The criterion of truth is the measure of the truthfulness and reliability of our knowledge. It is also the basis for determining the correctness of our concepts and how much our perceptions, ideas, and concepts accord with objective reality. Idealism holds to the idea that the criterion of truth does not involve the integration between theory as created by human intelligence and objective reality, but rather that the criterion of truth involves the "clarity and (...) correctness" of perception, viewpoints, and concepts by the subject. For instance, the Machists 1 think that the criterion of truth is experience, however, they neither interpret experience from a materialistic viewpoint, nor view experience as the result of humans interacting with nature as they reform it. The Machists view experience as a summary of perceptions and as the subjective experience of humans. In this sense, perception must be tested by perception itself. In attempting to escape the trap of solipsism , they proposed "collective experience" as the criterion of truth. According to such a view, anything that involves "common significance," that is, anything acknowledged by everyone, is the truth. Lenin exposed the absurdity of idealist theory by pointing out that by following the view of "socially formed experience" it is very easy to consider as normal the most absurd and farcical notions, such as ghosts, for such beliefs are also a form of human "experience." Religion also possesses a "common significance," for innumerable people believe in ghosts and miracles, etc. Nevertheless, religion does not become the truth because of this. The concept of the "criterion of truth" held by the Machists played a dominant role in modern bourgeois philosophy. Jean Jacques Rousseau and John Dewey, along with other reactionaries in philosophy all denied scientific criteria. They would rather that the masses remain ignorant of how to understand and determine the truth. (shrink)

Thirteen essays on the treatment of a criterion for truth by such classical writers as Parmenides, Protagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, Philo, Epicurius, the Stoics, Plotinus, and Ptolemy, whose neglected Greek work on the subject is included here, along with an annotated English translation. The price $LB12.50, has been estimated to US $24. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

The absolute self-evidence of consciousness is due to the fact that the object of consciousness is present or immanent in it. We may therefore formulate the absolutely certain starting point of philosophy as follows: knowledge about an object immanent in consciousness is absolutely certain in so far as it is the actual testimony of the object about itself, and does not go beyond that which is present in consciousness. The criterion of the absolute certainty of such knowledge is self (...) evidence, i.e. the fact that it consists entirely of what is present in consciousness. To doubt such knowledge is absurd because it is not a copy of the object, it is not a symbol of it, but simply and directly contains the object itself as known. I designate the act of the immediate contemplation of objects by the term intuition. According to the epistemological theory which I began to work out in 1903 all our trustworthy knowledge is obtained by means of such immediate observation of objects as they are in themselves; I therefore call my theory of knowledge Intuitivism. (shrink)

This article may be of significant interest to those who may want to reconsider Aristotelian principles in the light of the philosophy of science---i. e., the Aristotelian Thomistic philosophy of sensation as harmonizable with recent findings in the physics/chemistry/physiology of sensation, especially in correlation with research in colorimetry and spectrophotometry. Primarily metaphysical and epistemological in orientation, this paper makes a case for “methodological realism”---viz., how evidence may be grasped, judged, and interpreted in a way that recognizes extemal sense objects to (...) be criteria for verifying statements made about these objects. Amongst the matters and/or problems, considered philosophically, historically, and scientifically, in the course of the article, are: the kinds of sensible qualities discoverable by us; the problem of “immediate” sensation; an analysis of the intemal process of sensation, investigated in conjunction with insights from Aquinas and today’s science; objective/subjective aspects of sensation; causality in sensation; sceptical positions regarding sensation; the problem of sense error; a critique of Descartes’s assumptions about sensation; a sumrnary of conclusions, based on this examination. (shrink)

