What if we fail to mitigate and adapt to climate change, and so face its more severe impacts? I argue that asking this question reveals a new obligation of climate justice: contingency planning for severe climate change. Surprisingly, such plans are already being drafted. But the politics behind them is neoliberal and militarist. I identify the epistemology of futurity motivating contingency planning—possibilism—and argue that we can and should dissociate it from, and redeploy it against, neoliberal militarism.

Trusting relationships are both valuable and risky. Where the risks are high and the fears of betrayal are also high, it might seem rational to try to mitigate the risks, while still enjoying the benefits of the trusting relationship, by forming a contingency plan. A contingency plan—in the sense I am interested in—involves contingent punishments for defection, which are primarily meant to encourage the trusted partner to act trustworthily. I argue, however, that such contingency plans suffer from (...) an internal tension wherein the contingency planner both seeks and undermines a particular level (or kind) of trust. There are two problems in particular, either of which is sufficient to undermine trusting relationships: one, the planner fails to see the trusted partner as sincerely engaged in the trusting relationship, and two, the planner separates herself out from the trusting relationship by seeing her flourishing as separate from her partner’s (or, even worse, as dependent on her partner’s harm). Continency plans, then, are not just about the future; they cast a moral shadow on what we are doing now. (shrink)

Humean constructivists object to Kantian constructivism that by endorsing the constitutivist strategy, which grounds moral obligations in rational agency, this position discounts the impact of cont...

In August of 1971, President Nixon announced that the United States was “closing the gold window,” bringing an end to the postwar system of international exchange rate stability and precipitating a period of significant uncertainty and transformation in global institutions. Although this critical historical episode is important for an understanding of historical “neoliberalism” and institutional change, modern sociological perspectives have scarcely been applied to it. The present analysis uses archival data to show that closing the gold window was never the (...) goal or preferred strategy of the Nixon administration, which had spent years preparing much more modest reforms. Nevertheless, US policymakers took this unilateral action as a contingency plan to achieve a short-term goal, knowing that it would dramatically change the functioning of the international economy. Surprisingly, the autonomous structure of the IMF did not channel US initiatives toward gradual evolution but rather helped determine a radical change in strategy. (shrink)

There are two general approaches to handling contingencies in decision-theoretic planning. State-space planners reason globally, building a map of the parts of the world relevant to the planning problem, and then attempt to distill a plan out of the map. POCL planners reason locally, attempting to build the plan up from local relationships. A planning problem is constructed that humans find trivial, but no state-space planner can solve. This motivates an investigation of decision-theoretic POCL contingency planners. (...) Existing POCL contingency planners attempt to generalize the results of classical POCL contingency planning. However, this paper argues that the nature of contingency planning changes dramatically in decision-theoretic contexts, and results from classical contingency planning are of little relevance. In particular, in classical planning contingencies can only be attached to conditional forks, but in most uses of contingencies in decision-theoretic planning they are attached to single branches of the plan rather than to conditional forks. A criterion of adequacy for contingency planners is formulated, following from ordinary completeness, and it is shown that existing decision-theoretic POCL contingency planners do not satisfy it. Some tentative suggestions are made regarding how to construct a planner that does satisfy the adequacy condition. (shrink)

This article is concerned with the relationship between assessment information and teacher planning. In the UK, although planning used to be central to characterisations of formative assessment, the most recent government proclamations under the 'Assessment for Learning' banner offer no clear role for teachers making decisions about what to do based on assessment information. In this article, the reasons behind the shift will be examined. 'Contingent planning' will be proposed as a mechanism for using assessment information in (...) a planning context. (shrink)

This article is concerned with the relationship between assessment information and teacher planning. In the UK, although planning used to be central to characterisations of formative assessment, the most recent government proclamations under the 'Assessment for Learning' banner offer no clear role for teachers making decisions about what to do based on assessment information. In this article, the reasons behind the shift will be examined. 'Contingent planning' will be proposed as a mechanism for using assessment information in (...) a planning context. (shrink)

