Several theological writings by Erasmus are gathered and edited. They show some aspects of Erasmus' theology and spirituality and his embeddedness in the Church and liturgy.

We argue that an understanding of livestock farming as normative practice clarifies how sustainability is to be understood in livestock farming. The sustainability of livestock farming is first approached by investigating its identity. We argue that the economic aspect qualifies and the formative aspect founds the livestock farming practice. Observing the normativity related to these aspects will be the first task for the livestock farmer. In addition, we can distinguish conditioning norms applicable to the livestock farming practice which should be (...) observed for competent performance of the practice. Failing to do justice to this normativity might affect the practice’s sustainability only in the long term—this is especially the case with conditioning norms. Motives to observe normativity have, therefore, the character of an ultimate conviction regarding the flourishing of the practice. Finally, the sustainability of the livestock farming practice crucially depends on the broader food system of which it is part. (shrink)

The role of faith and religion in international development cooperation is hotly debated today. The legitimacy of this role remains, however, often confided to instrumental reasons. Yet, thinking about faith and religion only in instrumental terms leaves unquestioned the possibility of a religious background of development cooperation as a practice itself and the potential role of faith through individual practitioners that operate within secular NGOs, and research and policy institutes. The aim of the present paper is therefore to consider the (...) structural role of faith and worldview in relation to agricultural development, moving beyond the discourse of instrumentality. We do this by focusing on Giller and Andersson’s political agronomy analysis of the promotion of Conservation Agriculture in Zimbabwe by the faith-based organisation ‘Foundations for Farming’. We argue that a distinction should be made between religion as a practice of believers and faith functioning as a worldview in every practice. In addition, we argue that it is helpful to distinguish between different kinds of practices involved in agricultural development in sub-Saharan Africa, namely farming practice, agronomic scientific practice, and faith practice. The value of this philosophical analysis is that it challenges a dichotomous model of ‘science-based versus faith-based’ approaches to agricultural development. Furthermore, specific kinds of normativity are identified as always already functioning inside practices, rather than practices being neutral spaces that are infused with normativity by applying external ethical standards. (shrink)

Ontologies are computational artifacts that model consensual aspects of reality. In distributed contexts, applications often need to utilize information from several distinct ontologies. In order to integrate multiple ontologies, entities modeled in each ontology must be matched through an ontology alignment. However, imperfect alignments may introduce inconsistencies. One kind of inconsistency, which is often introduced, is the violation of the conservativity principle, that states that the alignment should not introduce new subsumption relations between entities from the same source ontology. We (...) propose a two-step quadratic-time algorithm for automatically correcting such violations, and evaluate it against datasets from the Ontology Alignment Evaluation Initiative 2019, comparing the results to a state-of-the-art approach. The proposed algorithm was significantly faster and less aggressive; that is, it performed fewer modifications over the original alignment when compared to the state-of-the-art algorithm. (shrink)

In 2010, the Dutch Scientific Council for Governmental Policy called for an explicit and adequate intervention ethics for policy on international development cooperation. Yet, as appears from a careful reading of their report, the council’s own overall commitment to a modernist worldview hinders the fruitful development of such an intervention ethics. There is, however, a strand in their thinking that draws attention to the importance of practical knowledge. We argue specifically that an intervention ethics for development cooperation in agriculture should (...) start from this practical knowledge, which points to the inherent normativity of agricultural development cooperation. That is, agricultural development cooperation is a normative practice of which the inherent normativity consists in facilitating other practices in the agricultural domain. As such, agricultural development cooperation should respect the normativity inherent in those other practices. (shrink)

ASD VIII, 1 publishes texts by Erasmus related to the Church Fathers: the Vitae of Jerome, John Chrysostom and Origen, the forgery ‘Cyprian’s _De duplici martyrio_, and the prefaces to the Fathers of the Church.

