By exploring whether nanotechnologies have the potential to generate green innovations, we consider the paradox between the negative and positive side-effects that could come with the development of nanotechnologies. Starting from the conceptual framework of green product innovation, the potential green innovation activity of more than 14,000 firms of the nanotech sector is investigated. Using a query-search method, their patenting activity is explored. Results first show that there is an increasing trend toward the creation of fundamental green knowledge by firms (...) involved in nanotechnologies; second, they demonstrate that energy efficiency is the main driver of green knowledge creation in the sector and third they reveal the main characteristics of nanotech firms creating green knowledge. Beyond their contribution to the debate between positive and negative outcomes of nanotechnology developments, these results also enrich the conceptual framework of green product innovation—a key route to achieving sustainability at the same time as growth. (shrink)

Building on the emerging literature on the ethics of social enterprises (SEs), this paper advances the underexplored role of frontline workers (FLWs) as embedded agents at the interface between communities and SEs. Specifically, we uncover the subjectivity of FLWs as they navigate moral ambiguities while performing their professional roles, dealing with rules and regulations within the organizational hierarchy and living as members of local communities. Based on an inductive case study of a microfinance organization in Cameroon, we find that FLWs (...) engage in three rationalization strategies: cautious disengaging, safeguarding self-interest, and justifying relevance. Our findings offer a better understanding of the ethics of SEs by unpacking the subjectivity of FLWs. We highlight a bottom-up account of caring SEs, identify a boundary condition to subjectivity, and present a nuanced view of FLWs in embedded organizations. We also discuss the practical implications for SEs to improve their compassion and cater for the mental wellbeing of FLWs. (shrink)

This paper concerns connection between knowing or accepting a logical principle such as Modus Ponens and actions of reasoning involving it. Discussions of this connection typically mention the so-called ‘Lewis Carroll Regress’ and there is near consensus that the regress shows something important about it. Also, although the regress explicitly concerns logic, many philosophers think that it establishes a more general truth, about the structurally similar connection between epistemic or practical principles and actions involving them. This paper’s first aim is (...) to address key interpretations Carroll’s regress as clearly as possible so as to show precisely how it might be relevant to questions concerning the connection between logical knowledge and reasoning, and, more broadly, to discussions of how epistemic or practical principles may be action-guiding. Its second aim is to show that the regress fails to establish anything of substance about the connection between logical knowledge and reasoning, or any other structurally similar relation, unless substantive, contentious and typically undefended assumptions are made. The consensus is thus on shaky ground. (shrink)

I address a type of circularity threat that arises for the view that we employ general basic logical principles in deductive reasoning. This type of threat has been used to argue that whatever knowing such principles is, it cannot be a fully cognitive or propositional state, otherwise deductive reasoning would not be possible. I look at two versions of the circularity threat and answer them in a way that both challenges the view that we need to apply general logical principles (...) in deductive reasoning and defuses the threat to a cognitivist account of knowing basic logical principles. (shrink)

L'interdiction du meurtre a un sens même en l'absence de toute référence à un Dieu transcendant et à l'idée selon laquelle la vie humaine serait sacrée. Bien plus, la justification de cette norme par des valeurs morales et l'effort pour la fonder rationnellement l'affaiblissent. Malgré l'apport majeur de Kant à la morale, son analyse consistant à rapprocher les devoirs envers soi-même des devoirs envers autrui passe à côté de la violence propre au meurtre et criminalise le suicide. Au contraire, en (...) faisant de l'expérience de mon rapport à l'autre la source de l'éthique, la description du meurtre, qui renvoie à la volonté d'anéantir l'autre comme tel, permet de dégager l'essence de la violence qui est un faire taire. Il y a donc dans le "tu ne tueras point" plus qu'une prohibition de l'homicide volontaire. Affirmer l'actualité de cet interdit, c'est rappeler le sens des crimes imprescriptibles tout en invitant à prendre la mesure de ce qu'impliquent les guerres qui ne sont pas des génocides. C'est aussi préconiser des solutions adaptées aux problèmes qui se posent au début et à la fin de la vie, comme on le voit avec l'avortement, le suicide assisté et l'euthanasie. Enfin, c'est reconnaître que le droit absolu que nous nous octroyons sur les animaux relève d'une transgression. (shrink)