This paper rejects most aspects of John W. Lango and Eric Patterson’s proposal that the United States should plan for a possible intervention in Sudan on secessionist and humanitarian grounds and announce this planning as a deterrent to the central government of Sudan attacking the people of South Sudan if they would opt in a January 2011 referendum for independence. I argue that secession is not a just cause for armed intervention and that, rightfully, neither the American people nor (...) many of its men and women in uniform would be prepared to engage in an intervention that might easily escalate. I also caution that American intervention against an Islamic regime might have high global security costs. For the sake of avoiding these negative consequences and harm to the people of Sudan, available nonviolent policy alternatives should be pursued. Still, I grant that the global community should intervene in Sudan if mass slaughter of civilians were to occur as a result of renewed hostilities between North and South Sudan. My objections to Lango and Patterson’s intervention proposal appeal to jus ad bellum principles as well as just military preparedness (jus ante bellum) principles. (shrink)

In their examination of elementary science classrooms, Amerine and Bilmes (1988) found that following instructions requires students to understand the relationship between the projected outcome and the corresponding course of actions. One of the most important resources for instructions is the lesson plan, which prescribes the sequence of teaching. However, there is often a gap between what is planned and what actually happens in the classroom. This raises the question of how teachers come to terms with contingent variants and unexpected (...) outcomes that real-time interactions occasion and how lesson plans are configured into these processes. This study examines a teacher education program that uses lesson plans as a central resource for teaching mathematics. The results suggest that classroom teachers use lesson plans as communicative resources to identify problems, specify assumptions about their teaching and act on the evolving contingency of classroom interaction. The interactional contingency is the locus of teaching practices, not an obstacle to the application of procedures in lesson plans. (shrink)

As software piracy continues to be a threat to the growth of national and global economies, understanding why people continue to use pirated software and learning how to discourage the use of pirated software are urgent and important issues. In addition to applying the theory of planned behavior (TPB) perspective to capture behavioral intention to use pirated software, this paper considers perceived risk as a salient belief influencing attitude and intention toward using pirated software. Four perceived risk components related to (...) the use of pirated software (performance, social, prosecution and psychological risks) have been identified, measured and tested. Data were collected through an online survey of 305 participants. The results indicate that perceived prosecution risk has an impact on intention to use pirated software, and perceived psychological risk is a strong predictor of attitude toward using pirated software. In addition, attitude and perceived behavior control contribute significantly to the intended use of pirated software. However, the proposed direct relationship between subjective norm and intention to use pirated software is not supported. Implications for research and practice are discussed. (shrink)

What is the relationship between evolutionary contingency and diversity? The evolutionary contingency thesis emphasizes dependency relations and chance as the hallmarks of evolution. While contingency can be destructive of, for example, the fragile and complex dynamics in an ecosystem, I will mainly focus on the productive or causal aspect of contingency for a particular sort of diversity. There are many sorts of diversities: Gould is most famous for his diversity-to-decimation model, which includes disparate body plans distinguishing (...) different phyla. However, structural diversity construed more broadly spans scales, such as organization in and among cells, structural arrangements and biomechanics on various scales, and even the profile of ancestor-descendent relationships or community structure of interactions within ecosystems. By focusing on stochastic processes in contingent evolution, I argue that contingency causes structural diversity. Specifically, I focus on the plurality of structural types of cells, genetic codes, and phyla diversity as case studies. (shrink)

The target article by David Alfandre et al. offers a new ethical framework to guide COVID-19 contingency surge planning and response, and applies this ethical framework to three case example...

Leibniz’s famous Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) states that no two things are exactly alike. The PII is commonly thought to be metaphysically necessary for Leibniz: the coexistence of two indiscernibles is metaphysically impossible. This paper argues, against the standard interpretation, that Leibniz’s PII is metaphysically contingent. In other words, while the coexistence of indiscernibles would not imply a contradiction, the PII is true in the actual world because the Principle of Sufficient Reason rules out violations of the (...) PII. God could have created indiscernibles but he did not because he is wise and does nothing without a sufficient reason. Because it is plausible that all Leibnizian possible worlds are unified by a wise plan, this means that the PII is true in all possible worlds. God could create indiscernibles, but the resulting creation would not be a world. To argue for this conclusion, the paper carefully examines Leibniz’s mature account of metaphysical contingency. It shows that for Leibniz, only states of affairs that imply logical contradictions are metaphysically impossible. Next, it argues that the coexistence of indiscernibles would not imply a logical contradiction; it would merely imply what Leibniz calls a “moral absurdity,” that is, a violation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. This means that the PII is true contingently and—since God can do whatever is metaphysically possible—that God can create two things that are exactly alike. (shrink)