Progressive supranuclear palsy is a movement disorder with prominent tau neuropathology. Brain diseases with abnormal tau deposits are called tauopathies, the most common of which is Alzheimer's disease. Environmental causes of tauopathies include repetitive head trauma associated with some sports. To identify common genetic variation contributing to risk for tauopathies, we carried out a genome-wide association study of 1,114 individuals with PSP and 3,247 controls followed by a second stage in which we genotyped 1,051 cases and 3,560 controls for the (...) stage 1 SNPs that yielded P ≤ 10-3. We found significant previously unidentified signals associated with PSP risk at STX6, EIF2AK3 and MOBP. We confirmed two independent variants in MAPT affecting risk for PSP, one of which influences MAPT brain expression. The genes implicated encode proteins for vesicle-membrane fusion at the Golgi-endosomal interface, for the endoplasmic reticulum unfolded protein response and for a myelin structural component. © 2011 Nature America, Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)

The third volume of Ordo V in the Amsterdam edition of the Latin texts of Erasmus presents the second half of Erasmus’ commentaries on eleven Psalms. Two of them not only explain the psalms themselves, but also deal with topical questions, viz. the war against the Turks and the disintegration of Christendom.

In this paper we investigate those extensions of the bimodal provability logic ${\vec CSM}_{0}$ (alias ${\vec PRL}_{1}$ or ${\vec F}^{-})$ which are subframe logics, i.e. whose general frames are closed under a certain type of substructures. Most bimodal provability logics are in this class. The main result states that all finitely axiomatizable subframe logics containing ${\vec CSM}_{0}$ are decidable. We note that, as a rule, interesting systems in this class do not have the finite model property and are not even (...) complete with respect to Kripke semantics. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate those extensions of the bimodal provability logic \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} ${\vec CSM}_{0}$\end{document} (alias \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} ${\vec PRL}_{1}$\end{document} or \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} ${\vec F}^{-})$\end{document} which are subframe logics, i.e. whose general frames are closed under a certain type of substructures. Most bimodal provability logics are in this class. The main result states that all finitely (...) axiomatizable subframe logics containing \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} ${\vec CSM}_{0}$\end{document} are decidable. We note that, as a rule, interesting systems in this class do not have the finite model property and are not even complete with respect to Kripke semantics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Cartesian CompositesPaul HoffmanTowards the end of a paper in which I argued that Descartes thinks a human being is a genuine unity, I invited other commentators to come to Descartes’s defense by accounting for his apparently contradictory claims that a human being is an ens per se and that it is an ens per accidens.1 These claims seem to be contradictory, because in saying that a human being is (...) an ens per se, Descartes appears to be asserting that a human being is genuinely one, and in saying that a human being is an ens per accidens, he appears to assert that a human being is not genuinely one, but instead is a mere heap or aggregate. In the ensuing eleven years no one has taken up my invitation, except to argue that I was mistaken in claiming that Descartes thinks a human being has per se unity in any robust sense.2In this paper I will take up the challenge myself, having noticed a similarity between Descartes’s account of the unity of composite substances and his account of composite figures having true and immutable natures. After showing how he can consistently maintain that a human being is both an ens per se and ens per accidens in roughly the same way he can consistently maintain that composite figures both do and do not have true and immutable natures, I will try to respond to criticisms of my claim that he thinks of a human being as a substance or an ens per se.Let me begin with an analysis and comparison of two passages from the Objections and Replies. In the first, from the Replies to the First Objections, Descartes [End Page 251] discusses composite figures. In the second, from the Replies to the Fourth Objections, Descartes discusses composite substances.Next, to remove the other part of the difficulty, it should be noted that those ideas which do not contain true and immutable natures, but contain only ones which are fictitious and composed by the intellect, can be divided by the same intellect, not only through abstraction, but through a clear and distinct operation, so that any ideas which the intellect cannot so divide were undoubtedly not composed by it. As, for example, when I think of a winged horse, or an actually existing lion, or a triangle inscribed in a square, I easily understand that I can also in opposition think of a horse without wings, a non-existing lion, a triangle without a square, and so on; from which it follows that these do not have true and immutable natures. But if I think of a triangle or a square (I do not speak here of a lion or horse because their natures are not clearly evident to us), then certainly whatever I apprehend as contained in the idea of a triangle, as that its three angles are equal to two right angles, etc., I will truly affirm of the triangle, and of the square whatever is found in the idea of the square. For even if I can understand a triangle, abstracting from the fact that its angles should equal two right angles, I cannot nevertheless deny that of it by a clear and distinct operation, that is, correctly understanding this is what I say. Furthermore, if I consider a triangle inscribed in a square, not in order to attribute to the square those things which pertain only to the triangle or to the triangle those things which pertain to the square, but in order to examine only those things which arise from the conjunction of the two, then its nature will be no less true and immutable than the square or triangle alone, and it will be permitted to affirm that the square is not less than twice the triangle inscribed in it and similar things which pertain to the nature of this composite figure. (AT VII 117–8; CSM II 83–4)3I am not unaware that some substances are commonly called ‘incomplete.’ But if they are said to be incomplete because they cannot exist per se alone, I confess that it seems contradictory to me that... (shrink)

