Cet article analyse les liens entre les SEL et l'économie solidaire. Les SEL sont définis comme des associations au sein desquelles des personnes échangent services et biens au moyen d'une comptabilité interne tenue en une monnaie propre ; elles émergent en 1983. SEL et économie solidaire partagent certains objectifs communs. Les SEL revendiquent en effet par leurs actions l'institution de nouveaux rapports économiques procédant d'une solidarité sous la forme d'une proximité relationnelle et spatiale, à laquelle ne répondent pas l'échange marchand (...) et la redistribution étatique. Cependant les SEL peuvent voir leur projet solidaire remis en cause, en particulier pour deux raisons : le risque d'instrumentalisation politique d'une part, la contrainte juridique et sociale d'autre part.This article analyzes links between LETS and a civil and solidarity-based economy. LETS are defined as associations in which individuals exchange services and goods by means of an internal accounting system based on its own currency. The first LETS appeared in 1983. These LETS and the new social economy share some common purposes. By their actions, LETS aim to set up a new system of economic relations based on solidarity proceeding from relational and spatial proximity. Market exchanges and State redistribution do not provide an efficient response to these needs. However, there are certain threats to the solidarity aimed at by LETS such as firstly the risk that politicians may instrumentalize these initatives and secondly legal and social constraints. (shrink)

ISBN 1-58477-498-3. Cloth. $125. * The standard one-volume treatise based on classic legal-realist principles.

The dissertation concerns F. A. Hayek’s critique of legislation. The purpose of the investigation is to clarify and assess that critique. I argue that there is in Hayek’s work a critique of legislation that is distinct from his well-known critique of social planning. Further that the main claim of this critique is what I refer to as Hayek’s legislation tenet, namely that legislation that aims to achieve specific aggregate results in complex orders of society will decrease the welfare level. The (...) legislation tenet gains support; from the welfare claim – according to which there is a positive correlation between the utilization of knowledge and the welfare level in society; from the dispersal of knowledge thesis – according to which the total knowledge of society is dispersed and not available to any one agency; and from the cultural evolution thesis – according to which evolutionary rules are more favorable to the utilization of knowledge in social cooperation than are legislative rules. More specifically, I argue that these form two lines of argument in support of the legislation tenet. One line of argument is based on the conjunction of the welfare claim and the dispersal of knowledge thesis. I argue that this line of argument is true. The other line of argument is based on the conjunction of the welfare claim and the cultural evolution thesis. I argue that this line of argument is false, mainly because the empirical work of political scientist Elinor Ostrom refutes it. Because the two lines of argument support the legislation tenet independently of each other, I argue that Hayek’s critique of legislation is true. In this dissertation, I further develop a legislative policy tool as based on the welfare claim and Hayek’s conception of coercion. I also consider Hayek’s idea that rules and law are instrumental in forging rational individual action and rational social orders, and turn to review this idea in light of the work of experimental economist Vernon Smith and economic historian Avner Greif. I find that Smith and Greif support this idea of Hayek’s, and I conjecture that it contributes to our understanding of Adam Smith’s notion of the invisible hand: It is rules – not an invisible hand – that prompt subjects to align individual and aggregate rationality in social interaction. Finally, I argue that Hayek’s critique is essentially utilitarian, as it is concerned with the negative welfare consequences of certain forms of legislation. And although it may appear that the dispersal of knowledge thesis will undermine the possibility of carrying out the utilitarian calculus, due to the lack of knowledge of the consequences of one’s actions – and therefore undermine the legislation tenet itself – I argue that the distinction between utilitarianism conceived as a method of deliberation and utilitarianism conceived as a criterion of correctness may be used to save Hayek’s critique from this objection. (shrink)

" In the generations since, its influence has grown-today it is accepted as a classic of general jurisprudence.The work is a bold and persuasive attack on the ...