L’idée selon laquelle le temps, son organisation, sa discipline est un facteur discriminant permettant de séparer nettement la période industrielle de celle qui la précède a longtemps prévalu chez les historiens. Cet article s’inscrit en faux contre cette thèse : les conflits autour du temps de travail doivent être inscrits dans la longue durée des rapports sociaux de production. Nous dressons ici une esquisse large des conflits où le temps est un élément de la mobilisation des travailleurs, du XIVe au (...) premier XIXe siècle. Alors qu’au Moyen-Âge, certains conflits portent clairement sur la remise en cause de la définition du temps de travail, à partir du XVIIe siècle, le thème semble s’estomper. Mais apparaissent alors des conflits qui portent sur le contenu du travail effectué dans un temps donné. La première industrialisation ne change pas véritablement la nature des revendications. Elles proviennent encore majoritairement d’ouvriers engagés dans des activités traditionnelles. Les ouvriers d’usine, quant à eux, ne sortent globalement pas de leur mutisme avant les décennies 1860/1870. (shrink)

Comment défendre les Lumières aujourd'hui? Leur idéal d'émancipation a-t-il encore un sens? On ne saurait se borner à invoquer un esprit des Lumières immuable dans un contexte marqué par le réveil du nationalisme, les crises environnementales et sanitaires et l'augmentation des inégalités. Faire face au danger d'effondrement de notre civilisation sans renoncer à la rationalité philosophico-scientifique, mais en tenant compte de notre dépendance à l'égard de la nature et des autres vivants: telle est la démarche qui fonde ce livre. Pour (...) combattre les anti-Lumières qui souhaitent rétablir une société hiérarchique ou théocratique et répondre aux accusations des postmodernes qui suspectent tout universalisme d'être hégémonique, il faut donc proposer de nouvelles Lumières. Celles-ci supposent de revisiter l'histoire des Lumières, mais aussi de lutter contre l'amputation de la raison qui a été réduite à un instrument de calcul et d'exploitation. L'objectif des Lumières à l'âge du vivant et de leur projet d'une société démocratique et écologique est bien de destituer le principe de la domination--une domination des autres et de la nature à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur de soi qui traduit un mépris du corps et de la vulnérabilité."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

In Paul’s argument against dissensions, Paul is said to have tried to regain his authority before the Corinthians. The first rhetorical unit is thus seen as an apologia. In his argument, he seemingly uses the concept of paterfamilias known to have evoked power and control. However, such a proposal neglects the fact that Paul’s argument is against exactly such type of discourse in which one seeks to elevate one teacher against another. Rather, in the use of the concept of paterfamilias (...) we should see Paul redefining the concept and filling it with affection. (shrink)

Emmanuel Levinas a renouvelé en profondeur la philosophie, qu'il s'agisse de la définition de la subjectivité par la responsabilité, des implications politiques de cette conception du sujet ou de son insistance sur la corporéité, pensée comme vulnérabilité ou associée à une phénoménologie du « vivre de » et des nourritures. Dans un séminaire qui s'adressait à des étudiants en philosophie et à des soignants, Corine Pelluchon donne les clefs pour comprendre cette œuvre exigeante et communique une expérience de pensée (...) liée à la manière dont la réflexion et le style de Levinas l'ont bouleversée. Elle montre en quel sens il a inspiré ses propres travaux, qui prolongent et parfois discutent ses thèses, soulignant aussi l'actualité de Levinas, y compris lorsqu'on s'intéresse à des sujets sur lesquels il ne s'est pas exprimé, comme la médecine, l'écologie et le rapport aux animaux."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Theories of diagrams and diagrammatic reasoning typically seek to account for either the formal semantics of diagrams, or for the advantages which diagrammatic representations hold for the reasoner over other forms of representation. Regrettably, almost no theory exists which accounts for both of these issues together, nor how they affect one another. We do not attempt to provide such an account here. We do, however, seek to lay out larger context than is generally used for examining the processes of using (...) diagrams in reasoning or communication. A context in which detailed studies of sub-problems, such as the formal semantics or cognitive impact of specific diagrammatic systems, may be embedded.Accounts of the embedding of sentential logics in the computational processes of reasoners and communicators are relatively well developed from several decades of research in AI. Analogies between the sentential and the graphical cases are quite revealing about both similarities and differences. To provide a structure for the 'grand context' of diagrammatic representation and reasoning, and to clarify the relations between its component problems, we examine carefully these analogies and the decomposition they provide of subproblems for analysing diagrammatic reasoning. (shrink)