Some have argued that chance and determinism are compatible in order to account for the objectivity of probabilities in theories that are compatible with determinism, like Classical Statistical Mechanics (CSM) and Evolutionary Theory (ET). Contrarily, some have argued that chance and determinism are incompatible, and so such probabilities are subjective. In this paper, I argue that both of these positions are unsatisfactory. I argue that the probabilities of theories like CSM and ET are not chances, but also that they are (...) not subjective probabilities either. Rather, they are a third type of probability, which I call counterfactual probability. The main distinguishing feature of counterfactual-probability is the role it plays in conveying important counterfactual information in explanations. This distinguishes counterfactual probability from chance as a second concept of objective probability. (shrink)

This article evaluates the usefulness of the concept of hegemony in theorizing men. The discussion is located within the framework of ‘Critical Studies on Men’ (CSM), in which the centrality of power issues is recognized, rather than that of ‘Men’s Studies’, where it is frequently not. Recent uses, as in ‘hegemonic masculinity’ in the analysis of masculinities, are subjected to a qualified critique. Instead a shift is proposed from masculinity to men, to focus on ‘the hegemony of men’. This formulation (...) seeks to address the double complexity that men are both a social category formed by the gender system and collective and individual agents, often dominant collective and individual agents, of social practices. This is explored mainly in relation to substantive studies on men, and briefly the institutional development of CSM. The concluding discussion examines how these arguments connect with debates in feminist theory and social theory. (shrink)

This theoretical paper develops a conceptual framework that explains how companies can influence consumer behavior in terms of both social and business benefits through their corporate social marketing initiatives. Drawing from the source credibility literature, the article asserts that the effectiveness of CSM depends largely on the corporate credibility of a company in supporting a social cause. Based on this assertion, the framework identifies ten different antecedents of CSM credibility, which are organized into attributes of the company, attributes of the (...) CSM initiative, and attributes of the cause. Furthermore, this framework shows that CSM credibility affects the two examined consequences, intended prosocial behavior and consumer loyalty. Several research and managerial implications are developed based on the propositions specified in the framework. (shrink)

Descartes held the doctrine that the eternal truths are freely created by God. He seems to have thought that a proper understanding of God's freedom entails such a doctrine concerning the eternal truths. In this paper, I examine Descartes' account of divine freedom. I argue that Descartes' statements about indifference, namely that indifference is the lowest grade of freedom and that indifference is the essence of God's freedom are not incompatible. I also show how Descartes arrived at his doctrine of (...) the creation of the eternal truths by consideration of the nature of God's freedom. Footnotes1 In this paper, I employ the following abbreviations:AT: Descartes, René Oeuvres de Descartes, C. Adam and P. Tannery (eds) (Paris: J. Vrin, 1996) (cited by volume and page number).CSM: Descartes, René The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vols 1 and 2, J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch (transl.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) (cited by volume and page number).CSMK: Descartes, René The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 3, J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch, A. Kenny (transl.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) (cited by page number). (shrink)

