In his influential paper Legal Reasons, Sources and Gaps' reprinted in The Authority of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), Raz says that legal gaps only exist when law speaks with uncertain voice or when it speaks with many voices, but there are no gaps when law is silent. In this later case, rules of closure, which are analytically true, prevent from the occurrence of gaps. According to Raz, if there is a gap in a legal system, then both the (...) claim that there is a conclusive legal reason to perform a certain action, and its negation are neither true nor false. Therefore, one of the Raz's most important contributions to the solution of the problem of legal gaps is to remark that legal discourse is not altogether governed by the principle of bivalence. However, philosophers often claim that the denial of bivalence leads to a logical inconsistency. If this claim were true, then Raz's solution to the problem of gaps would be seriously threatened. In this paper we show ‐ with the aid of a sophisticated analytical tool, i.e. von Wright's Truth Logic ‐ that the rejection of bivalence only commits us to accept the trivial conclusion that propositions can lack truth‐values. For this reason, Raz's paper can still be regarded as a good starting‐point for analyzing the relationships among norms, practical reasoning and legal gaps. However, we also show that in order to admit propositions which are neither true nor false, Raz's theses must be reformulated. Otherwise, the claim that there is no gap when law is silent would not be compatible with the rejection of bivalence. (shrink)

The first part of this article is about the rules that define a legal order’s supreme legislative authority. In this first part, the article also dwells on several distinctions such as those between norms and meta-norms, legislative and customary rules, and constitutive and regulative rules, all with the objective of determining which of these categories the aforementioned rules belong to. The conclusion is that the basic rules defining the supreme legislative authorities of every existing legal order are necessarily constitutive meta-norms (...) and have a customary nature. The second part of this article takes into account the different possible contents of the ultimate rules that define legislative authority. On this basis, four models of legal order and legislative authority are distinguished: those corresponding to absolute authority and to moral authority, and those corresponding to the rule-of-law state and to the constitutional state. In this regard, several considerations are offered that, on the one hand, single out the specific notion of authority accepted within the constitutional state and, on the other, offer a specific critique of the theoretical distinction between constitutive and constituted authority. According to the analysis provided in this article, every authority is a constituted authority. In particular, supreme legislative authorities are constituted by customary constitutive norms that fall beyond the reach of the authorities themselves and do not depend on the decision or will of any particular individual. (shrink)