Despite a misleading title, a superfluous introduction, and a dubious concluding argument, this book succeeds in demonstrating the unorthodox thesis that a concept of a "history of reason" is "genuine and central" to Kant’s system. The first part demonstrates a decisive and highly problematic shift in Kant’s practical philosophy, where a synthesis of morality and nature, the idea of the highest good, is made the object of duty. In this way the highest good, initially a "rational version of the notion (...) of the next world," becomes Kant’s regulative idea of history, "the kingdom of God on earth," comprising both "inner disposition and external institution". The ability to realize the highest good is a logical condition of the concept of duty and a "psychological condition of the ‘inner act’ of intention". The latter condition, Yovel suggests, explains why Kant identifies the ground of this ability with God. The sole objective significance of Kant’s idea of God, however, is said to reside in duty’s logical condition, viz., "the assertion that the given world is the highest good in potentia, and that human praxis can make it so actually". Though much more needs to be said, Yovel thus makes a strong case that Kant’s concept of God is "only a subjective decor" and "strictly humanistic". (shrink)

Beschouwingen van de hoogleraar voor kennisleer en metafysica aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam over regelpatronen.

The problem the author sets himself in this historico-critical study of the post-Kantian development of the a priori is: Can one understand the nature of the a priori as part of the explanation of knowledge, without assigning it exclusively to the subject and without radically identifying the a priori and the a posteriori? Dufrenne thinks this can be done by retaining a dualism of subject and object. Well-written and scholarly. An index would have been helpful.--D. D. O.

D.O. Thomas; VI*—The Duty to Trust, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 79, Issue 1, 1 June 1979, Pages 89–102, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian.

D.O. Thomas; VI*—The Duty to Trust, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 79, Issue 1, 1 June 1979, Pages 89–102, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian.

D. O. Thomas; XIII—Obedience to Conscience, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 64, Issue 1, 1 June 1964, Pages 243–258, https://doi.org/10.1093/ari.

The term "Middle Platonism" is used as a classification of those who professed some form of Platonic philosophy between the end of the third Academy and the beginning of "Neoplatonism". The evidence which survives concerning the "Middle" Platonists is not on the whole of great philosophical interest, but has been given increasing attention in recent years for the reason that the Middle Platonists are to some extent heirs to the Academy and ancestors to Neoplatonism. Middle Platonism is also of interest (...) to intellectual historians as an important intellectual force in the literary and religious life of the Roman Empire. For an introduction to Middle Platonism, the English-speaking non-expert has had to turn to Merlan’s rather compressed account in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy. He now will be able to avail of Dillon’s detailed and compendious survey. (shrink)

Purpose. The aim of the article is to clarify the content of the concept of culture as an explication of vitality within the philosophy of life and its further modifications in current problems of contemporary. The analysis performed standing from the point, that contrasting of nature and culture is irrelevant, since culture does not contradict natural determinants and patterns, but rather qualitatively alters them. So, are justified the idea of culture as a phenomenon that exist accordingly and in proportion to (...) nature, need to form its potential and content and not contradict the axioms and values of life. Theoretical basis. In the theoretical field of philosophy of life, the local development of the problem of culture as an explication of vitality produces grounds for analytical and prognostic activity concerning meaningful transformations in a separate historical and social horizon. The fundamental categories of culture: spirit, value, symbol, freedom, justice and harmony receive the requested content and meaning. The idea of the constancy and super-naturality of cultural universals is illusory and dangerous. The consequences of such a "non-cosmological" justification of freedom and will, and the assertion of values, that contradict the logic of life, are the global environmental, economic and social crisis of our time. Originality. The originality of the authors’ thought lies in the interpretation of the essence of culture as an explication of vitality, as a logical and natural extension of life. In this formulation of the problem of culture, the possibility of reconciling the natural, social and value determinants of human life is formed. Theorists of the philosophy of life substantiated the primacy and supremacy of the values of life over the values and meanings of culture. The position of authors position consists in the need to understand culture as an environmentally appropriate and dimensional phenomenon, the content and strategies of which are determined by a single ontology. Conclusions. The analysis let authors understand the voluntarily chaotic element of life. Culture in its philosophical analysis took on a clearer anthropomorphic dimension: the immanent logic of being in substantiating the essence and purpose of man and the value of his being localized the universe of transcendence in the concept of "living world", "inhabited space", "human, too human". Accordingly, the range of cultural evaluations has been polarized: from the approving statement of its vital essence, to the disparaging calls for its reform. The chaotic state of voluntarily acts is transformed into cultural codes and stereotypes by rationalization. The modern global nature of crisis phenomena, both in the worldview, in the social, and in the ecological dimension, requires reformatting the understanding of culture as a continuation of nature, and not its antipode. (shrink)

We give here alternative definitions for the notions that S. Shelah has introduced in recent papers: the dimensional order property and the depth of a theory. We will also give a proof that the depth of a countable theory, when defined, is an ordinal recursive in T.

Richard Price argued for democratic institutions on the ground that each individual has a moral responsibility for the good government of his community. This assumption that political responsibilities are moral responsibilities was in turn derived from the belief that each individual has a continuous duty to create in his own personality and in his relations with his fellow men the conditions of the virtuous life. Popular political responsibility was thus defended by the extension of a rigorous moral athleticism into the (...) sphere of social arrangements. The dominating feature of this demand for comprehensive reform and reconstruction is the attempt to construe the moral life as a process in which the individual struggles to recreate himself in the light of his most mature conceptions. These conceptions, Price maintained, are determined rationally, and that they are so is presented in two different ways. Either as in the case of the principles of moral judgment they are held to be the objects of a rational intuition; or as in the defence of democratic institutions they are derived from an abstract construction of the demands of moral personality. (shrink)

AT Historia Animalium 561b27, during the course of his account of chick embryology, Aristotle notes : . D'Arcy Thompson translated this passage as follows: About the twentieth day, if you open the egg and touch the chick, it moves inside and chirps, and it is already coming to be covered in down when, after the twentieth day is past, the chick begins to break the shell.

When can one say that a new theory is truer than the old one it contradicts, even though neither is absolutely true? We are primarily concerned with the case in which the conflicting theories offer answers to the same questions, and so we do not introduce considerations of "logical width". We propose that part of the new theory is truer than part of the old one when the former part gets right whatever the latter-part got right while the former does (...) not make any new mistakes. Pragmatic considerations will determine the relative importance of whatever new mistakes the new theory does make as a whole. To avoid artificial counterexamples, we restrict the parts compared to those that are "convex". A "convex" theory is one that holds in all cases intermediate between any two cases in which it holds. (shrink)