Quantum mechanics (QM) is a favorite area of physics to feature in “science and religion” discussions. We argue that this is at least partly because the arcane results of QM can be deployed to make big theological claims by the linguistic sleight of hand of “register switching”—sliding imperceptibly from technical into everyday language using the same vocabulary. We clarify the discussion by deploying the formal mapping of QM into classical statistical mechanics (CSM) via the mathematical device of “Wick rotation.” This (...) equivalence between QM and CSM suggests caution in claiming distinctiveness for quantum theologizing. After outlining two areas in which quantum insights nevertheless resonate with longstanding themes in theological reflection (hiddenness and visualizability), we suggest that both QM and CSM point to a theology of science in which scientists participate in the divine gaze on creation as imago Dei. (shrink)

The arguments of Van Niekerk and Van Zyl that, on the grounds that it involves an inappropriate commodification and alienation of women's labour, commercial surrogate motherhood (CSM) is morally suspect are discussed and considered to be defective. In addition, doubt is cast on the notion that CSM should be illegal.

Consequentialism broadly speaking is the idea that the moral rightness and wrongness of a thing (an act, a policy, an institution) is determined by the quality of its consequences. A prominent version is act consequentialism, which holds one morally always ought to do an act whose outcome is no worse than the outcome of any other act one might have done instead. This doctrine has little content—no commitment is involved as to how one should evaluate consequences—but is still highly controversial. (...) What is called common-sense morality or CSM—moral views it is supposed many people embrace—rejects consequentialism as both too demanding and too permissive. Too permissive, because CSM includes constraints, rules one should not break even if doing so would produce the best attainable outcome. Too demanding, because CSM includes options. The demands of CSM mostly involve refraining from harming others in certain ways, and provided one observes these constraints, one is morally at liberty to do whatever one chooses, whether or not that produces the best outcome. In most situations, according to CSM, morality allow one many options, alternative acts one is morally permitted to do. (shrink)

In Principles I. 53, Descartes states what appears to be an important metaphysical principle: P1: Each substance has one principal property, which constitutes its nature and essence, and to which all its other properties are referred (AT VIIIA 25; CSM I 210).1 Marleen Rozemond calls this Descartes's "Attributes Premise", and it leads directly, as she points out, to Cartesian Dualism, the doctrine that a human mind and a human body, even when they belong to the same human being, are distinct (...) substances (Rozemond forthcoming). (shrink)

On his interpretation, the Truth Rule is intended to provide an epistemic principle that grounds specifically existential knowledge. Vinci builds his account around Descartes' doctrine that "if we perceive the presence of some attribute, we can infer that there must also be present an existing thing or substance to which it may be attributed" (Prin. 1:51, CSM 1:210, AT 8a:25). As Vinci understands it, the Truth Rule is a principle ensuring (roughly) that whatever properties I clearly and distinctly perceive are (...) contained in a substance. (shrink)

The importance of the Low Countries as a centre for the study of foreign languages is well-known. The mutual relationship between the Dutch grammatical tradition and the Western European context has, however, been largely neglected. In this collection of papers on the history of linguistics in the Low Countries the editors have made an effort to present the Dutch tradition in connection with that of the neighbouring countries. Three articles by Claes, Dibbets and Klifman deal with the earliest stages of (...) the development of a grammar for the Dutch vernacular. Several important European figures worked in the Low Countries; their contribution to linguistics is discussed in articles on Vossius (Rademaker), Spinoza (Klijnsmit), and one of the most original phoneticians of European linguistics, Montanus (Hulsker). Vivian Salmon's article is a survey on the relations between English and Dutch linguistics in the field of foreign language teaching. In the 19th century Dutch linguistics had a special relationship with German general and historical linguistics; four articles deal with this period (Jongeneelen, van Driel, le Loux-Schuringa, Noordegraaf). Finally, there are three articles by Kaldewij, Hagen and van Els/Knops on the development of three branches of linguistics in the 20th century: structuralism, dialectology and applied linguistics. This volume should be of interest for all specialists in the history of linguistics in Europe, who are interested in the interdependence of the various traditions. (shrink)

