This article presents the interpretation of Herman Jean de Vleeschauwer (1899-1986) of Medieval philosophy during his career as a lecturer and professor of philosophy at the University of South Africa (UNISA) from 1951 to 1964. The study is done regarding De Vleeschauwer's publications and unpublished manuscripts relating to Medieval philosophy, as filed in Archive MSS Acc 32 at the UNISA Institutional Repository. Essentially, De Vleeschauwer was one of only two South African university lecturers in the 20th century who consistently (...) included the Middle Ages in the philosophy curriculum (the other was Martin Versfeld at the University of Cape Town, from 1937 to 1972). When précising his work in Medieval philosophy at UNISA for the designated period, it becomes clear that De Vleeschauwer's nuanced defence of Thomism was the matrix of his interpretation. This cornerstone, and his numerous other published and unpublished texts relating to the Middle Ages, show that De Vleeschauwer was an erudite commentator, competent lecturer and skilled specialist researcher in Medieval philosophy, as he was in early modern and modern philosophy (especially on Kant and Geulincx). As a scholar of Medieval philosophy, in particular, De Vleeschauwer had no equal in the 20th century South African context. CONTRIBUTION: This article contributes to the ongoing assessment of the characteristic and curious inattention to Medieval philosophy at South African (especially the historical Afrikaans) universities during the course of the 20th century. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Since the seventeenth century, scholars have been accusing each other of ‘dogmatism’. But what exactly did this mean? In exploring this question, this article focuses on philosophy and Biblical scholarship in nineteenth-century Germany. Scholars in both of these fields habitually contrasted Dogmatismus with Kritik, to the point of emplotting the history of their field as a gradual triumph of critical thinking over dogmatic belief. The article shows that charges of dogmatism derived much of their rhetorical force from such progressive (...) narratives. Especially neo-Kantian philosophers and Biblical scholars of liberal Protestant persuasion liked to depict their opponents as clinging to long-superseded modes of thought, thereby implying that these colleagues harked back to a past from which modern Wissenschaft had emancipated itself. This ‘denial of coevalness’, as Johannes Fabian calls it, demonstrates to what extent the vice of dogmatism was imbued with normative visions of how the field or, more broadly, German intellectual life should develop. (shrink)

Episodic memory has been analyzed in a number of different ways in both philosophy and psychology, and most controversy has centered on its self-referential, autonoetic character. Here, we offer a comprehensive characterization of episodic memory in representational terms and propose a novel functional account on this basis. We argue that episodic memory should be understood as a distinctive epistemic attitude taken toward an event simulation. In this view, episodic memory has a metarepresentational format and should not be equated with beliefs (...) about the past. Instead, empirical findings suggest that the contents of human episodic memory are often constructed in the service of the explicit justification of such beliefs. Existing accounts of episodic memory function that have focused on explaining its constructive character through its role in future-oriented mental time travel do justice neither to its capacity to ground veridical beliefs about the past nor to its representational format. We provide an account of the metarepresentational structure of episodic memory in terms of its role in communicative interaction. The generative nature of recollection allows us to represent and communicate the reasons why we hold certain beliefs about the past. In this process, autonoesis corresponds to the capacity to determine when and how to assert epistemic authority in making claims about the past. A domain where such claims are indispensable are human social engagements. Such engagements commonly require the justification of entitlements and obligations, which is often possible only by explicit reference to specific past events. (shrink)

This article examines the methodology of a core branch of contemporary political theory or philosophy: “analytic” political theory. After distinguishing political theory from related fields, such as political science, moral philosophy, and legal theory, the article discusses the analysis of political concepts. It then turns to the notions of principles and theories, as distinct from concepts, and reviews the methods of assessing such principles and theories (e.g., the reflective-equilibrium method), for the purpose of justifying or criticizing them. Finally, it looks (...) at a recent debate on how abstract and idealized political theory should be, and assesses the significance of disagreement in political theory. The discussion is carried out from an angle inspired by the philosophy of science. (shrink)

Reading these excellent commentaries we already wish we had written another book—a more comprehensive, clearer, and better defended one than what we have. We are, however, quite fond of the book we ended up with, and so we’ve decided that, rather than to yield, we’ll clarify. These contributions have helped us do that, and for that we are grateful to our critics. We’re lucky in that many (so far about twenty)1 extremely able philosophers have read and commented on our work (...) in print. A slightly discouraging fact is that all these commentators seem to think we are completely, utterly mistaken. On the positive side: Our critics seem to disagree about what we’re completely wrong about. On the one hand, radical contextualists (e.g. Travis) find our objections against them off the mark, but our objections to moderate contextualism dead-on. On the other hand, the moderate contextualists (e.g. Szabo) think that our objections against them fail, but our objections to radical contextualism are strong (Szabo, concludes that we ‘present strong arguments against radical contextualism, but only a weak case against moderate contextualism’). This means we’ve got our work cut out for us—defending the middle ground from every which way— something we are more than pleased to do. We start with general points of clarification, points it will be useful to reference from time to time when discussing each commentary. (General Comment #4 is the most important, and we will make reference to it repeatedly in what follows.). (shrink)