Surely since the Enlightenment, if not before, the study of mind has centered principally on how man achieves a “true” knowledge of the world. Emphasis in this pursuit has varied, of course: empiricists have concentrated on the mind’s interplay with an external world of nature, hoping to find the key in the association of sensations and ideas, while rationalists have looked inward to the powers of mind itself for the principles of right reason. The objective, in either case, has been (...) to discover how we achieve “reality,” that is to say, how we get a reliable fix on the world, a world that is, as it were, assumed to be immutable and, as it were, “there to be observed.”This quest has, of course, had a profound effect on the development of psychology, and the empiricist and rationalist traditions have dominated our conceptions of how the mind grows and how it gets its grasp on the “real world.” Indeed, at midcentury Gestalt theory represented the rationalist wing of this enterprise and American learning theory the empiricist. Both gave accounts of mental development as proceeding in some more or less linear and uniform fashion from an initial incompetence in grasping reality to a final competence, in one case attributing it to the work out of internal processes or mental organization, and in the other to some unspecified principle of reflection by which—whether through reinforcement, association, or conditioning—we came to respond to the world “as it is.” There have always been dissidents who challenged these views, but conjectures about human mental development have been influenced far more by majoritarian rationalism and empiricism than by these dissident voices. Jerome Bruner is research professor of psychology at New York University, where he is also serving as Meyer Visiting Professor of Law. His most recent book, Acts of Meaning, appeared in 1990. In 1987 he received the Balzan Prize for “a lifetime contribution to the study of human psychology.”. (shrink)

This paper explores the extent to which behavioral public policies can be both efficient and democratic by reflecting on the conditions under which individuals could rationally consent to them. Consent refers to a moral requirement that a behavioral public policy should respect what I call a person’s value autonomy and conception of the good. Behavioral public policies can take many forms. Based on a social choice framework, I argue that fully paternalistic and prudential behavioral public policies are unlikely to trigger (...) a hypothetical form of rational consent. Non-fully paternalistic behavioral public policies with partially non-prudential motivations are less problematic in this perspective. In any case, a public deliberative stage preceding the implementation of policies seems to be the best democratic way to justify them. (shrink)

Everettian quantum mechanics tells us that the fundamental dynamics of the universe are deterministic. So what are the `probabilities' that the Born rule describes? One popular answer has been to treat these probabilities as rational credences. A recent alternative, Isaac Wilhelm's centered Everett Interpretation (CEI), takes the Born probabilities to be centered chances: the objective chances that some centered propositions are true. Thus, the CEI challenges the `orthodox assumption’ that fundamental physical laws concern only uncentered facts. I provide three arguments (...) against the centered Everett Interpretation. First, I argue that the CEI is in apparent tension with a significant motivation for adopting Everettian quantum mechanics: rejecting the attribution of special significance to observers or agents in fundamental physics. I suggest the CEI can avoid this tension, but only at the cost of sacrificing its central claim that there are objective chances in an Everettian multiverse. My second argument concerns the CEI’s claim that the centered Born rule is a fundamental physical law. I provide two plausible notions of fundamentality for physical laws, and I argue that the centered Born rule satisfies neither. My final argument is that the CEI’s branch-relative laws cannot explain or constrain an agent’s rational credences in the way that the CEI claims. (shrink)

Comment les juristes pensent-ils les fondements du droit? Le constructivisme juridique apporte une réponse inédite à cette interrogation. Cet essai le révèle en tant que modèle épistémologique permettant de refonder le droit par la science juridique. Inexploré jusqu'alors en droit, le constructivisme apparaît comme une structure de la pensée des juristes qui se manifeste en période de crise à travers un processus en forme de boucle révolutionnant successivement les méthodes, le concept et les valeurs de la connaissance juridique (fig. de (...) la couverture). Par une plongée au cur de la Rome antique, ce premier tome consacré aux origines romaines du constructivisme juridique étudie l'émergence du jusnaturalisme dans une société romaine en crise marquée par un droit privé en pleine mutation. Il décrit comment la transformation du savoir classique des jurisconsultes en une science du droit rationnelle et abstraite est l'uvre d'un fondement constructiviste du droit en mesure de répondre aux réalités sociopolitiques. Et si l'étude historique de ces temps de crise pouvait nous aider à comprendre les évolutions du droit d'aujourd'hui? (shrink)

Hall discusses the ideas of modern day legal philosophers such as Duguit, Geny, Ehrlich, & Kelsen, & what their conceptions mean to a democratic society.

The normalized, deterministic conception of evolution espoused by Dennett is increasingly being challenged by theorists who, following Gould, emphasize the role that historical contingencies play in it. I explore the conflict between these views and argue that correcting our understanding of the relationship between nature’s systematic necessities and historical temporality can resolve it. The mathematically precise laws science formulates describe the systematic patterns of nature abstractly and, as abstractions, these laws do not preclude but allow for the contingencies of historical (...) time. Drawing on Heidegger and Hume, I argue that historical time is characterized by the ingression of the unprecedented future into the present. This is the ontological infrastructure that makes the evolution of unprecedented ontological alterities possible. (shrink)