Central-state materialism is a very strong, but also very exciting theory of mind according to which each mental state is identical with a state of the central nervous system. CSM thus goes considerably beyond early versions of the identity theory of mind, since those early accounts held only that sensations are to be identified with neural events. CSM, by contrast, is a thesis about all mental states; every mental state is held to be a state of the central nervous system. (...) In fact, as we will see shortly, CSM is an even more sweeping thesis than this formulation of it suggests, since it is not concerned simply with mental states.One prominent defender of CSM, David Armstrong, has maintained that CSM can be established by means of a two-step argument. (shrink)

The problem of relation between statistical mechanics (SM) and classical mechanics (CM), especially the question whether SM can be founded on CM, has been a subject of controversies since the rise of classical statistical mechanics (CSM) at the end of 19th century. The first views rejecting explicitly the possibility of laying the foundations of CSM in CM were triggered by the "Wiederkehr-" and "Umkehreinwand" arguments. These arguments played an important role in the debate about Boltzmann's original H-theorem and led to (...) the so called statistical H-theorem proposed by Boltzmann himself. (For the history of these early debates we refer to Brush's monograph (Brush 1976).) After CSM had been brought to "canonical form" by the Ehrenfests, (Ehrenfest and Ehrenfest 1959) the physicists turned away from the foundational problem leaving it to mathematicians to worry about in the form of what has become called the ergodic theory. In retrospect, the physicists' general mood seems to have been the hope that ergodic theory establishes rigorously what is needed to found CSM on CM and which had been expressed essentially by Boltzmann already (Wightman 1985). However, very few physicists followed closely the developments in the mathematical theory of dynamic systems. One of those who did was the Russian physicist N.S. Krylov. (For a brief description of Krylov's personal life we refer to the papers in (Krylov 1979).). (shrink)

This paper explores the linkage between electoral systems and candidate selection methods by analyzing two innovations of CSMs in Taiwan and Japan: polling primary and kobo, respectively. With an assumption that partiesno-finding’ conclusion in some previous large-N studies on the linkage between electoral systems and choices of CSMs. Additionally, our findings highlight the importance of institutional factors, such as electoral systems, in explaining CSM reforms in a comparative perspective.

