1. Introduction Ce numéro spécial dédié aux corpus d’ancien et moyen français, à leur constitution et à leur exploitation, vient après bien d’autres numéros de revues présentantl’usage des corpus en linguistique depuis une dizaine d’années. Mais celui-ci est spécifiquement consacré aux corpus concernant les périodes les plus anciennes de la langue, c’est-à-dire aux formes et pratiques linguistiques qui sont les plus différentes de ce que connaît et pratique le locuteur moderne, et pour lesque..

1. Introduction Ce numéro spécial dédié aux corpus d’ancien et moyen français, à leur constitution et à leur exploitation, vient après bien d’autres numéros de revues présentantl’usage des corpus en linguistique depuis une dizaine d’années. Mais celui-ci est spécifiquement consacré aux corpus concernant les périodes les plus anciennes de la langue, c’est-à-dire aux formes et pratiques linguistiques qui sont les plus différentes de ce que connaît et pratique le locuteur moderne, et pour lesque...

Ce volume d’hommage s’ouvre, après l’introduction des coordinateurs, par quelques pages de reproductions iconographiques (enluminures, manuscrits médiévaux) en lien avec certains centres d’intérêt de C. Marchello-Nizia, suivies de la liste de ses publications, puis d’un récit à trois mains dans lequel Bernard Cerquiglini, Jacqueline Cerquiglini-Toulet et Michèle Perret évoquent la constitution et la vie du Groupe de Linguistique romane (1971-1980) fondé en grande partie à l’instigation de C. ..

Ce volume d’hommage s’ouvre, après l’introduction des coordinateurs, par quelques pages de reproductions iconographiques (enluminures, manuscrits médiévaux) en lien avec certains centres d’intérêt de C. Marchello-Nizia, suivies de la liste de ses publications, puis d’un récit à trois mains dans lequel Bernard Cerquiglini, Jacqueline Cerquiglini-Toulet et Michèle Perret évoquent la constitution et la vie du Groupe de Linguistique romane (1971-1980) fondé en grande partie à l’instigation de C....

This essay aims to show that implicit biases should not be conceived of as “inside the head” of individuals, but rather as embodied and social. My argument unfolds in three stages. First, I make the case for conceiving of implicit biases as perceptual habits. Second, I argue that we should think of perceptual habits and, by extension, implicit biases, as located in the body. Third, I claim that individual habits are shaped by the social world in which we find ourselves (...) and that the social world is itself shaped by our habitual ways of interacting with and perceiving others. This suggests that implicit biases are part of the fabric of the social world. Thus, I conclude that implicit biases should be understood as embodied and social. (shrink)

This study investigates how diverse European legal systems and financial structures influence corporate social and environmental responsibility. The argument is developed by means of a framework that integrates legal systems and financial structures. Hypotheses relating to environmental responsibility have been tested using Innovest data gathered between 2002 and 2007 from 645 companies in 16 countries; and hypotheses relating to social responsibility have been tested using Innovest data gathered between 2004 and 2007 from 600 companies. The findings demonstrate that legal systems (...) influence corporate responsibility (CR) in both social and environmental spheres. They also support the claim that corporations are more likely to act in environmentally responsible ways when there are strong and well-enforced state regulations in place to ensure such behavior. Company size is shown to have a greater impact on CR than either excess cash or performance. Large companies tend to be more visible than small ones do, and society expects them to behave in a more socially and environmentally responsible manner regardless of their financial performance or available cash. Finally, these findings support the hypothesis that capital structure significantly influences CR: companies with a high number of publicly held shares and a low percentage of debt are more likely than others to commit themselves to social and environmental activities. (shrink)

In recent debates on phenomenal consciousness, a distinction is sometimes made, after Levine (2001) and Kriegel (2009), between the “qualitative character” of an experience, i.e. the specific way it feels to the subject (e.g. blueish or sweetish or pleasant), and its “subjective character”, i.e. the fact that there is anything at all that it feels like to her. I argue that much discussion of subjective character is affected by a conflation between three different notions. I start by disentangling the three (...) notions in question, under the labels of “for-me-ness”, “me-ness” and “mineness”. Next, I argue that these notions are not equivalent; in particular, there is no conceptual implication from for-me-ness to me-ishness or mineness. Empirical considerations based on clinical cases additionally suggest that the three notions may also correspond to different properties (although the claim of conceptual non-equivalence does not depend on this further point). The aim is clarificatory, cautionary but also critical: I examine four existing arguments from subjective character that are fuelled by an undifferentiated use of the three notions, and find them to be flawed for this reason. (shrink)