It is highly now intuitive that the future is open and the past is closed now—whereas it is unsettled whether there will be a fourth world war, it is settled that there was a first. Recently, it has become increasingly popular to claim that the intuitive openness of the future implies that contingent statements about the future, such as ‘There will be a sea battle tomorrow,’ are non-bivalent (neither true nor false). In this paper, we argue that the non-bivalence of (...) future contingents is at odds with our pre-theoretic intuitions about the openness of the future. These intuitions are revealed by our pragmatic judgments concerning the correctness and incorrectness of assertions of future contingents. We argue that the pragmatic data together with a plausible account of assertion shows that in many cases we take future contingents to be true (or to be false), though we take the future to be open in relevant respects. It follows that appeals to intuition to support the non-bivalence of future contingents are untenable. Intuition favours bivalence. (shrink)

Pourquoi avons-nous tant de mal à changer nos styles de vie alors que plus personne ne peut nier que notre modèle de développement a un impact destructeur sur le plan écologique et social ni douter de l'intensité des violences infligées aux animaux? Relever ce défi implique de combler l'écart entre la théorie et la pratique en développant une éthique des vertus. Au lieu de se focaliser sur les principes ou sur les conséquences de nos actes, celle-ci s'intéresse à nos motivations (...) concrètes, c'est-à-dire aux représentations et aux affects qui nous poussent à agir. Quels traits moraux peuvent nous conduire à être sobres et à avoir du plaisir à faire le bien, au lieu d'être constamment déchirés entre le bonheur et le devoir? L'éthique de la considération prend sa source dans les morales antiques, mais elle rejette leur essentialisme et s'appuie sur l'humilité et sur la vulnérabilité. Alors que Bernard de Clairvaux fait reposer la considération sur une expérience de l'incommensurable supposant la foi, Corine Pelluchon la définit par la transdescendance. Celle-ci désigne un mouvement d'approfondissement de soi-même permettant au sujet d'éprouver le lien l'unissant aux autres vivants et de transformer la conscience de son appartenance au monde commun en savoir vécu et en engagement. La considération est l'attitude globale sur laquelle les vertus se fondent au cours d'un processus d'individuation dont l'auteur décrit les étapes. (shrink)

Metaphysics, Psychology and Philosophy have defined the notion of archetype. We will argue that there is another concept, the “anarchetype” which could escape to the centralization and to any pre‑defined structure building on archetypes. Anarchetype belongs to anarchic and unpredictable structures denying center and logos. It could be used to study marginal or non coherent works far beyond occidental pattern. Eschatype is finally analysed. Some structures without any archetype have to draw an internal evolution before building any model or order. (...) If eschatype is not initially known, it finally shows up and exposes explanations, meanings and even a structure. Eschatype may then give birth to a new theme. It finally may be found in other supports or works, structure and archetype. (shrink)