This article may be of significant interest to those who may want to reconsider Aristotelian principles in the light of the philosophy of science---i. e., the Aristotelian Thomistic philosophy of sensation as harmonizable with recent findings in the physics/chemistry/physiology of sensation, especially in correlation with research in colorimetry and spectrophotometry. Primarily metaphysical and epistemological in orientation, this paper makes a case for “methodological realism”---viz., how evidence may be grasped, judged, and interpreted in a way that recognizes extemal sense objects to (...) be criteria for verifying statements made about these objects. Amongst the matters and/or problems, considered philosophically, historically, and scientifically, in the course of the article, are: the kinds of sensible qualities discoverable by us; the problem of “immediate” sensation; an analysis of the intemal process of sensation, investigated in conjunction with insights from Aquinas and today’s science; objective/subjective aspects of sensation; causality in sensation; sceptical positions regarding sensation; the problem of sense error; a critique of Descartes’s assumptions about sensation; a sumrnary of conclusions, based on this examination. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Martin Heidegger and OntologyEmmanuel Levinas (bio)The prestige of Martin Heidegger 1 and the influence of his thought on German philosophy marks both a new phase and one of the high points of the phenomenological movement. Caught unawares, the traditional establishment is obliged to clarify its position on this new teaching which casts a spell over youth and which, overstepping the bounds of permissibility, is already in vogue. For once, (...) Fame has picked one who deserves it and, for that matter, one who is still living. Anyone who has studied philosophy cannot, when confronted by Heidegger’s work, fail to recognize how the originality and force of his achievements, stemming from genius, are combined with an attentive, painstaking, and close working-out of the argument—with that craftsmanship of the patient artisan in which phenomenologists take such pride. In this study, it is important for us to understand, above all, the true intentions of our author, to illuminate what he thinks really needs to be said, and to surmise what is most critical for him.To get to the heart of Heidegger’s system, it seems fitting to begin with a problem that is generally familiar. We choose the problem of knowledge, a deeper understanding of which takes us to the very threshold of Heidegger’s thought. For this problem, central to modern philosophy, is one of the main obstacles of modern philosophy that Heidegger wishes to surmount. Neo-Kantianism, which takes knowledge as the philosophical problem of the first rank, is the movement against which Heidegger rebels with all his strength. We have, thus, every chance of gaining access to his thought by the main door, so to speak. Once inside the system we will try to trace its outlines, 2 reserving, for a second part of our work, the determination of Heidegger’s place in the history of ideas, especially in the phenomenological movement, as well as of his relations with the philosopher to whom he owes so much—Edmund Husserl. 31In its most general form, the problem of the theory of knowledge has a critical significance. It consists in delineating a domain where knowledge can be certain and in determining the criteria for the legitimate scope of knowledge. But this problem, as normal and as simple as it may appear, has deeper roots. That knowledge should need a criterion at all presupposes that truth is not identical to all that is known and that the course [End Page 11] of things can fail to correspond with the course of thought. “How does knowledge correspond to being?” is a more profound formulation of the problem of knowledge.But we are not going to touch anymore on the primordial phenomenon that generates the problem. The problem of correspondence between thing and thought presupposes a free activity of thought and its isolation in relation to the object. It is precisely this presupposition which renders their harmony and even their contact problematic. “How does the subject take leave of itself to attain the object?” is what the problem of knowledge, in the last analysis, boils down to. Its true source is thus the concept of “subject” as elaborated by modern philosophy. The cogito presided over the subject’s birth. The cogito was the affirmation of the privileged nature of the subject’s immanent sphere, of its unique place in existence; hence, the cogito was the specificity of the subject’s connection to the rest of reality, the sui generis nature which opens up the passage from immanence to transcendence, the passage from ideas contained in the thinking substance to 4 their “formal existence.”The concept of the subject, understood as a substance having a specific position in the entire domain of being, presents us with difficulties of two kinds. First, how do we understand this leave-taking from the self which the thinking substance brings about and which displays an entirely original aspect? Indeed, we could say that thought, in reaching out toward objects, does not actually take leave of itself, since its objects—considered as ideas and contents of thought—are, in a certain sense, already within it. In order to make sense of this paradox, Descartes... (shrink)

In this paper I examine, and reject, one of the chief philosophical arguments that purports to show that Pyrrhonian Skepticism is incompatible with possessing any beliefs. That argument, first put forward by Jonathan Barnes and since accepted by many philosophers, focuses on the skeptic's resolute suspension of judgment concerning one philosophical issue, namely whether criteria of truth exist. In short, the argument holds that, because skeptics suspend judgment whether criteria of truth exist, they have no basis on which (...) to discriminate between their impressions, which is a necessary condition for belief formation. I show that this argument fails because it misunderstands both the nature of criteria of truth and the epistemic consequences of suspending judgment concerning their existence. Thus, I clear the main philosophical obstacle preventing an interpretation of Pyrrhonism as consistent with possessing beliefs (associated most famously with Michael Frede). (shrink)

What is the criterion of truth? This is a question that was resolved long ago by the revolutionary teachers of the proletariat. But as a result of damage done by the "Gang of Four" and a mass of distorted propaganda in the media under their control, it has become muddled beyond compare in recent years. In order to deepen the criticism of the "Gang of Four" and eradicate the remnants of their poison and influence, it is very important (...) to clear this up and sort it out. (shrink)

In 1845, while developing a new world view, Marx introduced practice as the criterion of truth: "The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the reality and power, the this-worldliness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question."1 Whether a theory (...) correctly reflects the objectively existing objects with which it concerns itself, and whether it is the truth, cannot be determined within the sphere of thinking, or by means of theoretical argument, but only on the basis of testing in social practice. This is a basic principle and characteristic feature of Marxist philosophy. (shrink)

