This chapter contains section titled: References Further reading.

The "New Hume" referred to in the title of this collection of essays is the Hume who is supposed to be a causal realist in Galen Strawson's and John Wright's senses of that term. There are, of course, other "New Humes." There is the "New Hume" who is not an inductive sceptic, the "New Hume" who is a moral realist, and the "New Hume" who is a causal realist of a very different kind, to name but a few. Perhaps the (...) book should have been called A New Hume Debate to acknowledge the many interesting and new interpretations of Hume that have very little to do with Strawson's and Wright's forms of causal realism and may even be incompatible with them. (shrink)

Central to Husserl's investigation of the foundations of logic is the notion of the identity of the judgment. Every theoretical enterprise, including logic, presupposes that its judgments are stable and enduring acquisitions which can be understood in the same sense by anyone at any time. In order fully to understand logic and its foundational role for all the other sciences Husserl believed it necessary to examine how this sense of the identical judgment is constituted. It is within this context that (...) Moneta carries out her study of identity. The results she arrives at are significant for Husserl's investigation of logic and also for his theory of perception. (shrink)