Recent debates on phenomenal consciousness have shown renewed interest for the idea that experience generally includes an experience of the self – a self-experience – whatever else it may present the self with. When a subject has an ordinary experience (as of a bouncing red ball, for example), the thought goes, she is not just phenomenally aware of the world as being presented in a certain way (a bouncy, reddish, roundish way in this case); she is also phenomenally aware of (...) the fact that it is presented to her. This supposed phenomenal dimension has been variously called “mineness”, “for-me-ness”, “pre-reflective self-awareness” and “subjective character”, among others. This view, associated with historical figures such as William James, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, is attracting a new surge of attention at the crossroads of phenomenology, analytic philosophy of mind and the philosophy of cognitive science, but also intense controversy. This book explores some of the questions running through the ongoing debate on the putative subjective dimension of experience: Does it exist?, the existence question; What is it?, the essence question; What is it for?, the function question; and What else does it explain?, the explanation question. The volume also surveys various domains of human experience, both normal and pathological, where a “sense of self” might be at play, including agency, bodily awareness, introspection, memory, emotions and values, and offers insights into the possible relations between the notions of subjective awareness involved. The first part of the book is devoted to more sceptical or deflationary views about self-experience, and the second, to more robust ones. (shrink)

Philosophy as Dialogue is a curious collection of papers: it brings together an eclectic set of Putnam’s writings on various topics, from realism to ethics, from perception to quantum mechanics, al...

The ability to reflect on and monitor memory processes is one of the most investigated metamemory functions, and one of the important ways consciousnesses interacts with memory. The feeling-of-knowing is one task used to evaluate individual’s capacity to monitor their memory. We examined this reflective function of metacognition in older adults. We explored the contribution of metacognition to episodic memory impairment, in relation to the idea that older adults show a reduction in memory awareness characteristic of episodic memory. A first (...) experiment showed that age affects the accuracy of FOK when predictions are made on an episodic memory task but not on a semantic memory task, suggesting a particular role for episodic memory awareness in metacognitive evaluations. A second experiment showed that the age-difference in episodic FOK accuracy was removed if one took into account subjective reports of memory awareness, or recollection. We argue that the FOK deficit specific to episodic memory is based on a lack of memory awareness manifest as a recollection deficit. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering takes a distinctively normative and reconstructive approach to our conceptual repertoire. This approach is congenial to the ideas defended by philosophers belonging to the multifaceted tradition of American and Cambridge Pragmatism. This special issue is devoted to the investigation and development of these connections. Our introduction maps some of the historical and theoretical entanglements between the two fields and gives a short overview of the contributions to the special issue.

This study investigates how one important accounting professional authority—CPA Canada—discusses accounting ethics and exhorts its members to think about ethics-related issues. To do this, we rely on empirical evidence of the types of arguments used by CPA Canada to describe what they consider acceptable moral justifications in a variety of practical situations that accountants may encounter. We argue that the articles contained in the profession’s primary publication for all members, CPA Magazine, offer a wealth of such evidence. We analyze 237 (...) articles about accounting ethics that were published in CPA Magazine from January 2000 to December 2017, and find evidence of moral pluralism. Six categories of justifications dominate: private commitments, utility, perfectionist ends, general duties, and specific obligations, plus self-interest. Of these categories, the specific obligations logic is the most widely used. We offer a tentative explanation, and discuss the implications of our findings for a better grasp of the complexities of accountants’ practical conflicts and a rethink of the ongoing tension between professionalism and commercialism. (shrink)

In this article, I draw an important distinction between two kinds of inquiry. “Framed inquiries” take for granted and use a conceptual framework in order to ask and answer questions, while “framing inquiries” require the creation, revision, or expansion of the conceptual framework itself in order to address the problem at hand. This distinction has been largely ignored in epistemology, and collapsed by two radically opposed philosophical camps: representationalism and antirepresentationalism. While the former takes all inquiries to be in the (...) business of discovering mind-independent facts, the latter takes all inquiries to be primarily governed by pragmatic considerations. Against the objections raised by both camps, I defend a pragmatist and substantive distinction between framed and framing inquiry, inspired by Rudolf Carnap’s distinction between internal and external questions and reformulated in terms of John Dewey’s theory of inquiry. (shrink)