The focus of this paper is two-fold. First, similarities generated from six semantic models were compared to human ratings of paragraph similarity on two datasets—23 World Entertainment News Network paragraphs and 50 ABC newswire paragraphs. Contrary to findings on smaller textual units such as word associations (Griffiths, Tenenbaum, & Steyvers, 2007), our results suggest that when single paragraphs are compared, simple nonreductive models (word overlap and vector space) can provide better similarity estimates than more complex models (LSA, Topic Model, SpNMF, (...) and CSM). Second, various methods of corpus creation were explored to facilitate the semantic models’ similarity estimates. Removing numeric and single characters, and also truncating document length improved performance. Automated construction of smaller Wikipedia-based corpora proved to be very effective, even improving upon the performance of corpora that had been chosen for the domain. Model performance was further improved by augmenting corpora with dataset paragraphs. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Descartes’ Natural Light ReconsideredDeborah Boyle1. INTRODUCTIONThe “natural light” occupies an important position in Descartes’ Third Meditation, where the meditator invokes it to provide the premises needed for his proof for the existence of a non-deceiving God. Descartes also refers to the natural light throughout his Replies to the Objections to the Meditations and in the Principles of Philosophy. Yet he says almost nothing about what the natural light is (...) supposed to be, apparently assuming that his readers already know what he means. English-speaking commentators on Descartes have said little about the natural light,1 and although French commentators have paid slightly more attention to this topic, they have nonetheless provided no detailed analysis of the concept of the natural light and the role it plays in Descartes’ Meditations.2In 1973, however, John Morris published an article entitled “Descartes’ Natural Light” in the Journal of the History of Philosophy, later reprinted in Eternal Truths and the Cartesian Circle.3 Morris argues that “the understanding can be regarded in an active and a passive sense, ”4 and that the natural light should [End Page 601] be equated with the passive function of the intellect. The natural light, he asserts, isa power of cognition, which contrasts with the “active” power of conceiving. Unlike this power, it does not form ideas, or bring them to consciousness. Instead, it simply gives a click of recognition when a true idea is brought before it.5However, the textual evidence for Morris’ interpretation of the natural light is slender, and in fact the texts support a quite different reading. I shall point out some problems with Morris’ reading, and offer the beginnings of an alternative account.2. ACTIVITY, PASSIVITY, AND THE MINDIn the Fourth Meditation, Descartes draws a distinction between two faculties of mind: intellect and will. Intellect, he says, allows him “to perceive the ideas which are subjects for possible judgements” (CSM II 39/AT VII 5),6 while the will “simply consists in our ability to do or not do something (that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or avoid)” (CSM II 40/AT VII 57). Although he does not say so in the Fourth Meditation, Descartes suggests in two 1641 letters to Regius that the intellect is passive and the will is active; strictly speaking, he says, “understanding [intellectio] is the passivity of the mind and willing [volitio] is its activity” (CSMK III 182/AT III 372). A few months later, he writes that “we should use the term ‘action’ for what plays the role of a moving force, like volition in the mind, while we apply the term ‘passion’ to what plays the role of something moved, like intellection [intellectio] and vision in the same mind” (CSMK III 199/AT III 454–5). And in the Passions of the Soul Descartes states that while volitions are actions, “the various perceptions or modes of knowledge present in us may be called its passions, in a general sense” (CSM I 335/AT XI 342).In his early work, the Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Descartes does refer to “actions of the intellect.”7 If we do not allow for changes in Descartes’ thinking, we might assume that at the time of the Meditations, too, he would be willing to speak of “actions of the intellect.” But Descartes provides no account of the [End Page 602] will in the Rules; thus any activity he might have attributed to the mind would have to be included in the role of the intellect. In the Meditations, Descartes’ philosophy of mind has expanded to provide a place for the will, which can take over the active functions previously assigned to the intellect.John Morris’ reading of the role of the natural light in the Meditations takes as its starting point a passage in the Rules where Descartes claims that the intellect itself, the cognitive power or vis cognoscens, has both active and passive functions; it is, he says, sometimes like a seal, sometimes like wax.8 After describing the various functions of the cognitive power, Descartes concludes that “according to its different functions, then, the same power is... (shrink)

Drawing on case studies from the modern era of pharmaceutical regulation in the UK, US and Europe, I examine how the extent and distribution of trust between regulators, the pharmaceutical industry, and the medical profession about drug testing and monitoring influences knowledge and regulatory judgements about the efficacy and safety of prescription drugs. Introducing the concepts of ‘acquiescent’ and ‘investigative’ norms of regulatory trust, I demonstrate how investigative norms of regulatory trust—which deter pharmaceutical companies from assuming that their data analyses (...) will be accepted without independent de-construction—drive up bioethical and regulatory standards of drug assessment in the interests of health. By contrast, acquiescent norms of regulatory trust, which are associated with industrial capture and professional closure of interests, promote permissive standards allowing patients to take pharmaceuticals with greater risks to health and less evidence of therapeutic efficacy. (shrink)

Descartes insists, “[...] there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me [...]” (AT-VII, 25; CSM-II, 17). In what way can we draw evidence that our existence can be drawn from our being deceived? The interpretations that the earlier studies have shown is not a monolith. Then I will search for some inherent characteristics of deception, and analyse the construction of the (...) reasoning, “if a deceiver deceives me, I exist.” To be concrete, I show: 1) that it is not “I exist” but “I think” that is concluded from the supposition “a deceiver deceives me/I am deceived by a deceiver”; 2) that the attributions of the self as a thinking thing, i.e. understanding, affirming, and denying (AT-VII, 28; CSM-II, 19), are discovered in the very supposition of a deceiver. (shrink)