There is a growing interest in aggregating more biomedical and patient data into large health data sets for research and public benefits. However, collecting and processing patient data raises new ethical issues regarding patient’s rights, social justice and trust in public institutions. The aim of this empirical study is to gain an in-depth understanding of the awareness of possible ethical risks and corresponding obligations among those who are involved in projects using patient data, i.e. healthcare professionals, regulators and policy makers. (...) We used a qualitative design to examine Swiss healthcare stakeholders’ experiences and perceptions of ethical challenges with regard to patient data in real-life settings where clinical registries are sponsored, created and/or used. A semi-structured interview was carried out with 22 participants between July 2014 and January 2015. The interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed, coded and analysed using a thematic method derived from Grounded Theory. All interviewees were concerned as a matter of priority with the needs of legal and operating norms for the collection and use of data, whereas less interest was shown in issues regarding patient agency, the need for reciprocity, and shared governance in the management and use of clinical registries’ patient data. This observed asymmetry highlights a possible tension between public and research interests on the one hand, and the recognition of patients’ rights and citizens’ involvement on the other. The advocation of further health-related data sharing on the grounds of research and public interest, without due regard for the perspective of patients and donors, could run the risk of fostering distrust towards healthcare data collections. Ultimately, this could diminish the expected social benefits. However, rather than setting patient rights against public interest, new ethical approaches could strengthen both concurrently. On a normative level, this study thus provides material from which to develop further ethical reflection towards a more cooperative approach involving patients and citizens in the governance of their health-related big data. (shrink)

This paper argues that the prominent accounts of logical knowledge have the consequence that they conflict with ordinary reasoning. On these accounts knowing a logical principle, for instance, is having a disposition to infer according to it. These accounts in particular conflict with so-called ‘reasoned change in view’, where someone does not infer according to a logical principle but revise their views instead. The paper also outlines a propositional account of logical knowledge which does not conflict with ordinary reasoning.

This paper considers the problem of assigning meanings to empty natural kind terms. It does so in the context of the Twin-Earth externalist-internalist debate about whether the meanings of natural kind terms are individuated by the external physical environment of the speakers using these terms. The paper clarifies and outlines the different ways in which meanings could be assigned to empty natural kind terms. And it argues that externalists do not have the semantic resources to assign them meanings. The paper (...) ends on a sceptical note concerning the fruitfulness of using the Twin-Earth setting in debates about the semantics of empty natural kind terms. (shrink)

This paper considers the question of what knowing a logical rule consists in. I defend the view that knowing a logical rule is having propositional knowledge. Many philosophers reject this view and argue for the alternative view that knowing a logical rule is, at least at the fundamental level, having a disposition to infer according to it. To motivate this dispositionalist view, its defenders often appeal to Carroll’s regress argument in ‘What the Tortoise Said to Achilles’. I show that this (...) dispositionalist view, and the regress that supposedly motivates it, operate with the wrong picture of what is involved in knowing a logical rule. In particular I show that it gives us the wrong picture of the relation between knowing a logical rule and actions of inferring according to it, as well as of the way in which knowing a logical rule might be a priori. (shrink)

Normal 0 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:#0400; mso-fareast-language:#0400; mso-bidi-language:#0400;} Carlos Castaneda’s books and his New Age shamanistic religion raise, beyond the controversy regarding the counterfeit character of his ethnographic narrative and charlatanism, several methodological problems. Educated within the emerging paradigm of emic studies and ethnomethodoly of the 1960s, Castaneda used it in order to set a very clever methodological (...) trap: Can an ethnologist and historian of religions discard a religious movement on account that its initiator is a charlatan or, at best, an enlightened or self-deluded individual? In order to tackle this dilemma, in this article I successively rally several methods and hermeneutics: reader-response theory, phenomenological anthropology, ethnomethodology and emic studies, psychoanalysis, fictional worlds theory, and “make believe / make belief” theatrical theory. (shrink)

We start from the idea that Utopia is a Renaissance alternative to the Medieval Garden of Eden and, consequently, that dystopia, as a failed utopia, continues the theme of Paradise Lost. Inheriting such a rich tradition, the word “utopia” designates a semantic hybrid that encompasses several fields and disciplines. In this paper, we propose a reorganisation of the species of the utopian genre by reusing, with a minimum of violence, the already existing, albeit rather lax terms of utopia, eutopia, dystopia (...) and antiutopia. The main criteria for distinguishing these species are the moral value, the degree of verisimilitude, the constructing procedures. (shrink)