We adapted the Bubbles procedure [Vis. Res. 41 (2001) 2261] to examine the effective use of information during the first 282 ms of face identification. Ten participants each viewed a total of 5100 faces sub-sampled in space–time. We obtained a clear pattern of effective use of information: the eye on the left side of the image became diagnostic between 47 and 94 ms after the onset of the stimulus; after 94 ms, both eyes were used effectively. This preference for the (...) eyes increased with practice, and was not solely due to the informativeness of the eyes for the task at hand. The bias for the eye on the left side of the image is explained in terms of hemispheric specialization. Although there were individual differences, most participants exhibited this pattern of effective use of information. An intriguing finding is that most participants displayed a clear sinusoidal modulation of effective use of attention through time with a frequency of about 10.6 Hz. (shrink)

This chapter examines Dewey’s view of moral knowledge developed in Chapter 14 of the Ethics. I focus more specifically on the role played by sympathy in moral inquiry. While Dewey claims that sympathy is “the general principle of moral knowledge” as well as “the surest way to attain objectivity of moral knowledge,” it has not been the object of any extensive discussion by commentators on Dewey’s ethics. I emphasize the originality of Dewey’s position by contrasting it with that of David (...) Hume, Adam Smith, and John Stuart Mill, who all stressed the fundamental role of sympathy in making moral judgments. Accordingly, I examine their respective answers to the moral problem raised by natural sympathy: how can such a biased and partial psychological mechanism play a beneficial role in the formation of moral judgments, which specifically aim at impartiality and objectivity? I will argue that while Hume, Smith, and Mill choose to simply extend the scope of natural sympathy, Dewey argues in favor of a deeper transformation of natural sympathy: (1) the spontaneous emotional reaction becomes intentional perspective-taking; (2) it loses its function of direct approval or disapproval, and takes on an epistemic function of data-gathering subordinated to moral reasoning. (shrink)

Companies face a dilemma between what society as a whole demands and the necessity of being economically efficient and creating value for all stakeholders. Why some companies take it upon themselves to be socially responsible while others not? I argue that companies act in a socially responsible way when social necessity is combined with a global low reputation. This paper provides a theoretical insight into reflection on the roles of companies within a society.

The effects of aging on the cognitive and affective dimensions of theory of mind , and on the latter’s links with other cognitive processes, such as information processing speed, executive functions and episodic memory, are still unclear. We therefore investigated these effects in young , middle-aged and older adults , using separate subjective and objective assessment tasks. Furthermore, a novel composite task probed participants’ abilities to infer both cognitive and affective mental states in an interpersonal context. Although age affected the (...) objective ToM tests, results revealed a direct aging effect on the second-order ToM, but an indirect one on the first-order cognitive ToM, mediated mainly by age-related declines in executive functions. This study supports the notion of an age-related distinction between subjective and objective assessments of ToM, and confirms that ToM is a complex mental ability with several characteristics reliant to some extent on executive processes. (shrink)

This research applies the notion of sustainability (Barney, 1991; Braa, Monteiro, & Sahay, 2004) to the mechanisms used by socially responsible investment(SRI) firms with respect to their stakeholders (investors and target firms). A contrast is developed between US and UK SRI firms. It is noted that screens, while maintaining a strong investor base, are less sustainable from the perspective of the firms targeted by SRI funds, whereas advocacy has stronger elements of sustainability with respect to the relations with corporations.

We adapted the Bubbles procedure [Vis. Res. 41 (2001) 2261] to examine the effective use of information during the first 282 ms of face identification. Ten participants each viewed a total of 5100 faces sub-sampled in space–time. We obtained a clear pattern of effective use of information: the eye on the left side of the image became diagnostic between 47 and 94 ms after the onset of the stimulus; after 94 ms, both eyes were used effectively. This preference for the (...) eyes increased with practice, and was not solely due to the informativeness of the eyes for the task at hand. The bias for the eye on the left side of the image is explained in terms of hemispheric specialization. Although there were individual differences, most participants exhibited this pattern of effective use of information. An intriguing finding is that most participants displayed a clear sinusoidal modulation of effective use of attention through time with a frequency of about 10.6 Hz. (shrink)