Central to Descartes’ philosophy is a view about immutable essences and eternal truths. After mentioning a Platonist account of recollection in Meditation V, Descartes declares that the ideas we have of mathematical notions “are not my invention but have their own true and immutable natures” (AT VII, 64/CSM II, 44).Descartes claims that other important philosophical notions, such as God, mind, body, and human free will (AT VII, 68; AT VIII-2, 348; AT III, 383; AT VII, 433, respectively), also have immutable (...) natures or essences. Although Descartes says a good many things about this view, nowhere does he offer definitive doctrine on the matter, and in fact frequently confuses his reader with apparently inconsistent pronouncements about immutable natures and eternal truths. In this essay, I focus on the immutable natures and propose a solution to two of the main problems associated with Descartes’ position, the metaphysical status of immutable natures and the purported indivisibility of their existence as ideas in the mind. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Cogito Interruptus:The Epistolary Body in the Elisabeth-Descartes Correspondence, June 22, 1645-November 3, 1645Kyoo LeeCogito interruptus is typical of those who see the world inhabited by symbols and symptoms. Like someone who, for example, points to the little box of matches, stares hard into your eyes, and says, "You see, there are seven...," then gives you a meaningful look, waiting for you to perceive the meaning concealed in that unmistakable (...) sign.Cogito interruptus is also typical of those who see the world inhabited not by symbols but by symptoms: indubitable signs of something that is neither here below nor up above, but that sooner or later will happen....Cogito interruptus is not a great prophetic, poetic, psychological technique. Only that it is ineffable. And it takes real faith in cogito interruptus—and a wish that readers understand me—for me to venture to speak of it, no matter what.—Umberto Eco, "Cogito Interruptus," Travels in HyperrealityIntroduction: Back to the Letters ThemselvesWhile looking through the private letters that the philosopher M. René Descartes (1596-1650) exchanged with Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia (1618-1680) for the last seven years (1643-1650) of his life, I was fascinated [End Page 173] by the discussion of experiences of inconveniences, just small everyday interruptions that get in the way of the life of the so-called mind. They conversed and debated on matters ranging from metaphysical conundrums to psychosomatic troubles, on issues both extremely metaphysical and physical, ultimately impersonal and personal, all at once, such as pain; including other people's pain and especially other people as a pain. We are hardly short of such troubles in our own lives. The philosophical genius of Elisabeth, called by some "the first Cartesian" (Zedler 1989, 41), a title Descartes himself would not have deserved as he confesses but would have given her unreservedly (AT VI 325/CSM I 190-2), detects a fatal irony of an insulated and disciplined subjectivity.My concern in this paper is to keep alive Descartes's "mind-body problem" especially as a feminist issue. I am interested in reanimating that classical problem somehow otherwise. Here, I am hearing the voice of an unhappy and restless character, Elisabeth "la Grècque" (Nye 1999, 8), the autodidact who, embarrassed and curious, always has a question for the knowledgeable one, especially on that problem that mattered to her most. For some reason that becomes vitally important as we will see, the lady philosopher keeps reporting to the bearded one, without being asked to, how and how many times her act of letter writing has been interrupted by those around her who want every piece of her: "more than seven" at one point (Elisabeth to Descartes, Sept. 30, 1645, AT IV 303; Nye 1999, 64).From the early stage of correspondence that began in May 1643 and ended in December 1649 with Descartes's death, and specifically between June 22, 1645, and November 3, 1645, on which my analysis focuses, Elisabeth highlights, over and over again, this particular issue of sociomaterial obstacles and somatic disruptions in life. The young princess is constantly drawing and keeping the old philosopher's attention to the lived and living body; Descartes is relentlessly reminded of the blind spot in his carefully constructed house of the cogito, the mental foundation of selfhood. Consequently, almost precisely on November 3, 1645, just a year after publishing Principles of Philosophy (1644) where the key idea, floated between the two letter writers, on the obscure but "substantial" union of the mind and the body had already begun to surface, Descartes set out to pen the Passions of the Soul (1649) as a way of explicating answers to and for Elisabeth; she had been forcing him to think seriously and serially about the role of passions in the complementarily interactive relation between the mind and the body and, more significantly, the debilitating disrelations or dissonances between the two at times of psychosomatic troubles.What engages my attention here is the contextual porosity of epistolary cogitation: the bidirectional, transferential dance of the textured soul, in search of its truth. Call it an aesthetic phenomenology of correspondence; a [End Page 174] co... (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to examine whether corporate social responsibility activities perceived by consumers affect brand trust and corporate sustainability management. In other words, this study tried to examine whether the compatibility and authenticity of CSR influences brand trust, thereby affecting CSM including economic viability, environmental soundness, and social responsibility. To measure this, an empirical analysis was conducted on 479 consumers who had experience purchasing products from cosmetic companies that are carrying out CSR. As a result of the (...) analysis, it was found that the compatibility and authenticity of CSR have a positive effect on brand trust. Also, it was found that brand trust had a positive effect on social responsibility among the sub-concepts of CSM, but did not affect economic viability and environmental soundness. The results of this study are expected to provide strategic implications for social responsibility performance and brand trust building necessary for cosmetics companies to grow continuously. (shrink)