Some understand the evolutionary process as more or less predictable; others stress its contingency. I argue that both Christian evolutionists who have assumed that the purposes of the Creator can be realized only through more or less predictable processes as well as those who infer from the contingency of the evolutionary process to the lack of purpose in the universe generally, are mistaken if the Creator escapes from the limits imposed on the creature by temporality, as the traditional (...) Augustinian account supposes. The notion of “purpose” must itself be reinterpreted in such a case. It makes no difference whether the appearance of Homo sapiens is the inevitable result of a steady process of complexification stretching over billions of years, or whether it comes about through a series of coincidences that would have made it entirely unpredictable from the (causal) human standpoint. Either way, the outcome is of God's making, and from the biblical standpoint may appear as part of God's plan. (shrink)

‘A logical theory may be tested by its capacity for dealing with puzzles, and it is a wholesome plan, in thinking about logic, to stock the mind with as many puzzles as possible, since these serve much the same purpose as is served by experiments in physical science.’ This paper is an attempt to follow Russell’s advice by using a puzzle about the contingent a priori to test and explore certain theories of reference and modality. No one could claim that (...) the puzzle is of any great philosophical importance by itself, but to understand it, one has to get clear about certain aspects of the theory of reference; and to solve it, one has to think a little more deeply than one is perhaps accustomed about what it means to say that a statement is contingent or necessary. (shrink)

Alfandre et al. helpfully outlines the case for attending to contingency planning as well as to crisis measures during a pandemic. The authors provides a helpful framework for reflecting on...

‘A logical theory may be tested by its capacity for dealing with puzzles, and it is a wholesome plan, in thinking about logic, to stock the mind with as many puzzles as possible, since these serve much the same purpose as is served by experiments in physical science.’ This paper is an attempt to follow Russell’s advice by using a puzzle about the contingent a priori to test and explore certain theories of reference and modality. No one could claim that (...) the puzzle is of any great philosophical importance by itself, but to understand it, one has to get clear about certain aspects of the theory of reference; and to solve it, one has to think a little more deeply than one is perhaps accustomed about what it means to say that a statement is contingent or necessary. (shrink)

This paper analyzes what may have been a mistake by pianist Thelonious Monk playing a jazz solo in 1958. Even in a Monk composition designed for patterned mayhem, a note can sound out of pattern. We reframe the question of whether the note was a mistake and ask instead about how Monk handles the problem. Amazingly, he replays the note into a new pattern that resituates its jarring effect in retrospect. The mistake, or better, the mis-take , was “saved” by (...) subsequent notes. Our analysis, supported by reflections from jazz musicians and the philosopher John Dewey, encourages a reformulation of plans, takes, and mis-takes as categories for the interpretation of contingency, surprise, and repair in all human activities. A final section suggests that mistakes are essential to the practical plying and playing of knowledge into performances, particularly those that highlight learning. (shrink)

This chapter analyses how natural contingency refers both to the planning and the execution aspects of divine providence. For doing so, Silva contrasts the perspectives of some current trends within science and religion circles to find natural causal gaps in the created order to allow for God’s providence, with a typically Thomist approach within classical theistic circles. Silva suggests that classical theism offers a better understanding of the relation between natural contingency and divine providence than those who (...) search for scientific spaces for God to guide creation towards its goals. In regards to the planning, Silva argues that God’s providence includes in its planning the achieving of the divine goals even by means of created, contingent in their action, natural things causing indeterministically. God’s goals include those contingent effects because they are ordered to new good things in creation. This is the Thomist idea to express that God, through not intended effects (be it contingent or even evil events), can bring about new good things to creation. In regards to the execution of that planning, Silva argues first that, contrary to some positions that see God acting in the a-causal indeterministic spaces provided by contemporary science, a causal understanding of indeterminism that distinguishes between causation and determinism, allows for truly contingent happenings within the created natural world. Then Silva shows how, by complementing these ideas with the doctrine of primary and secondary causation, at least as understood by Thomas Aquinas, one may offer an explanation of how God’s providence is involved in the whole of creation. Thus, even by means of created, indeterministic natural causes (that can be described as deficient instruments), God achieves his goals and intentions by causing them to cause indeterministically. (shrink)