This commentary came from within the framework of integrating the humanities in medicine and from accompanying research on disease-related issues by teams involving clinicians and researchers in medical humanities. The purpose is to reflect on the challenges faced by researchers when conducting emotionally laden research and on how they impact observations and subsequent research findings. This commentary is furthermore a call to action since it promotes the institutionalization of a supportive context for medical humanities researchers who have not been trained (...) to cope with sensitive medical topics in research. To that end, concrete recommendations regarding training and supervision were formulated. (shrink)

Comment passer de la réflexion esthétique sur les atmosphères à une pratique architecturale des atmosphères? En suivant les Leçons d’esthétique du philosophe allemand Gernot Böhme, nous analysons la façon dont leur esprit est mis en œuvre par l’architecte suisse Peter Zumthor. Comment le sentiment fondamental de la présence est-il principiel dans le projet du plus grand musée d’art de Los Angeles? Composée de propositions concrètes, l’enjeu de l’esthétique envisagée ici tient moins de la détermination de l’œuvre d’art que du sentiment (...) de liberté qu’éprouvent des sujets dans le site qui leur est offert. (shrink)

Si le développement du web a rendu accessibles des masses de données numériques, facilitant la collecte de textes et le développement de corpus, il a également donné naissance à de nouveaux genres qui défient les représentations, les méthodes et les grilles d’analyses développées jusqu’à présent. Ainsi a-t-on vu apparaître des corpus assez éloignés des premiers corpus écrits traditionnels, regroupés sous la bannière de la CMR (Communication Médiée par les Réseaux / Computer-Mediated Communica...

The indexical word “I” has traditionally been assumed to be an overt analogue to the concept of self, and the best model for understanding it. This approach, I argue, overlooks the essential role of cognitive phenomenology in the mastery of the concept of self. I suggest that a better model is to be found in a different kind of representation: phenomenal concepts or more generally phenomenally grounded concepts. I start with what I take to be the defining feature of the (...) concept of self, namely its “super-reflexivity”: to use this concept is not just to think of oneself, but to think of oneself as the thinker of the present thought. I call this familiar observation the “Thinker Intuition”. I review some shortcomings of the indexical model of the concept of self, which is the classical account of the Thinker Intuition. I go on to propose a different account, the “phenomenal model”, according to which the concept of self is a phenomenally grounded concept, anchored in a generic kind of cognitive phenomenolog... (shrink)

This paper analyses the nature of the relationship between risk and responsibility. Since neither the concept of risk nor the concept of responsibility has an unequivocal definition, it is obvious that there is no single interpretation of their relationship. After introducing the different meanings of responsibility used in this paper, we analyse four conceptions of risk. This allows us to make their link with responsibility explicit and to determine if a shift in the connection between risk and responsibility can be (...) outlined. (1) In the engineer’s paradigm, the quantitative conception of risk does not include any concept of responsibility. Their relationship is indirect, the locus of responsibility being risk management. (2) In Mary Douglas’ cultural theory, risks are constructed through the responsibilities they engage. (3) Rayner and (4) Wolff go further by integrating forms of responsibility in the definition of risk itself. Analysis of these four frameworks shows that the concepts of risk and responsibility are increasingly intertwined. This tendency is reinforced by increasing public awareness and a call for the integration of a moral dimension in risk management. Therefore, we suggest that a form of virtue-responsibility should also be integrated in the concept of risk. (shrink)

The singular position of Montesquieu's political philosophy seems to raise the question: Isn't the opposition between republicanism and liberalism a largely artificial one? On the one hand, the description of the republican vivere civile in the Spirit of the Laws testifies to the important ties that exist between Montesquieu and the tradition of ?civic humanism?. However, this apparent theoretical proximity between Montesquieu and the British Neo-Harringtonians ought not to be taken too far, obscuring the deep divergences that differentiate their respective (...) positions, notably when it comes to the interpretation of history. Montesquieu's break from the republican tradition is exemplified by his rejection of its conception of freedom rooted in the citizens' necessary participation in power. But in the end, this does not enable us to conclude that he subscribes to a purely liberal theory. The British model shows that even if direct participation in the exercise of power is not necessary for the existence of liberty, a certain level of civic involvement and public awareness is needed. The liberal opposition between positive and negative liberty, political autonomy and enjoyment of rights without interference must therefore be transcended. (shrink)