Early medieval Irish literature presents several types of voyages into the afterworld: echtrai (various adventures into Mag Mell), immrama (sea travels to the enchanted islands of the Ocean), fisi (ecstatic revelations of Christian eschatology), journeys into Saint Patrick’s Purgatory. In this paper, we seek to contrast the fisi and the descents into the cave of Saint Patrick. From a morphological point of view, both have a great deal of topoï in common, which describe the structure of the Christian other world: (...) the waste land of pains, the infernal pit, the ordeal bridge, the land of the blessed, the celestial Kingdom of God, etc. However, between the two genres appear some major differences, such as the order in which these places are visited. The main distinction lies in the fact that the fisi are mainly ecstatic voyages (i.e. psychanodias ), implying a “ raptus animae ”, while the voyages into Saint Patrick’s Purgatory are physical expeditions (i.e. somanodias ), during the actual life of the adventurers. Although many of the common themes of the two genres derive from the medieval Christian tradition (especially the apocryphal apocalypses and visiones ), we argue that the differences may be due to the input of local Irish Celtic heritage. (shrink)

This paper comparatively presents three notions related to the concept of creative fantasy. These three terms (”imagination”, ”imaginaire”, ”imaginal”) have been developed by the French school of research on the imagination (“recherches sur l’imaginaire”), which is little known in the Anglo-Saxon academic field. As such, the terms don’t even have convenient translations and linguistic equivalents. Briefly, imagination is fantasy conceived as a combinatory faculty of the psyche. French rationalistic “philosophes” saw it as a misleading and rather weakly creative ability. ”L’imaginaire” (...) is the resourceful and inventive aspect of fantasy, as conceived by the Romantics and then theorized by psychoanalysis and contemporary French philosophers. ”L’imaginal”, or ”mundus imaginalis” is a concept defined by Henry Corbin in order to designate fantasies as self-sustained, ontological beings. (shrink)

Dans ses romans « historiques », Umberto Eco revisite, de manière postmoderne, le grand bassin sémantique des « merveilles » de la littérature médiévale et de la Renaissance. Plus spécifiquement, dans L’Île du jour d’avant, il travaille sur la toile de fond de l’imaginaire cosmographique de l’âge des grandes « reconnaissances ». Les aventures du protagoniste suivent un trajet initiatique vers un « centre sacré » de la mappemonde, le méridien zéro. En même temps, les péripéties extérieures sont le corrélatif (...) d’une évolution intérieure, que nous analysons avec les instruments de la psychologie analytique jungienne. La colombe orange qui jaillit de l’île au moment culminant du roman, ayant les caractéristiques d’un Phénix — oiseau de la rédemption et la renaissance — est un symbole de l’accomplissement du personnage, de l’atteinte de son soi mystique. In his “historical” novels, Umberto Eco revisits, in a postmodern manner, the great “semantic basin” of the marvels from medieval and Renaissance literature. In his Island of the Day Before, he makes use of the cosmographic representations of the world from the “Age of Reconnaissance”. The adventures of the character are organized as an initiation journey towards a sacred center of the mappaemundi of the epoch, the Meridian 0. These objective events are the correlative of an internal evolution, which we analyze using concepts from Jungian psychology. The orange dove that springs from the island at the climax of the novel, resembling a classical Phoenix, is a symbol for the character’s realization of the mystique Self. (shrink)

The constructing principles of ancient cartography were for most of the time non-mimetic and non-empirical, so that the maps build on their basis had a most fantastic shape. We could safely call this kind of non-realistic geography – symbolic geography. In this paper, I focus on the psychological projections that shaped the form of pre-modern maps. The main epistemological instrument for such an approach is offered by Freudian psychoanalysis and Jungian analytical psychology. In ”psychoanalytical geography”, Freudian schemes of interpretation (the (...) oral, anal and genital stages of evolution) are put to work for explaining the complex mechanisms of identification and transference at work in ancient cartography. (shrink)