The thesis that social practice is the only criterion by which to judge truth has now become common sense in Marxist philosophy. However, the formulation of the thesis came as a result of the long period of exploration and struggle over the issue of the criterion of truth in the history of human knowledge. In Europe, the criterion has varied from the scholasticism of the Middle Ages, through the capitalist philosophy of modern times, to Marxist (...) philosophy, according to the different philosophical lines and different viewpoints on truth. In a nutshell, in the Middle Ages, the criterion was the religious inquisition based on dogmas in the "Bible." In opposing the ecclesiastic theology of the Middle Ages, capitalist philosophers in modern times presented "judgment by rationality." On the issue of the criterion of truth, some of them stressed rationality, while others emphasized experience. Only when Marxist philosophy proposed judgment on the basis of social practice was the issue truly resolved scientifically. (shrink)

What is the criterion of truth? This is a question that was resolved long ago by the revolutionary teachers of the proletariat. But as a result of damage done by the "Gang of Four" and a mass of distorted propaganda in the media under their control, it has become muddled beyond compare in recent years. In order to deepen the criticism of the "Gang of Four" and eradicate the remnants of their poison and influence, it is very important (...) to clear this up and sort it out. (shrink)

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This paper discusses ἐπιβολαὶ τῆς διανοίας, which later Epicureans are supposed to have elevated to a fourth criterion of truth to complement perceptions, preconceptions and feelings. By examining Epicurus’ extant writings, the paper distinguishes three different senses of the term: ‘thought in general’, ‘act of attention’ and ‘mental perception’. It is argued that only the sense ‘mental perception’ yields a plausible reading of ἐπιβολαί as a criterion of truth. The paper then turns to the textual evidence (...) on ἐπιβολαί in later authors. While the term ἐπιβολή is not used by Cicero, Lucretius and Philodemus in the sense of mental perception, it is argued that this still is the most plausible way of understanding ἐπιβολή as a criterion of truth. (shrink)

A survey of Bayle's skeptical arguments regarding Descartes' criterion of truth, which Bayle refers to as "evidence." Bayle's arguments for degrees of evidence, as well as for the necessity and sufficiency of possessing a high degree of evidence in order to form virtuous beliefs, are surveyed as well.

During the recent discussions concerning the problem of the criterion of truth, some comrades have said: In real life we use a great many criteria to distinguish between true and false, such as the criterion for distinguishing between the fragrant flowers and the poison ivy [i.e., ideologically correct and incorrect], the criterion for distinguishing what is revolutionary from what is counterrevolutionary, the criterion for determining successors to manage the proletarian revolution, etc. Although these criteria are (...) derived from practice, in themselves they are not practice but things of the subjective realm. Do they function in reality as criteria to test truth? (shrink)

An analysis of Nicholas of Cusa’s conception of the power of judgment that shows it enables morality as well as cognition.

In his recent book, The Coherence Theory of Truth, Nicholas Rescher emphasizes the difference between the question of the criterion of truth and the question of the nature of truth. A particular position concerning the criterion of truth, he says, may leave open a variety of options on the question of the nature of truth. There have been several recent attempts to defend coherence theories of rational justification in which coherence is held to (...) be a criterion of truth, but the coherence theory of the nature of truth has been resisted because of the supposed metaphysical implications of such a position. In this paper I shall consider whether the coherence theory of justification can be adequately defended apart from a commitment to the coherence theory of truth. I shall argue that coherence as the criterion of truth does entail that coherence is the nature of truth, that the coherence theory of justification is correct, and that therefore the coherence theory of truth is correct. (shrink)

The age-old question “What is truth?” is not an unambiguous one. There are at least two different meanings. In one sense, it is a semantic question about the meaning of the word “truth” and/or a metaphysical question about the nature of the property of truth, that is, how truth can be defined in terms of other notions, if it is definable at all. In another sense, it is an epistemological question about the criterion or test (...) of truth, that is, how we can recognize or accept (empirical) propositions as true. Ayer, in Language, Truth and Logic (LTL) and some other articles, tried to convince us that when we attempt to elucidate a theory of truth, we are only engaging in the epistemological project of finding the criterion of truth. This anti-semantical and anti-metaphysical view is based on Ayer’s (radical) deflationism about truth. In this chapter, I will argue that since Ayer did not accept that the criterion of truth is intimately related to the concept of truth, he can be seen as a deflationist about the nature of truth and as an advocate of a certain (Schlickian) kind of correspondence conception about the criterion of truth. His position would not be tenable if he had maintained what some of his contemporaries accepted, namely that there is a close connection between the two truth-theoretical tasks: the definitional and the criterial one. (shrink)