Religious organisations are major investors with sometimes substantial investment volumes. An important question for them is how to make investments in, and to earn returns from, companies and activities that are consistent with their religious beliefs or that even support these beliefs. Religious organisations have pioneered responsible investment. Yet little is known about their investment attitudes. This article addresses this gap by studying faith consistent investing. Based on a survey complemented by interviews, we investigate religious organisations’ attitudes towards responsible investment (...) including opinions, practices and the impediments for implementing faith consistent investing. Although our results cannot be generalised because of the non-random character of our sample, six main characteristics of faith consistent investing are drawn: investing is not perceived as being in contradiction with religious values, religious values are important drivers, there is a strong community around faith consistent investing, religious investors are pioneering impact investing, implementing faith consistent investing is not without difficulties, and practices vary across regions. The survey also reveals that faith consistent investing has many commonalities with secular responsible investors. (shrink)

Improving working conditions at the bottom of global value chains has become a central issue in our global economy. In this battle, trade unionism has been presented as a way for workers to make their voices heard. Therefore, it is strongly promoted by most social standards. However, establishing a well-functioning trade union is not as obvious as it may seem. Using a comparative case study approach, we examine impediments to farm-level unionism in the cut flower industry in Ethiopia. For this (...) purpose, we propose an integrated framework combining two lenses, namely a vertical one and a horizontal one. We identify 10 impediments that point to three major dimensions contributing to unionisation. These three dimensions include awareness of and interest from workers, legitimacy of trade unions, and capacity of trade unions to act. Furthermore, our results suggest that private social standards may, in certain cases, be counterproductive for the efficient functioning of trade unions. Although we argue that there is no ‘quick fix’ solution to weak workplace unionism at the bottom of global value chains, we stress the importance of considering the dynamics of, and interactions between, the impediments when designing potential support measures that mitigate negative impacts. (shrink)

It has recently been proposed that the framework of semantic relativism be put to use to describe mental content, as deployed in some of the fundamental operations of the mind. This programme has inspired in particular a novel strategy of accounting for the essential egocentricity of first-personal or de se thoughts in relativist terms, with the advantage of dispensing with a notion of self-representation. This paper is a critical discussion of this strategy. While it is based on a plausible appeal (...) to cognitive economy, the relativist theory does not fully account for the epistemic profile that distinguishes de se thinking, as some of its proponents hope to do. A deeper worry concerns the reliance of the theory on a primitive notion of “centre” that hasn’t yet received enough critical attention, and is ambiguous between a thin and a rich reading. I argue that while the rich reading is required if the relativist analysis of the de se is to achieve its most ambitious aims, it also deprives the theory of much of its explanatory power. (shrink)

The ethical matrix is a participatory tool designed to structure ethical reflection about the design, the introduction, the development or the use of technologies. Its collective implementation, in the context of participatory decision-making, has shown its potential usefulness. On the contrary, its implementation by a single researcher has not been thoroughly analyzed. The aim of this paper is precisely to assess the strength of ethical matrixes implemented by a single researcher as a tool for conceptual normative analysis related to technological (...) choices. Therefore, the ethical matrix framework is applied to the management of high-level radioactive waste, more specifically to retrievable and non-retrievable geological disposal. The results of this analysis show that the usefulness of ethical matrixes is twofold and that they provide a valuable input for further decision-making. Indeed, by using ethical matrixes, implicit ethically relevant issues were revealed—namely issues of equity associated with health impacts and differences between close and remote future generations regarding ethical impacts. Moreover, the ethical matrix framework was helpful in synthesizing and comparing systematically the ethical impacts of the technologies under scrutiny, and hence in highlighting the potential ethical conflicts. (shrink)

My essay discusses the politics of anger from a phenomenological perspective. Philosophers such as Martha Nussbaum have examined the importance of emotions for achieving social justice. In Anger and Forgiveness, Nussbaum criticizes most forms of anger for including the desire to retaliate, but identifies a species of anger, “Transition-Anger,” which can motivate us to respond to wrongdoing. In a similar vein, I claim that anger can help the oppressed respond to their oppression. To defend this claim, I consider cases in (...) which anger motivates a response to racial prejudice. These cases depict situations in which a black man is confronted with the gaze of a white person. By contrasting the phenomenology of skillful and unskillful activity, I explain why the white gaze can provoke a sense of disorientation and physical incapacitation—what I call “bodily alienation”—in the black man. I argue that anger can wrest a black person from this alienation. This is because anger encourages action and provides blacks with insight into their oppression. My argument implies that anger is instrumentally valuable for resisting racism. As such, it can play a positive role in redressing its harms. Yet the cases of anger I describe are tainted with desires for retaliation, and do not map onto the ideal form of Transition-Anger Nussbaum prizes. Still, anger should not be dismissed altogether: if it can transform the experiences of the oppressed for the better, then there is a place for this emotion in combating injustices. (shrink)