Avec l’essor et le succès croissant de la littérature de voyages, nourrie par les grandes explorations et découvertes, les utopistes de l’Âge classique ont commencé à s’intéresser plus au sujet épique qu’à l’encadrement rhétorique de la relation utopique. Avec comme résultat des utopies réalistes dans lesquelles les narrateurs, en imitant le schéma de la littérature de voyages et d’exploration, prétendent avoir découvert des civilisations exotiques idéales, crédibles et applicables, qu’ils offrent en modèle à leurs contemporains. Les principaux procédés de construction (...) des « utopies réalistes » sont la sélection et l’extrapolation utopique. Travaillant sur l’image de son monde historique, l’utopiste fait un choix des traits négatifs et positifs et les regroupe dans deux espaces complémentaires. Les caractéristiques jugées mauvaises sont rassemblées et isolées dans la description de « notre » civilisation, celles bénéfiques sont regroupées et extrapolées dans la configuration de la civilisation exotique. L’exclusion des éléments désagréables, nuisibles et funestes soumet la fiction utopique à une « réduction au positif », ce qui fait d’elle un univers fictionnel eudémonique, capable de susciter l’adhésion rationnelle, morale et affective des personnages, ainsi que des lecteurs. Nurtured by the great explorations of the period, the emergence of voyage literature in early modern Europe led classical utopian writers to shift from the dialogical form of Renaissance utopias to voyage narratives. A great many of the classical utopias worked in a realistic code, mimicking the voyage epic, in which fictional voyagers discovered exotic ideal civilizations that were offered as a contrastive example to the European countries. The main construction procedures of these “realistic utopias” were utopian selection and extrapolation. The utopian writer started from the “neutral” image of his contemporary world and operated a separation between its positive and negative features. He regrouped the negative features into the image of “our” civilization and the positive features into the image of the antipodal civilization. By excluding the bad and harmful elements, the utopian writer submitted his ideal society to a “reduction to the positive” and transformed it into a eudemonic fictional world, meant to prompt a rational, moral and emotional adhesion response in the characters, as well as in the readers. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show what sorts of logics are required by externalist and internalist accounts of the meanings of natural kind nouns. These logics give us a new perspective from which to evaluate the respective positions in the externalist-internalist debate about the meanings of such nouns. The two main claims of the paper are the following: first, that adequate logics for internalism and externalism about natural kind nouns are second-order logics; second, that an internalist second-order logic (...) is a free logic—a second order logic free of existential commitments for natural kind nouns, while an externalist second-order logic is not free of existential commitments for natural kind nouns—it is existentially committed. (shrink)

It is disputed what norm, if any, governs assertion. We address this question by looking at assertions of future contingents: statements about the future that are neither metaphysically necessary nor metaphysically impossible. Many philosophers think that future contingents are not truth apt, which together with a Truth Norm or a Knowledge Norm of assertion implies that assertions of these future contingents are systematically infelicitous. In this article, we argue that our practice of asserting future contingents is incompatible with the view (...) that they are not truth apt. We consider a range of norms of assertion and argue that the best explanation of the data is provided by the view that assertion is governed by the Knowledge Norm. (shrink)

In this paper, I address a key argument in favour of logical expressivism, the view that knowing a logical principle such as Modus Ponens is not a cognitive state but a pro-attitude towards drawing certain types of conclusions from certain types of premises. The argument is that logical expressivism is the only view that can take us out of Lewis Carroll's Regress – which suggests that elementary deductive reasoning is impossible. I show that the argument does not hold scrutiny and (...) that logical cognitivism can be vindicated. In the course of the discussion, I draw substantially on a comparison with a similar argument in meta-ethics, for moral expressivism. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Gilbert Ryle’s claim that ordinary competence with logical principles or rules is a kind of knowing how, where such knowledge is understood as a skill, a multi-track disposition. Ryle argues that his account of ordinary logical competence helps avoid Lewis Carroll’s famous regress argument (Carroll 1895), which suggests that elementary deductive reasoning might be impossible. Indeed, Carroll’s regress is the central motivation for Ryle’s account. I argue that this account is inadequate on two counts: it (...) cannot serve to articulate the way ordinary reasoners might exercise their knowledge in reasoning and it does not do much to help us avoid Carroll’s regress. I sketch an alternative view, still Rylean in spirit, that fares better on both counts. (shrink)