This article draws on the Conversational Structure Model (CSM) to explore a different explanation of the educational phenomenon. It is argued that education can be seen as a lifelong individual process that is lived by a human being in the different niches with which he or she interacts. These niches are modified by the persons' actions that are part of that structure; at the same time, the environments he or she interacts will modify the person, structurally. These structural changes produce, (...) in human beings, behaviors different from those shown before the interaction: the person has learned. The conclusion is that education occurs in a specific kind of conversations. (shrink)

We prove two embedding and extension theorems in the context of the constructive theory of metric spaces. The first states that Cantor space embeds in any inhabited complete separable metric space without isolated points, X, in such a way that every sequentially continuous function from Cantor space to ℤ extends to a sequentially continuous function from X to ℝ. The second asserts an analogous property for Baire space relative to any inhabited locally non-compact CSM. Both results rely on having careful (...) constructive formulations of the concepts involved.As a first application, we derive new relationships between “continuity principles” asserting that all functions between specified metric spaces are pointwise continuous. In particular, we give conditions that imply the failure of the continuity principle “all functions from X to ℝ are continuous”, when X is an inhabited CSM without isolated points, and when X is an inhabited locally non-compact CSM. One situation in which the latter case applies is in models based on “domain realizability”, in which the failure of the continuity principle for any inhabited locally non-compact CSM, X, generalizes a result previously obtained by Escardó and Streicher in the special case X = C[0, 1].As a second application, we show that, when the notion of inhabited complete separable metric space without isolated points is interpreted in a recursion-theoretic setting, then, for any such space X, there exists a Banach-Mazur computable function from X to the computable real numbers that is not Markov computable. This generalizes a result obtained by Hertling in the special case that X is the space of computable real numbers. (shrink)

We prove two embedding and extension theorems in the context of the constructive theory of metric spaces. The first states that Cantor space embeds in any inhabited complete separable metric space (CSM) without isolated points, X, in such a way that every sequentially continuous function from Cantor space to ℤ extends to a sequentially continuous function from X to ℝ. The second asserts an analogous property for Baire space relative to any inhabited locally non‐compact CSM. Both results rely on having (...) careful constructive formulations of the concepts involved.As a first application, we derive new relationships between “continuity principles” asserting that all functions between specified metric spaces are pointwise continuous. In particular, we give conditions that imply the failure of the continuity principle “all functions from X to ℝ are continuous”, when X is an inhabited CSM without isolated points, and when X is an inhabited locally non‐compact CSM. One situation in which the latter case applies is in models based on “domain realizability”, in which the failure of the continuity principle for any inhabited locally non‐compact CSM, X, generalizes a result previously obtained by Escardó and Streicher in the special case X = C[0, 1].As a second application, we show that, when the notion of inhabited complete separable metric space without isolated points is interpreted in a recursion‐theoretic setting, then, for any such space X, there exists a Banach‐Mazur computable function from X to the computable real numbers that is not Markov computable. This generalizes a result obtained by Hertling in the special case that X is the space of computable real numbers. (© 2004 WILEY‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim). (shrink)