We argue that relating to myself as me provides, as such, a reason to care about myself: grasping that an event involves me, instead of another, makes it matter in a special way. Further, this self-concern is not simply a matter of seeing in myself some instrumental value for other ends. We use as our foil a recent skeptical challenge to this view offered in Setiya (2015). We think the case against self-concern is powered by unwarrantedly narrow construals of three (...) key notions. One is the notion of a first-personal way of relating to oneself. A narrow account of the first person in terms of special epistemic relations to oneself makes it easy to overlook a source of non-instrumental reasons of self-concern, located in the special relation a subject has to herself as agent. Two is the notion of what it is to be a reason. And three is the notion of self-concern itself. We show that the skeptical case rests in part on a slide towards neighbouring but distinct notions of egoism and selfishness. We also argue that Setiya’s notion of self-love, offered to capture the pre-theoretical intuition of self-concern, cannot do it justice. (shrink)

We argue that relating to myself as me provides, as such, a reason to care about myself: grasping that an event involves me, instead of another, makes it matter in a special way. Further, this self-concern is not simply a matter of seeing in myself some instrumental value for other ends. We use as our foil a recent skeptical challenge to this view offered in Setiya 2015. We think the case against self-concern is powered by unwarrantedly narrow construals of three (...) key notions. One is the notion of a first-personal way of relating to oneself. A narrow account of the first person in terms of special epistemic relations to oneself makes it easy to overlook a source of non-instrumental reasons of self-concern, located in the special relation a subject has to herself as agent. Two is the notion of what it is to be a reason. And, three, is the notion of self-concern itself. We show that the skeptical case rests in part on a slide towards neighbouring but distinct notions of egoism and selfishness. We also argue that Setiya’s notion of self-love, offered to capture the pre-theoretical intuition of self-concern, cannot do it justice. (shrink)

La Révolution française et certaines idées des Lumières ont produit une évolution radicale de sens du terme geming (révolution) qui, devenant un mot d’ordre, a engendré un nouveau courant de pensée à la fin de la dynastie des Qing. Connue tardivement en Chine, elle fut d’abord présentée comme négative pour prêcher une réforme politique d’urgence, devint ensuite un objet de polémiques qui opposèrent réformistes et révolutionnaires. Dans le même temps, le terme geming, qui désignait à l’origine le « changement de (...) mandat céleste », ne cessa de susciter des interprétations diverses selon la période et la position politique des commentateurs. L’objectif de cet article est d’interroger le processus de transformation de cette notion et de son adaptation à la réalité chinoise, afin de mieux mesurer en quoi consiste l’héritage de la Révolution française dans la construction de la Chine moderne. (shrink)

The literature concerning ethical issues associated with nanotechnologies has become prolific. However, it has been claimed that ethical problems are only at stake with rather sophisticated nanotechnologies such as active nanostructures, integrated nanosystems and heterogeneous molecular nanosystems, whereas more basic nanotechnologies such as passive nanostructures mainly pose technical difficulties. In this paper I argue that fundamental ethical issues are already at stake with this more basic kind of nanotechnologies and that ethics impacts every kind of nanotechnologies, already from the simplest (...) kind of engineered nanoproducts. These ethical issues are mainly associated with the social desirability of nanotechnologies, with the difficulties to define nanotechnologies properly, with the important uncertainties surrounding nanotechnologies, with the threat of ‘nano-divide’, and with nanotechnology as ‘dual-use technology’. (shrink)

The nuclear community frequently refers to the concept of “future generations” when discussing the management of high-level radioactive waste. However, this notion is generally not defined. In this context, we have to assume a wide definition of the concept of future generations, conceived as people who will live after the contemporary people are dead. This definition embraces thus each generation following ours, without any restriction in time. The aim of this paper is to show that, in the debate about nuclear (...) waste, this broad notion should be further specified and to clarify the related implications for nuclear waste management policies. Therefore, we provide an ethical analysis of different management strategies for high-level waste in the light of two principles, protection of future generations—based on safety and security—and respect for their choice. This analysis shows that high-level waste management options have different ethical impacts across future generations, depending on whether the memory of the waste and its location is lost, or not. We suggest taking this distinction into account by introducing the notions of “close future generations” and “remote future generations”, which has important implications on nuclear waste management policies insofar as it stresses that a retrievable disposal has fewer benefits than usually assumed. (shrink)