Knowledge of the basic rules of logic is often thought to be distinctive, for it seems to be a case of non-inferential a priori knowledge. Many philosophers take its source to be different from those of other types of knowledge, such as knowledge of empirical facts. The most prominent account of knowledge of the basic rules of logic takes this source to be the understanding of logical expressions or concepts. On this account, what explains why such knowledge is distinctive is (...) that it is grounded in semantic or conceptual understanding. However, I show that this cannot be the correct account of knowledge of the basic rules of logic, because it is open to Gettier-style counter-examples. (shrink)

A paradigmatic case of rigidity for singular terms is that of proper names. And it would seem that a paradigmatic case of rigidity for general terms is that of natural kind terms. However, many philosophers think that rigidity cannot be extended from singular terms to general terms. The reason for this is that rigidity appears to become trivial when such terms are considered: natural kind terms come out as rigid, but so do all other general terms, and in particular all (...) descriptive general terms. This paper offers an account of rigidity for natural kind terms which does not trivialise in this way. On this account, natural kind terms are de jure obstinately rigid designators and other general terms, such as descriptive general terms, are not. (shrink)

Many philosophers claim that understanding a logical constant (e.g. ‘if, then’) fundamentally consists in having dispositions to infer according to the logical rules (e.g. Modus Ponens) that fix its meaning. This paper argues that such dispositionalist accounts give us the wrong picture of what understanding a logical constant consists in. The objection here is that they give an account of understanding a logical constant which is inconsistent with what seem to be adequate manifestations of such understanding. I then outline an (...) alternative account according to which understanding a logical constant is not to be understood dispositionally, but propositionally. I argue that this account is not inconsistent with intuitively correct manifestations of understanding the logical constants. (shrink)

L’anorexie fait partie des troubles du comportement ou de la conduite alimentaire qui sont répertoriés dans le Manuel diagnostique et statistique des troubles mentaux, publié par la Société américaine de psychiatrie. Elle figure parmi les troubles majeurs cliniques, à côté de la dépression, du trouble bipolaire, de la schizophrénie, et de la boulimie à laquelle elle est associée comme s’il s’agissait de l’autre face d’une même pathologie addictive. Au-delà des critiques que ce rapprochement peut susciter, parce qu’il ne permet pas (...) d’analyser la spécificité du mode d’expression des personnes qui s’imposent ces.. (shrink)

Why do we continue to adopt lifestyles that are destructive to both the ecological and social levels? The relative failure of environmental ethics is, above all, due to the fact that it has neither been able to link ecology with a philosophy of existence that could enable people to respect nature and its beauty, nor to indicate the way to a possible renewal of democracy. One has to face this double task. By considering everything we live on and depend upon (...) as nourishment, and not as resources, we understand our inhabiting the earth as living together with other living beings. The political consequences of this phenomenology of corporeality, which emphasizes the aesthetic dimension of our relationship to nature, are highlighted. The question of which moral dispositions are required of subjects to achieve the ecological transition are highlighted, as well as the question of what kind of role aesthetics play in ethics and politics. (shrink)

Classical logic counts sentences such as ‘Alice is identical with Alice’ as logically true. A standard objection to classical logic is that Alice’s self-identity, for instance, is not a matter of logic because the identity of particular objects is not a matter of logic. For this reason, many philosophers argue that classical logic is not the right logic, and that it should be abandoned in favour of free logic — logic free of existential commitments with respect to singular terms. In (...) most standard free logics, sentences such as ‘Alice is identical with Alice’ are not logically true. This paper argues that this objection from existential commitments is some- what superficial and that there is a deeper reason why ‘Alice is identical with Alice’ should not be considered a logical truth. Indeed, a key fundamental thought about the nature of logic is that a logical truth is true in virtue of its logical form. The fundamental problem I raise is that a sentence such as ‘Alice is identical with Alice’ appears to not even be true in virtue of its logical form. Thus this paper argues that given that such a sentence is not true in virtue of its logical form, it should not be counted as logically true. It moreover argues, on the same grounds, that even the sentences which free logicians regard as logically true shouldn’t be regarded as logically true. So in this sense free logic is no repair to classical logic. (shrink)

John MacFarlane has recently argued that his brand of truth relativism – Assessment Sensitivity – provides the best solution to the puzzle of future contingents: statements about the future that are metaphysically neither necessary nor impossible. In this paper, we show that even if we grant all of the metaphysical, semantic and pragmatic assumptions in terms of which MacFarlane sets and solves the puzzle, Assessment Sensitivity is ultimately self-refuting.