La 4e de couv. indique : "Prenant le contrepied de l'interprétation nietzschéenne plutôt dépréciative du ressentiment, qui cadrait avec un certain souci de défendre les privilèges de l'aristocratie, cet essai suggère une interprétation juridique du ressentiment permettant d'en faire ressortir les aspects positifs. La démarche convie à un parcours en trois étapes. La première conduit de la définition que Spinoza donna de la haine en général au sentiment d'injustice, qui est un motif de haine particulier. La définition de l'injustice, correspondant (...) chez Aristote à des cas de haine donnant lieu à une colère justifiée, permet, à rebours, d'identifier et de déprécier la haine qui ne répond pas à cette définition. Se dévoile ainsi déjà en filigrane le discret génie du ressentiment. La deuxième étape chemine du sentiment d'injustice au ressentiment et permet de distinguer, à partir du critère du droit, le ressentiment de l'indignation. Si l'interprétation de Nietzsche approfondissait la distinction entre le ressentiment et l'acquiescement, l'interprétation juridique conduit à souligner la distinction entre le ressentiment et l'indignation. Redéfini comme sentiment du droit et sentiment juridique d'injustice, le ressentiment fait l'objet d'une réhabilitation dans le dernier temps de cet essai qui est aussi l'occasion d'aborder les relations entre droit et politique, droit et science, justice et amour et de réfléchir aux liens entre ressentiment, indignation et droits de l'homme à l'âge démocratique. En intégrant la vision de Jhering, qui faisait de la paix le but du droit et de la lutte le moyen de l'atteindre, en cherchant à corriger « l'erreur » de Nietzsche par Nietzsche, le droit, sous le rapport de ses liaisons avec les affects, pourrait peut-être se définir comme une arme morale, sociale et politique, plongée dans les complexions de la haine, qui sépare le ressentiment de l'indignation, la domination du premier ayant pour effet de modérer ou de subjuguer la seconde..". (shrink)

This analytic autoethnographic and autobiographical essay addresses several interrelated questions regarding the use of ethnographic and otherwise ‘qualitative’ research methods in the study of contemporary urban society. The testy relationship between qualitative and quantitative research has historical as well as logico-deductive roots that continue to haunt the social sciences. As to hermeneutics, the debate parallels my academic career journey from Indiana University to Brooklyn College by way of New York University during which I learned that the normative practices of the (...) social and not so social sciences come in a myriad of different competing, and occasionally conflicting, pre- and proscriptions. My intention in this essay is not to construct a fine, or even a crude, philosophical discourse but to argue for more attention to be paid to what social scientists do best as opposed to the labels they apply to each other and their trades. As the positivist founders of sociology would agree, social science is not exempt from the laws of social science. At the conclusion, an example will be given of the kind of knowledge accessible only through direct observation and best conveyed by thick description. (shrink)

This article engages in a dialogue between the African philosophy of Ubuntu (humanity bound up in the other) and the Korean philosophy of Samae (love bound up in the other) to advocate for the emergence of a philosophy of agapeic humanism. Some structures (laws, standards, conventions, protocol and institutions), ideologies, ethics and socio‐cultural practices of indigenous African communities have particularistic, exclusive, egocentric and discriminatory strains that are in contradiction to communalism and its principles upon which the traditional African world‐view is (...) claimed to be founded. For instance, in indigenous Igbo communities in Africa, double standards are applied in their treatment of in‐groups and out‐groups, and their religious and moral codes cannot be invoked for an offence committed by an in‐group member against an outsider (an out‐group member), thus making such ethics and practices trans‐communally/racially inapplicable and therefore non‐universalisable. The article employs analytical, critical and comparative fusion methods to approach particularism in traditional Africa communities. While the analytical method facilitates the theorisation of Ubuntu and Samae, the critical approach critiques prevailing, narrowly defined conceptions of humanism prevalent among the Igbo people of Nigeria. Through the method of comparative fusion, the article integrates elements of Ubuntu and Samae to propose the concept of agapeic humanism. It concludes that the interchange between African and Asian philosophies holds the promise of transcending particularistic limitations within the current humanistic paradigm, thereby fostering new perspectives on shared humanity rooted in practical agape love. (shrink)

Le présent article propose de faire le point sur la façon dont le législateur français appréhende le conflit d’intérêts dans le milieu sanitaire, partagé entre droit commun et déontologie, au moment même où des scandales médiatiques l’obligent à encadrer la profession médicale. Le problème du débat juridique français est de se concentrer sur la définition essentialiste du conflit d’intérêts, alors qu’une approche pragmatique semblerait plus appropriée pour le qualifier pénalement. L’expérience française que nous relatons ici est riche d’enseignement pour d’autres (...) États. Entre déontologie et droit normatif, ce débat montre les limites du langage juridique et nous éclaire sur la bonne méthode à appliquer pour traiter les conflits d’intérêts. (shrink)