Stephen Jay Gould and others have argued that what we know about evolution implies that human beings are a 'cosmic accident'. In this paper I examine an argument for Gould's view and then attempt to show that it fails. Contrary to the claims of Gould, Daniel Dennett, and others, it is a mistake to think that what we have learned from evolutionary biology somehow shows that human beings are mere accidents of natural history. Nor does what we know about the (...) contingency of evolution give us good reason to reject the view that human beings came to be according to a divine providential plan. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Précis of Michael E. Bratman, Planning, Time, and Self-Governance: Essays in Practical Rationality. The planning theory highlights our capacity to settle on future courses of action in ways that Philosophy Department, shape on-going thought and action. Given our resource limits, our prior plans exhibit a characteristic partiality. Given this partiality, pressures for means-end coherence lead to problems of means. In solving these problems, one is constrained by pressures of consistency and intention stability, pressures that induce a filter (...) of admissibility on solutions. Such plan-infused functioning involves guidance of practical thinking by norms of intention rationality, including norms of consistency, agglomerativity, means-end coherence, and stability over time. These essays focus on questions about the nature of and support for these norms. The essays aim to incorporate but go beyond a two-tier pragmatic rationale for these norms. They seek a view between a skeptical ‘myth theory’ and a cognitivist view that sees these norms as a matter of theoretical rationality. The essays argue that these norms track conditions of a planning agent’s self-governance, both at a time and over time; and the essays explain the reflective significance of this tracking in part by appeal to our entrenched, though contingent, end of our diachronic self-governance. (shrink)

Much of the sustained attention on pandemic preparedness has focused on the ethical justification for plans for the “crisis” phase of a surge when, despite augmentation efforts, the demand for life...

This article examines the structural power of domestic finance in developing and emerging economies in the context of a shift toward increasingly activist financial development planning and financial sector reform. Focusing on efforts to create large, internationally competitive banks in Malaysia and Nigeria dating to the late 1990s and early 2000s, it highlights that banks have not played their envisaged role in financing structural transformation via industrial growth and economic development. Nonetheless, banks in DEEs have attained considerable structural power (...) over financial policy, supporting their ability to shape growth and investment strategies. Therefore, the article proposes a revised model of the structural power of finance, recognizing its contingent nature. States pursue various forms of financialization both as a substitute to, or in conjunction with, industrial policy. Financialized development strategies enhance the structural power of large banks in DEEs, notwithstanding their limited role in meeting the investment/development imperative. (shrink)

In _Action in Perception _Alva No develops and presents a sensorimotor account of vision and of visual consciousness. According to such an account seeing (and indeed perceiving more generally) is analysed as a kind of skilful bodily activity. Such a view is consistent with the emerging emphasis, in both philosophy and cognitive science, on the critical role of embodiment in the construction of intelligent agency. I shall argue, however, that the full sensorimotor model faces three important challenges. The first is (...) to negotiate a path between two prima facie unsatisfactory readings of the central claim that conscious perceptual experience is constituted by knowledge of patterns of sensorimotor dependence. The second is to convince us that the sensorimotor contribution, in such cases, is actually constitutive of perceptual experience rather than merely causally implicated in the origination of such experience.² And the third is to respond to the important challenge raised by what I will dub 'sensorimotor summarizing' models of the relation between conscious experience and richly detailed sensorimotor routines. According to such models³ conscious perceptual experience only rather indirectly reflects the rich detail of our actual sensorimotor engagements, which are instead lightly sampled as a coarse guide, optimized for planning and reasoning, and geared and filtered according to current needs and purposes. (shrink)