Why is it so difficult to change our lifestyles and achieve environmental sustainability, when it is undeniable that our current model of development has a destructive ecological and social impact and that it inflicts unacceptable violence on animals? In an attempt to reduce the gap between theory and practice, Corine Pelluchon proposes a virtue ethics that was expounded in Éthique de la considération published in 2018. “ Considération and Feminism” is a chapter of this book. Ecofeminism has shown that (...) our capacity to care for others does not derive from duties but is linked to the particular bonds that tie us to them. Nevertheless, the key to environmental virtues is our relationship with ourselves and our personal experience of the incommensurable. This point, and the process of self-transformation it requires, highlight the difference between the ethics of consideration and ecofeminism, although they have much in common. (shrink)

Les conférences intitulées « Les Nourritures » et « Les Enseignements » sont révélatrices de la philosophie du sensible de Levinas, c’est-à-dire de sa manière de souligner la corporéité du sujet en insistant sur sa matérialité, sur le fait que nous « vivons de ». Comme dans De L’existence à l’existant et dans Totalité et Infini, le plan du sensible, qu’il appelle le monde des nourritures, se caractérise par la jouissance, ce qui veut dire que le besoin n’est pas pensé (...) comme privation, ni rapporté à l’instinct et à la conservation de soi. Cependant, l’originalité de ces conférences tient au passage du plan de la jouissance à celui de la justice. Levinas ne se borne pas à dire que ce passage est une rupture, que seul l’autre m’arrache à « l’égoïsme innocent » de la jouissance. En disant que ma liberté m’apparaît comme injustifiée, il pose la question du droit de notre droit, remettant en question le fondement de la philosophie moderne et la manière dont nous interprétons les droits de l’homme. Bien plus, en associant cette interrogation au thème des nourritures, il articule son ontologie à une réflexion sur l’organisation sociale et politique dont il importe de mesurer toute la profondeur, même si les perspectives ébauchées dans ces textes soulèvent des difficultés. (shrink)

Si nous ne voulons pas que l'écologie se réduise à des déclarations d'intention, des changements dans nos styles de vie sont nécessaires. La question est de savoir quelle éthique et quelles transformations de la démocratie peuvent rendre possible la prise en compte de l'écologie dans notre vie. Reliant des champs de l'éthique appliquée qui d'ordinaire sont étudiés séparément - la culture et l'agriculture, le rapport aux animaux, l'organisation du travail et l'intégration des personnes en situation de handicap -, cette enquête (...) élabore un concept rigoureux de responsabilité susceptible de promouvoir une autre manière de penser le sujet et une autre organisation politique. Loin de fonder la politique sur l'écologie, il s'agit de montrer que celle-ci ne peut être prise au sérieux qu'au sein d'un humanisme rénové. Ainsi, le sujet de l'éthique de la vulnérabilité s'inquiète du devoir être de son droit et intègre, dans son vouloir vivre, le souci de préserver la santé de la terre et de ne pas imposer aux autres hommes et aux autres espèces une vie diminuée. (shrink)

Why is it so difficult to change our lifestyles and achieve environmental sustainability when no one can deny that our model of development has a destructive ecological and social impact and that it inflicts considerable violence on animals? What could contribute to the reinforcement of democracy today when so many people experience a socially degraded life, have lost the desire to participate in public life, or are seduced by populism?In an attempt to respond to these challenges and reduce the gap (...) between theory and practice, we propose a virtue ethics that was expounded in detail in Éthique de la considération. “Considération and Feminism” is a chapter of this book.Instead of focusing on principles or on the... (shrink)