"No soy de los que deploran la especialización; en todo caso, dudo que sea posible, aunque fuere deseable, frenar la persecución de un saber especializado, en complejas sociedades. Pero es que la filosofía del Derecho ha descansado tradicionalmente en una perspectiva muy amplia, y hay que lamentar de modo especial la pérdida de sus funciones unitivas debido a la extraordinaria necesidad presente de comprender y mejorar las instituciones jurídicas. La situación actual no clama por la desvalorización de la especialización, sino (...) que, por el contrario, desafía a los estudiosos a trascender las especializaciones de la filosofía del Derecho, y cualquiera fuere la utilidad que con ello pudiera lograrse, a construir una jusfilosofía que satisfaga más adecuadamente las presentes demandas". Jerome Hall. (shrink)

MAIMONIDES the great systematizer of Jewish Law, left no systematic philosophy for later generations. His philosophical legacy consists mainly of his Guide of the Perplexed and a few lesser philosophical tracts. The Guide is notoriously informal and unsystematic, moving from topic to topic in a manner that appears at times to have no inner logic. The lesser tracts yield only fragments of a whole. In addition, for whatever reasons, Maimonides felt obliged to conceal at least some of his true philosophical (...) positions, displaying to the untrained eye one position, while hinting to the more discerning reader a "true" position lying behind the official one. There is nothing in Maimonides' writings that even begins to approach the monumental architectonic of Aquinas' Summa Theologiae. (shrink)

Background: As actors with the key responsibility for the protection of human research participants, Research Ethics Committees (RECs) need to be competent and well-resourced in order to fulfil their roles. Despite recent programs designed to strengthen RECs in Africa, much more needs to be accomplished before these committees can function optimally.Objective: To assess training needs for biomedical research ethics evaluation among targeted countries.Methods: Members of RECs operating in three targeted African countries were surveyed between August and November 2007. Before implementing (...) the survey, ethical approvals were obtained from RECs in Switzerland, Cameroon, Mali and Tanzania. Data were collected using a semi-structured questionnaire in English and in French.Results: A total of 74 respondents participated in the study. The participation rate was 68%. Seventy one percent of respondents reported having received some training in research ethics evaluation. This training was given by national institutions (31%) and international institutions (69%). Researchers and REC members were ranked as the top target audiences to be trained. Of 32 topics, the top five training priorities were: basic ethical principles, coverage of applicable laws and regulations, how to conduct ethics review, evaluating informed consent processes and the role of the REC.Conclusion: Although the majority of REC members in the targeted African countries had received training in ethics, they expressed a need for additional training. The results of this survey have been used to design a training program in research ethics evaluation that meets this need. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Whereas relevance in scientific explanations is usually discussed as if it was a single problem, several criteria of relevance will be distinguished in this paper. Emphasis is laid upon the notion of intra-scientific relevance, which is illustrated using explanation of the law of areas as an example. Traditional accounts of explanation, such as the causal and unificationist accounts, are analyzed against these criteria of relevance. Particularly, it will be shown that these accounts fail to indicate which explanations fulfill the (...) condition of intra-scientific relevance. Finally, the significance of this latter criterion is emphasized, and the epistemic benefits of explanations that fulfill it are highlighted. (shrink)

A major obstacle to formulating a broad-content intentional psychology is the occurrence of ''Frege cases'' - cases in which a person apparently believes or desires Fa but not Fb and acts accordingly, even though "a" and "b" have the same broad content. Frege cases seem to demand narrow-content distinctions to explain actions by the contents of beliefs and desires. Jerry Fodor ( The elm and the expert: Mentalese and its semantics , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994) argues that an explanatorily (...) adequate broad-content psychology is nonetheless possible because Frege cases rarely occur in intentional-explanatory contexts, and they are not systematically linked to intentional laws in a way that demands intentional explanation. Thus, he claims, behaviors associated with Frege cases can be considered ceteris-paribus exceptions to broad-content intentional laws without significantly decreasing the explanatory power of intentional psychology. I argue that Frege cases are plentiful and systematically linked to intentional laws in a way that requires intentional explanation, specifically in the explanation of why certain actions are not performed. Consequently, Frege-case behaviors cannot be construed as ceteris-paribus exceptions to intentional laws without significantly eroding the explanatory power of intentional psychology and reducing the rationality of the agent. Fodor thus fails to save broad-content psychology from the prima facie objections against it based on Frege cases. (shrink)

