi "pratica" è usato come un verbo. Tutti questi usi, sia nominali che verbali, sono in realtà ben distinti, ma chiaramente connessi, a ciò che interessa ai filosofi (...) quando parlano di "una pratica". In _Due concetti di regole_ John Rawls ha offerto una definizione di 'pratica' che ha influenzato le successive discussioni filosofiche su cosa significhi essere una pratica: «Uso la parola 'pratica' come una sorta di termine tecnico che indica qualsiasi forma di attività specificata da un sistema di regole che definisce posizioni, ruoli, mosse, penalità, difese e così via, e che dà all'attività la sua struttura. Come esempi si può pensare ai giochi e ai rituali, ai processi e ai parlamenti». La tesi centrale di _Due concetti di regole_ è che le regole consequenzialiste e deontiche (o norme) sono entrambe essenzialmente coinvolte nell'istituzione e nella valutazione delle pratiche. La tesi del presente lavoro, tuttavia, è che se ci si concentra sul processo di esercizio di una pratica per sviluppare e mantenere la capacità di occupare con successo una posizione in una pratica rawlsiana, si può vedere che Rawls ha sbagliato sia a identificare il carattere di queste norme sia a individuare i loro obiettivi. (shrink)

Recently there has been a revival of philosophic interest in, and discussion of, ‘relativism’. Debates concerning relativism, however, tend to have an odd air of unreality. It is odd that while most everyone wants to refute relativism, just about no one wants to be identified as a relativist. There is even a tendency to use ‘relativist’ as an epithet of abuse. But, if relativism is universally acknowledged to be refuted, even self-refuting, then why is there so much discussion of it, (...) and why is there such a temptation to accuse opponents of this sin? The answer to this question which I wish to propose in this paper is that there are two sources for this situation. First, the fact that while no one sees themselves as relativists, many are seen as relativists suggests that there is a fair amount of current confusion in regard to what precisely ‘relativism’ is. Whenever there is a high degree of disagreement about the extension of a term, especially a term used to describe a philosophical position, it is reasonable to investigate whether there is some equivocation in the use of that term. Such an equivocation by itself, however, would not account for the present state of affairs. That ‘relativism’ is only applied to opponents suggests that there is some similarity between ‘relativist* positions, in at least some senses of that word, and some other positions that people are interested in defending. (shrink)

This paper argues that Spinoza makes a distinction between the constitutive essence of God (the totality of His attributes) and the essence of God per se (His power and causal efficacy). Using this distinction, I explain how Spinoza can conceive of God as being both an immutable simple unity and a subject for constantly changing modes. Spinoza believes that God qua Natura Naturans is immutable, while God qua Natura Naturata is not. With this point established, Curley’s claim that Spinozistic modes (...) are causally dependent on but not properties of God loses much of its attraction. In conclusion, I suggest how God’s essence is related to His attributes and His modes. (shrink)

While avoiding relativism, Rorty claims that: (1) truth is just for a time and a place; (2) ?truth? and ?rationality? are indexed to a community's standards of warranted assertibility; and (3) there is nothing more to be said about truth and rationality than is contained, in a community's procedures for evaluating claims. He makes these assertions because he believes that the cautionary uses of ?true? and ?rational? crucially depend upon the endorsing uses of these terms. I argue that Rorty is (...) wrong in this belief and that the principle of charity assures us that in their cautionary uses ?true? and ?rational? are independent of any idiosyncracies associated with any community's current standards of justification. (shrink)

" -- Africa Today "The excellence of this book lies in the wealth of perspectives that it brings to the discussion on what constitutes philosophy, rationality, ...

Authors philosophical notes on life, conduct of life from the perspective of a life.

A comprehensive introduction to the ways in which meaning is conveyed in language. Alan Cruse covers semantic matters, but also deals with topics that are usually considered to fall under pragmatics. A major aim is to highlight the richness and subtlety of meaning phenomena, rather than to expound any particular theory. Rich in examples and exercises, Meaning in Language provides an invaluable descriptive approach to this area of linguistics for undergraduates and postgraduates alike.

This book: * assumes no mathematical background and keeps the technicalities to a minimum * explains the most important applications of probability theory to ...

In this entry we provide a critical review of recent work on the nature and ethics of blame, including issues of moral standing.

A record of the words and teachings of Confucius, _The Analects_ is considered the most reliable expression of Confucian thought. However, the original meaning of Confucius's teachings have been filtered and interpreted by the commentaries of Confucianists of later ages, particularly the Neo-Confucianists of the Song dynasty, not altogether without distortion.In this monumental translation by Professor D. C. Lau, an attempt has been made to interpret the sayings as they stand. The corpus of the sayings is taken as an organic (...) whole and the final test of the interpretation rests on the internal consistency it exhibits. In other words, _The Analects_ is read in the light of _The Analects._This results in a truer understanding of Confucius' thought than the traditional interpretation and paves the way for a re-assessment of its importance in the history of Chinese thought and its relevance to the present day world.This volume also contains an introduction to the life and teachings of Confucius, and three appendices on the events in the life of Confucius, on his disciples, and on the composition of _The Analects._. (shrink)

In the preface of this book, Loscerbo states that "the work has no pretense to 'criticize' in the sense of 'refuting'--which task we leave to those more able". In fact, Loscerbo makes little attempt either to criticize or evaluate critically Heidegger's work on technology. Rather, the book gives us a general reading of Heidegger's thought as a whole which focuses loosely on the question concerning the essence of technology. Loscerbo organizes his interpretation of Heidegger according to two principles, one microscopic, (...) the other macroscopic. Microscopically the book is a series of elucidative essays, each of which concentrates almost exclusively on a single Heideggerian text. It is one of the virtues of this book that the range of texts considered is quite broad, and many of the texts discussed relate only tangentially to technology. On the other hand, this series of interpretive essays is arranged according to a three-fold division. The first part of the book consists of an examination of the historical origins of modern technology, the second part attempts a "metaphysical" exposition of the Being of beings in the modern, technological world, and the third part considers technology "out of Being as its own self- sending, which expression means as much as Being as 'die Lichtung des Sichverbergenden'". In practice, this division amounts to a section which considers a group of Heideggerian texts which focus on the history of philosophy, or the history of Being, a section which focuses directly on Heidegger's work specifically concerning technology, and a section which deals with Heideggerian texts which concentrate on the "truth-untruth" structure of Being. For the real subject of this book is neither Being nor technology, but rather, primarily, Heidegger's thought concerning Being, and secondarily, his thought concerning technology. (shrink)

The Greeks have long been regarded as innovators across a wide range of fields in literature, culture, philosophy, politics and science. However, little attention has been paid to how they thought and felt about novelty and innovation itself, and to relating this to the forces of traditionalism and conservatism which were also present across all the various societies within ancient Greece. What inspired the Greeks to embark on their unique and enduring innovations? How did they think and feel about the (...) new? This book represents the first serious attempt to address these issues, and deals with the phenomenon across all periods and areas of classical Greek history and thought. Each chapter concentrates on a different area of culture or thought, while the book as a whole argues that much of the impulse towards innovation came from the life of the polis which provided its setting. (shrink)