Dramatic changes in medical technology challenge mankind’s traditional ways of diagnosing death. Death, Brain Death and Ethics examines the concept of death against the background of these changes, as well as ethical and philosophical issues arising from attempts to redefine the boundaries of life. In this book, David Lamb supports the use of brain-related criteria for the diagnosis of death, and proposes a new clinical definition of death based on both medical and philosophical principles. Death, Brain Death and Ethics articulates (...) the case for a brain death standard, while presenting an informed viewpoint on what constitutes the end points of human life. Although the book is written from a philosophical standpoint, it raises fundamental questions regarding the meaning of life and death, and will interest lay-persons, lawyers, and physicians. Death, Brain Death and Ethics is sure to prompt discussion and reflection on some of the philosophical beliefs which underlie clinical practice. (shrink)

This stimulating collection is devoted to the life and work of the most flamboyant of twentieth-century philosophers, Paul Feyerabend. Feyerabend's radical epistemological claims, and his stunning argument that there is no such thing as scientific method, were highly influential during his life and have only gained attention since his death in 1994. The essays that make up this volume, written by some of today's most respected philosophers of science, many of whom knew Feyerabend as students and colleagues, cover the diverse (...) themes in his extensive body of work and present a personal account of this fascinating thinker. (shrink)

A `slippery slope' argument in medical ethics is one that opposes itself to a new proposal on the grounds that it is not _per se_ intolerable but will lead to a situation that is. Lamb evaluates such arguments, demonstrating their centrality to the subject.

A `slippery slope' argument in medical ethics is one that opposes itself to a new proposal on the grounds that it is not per se intolerable but will lead to a situation that is. Lamb evaluates such arguments, demonstrating their centrality to the subject.

A `slippery slope' argument in medical ethics is one that opposes itself to a new proposal on the grounds that it is not _per se_ intolerable but will lead to a situation that is. Lamb evaluates such arguments, demonstrating their centrality to the subject.

In this reply to David J Cole it is argued that the medical concept of death as an irreversible phenomenon is correct and that it does not conflict with ordinary concepts of death.

Originally published in 1987, this volume reflects the diversity in Hegelianism and every branch of philosophy which he contributed to. It includes essays on his contribution to contemporary social philosophy, logic and the philosophy of religion. His work is examined in relation to Marx, Wittgenstein and his social philosophy discussed from a feminist standpoint.

Originally published in 1990, this study of the moral problems bound up with transplant therapy addresses a finely balanced distinction between ethical issues relating to its experimental nature on the one hand and those which arise when transplantation is routine on the other. Among the issues examined are proposals for routine cadaveric harvesting, criteria for organ and tissue procurement from living donors, foetuses, non-human animals and current ethical problems with artificial implants. Written as a contribution to practical philosophy, this book (...) will interest ethicists and health care professionals. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: Down the Slippery Slope: Arguing in Applied Ethics. By David Lamb.

This paper examines the development of the concept of brain death and of the criteria necessary for its recognition. Competing formulations of brain death are assessed and the case for a ‘brainstem’ concept of death is argued. Attention is finally drawn to some of the ethical issues raised by the use of neurological criteria in the diagnosis of human death.

Is the Search for Extra Terrestrial Intelligence a genuine scientific research programme? David Lamb evaluates claims and counter-claims, and examines recent attempts to establish contact with other intelligent life forms. He considers the benefits and drawbacks of this communication, how we should communicate and whether we actually can. He also assesses competing theories on the origin of life on Earth, discoveries of former solar planets, proposals for space colonies and the consequent technical and ethical issues.

Papers delivered at the joint meeting of the Hegel Society of America and the Hegel Society of Great Britain held at Merton College, Oxford, Sept. 1-4, 1981, to mark the 150th anniversary of Hegel's death. Includes bibliographical references and index.

In this commentary on the recommendations of the Danish Council of Ethics (DCE) concerning criteria for death it is argued that whilst the DCE is correct in stressing the cultural aspects of death, its adoption of cardiac-oriented criteria raises several problems. There are problems with its notion of a 'death process', which purportedly begins with brain death and ends with cessation of cardiac function, and there are serious problems regarding its commitment to a cardiac-oriented definition whilst permitting transplantation when the (...) heart is still beating. (shrink)

This paper is a reply to proposals to base priority health-care decisions on public opinion surveys. Whilst it is recognised that current practice is less than satisfactory, it is argued here that basing health-care priorities on societal attitudes in this way is not a solution and does not provide a satisfactory basis for bringing democracy to the health service.

This is a two-volume study of the work of 18th-century German philosopher Georg Hegel. When studying Hegel's work it is notoriously difficult to find a starting point. Volume I begins with his views on moral issues and progresses through political and legal theory and property and punishment. Volume II explores Hegel's ideas of logic, freedom and recognition, science, aesthetics, religion and feminism in the 20th century.