La Base de français médiéval (BFM) fait partie des corpus de français médiéval (9e-15e s.) les plus anciens et les plus utilisés par les linguistes diachroniciens et plus largement par tous ceux qui s’intéressent à l’histoire du français. Elle est le fruit d’une collaboration entre linguistes-philologues et spécialistes de la méthode textométrique implémentée dans la plateforme TXM. L’article présente un état des lieux du corpus BFM2022 focalisé sur la représentativité et l’interopérabilité des données. Il illustre l’apport des outils numériques pour (...) l’équilibrage des données et présente la stratégie de standardisation multi-niveau (structure textuelle, références, métadonnées, annotations) ayant permis à la Base de s’intégrer à des corpus diachroniques plus étendus pour des recherches en diachronie longue. (shrink)

One broadly recognised characteristic feature of (a core subset of) the self-attributions constitutive of self-knowledge is that they are ‘immune to error through misidentification’ (hereafter IEM). In the last thirty years, Evans’s notion of “identification-freedom” (Evans 1982) has been central to most classical approaches to IEM. In the Evansian picture, it is not clear, however, whether there is room for a description of what may be the strongest and most interesting variant of IEM; namely what Pryor (1999) has first brought (...) to the fore under the name “Which-object IEM”, and which I’ll prefer calling existential IEM. I argue that recent development of relativist frameworks in semantics and pragmatics, particularly in Recanati (2007a-b), (2009), (2010), (2012a), may be precisely of a nature to address this limitation. The relativist theory of IEM, and in particular its suitability to cover existential IEM, may superficially seem to stem from a rejection of the core elements of the classical identification-freedom approach. However, I hope to show that, modulo a clarification and richer un-derstanding of the relevant notions of identification and identification-freedom, the relativist theory of IEM can be seen as both pushing further and complementing Evans’s intuitions, rather than conflicting with them. (shrink)

In Jacques Derrida's formalisation of the problem of the gift in Donner le temps (1991), where Derrida offers a joint reading of Marcel Mauss’’ The Gift and Baudelaire's La Fausse monnaie, there is an apparent rejection of rational calculation (and of economism) in a narrow sense. This exclusion is only one of the steps in the deconstruction of the metaphysics of the gift, and of other motifs such as, for example, invention, forgiveness, and hospitality. In another step, calculation and economy (...) are the terms of logico-formal paradoxes, and engages us to think of the incompatible demands of calculability and incalculability between which reason is torn, and which Derrida has discussed, for example, in ‘‘The ““World”” of the Enlightenment to Come (Exception, Calculation and Sovereignty)’’ (2003). In this paper, I argue that in his evaluation of Mauss’’ moderate view of economy and exchange, Derrida has limited Mauss’’ notions of economy and rationality to reason as calculation. This evaluation jars with Derrida's deconstruction of calculation in his reading of Hegel and Rousseau among others, as I begin to show, Hegel, for whom ‘‘counting was a bad procedure’’. (shrink)

This work, by one of the most innovative and challenging of contemporary thinkers, pivots on a _Remark_ added by Hegel in 1831 to the second edition of his _Science of Logic_. As a model of close reading applied both to philosophical texts and the making of philosophical systems, _The Speculative Remark_ played a significant role in transforming the practice of philosophy away from system building to analysis of specific linguistic detail, with meticulous attention to etymological, philological, and rhetorical nuance. Nancy (...) uses his extended examination of the _Remark_ to delineate certain overall strategies in several Hegelian texts that militate for language-oriented readings of Hegel, as shown in Nancy's redefinition of such key terms as _Aufhebung_, _mediation_, and _speculation_. Nancy's reading progresses from speculative words and propositions to registering the speculative itself. While he avoids analyzing Hegel's system as such, Nancy reconstructs the Hegelian trajectory on a basis of tropes, building from propositions rather than structures, elements, and cycles. The overview that emerges in the final chapter and epilogue constitutes a broad statement about Hegel's practice and significance, one nuanced by close attention to his deployment of rhetoric and linguistic play. _The Speculative Remark_ thus furnishes a model for a theoretically aware approach to all systematic philosophy, while providing a significant historical contribution to the evolution of contemporary critical theory. (shrink)