This dissertation is dedicated to developing a principle of autonomy that is suited to human rational agents situated in particular and contingent settings. In doing so, I start out by examining a very influential conception of autonomy which defines autonomy in terms of an agent's ability to "transcend" her particular and contingent life-situation. I call such a conception of autonomy deontological autonomy. I argue that there is an inherent inconsistency in the deontological approach since deontological autonomy cannot accommodate the inescapable (...) contingency in the concrete and particular life of each individual. I propose the notion of procedural autonomy as a more plausible conception of autonomy for humans, since it is achievable in one's particular and concrete setting. ;What makes us procedurally autonomous in contingent human conditions is the process of critical deliberation which consists of two stages: The first stage requires that an agent should examine hierarchically lower intentions and beliefs with her plan of life, the hierarchically most prior set of intentions and beliefs. In the second stage an agent must choose an adequate plan of life for herself, which can be chosen only when the agent is fully aware of various alternative life plans and has given each serious consideration for adoption. The injunction that an agent should be engaged in the two stages of critical deliberation in order to be procedurally autonomous is termed the Principle of Procedural Autonomy. This principle is an ethical principle that is hierarchically prior to moral principles, and it is a procedural principle which is primarily concerned with how one should act rather than what ends should be attained. ;I conclude by applying the Principle of Procedural Autonomy to the debate concerning moral maturity of rational agents in which certain feminist objections have been raised against the concept of autonomy; I argue that procedural autonomy escapes their criticism. ;In developing my position I consider Kant and Aristotle, and a number of contemporary thinkers including J. Rawls, M. Bratman, D. Parfit, B. Williams, C. Gilligan and N. Noddings, among others. (shrink)

Two studies examine whether income volatility might lead to greater personal financial insecurity and might create a decision environment that discourages planning ahead on personal finances. In Study 1, participants who reported more month-to-month variability in their actual income were less likely to have planned for financial contingencies. A lower internal locus of control partially mediated the link between volatility and financial planning decisions in Study 1, and lower internal locus of economic control predicted financial planning decisions (...) independently of volatility. In Study 2, participants who were randomly assigned to receive volatile payments in a simulated work environment were less likely to save their compensation for this work. Again, lower internal locus of economic control predicted financial planning decisions independently of volatility. This is the first study to demonstrate a causal link between income volatility and financial decisions, specifically a heightened tendency to make short-term financial decisions. Both studies also underlined the importance of internal locus of control for financial planning decisions. (shrink)

Dieser Aufsatz möchte zeigen, daß Leibniz Freiheit nur in dem Sinne Kontingenz voraussetzt, daß andere Handlungsweisen als absolut möglich denkbar sein müssen. Freiheit besteht nicht in der bloßen Illusion, daß unsere Handlungen nicht durch unseren vollständigen Begriff verursacht und bestimmt sind, sondern in der epistemischen Möglichkeit des Handelnden, anders zu handeln. Für endliche Wesen impliziert diese epistemische Möglichkeit die Unkenntnis des göttlichen Plans. Für Gott ist sie begründet in dem intellektuellen Bewußtsein, daß die Handlungen von seinem Willen, der aufgrund der (...) göttlichen Vollkommenheit stets das Beste wählt, abhängen. Daher wählt Gott die beste der möglichen Welten. Gott ist sich bewußt, daß er eine andere mögliche Welt erschaffen könnte, wenn er wollte, aber gleichzeitig ist er sich bewußt, daß er das niemals wollen wird. (shrink)

We examine three business-related initiatives designed to achieve peace positive impacts in the Cape Town township of Langa. Each was seemingly straightforward in its purpose, logic, and implementation. However, their positive intent was frustrated and their impacts ultimately harmful to their articulated goals. Understanding why this is so can be difficult in violent, turbulent, and information-poor environments such as Langa, confounding progress even by actors with ethical intentions. To aid in sense making and to provide insight for more positive future (...) action, we develop from 125 interviews conducted for this study causal loop models for these initiatives within their conflict subsystems. These explain the perverse impacts of these initiatives by illuminating their (lack of) salience to key conflict factors, their (in)sufficiency to effect positive change in light of competing systems dynamics, and their (in)attentiveness to interdependencies with the intentions and actions of others. We thus contribute to understanding of the factors required to achieve positive social outcomes in more extreme contexts. More generally, we demonstrate the value of systems analysis both for scholarship related to business and peace and for reducing blind spots that can inhibit sound planning for ethical business action amidst complexity. (shrink)