Is the Search for Extra Terrestrial Intelligence a genuine scientific research programme? David Lamb evaluates claims and counter-claims, and examines recent attempts to establish contact with other intelligent life forms. He considers the benefits and drawbacks of this communication, how we should communicate and whether we actually can. He also assesses competing theories on the origin of life on Earth, discoveries of former solar planets, proposals for space colonies and the consequent technical and ethical issues.

This reply to Martyn Evans's support for a cardiac-centered concept of death attempts to meet some objections to the brainstem definition of death. Evans's appeal to Wittgenstein's philosophy is also criticised.

Autonomous decision-making over therapy options is not reducible to the refusal of unwanted medical intervention. This is a myth that has been imported from questionable assumptions in political economy, and is of little benefit to medical practice and the sometimes agonizing decisions which have to be taken by patients and their relatives. An individual's right to therapy abatement can be protected from abuse only in the context of a full understanding of autonomous choice; not merely the right to refuse, but (...) the opportunity to receive assistance and consider alternatives. Limits are also required on the role of the surrogate in the refusal of therapy. Policies endorsing therapy abatement and exercise of the right to forego life-sustaining therapy should carry cast iron guarantees that they will not be disadvantageous to the poor and undereducated members of society. It should also be noted that fears of unlimited life-prolongation have been greatly exaggerated. In an atmosphere of governmental indifference to the plight of the sick, with the notion of welfare tuned to market forces, there is a danger that self-determination can have a restricted meaning; the option of death in the context of an underfunded health service. This may not be the time to campaign for the right to refuse therapy, but rather the time to campaign for improvements to existing therapy. (shrink)

This reply to P Whitaker's `Resource allocation: a plea for a touch of realism' acknowledges that health-care ethics should be relevant to events in the real world, but questions the extent to which philosophical inquiry should be confined to parameters determined by existing sociopolitical forces. The reading of the daily paper is the morning prayer of the realist.

l examine Singer’s analogy between human liberation movements and animal liberation movements. Two lines of criticism of animal liberation are rejected: (1) that animal-liberation is not as serious as human liberation since humans have interests which override those of animals; (2) that the concept of animal liberation blurs distinctions between what is appropriate for humans and what is appropriate foranimals. As an alternative I otfer a distinction between reform movements and liberation movements, arguing that while Singer meets the criterion for (...) the former, a higher degree of autonomy and communicative competence is necessary for the latter. In the final section, objections to the possibility of an autonomous animal liberation movement are met by rejecting assumptions concerning the illogicality of interspecies communication. (shrink)

l examine Singer’s analogy between human liberation movements and animal liberation movements. Two lines of criticism of animal liberation are rejected: (1) that animal-liberation is not as serious as human liberation since humans have interests which override those of animals; (2) that the concept of animal liberation blurs distinctions between what is appropriate for humans and what is appropriate foranimals. As an alternative I otfer a distinction between reform movements and liberation movements, arguing that while Singer meets the criterion for (...) the former, a higher degree of autonomy and communicative competence is necessary for the latter. In the final section, objections to the possibility of an autonomous animal liberation movement are met by rejecting assumptions concerning the illogicality of interspecies communication. (shrink)

Introducing Applied Ethics Edited by Brenda Almond, Blackwell, 1995. Pp. 375. ISBN 0-631-19389-8. 45.00 (hbk), 14.99 (pbk). Environmental Ethics Edited by Robert Elliot, Oxford University Press, 1995. Pp. 255. ISBN 9-19-875144-3. 9.95 (pbk) Medicine and Moral Reasoning Edited by K.W.M. Fulford, Grant Gillett and Janet Martin Soskice Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. 207. ISBN 0-521-45325-9 37.50 (hbk), 12.95 (pbk). Enlightenment and Religion. Rational Dissent in Eighteenth-century Britain Edited by Knud Haakonssen, Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. xii + 348. ISBN 0-521-56060-8. (...) 40.00. Dialettica, Arte e Societ : Saggio su Theodor W. Adorno By Giacomo Rinaldi, Quattroventi, Urbino, 1994. Pp. 205. L. 30,000. Relevance: Communication and Cognition, new revised edition, By Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, Blackwell, 1995. Pp. 326. ISBN 0-631-19878-4. 15.99. Autobiographical Reflections By Eric Voegelin (Edited, with Introduction, by Ellis Sandoz), Louisiana State University Press, 1996. Pp. 131. ISBN 0807120766 $10.95. (shrink)

This paper examines the development of the concept of brain death and of the criteria necessary for its recognition. Competing formulations of brain death are assessed and the case for a ‘brainstem’ concept of death is argued. Attention is finally drawn to some of the ethical issues raised by the use of neurological criteria in the diagnosis of human death.

This reply to John F Catherwood's criticism of brain-related criteria for death argues that brainstem criteria are neither reductionist nor do they presuppose a materialist theory of mind. Furthermore, it is argued that brain-related criteria are compatible with the majority of religious views concerning death.

A popular view among philosophers is that creativity and scientific discovery should be excluded from philosophical analysis. This book argues against this and suggests that a rational account of creativity is possible. Various approaches to creativity and discovery are examined.