Few topics in international intellectual property law have been as controversial in recent years as the one we are about to examine. In the 1980s and early 1990s, a Diplomatic Conference attempted to revise the oldest international convention providing some protection for patented inventions outside of the domestic laws. Those efforts broke down, largely because developed and developing countries could not agree on the powers that governments should retain to issue compulsory licenses or on the grounds for which these powers (...) could be exercised. The failure of this Conference, held under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), persuaded the technology-exporting countries to link future negotiations concerning international intellectual property protection to the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, known as the Uruguay Round, which got underway in 1986. The end result was Annex IC of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization of 1994, which incorporated a new, comprehensive and relatively elevated set of international minimum standards of patent protection into the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). (shrink)

In 1791, the Loi relative aux découvertes utiles instituted a new patent system in France. Because patents were seen as the expression of the natural right of inventors, prior examination was abolished. However, only a few years after the law was passed, an unofficial examination was reinstated, and it was entrusted to the Comité Consultatif des Arts et Manufactures – a consultative body composed of prominent scientists. I analyze the political significance of the involvement of the savants in the patent (...) system, and based on the archives of the Comité, I study the scope and practicalities of the examination process, paying close attention to the ways through which the savants of the Comité directly intervened in the writing and drawing of specifications. I show how a distinct regime of intellectual property emerged in France and how it was constructed by the interests and norms of scientists, eager as they were to distinguish ‘science’ from ‘industry’ and establish the superiority of the former over the latter. (shrink)

It is shown that a number of questions, usually considered philosophical rather than scientific, can be reformulated to apply to a world of automata or "well-informed heat engines." In some cases they admit of physical answers, but in many cases obtaining answers entails violation of the second law of thermodynamics. This is demonstrated explicitly for the problem of determinism and free will, for the discovery of the origin or ultimate fate of the universe, or for the discovery of causes or (...) purposes in nature. (shrink)

The defence of necessity has had a long, though confused, legal career. Like self-defence, consent, duress, insanity and mistake of law, necessity is rooted in moral intuitions about when conduct which causes harm to another's person or property is not wrong, or should be tolerated, permitted or praised. If a man is literally starving to death and steals a loaf of bread, we are reluctant to say that his extreme circumstances should make no difference at all to the way we (...) treat him at trial. And if two men, adrift at sea, are clinging to a log which can only support the weight of one, we are once again reluctant to say that if one pushes the other off the log, it is just a case of murder. These intuitions are deepseated; but it is extremely difficult to articulate the defence they seem to support, or to isolate the circumstances which mark the difference between a situation where the defence ought to apply and where it ought not. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that within the Japanese social context, the act of suicide is a positive moral act because the values underpinning it are directly related to a socially pervasive moral belief that any act of self-sacrifice is a worthy pursuit. The philosophical basis for this view of the self and its relation to society goes back to the writings of Confucius who advocated a life of propriety in which being dutiful, obedient, and loyal to one's group takes (...) precedence over the desires of the individual selves that make up the group. I argue that this philosophical perspective poses formidable challenges to Japanese psychiatry (which accepts a contrary western perspective) because, as western psychiatry is based on the concept of autonomous individuality, the Japanese conceive of the self as socially embedded. Because suicide in Japan is viewed as a potentially honorable, virtuous, and even beautiful act of self-sacrifice expressing one's duty to one's group, the western perspective is quite foreign to the Japanese self-conceptual framework. Therefore, since Japanese psychiatry and law have embraced the western medical tradition of viewing suicide as a non-rational response to mental illness, which runs counter to the cultural view that suicide is a moral (and rational) act, I argue that western explanations of suicide present significant cross-cultural problems for Japanese psychiatry. (shrink)

A thematic reading guide for the Great books of the Western world series.