The main thesis of this paper is that, whereas an intention simpliciter is a commitment to a plan of action, a conditional intention is a commitment to a contingency plan, a commitment about what to do upon (learning of) a certain contingency relevant to one’s interests obtaining. In unconditional intending, our commitment to acting is not contingent on finding out that some condition obtains. In conditional intending, we intend to undertake an action on some condition, impinging on our (...) interests, which is as yet unsettled for us, but about which we can find out without undue cost. (shrink)

Se analiza el debate actual sobre el concepto de Escuela de Salamanca. Se muestran las nuevas propuestas de los estudiosos: su carácter global (no solo Salamanca); su alcance interdisciplinar (no solo teológico, también jurídico, económico, sociopolítico, etc); la cuestión de los miembros también experimenta una ampliación, aunque siempre se señala un cierto cordón umbilical con los Maestros salmantinos; todo ello dentro de un marco temporal que se extiende durante el siglo XVI y primera mitad del XVII. Estas nuevas perspectivas no (...) excluyen los elementos tradicionales, sino que amplían y desarrollan el concepto primitivo, pero con carácter inclusivo. Por último, se aborda el tema de las condiciones de posibilidad de la Escuela, que se contextualiza en un ámbito histórico que la hace posible. Al término del estudio se ofrece un posible nuevo concepto de la Escuela, todavía _in fieri_. (shrink)

La psiquiatría nace con el siglo XIX, la fenomenología con el XX. Desde el advenimiento de la segunda ha querido la primera ver en ella una vía para la superación del positivismo que la atenazaba desde su mismo origen. Uno de sus intentos más logrados fue el del psiquiatra Ludwig Binswanger a lo largo de los años veinte del pasado siglo. Recorrió en ese tiempo las Investigaciones lógicas de Husserl y ensayó su acercamiento a la psicología estructural. Proponemos que una (...) deficiente lectura de las posibilidades de la fenomenología ―comprensible en su prematuridad, desgraciada en su ímpetu anti-(neo)kantiano― impidió que reconociera su horizonte trascendental y así pudiera entrever caminos de acceso al mundo, a la persona y a su concreto sufrimiento. Para concluir presentamos el intento que supone el proyecto La mirada filosófica como mirada médica por recuperar aquella problematicidad y ahondar en una aproximación respetuosa al padecer, tal como aparece, sin violentarlo por el concepto. (shrink)