In the strategic document of the African Union approved in 2013 and spanning over 50 years, known as Agenda 2063, we find a blueprint for transforming Africa into a global powerhouse of the future. Many of the themes mentioned in Agenda 2063 are also mentioned in the New Testament, such as slavery, unity, poverty, women, children, discrimination and diversity. It is therefore clear that Christianity has something to contribute to Agenda 2063. Another word used throughout the Agenda 2063 document is (...) ‘transformation’. Concepts such as ‘transformative leadership’ and ‘radical transformation at all levels and in all spheres’ are mentioned. This contribution draws on the Agenda 2063 document to engage the missiological themes of unity, reconciliation and justice through the lens of the Belhar Confession. Deeply aware of the pain and disruption colonial Christianity has caused in many instances in Africa, the author contends that the Good News, particularly the New Testament themes of unity, reconciliation and justice, present a potentially transformative approach towards developing Africa. The research question that this article attends to is: how can the churches in Africa contribute to the aspirations of Agenda 2063 from the themes of unity, justice and reconciliation as declared in the Belhar Confession? By interrogating these key concepts of Agenda 2063 through the Confession of Belhar, the author concludes that the Belhar Confession can be regarded as a key African document, which could be explored further to facilitate unity, reconciliation and justice on the continent.Contribution: This article indicates the important relationship between church and state and the need for a partnership for the benefit of both. The need for a transforming state and a transforming church to participate in a transformed Africa is argued. The article promotes multi-, inter- and transdisciplinary aspects of studies as part of a mission praxis and application. (shrink)

Whether practiced by ethics committees or clinical ethicists, medical ethics enjoys a solid foundation in acute care hospitals. However, medical ethics fails to have a strong presence in the primary care setting. Recently, some ethicists have argued that the reason for this disparity between ethics in the acute and primary care setting is that primary care ethics is distinct from acute care ethics: the failure to translate ethics to the primary care setting stems from the incorrect belief that acute care (...) ethics can be applied to the primary care setting. In this paper, I argue that primary care ethics and acute care ethics are species of the same ethical genus, and that the ethical differences are not ones of kind but of circumstance. I do this by appealing to the role obligations that underlie acute care and primary care clinicians’ medical ethical obligations and the shared institutions that ground those obligations. (shrink)

Making room for character -- Pluralism and the community of moral judgment -- A cosmopolitan kingdom of ends --Responsibility and moral competence --Can virtue be taught?: the problem of new moral facts -- Training to autonomy: Kant and the question of moral education -- Bootstrapping -- Rethinking Kant's hedonism -- The scope of moral requirement -- The will and its objects -- Obligatory ends -- Moral improvisation -- Contingency in obligation.

The notions of belief and truth frequently interact in philosophical discourse but, surprisingly, a coherent semantics for such discourse is still wanting. Indeed, a number of puzzles stand in way of a satisfactory semantic account of the notion of truth in doxastic contexts. In this paper we discuss these puzzles and develop a more satisfactory semantic account that combines ideas from contextualist theories of attitude reports and Awareness semantics for non-idealized belief.

This book brings together contributions that scrutinize the relation between the material and the discursive. Highlighting the materiality of discourse and the entanglement of matter and meaning, the volume explores how a materialist discourse analysis and theory can be put into practice.

The thesis addresses the nature of causation. It is argued that causation exists and is as local as its causes and effects. As a consequence, the position advocated is contrary to the as yet prevailing view that no 'causal tie' between cause and effect exists. Moreover, it is suggested that this tie can be perceived. The essay attempts to elucidate the nature of causes, effects, and causal mechanisms. It is argued that they are facts rather than particulars or universals. Furthermore (...) it is suggested that these facts can be conceived of as tropes. Finally, in the light of this thesis a few traditional issues are discussed: what is the relation between causation and explanation? How should we conceive of causal laws? Does the idea of mechanisms with different degrees of reliability further our understanding of the determinism/indeterminism issue? (shrink)

livre 1. La nature créatrice incréée -- livre 2. La nature créatrice créée -- livre 3. La nature créée incréatrice -- livre 4. La nature créée incréatrice -- livre 5. La nature incréatrice et incrée.

In Persson & Wallin we show that the common claim that internal validity should be understood as prior to external validity has, at least, three epistemologically problematic aspects: experimental artefacts, the implications of causal relations, and how the mechanism is measured. Each aspect demonstrates how important external validity is for the internal validity of the experimental result. This note is an invited summary of these results.

Models are not adequately evaluated simply by whether they capture the data, after the fact. Other criteria are needed. One criterion is parsimony; but utility and generality are at least as important. Even with respect to parsimony, however, the case against feedback is not as straightforward as Norris et al. present it. We use feedback consistency effects to illustrate these points.