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries provide the tools to teach the history of modern moral philosophy. What makes this selection distinctive is that it covers not only the familiar figures - Hobbes, Hume, Butler, Bentham and Kant - but also the important but generally ignored writers: new translations of Nicole, Wolff, Crusius and d'Holbach; as well as substantial excerpts from natural law theorists such as Suarez, Grotius and Pufendorf; from rationalists such as Malebranche, Cudworth, Spinoza and Leibniz; from Epicurean writers (...) such as Gassendi; and from their 'moral sense' and other critics: Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Price. In all, thirty-two authors are represented. The selections are preceded by a substantial contextual introduction, while each individual selection has a separate introduction, annotation and bibliography, and has been chosen for its centrality to a given philosopher's writings. The anthology can be used as an introductory survey or for more intensive graduate work as well. It can also be used as supplemental reading for courses on modern European intellectual history, the history of modern political thought, and the history of religious thought. (shrink)

Often advocates for persons with disabilities are resistant to what might appear to be the banal truism that, at bottom, disability is a decrement in health. Disability advocates have long objected to the “medicalization” of disability, when that means focusing entirely on a person’s underlying impairments and ignoring all of the manifold obstacles in his or her environment — e.g., physical, human-built, attitudinal, social, political, and cultural — that makes living with those impairments at least disadvantageous and socially devalued. Over-medicalization (...) is another and well understood problem that people with disabilities are justifiably concerned about. Yet it is somewhat of a mystery why anyone with an impairment would ever deny, or feel uncomfortable being told, that their impairment is a health problem. Surely, people with disabilities are unhealthy, by virtue of their impairments and to the degree according to the severity of those impairments. How could it be otherwise? (shrink)

Norval Morris, Madness and the Criminal Law Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982, 235 pp.

In their adversely critical attitude towards administrative agencies, many lawyers and judges disclose a distrust of the expert, the specialist. That distrust is curious, for the position of our profession in society rests on the fact that we ourselves are specialists.In the famous colloquy which is said to have occurred about three hundred years ago between King James I and Judge Coke, the King remarked that, if “law was founded upon reason, he and others could reason as well as the (...) judges,” and Coke loftily replied that lawsuits “are not to be decided by natural reason, but by the artificial reason and judgement of the law, which law is an art that requires long study and experience before that a man can attain to the cognizance of it.” The King, an intelligent amateur, was angered, for doubtless he saw that, as McIlwain observes, “if... the law was to be supreme, at the same time a mystery open only to the initiated, it is clear that, if the claim of the lawyers were to be admitted, the supreme authority would be their exclusive possession.” Demos, now King, sometimes echoes James’ anger at the idea of a government of lawyers, not of men. (shrink)

English summary: Kant described phenomenology as that which comes from us, and that which comes to us, a duality that leads towards the theological horizon. Kant opened a field of inquiry that historical phenomenology, born with Husserl and Heidegger, repeated. As with any repetition, criticisms of this do exist, but the dominant theme of its call is there, as well as the question: which voice do we hear? There are many shapes for this call, but each time there is the (...) law and the summons to be, the summons to change your life. Just as there is perhaps God. French description: La phenomenologie n'a pas a inventer les phenomenes - sinon comme on dit inventer un tresor - mais a les faire voir, ou entendre. Kant s'y emploie a sa maniere lorsqu'il fait entendre le ton de voix lie a l'imperatif categorique, celui d'une voix d'airain. C'est la reconduire la pensee a l'eclat d'un fait premier ou puiser ensuite ses ressources: il y a la loi. Kant le decrit comme un appel, a defaut de tout a fait le nommer ainsi, l'interpretant ensuite tout a la fois comme ce qui vient de nous (comme si le sujet ethique se donnait a lui-meme la loi) et ce qui vient a nous (comme si ce meme sujet repondait a la loi venue de Dieu). Prendre au serieux cette dualite suppose que le chantier kantien de l'ethique ouvre alors sur un horizon theologique. Kant ouvre un chantier que la phenomenologie historique, celle qui nait avec Husserl et Heidegger, repete. Comme toute vraie repetition, celle-ci ne va pas sans critique ni deplacement (Merleau-Ponty, Scheler, Jonas), mais le motif de l'appel est bel et bien la. Nous avons ete appeles - la trace laissee en nous par cet appel est trop forte pour que le moindre doute puisse encore s'elever a son propos, mais la question vient aussitot: quelle voix s'est fait entendre? Quel appel nous surprend et nous souleve? Appel de l'etre (Martin Heidegger), appel de l'Autre (Emmanuel Levinas) ou appel de la vie (Michel Henry)? Nous avons ete appeles, affectes, blesses - ce qui brise la vie lui appartient encore, mais qu'est-ce donc qui la brise et la releve? Multiples sont les figures de l'appel, mais a chaque fois il y a la loi et cette injonction d'etre - cette injonction silencieuse a laquelle le poete aura donne son exacte formule: Tu dois changer ta vie (Rilke). Comme il y a peut-etre Dieu. (shrink)