In the near future, experts predict, an influenza pandemic will likely spread throughout the world. Many countries have been creating a contingency plan in order to mitigate the severe health and social consequences of such an event. Examination of the pandemic plans of Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, from an ethical perspective, raises several concerns. One: scarcity of human and material resources is assumed to be severe. Plans focus on prioritization but do not identify resources that (...) would be optimally required to reduce deaths and other serious consequences. Hence, these plans do not facilitate a truly informed choice at the political level where decisions have to be made on how much to invest now in order to reduce scarcity when a pandemic occurs. Two: mass vaccination is considered to be the most important instrument for reducing the impact of infection, yet pandemic plans do not provide concrete estimates of the benefits and burdens of vaccination to assure everyone that the balance is highly favorable. Three: pandemic plans make extraordinary demands on health care workers, yet professional organizations and unions may not have been involved in the plans' formulation and they have not been assured that authorities will aim to protect and support health care workers in a way that corresponds to the demands made on them. Four: all sectors of society and all individuals will be affected by a pandemic and everyone's collaboration will be required. Yet, it appears that the various populations have been inadequately informed by occasional media reports. Hence, it is essential that plans are developed and communication programs implemented that will not only inform but also create an atmosphere of mutual trust and solidarity; qualities that at the time of a pandemic will be much needed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:When Ethics Survives Where People Do Not: A Story From DarfurGhaiath HusseinI was not new to Darfur. I had been here before, although I wore a different hat as I literally walked under the burning April sun along the wide, dusty, unpaved streets of Nyala, South Darfur, to “headquarters.” It was to be another interesting, but normal, peaceful, and safe day as I led the Sudanese household survey in (...) South Darfur, then the largest of all Darfur states. That was in 2006, a few years after I joined the Federal Ministry of Health. My office overlooked the Nile, but getting out of the capital city of Khartoum was always the best part of working there. I had the opportunity to meet real people in their real places, where they are home and at ease.Overall, the data collection team’s work went according to plan. Most of the randomly selected villages were visited as planned or replaced according to protocol. But this morning was anything but normal. A few days earlier, while visiting a village in a nearby town, Kass, my team was able to make a single phone call to us, the leadership [End Page 162] team, composed of two colleagues from Darfur and myself, indicating the team had no reception—the nearest signal was an hour’s drive away. The team leader assured me that they had started collecting data and promised to call every day or every other day. They were a team of six young men and women (I called them boys and girls because they were so young and innocent) between the ages of 20 and 25, all from Darfur. Two of them were in love and participated in the survey collection to save the per diem for their wedding.The time I was expecting their call came, but the call did not come. Then another day, then another, then another.One of the management team was in charge of the security update, and that morning he asked me in a shaky voice if we could have a private meeting as soon as I entered the room. He informed me that the village where my team was located had been attacked by the Janjaweed, the notorious militia known for its ruthless, brutal attacks that leave nothing behind, but men killed indiscriminately, houses and children on fire, and women raped. I recalled my experience in Darfur the year before when I mechanically asked a woman if she had lost a family member in the last six months and what the cause of death was. She burst into tears. I tried to calm her down. Finally, she told me that her few-month-old baby had been burned alive in front of her own eyes. Before I could even imagine the fate of the boys and girls on the team, a call came in. It was not from the team, but from a crying mother who asked me to “bring her daughter back.” She told me she did not want her daughter killed or raped. I cannot remember what I said because I was in shock and did not want anyone to see this, especially the other teams. The last thing I needed was to see the panic for which I was not trained to manage.I had no time to waste. I had no exit or contingency plan in the 224-page survey guide that explained how to collect the data, how to ask the questions, how to sort and safely store the paper questionnaires, how to enter the data. It seemed to provide extensive guidance on everything except for the only instruction I needed at the time—How to keep my teams safe under fire. I took the first flight to the survey’s national headquarters in Khartoum seeking help. I was promised to be put in contact with the intelligence and army in the region through the government agency responsible for organizing humanitarian work in the country. In fact, none of them were in the attacked village. My colleagues on the management team seemed more hardened to the conflict than I was. For me it was something I followed on the news... (shrink)

We defend Uniqueness, the claim that given a body of total evidence, there is a uniquely rational doxastic state that it is rational for one to be in. Epistemic rationality doesn't give you any leeway in forming your beliefs. To this end, we bring in two metaepistemological pictures about the roles played by rational evaluations. Rational evaluative terms serve to guide our practices of deference to the opinions of others, and also to help us formulate contingency plans about what (...) to believe in various situations. We argue that Uniqueness vindicates these two roles for rational evaluations, while Permissivism clashes with them. (shrink)

Politics is a part of human life, and biology is the study of life. All political beings are biological organisms. These are truisms, but they might suggest lines of investigation. Sociobiology, the name suggests, means social theory taken as a branch of the life sciences. Human sociobiology, then, would apply biological theory to human society. How might this be done?

Archaeologists have proposed that behavioral knowledge of a tool can be conceptualized as a “recipe”—a unit of cultural transmission that combines the preparation of raw materials, construction, and use of the tool, and contingency plans for repair and maintenance. This parallels theories in cognitive psychology that behavioral knowledge is hierarchically structured—sequences of actions are divided into higher level, partially independent subunits. Here we use an agent-based simulation model to explore the costs and benefits of hierarchical learning relative to holistic (...) learning, where entire behavioral sequences are learned in an all-or-nothing fashion, and diffusionist learning, where actions are completely independent. Hierarchical learning is favored under the reasonable assumptions that learning is associated with some degree of both error and cost, and that behavior can be grouped into subunits that repeat in one or more tool recipes. These general predictions can be tested in the archaeological and ethnographic record. Recent advances in evolutionary developmental biology have revealed a number of parallels between the hierarchically structured, recipe-like organization of behavioral knowledge that we examine here and the manner in which biological organisms develop. (shrink)

Expressivists have a problem with collectives. I initially illustrate the problem against the background of Allan Gibbard’s expressivist theory, where it is especially stark. I then argue that the problem generalizes. Gibbard’s account entails that judgments about what collective agents ought to do are contingency plans for what to do if one is in the circumstances facing the relevant collective agent. So, for example, my judgment that the United States ought not to have invaded Iraq is a contingency (...) plan for what to do if I find myself in the circumstances facing the United States on the eve of the Iraq war. I argue that, given plausible functionalist assumptions in the philosophy of mind expressivists would struggle to reject, such contingency plans are impossible for individual agents. Since normative judgments about collectives are possible, Gibbard’s theory is unacceptable. Having demonstrated the basic problem for Gibbard’s view, I then argue that the problem has a much wider scope. In particular, I argue that traditional forms of expressivism cannot simultaneously provide a plausible account of both agent-relative normative judgments and judgments about what collectives ought to do. Fortunately, all is not lost; hybrid or ‘ecumenical’ forms of expressivism can disarm the dilemma, or so I argue. I conclude by briefly sketching some further challenges ecumenical expressivism must overcome for its treatment of judgments about collectives to be fully satisfactory and indicate possible lines of argument to be pursued in future work on these challenges. (shrink)

The coronavirus disease imposes an unusual risk to the physical and mental health of healthcare workers and thereby to the functioning of healthcare systems during the crisis. This study investigates the clinical knowledge of healthcare workers about COVID-19, their ways of acquiring information, their emotional distress and risk perception, their adherence to preventive guidelines, their changed work situation due to the pandemic, and their perception of how the healthcare system has coped with the pandemic. It is based on a quantitative (...) cross-sectional survey of 185 Swiss healthcare workers directly attending to patients during the pandemic, with 22% of them being assigned to COVID-19-infected patients. The participants answered between 16th June and 15th July 2020, shortly after the first wave of COVID-19 had been overcome and the national government had relaxed its preventive regulations to a great extent. The questionnaire incorporated parts of the “Standard questionnaire on risk perception of an infectious disease outbreak”, which were adapted to the case of COVID-19. Clinical knowledge was lowest regarding the effectiveness of standard hygiene. Knowledge of infectiousness, incubation time, and life-threatening disease progression was higher, however still significantly lower than regarding asymptomatic cases and transmission without physical contact. 70% of the healthcare workers reported considerable emotional distress on at least one of the measured dimensions. They worried significantly more strongly about patients, elderly people, and family members, than about their own health. Adherence to preventive guidelines by the government displayed patterns such that not all guidelines were followed equally. Most of the participants were faced with a lack of protective materials, personnel, structures, processes, and contingency plans. An increase in stress level was the most prevalent among the diverse effects the pandemic had on their work situation. Better medical equipment, better protection for their own mental and physical health, more personnel, more comprehensive information about the symptoms of the disease, and a system of earlier warning were the primary lessons to be learned in view of upcoming waves of the pandemic. (shrink)

An expected utility model of individual choice is formulated which allows the decision maker to specify his available actions in the form of controls (partial contingency plans) and to simultaneously choose goals and controls in end-mean pairs. It is shown that the Savage expected utility model, the Marschak- Radner team model, the Bayesian statistical decision model, and the standard optimal control model can be viewed as special cases of this goal-control expected utility model.

A generalization of the standard n-person game is presented, with flexible information requirements suitable for players constrained by bounded rationality. Strategies (complete contingency plans) are replaced by "policies," i. e., end-mean pairs of candidate goals and "controls" (partial contingency plans). The existence of individual objective functions over the joint policy choice set is axiomatized in terms of primitive preference and probability orders. Conditions are given for the existence of pure policy Nash equilibrium points in n-person games, and pure (...) policy Nash bargaining and equilibrium threat solutions in 2-person policy games. Connectedness of the policy and payoff sets is not required. (shrink)