In The Contemplative Self after Michel Henry: A Phenomenological Theology, Joseph Rivera provides a close and critical reconstruction of the philosophical anthropology of Michel Henry (1922-2002) while also addressing the question of how theology contributes to Henry's phenomenology. In conversation with other French figures such as Derrida, Marion, Lacoste, and Barbaras, Rivera undertakes a global thematic study of Henry's work. He shows how, for Henry, the theological debate is shifted onto a phenomenological problem, with a coincident will to pursue (...) the epistemological efforts of Husserl and Heidegger. The chapters tackle some of the most pressing debates in contemporary Continental philosophy, such as the "modern ego," the nature and experience of temporality, and the constitution of the body and otherness, and how a theological discourse may illumine those anthropological structures. The book expands on the modern narrative of the self from Descartes to Nietzsche, opens up the particular lines of inquiry Henry advances in dialogue with those figures and phenomenology in particular, and highlights the surprising theological turns in Henry's late work on Christianity. Because Henry's work is difficult, it is often misunderstood; Rivera's own vision of the self, one that is shaped by Henry but not in full agreement with him, advances insights internal to Henry but also brings into sharp focus many problematic points in Henry's phenomenological theology. An array of classical theological voices appear in the final chapters, such as St. Augustine, Tertullian, Irenaeus, Pseudo-Dionysius, and Gregory of Nyssa, all of whom are set in dialogue with Henry. A fresh and creative articulation of contemplation and selfhood, the volume is a valuable addition to the continuing conversation that seeks to build bridges between phenomenology and theology. (shrink)

This volume deals with the appropriations, criticism and transformation of Plato’s and Aristotle’s positions about theory, practice and the contemplative life, including their epistemological and metaphysical foundations, from ...

Our EcoDialogue Center is an educational space for human sustainability within the University of Veracruz. We propose that creating sustainable knowledge requires re-thinking how we conceive ourselves as human beings. This requires paying attention to what we call “the quality of being,” which means caring about and attending to the physical–emotional–mental–spiritual as the foundation of education. This way we can create a space where we can dialogue contemplatively where all dimensions of our lives interact; the physical, the emotional, the communitarian, (...) the social politic, the planetarium, and the spiritual being act with social–environmental responsibility. (shrink)

Śaṅkara’s Advaita Vedānta is largely dismissive of ritual action, in part because the metaphysical position of non-duality erodes any independent existence of the individual as a ritual agent, and because knowledge of non-duality is thought to be independent of action. However, a close reading of Śaṅkara shows that he does accept forms of devotional practice that have remained largely marginalized in studies of Advaita Vedānta. This article compares and contrasts contemplative devotion, in the form of visualized meditations on īśvara, (...) with knowledge-like contemplation of non-duality. The challenge is that the Upaniṣads provide no clear distinctions between the two, and these upāsanas appear indistinguishable from nididhyāsana because they incorporate a conceptual identity with brahman or appear to affirm non-duality in some sense. Furthermore, the practices of both are rather obscure despite their significance in Śaṅkara’s system. Analyzing Śaṅkara’s interpretations of their underlying Upaniṣadic sentence structures in terms of grammatical apposition and reconstructing their use of visualization, superimposition, and negation, provides clues to properly delineate these practices, and to understand their epistemological functions and potential religious experiences. (shrink)

Contemplative pedagogy focuses on creating a sense of presence within educators to effectively educate the whole person through mindfulness in teaching. As I engage in a self-study, I develop initial components for the way I employ contemplative pedagogy. I aim to understand myself as an educator in order to teach effectively. One way to enable particular kinds of understandings is through self-study methodology. The foundational framework that develops through my ongoing self-study may interest those who are unfamiliar with (...) the terrain of contemplative pedagogy. For the purposes of this article, I place an emphasis on the philosophy and ethics classes that I taught at Middlesex County College in New Jersey, although I teach several classes on many campuses. My philosophical method requires me to engage in a self-study of my teaching practices. My project involves self-study as a philosophical research methodology that aims to inform educators and rethink the theories and praxis of teaching. As I work towards improvement- aimed pedagogy, I make myself vulnerable as I share my experiences with my Peer Scholar. My Peer Scholar, which some researchers call a “critical friend”, deliberates with me to challenge epistemological assumptions along with suspicions. The self-study dialogue with my Peer Scholar causes me to define initial components of how I engage in an improvement-aimed contemplative pedagogy. My hope is to support those who wish to implement contemplative pedagogy in higher education as I relate my working framework based on the themes that developed from the deliberation. The components in the article that convey how I engage in contemplative pedagogy are not meant to serve as a checklist or stern procedure for classroom activities. I share these components as aspects of my contemplative pedagogy, with suggestive scripts, not as a rigid structure but rather as a work in progress that is always under construction. (shrink)

Beginning from the notion that self is constructed, contributors in Identity Landscapes: Contemplating Place and the Construction of Self are particularly interested in how relationships with place inform identity development. Locating identity inquiry in methodologies that encourage an explicit examination of self (e.g. autoethnography, self-study, autobiographical inquiry, a/r/tography, and reflexive inquiry), authors situate themselves epistemologically and geographically as they explore where place and identity converge. Through critical, qualitative, creative, and arts-integrated approaches, this collection aims to advance thought regarding the myriad (...) ways that place informs identity development. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Contemplative Foundations of Classical Daoism by Harold D. RothDerek Asaba Chi (bio)The Contemplative Foundations of Classical Daoism. By Harold D. Roth. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2021. Series: SUNY series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture. Pp. xiii+ 522. Hardcover ＄ 77.37, isbn 978-1-4384-8271-2. The Contemplative Foundations of Classical Daoism (hereafter Contemplative Foundations) is a compilation of articles and book chapters selected (...) from Harold Roth's almost 27 years of scholarly publications on the origins and early history of the classical Daoist tradition. The essays that constitute this collection seek to counter certain myths about Early China Studies and Daoist Studies that have previously prevented the field from identifying, in a historically plausible, contemplatively grounded, and textually justified fashion, some of the basic contours of classical Daoism. Roth begins by discussing prior studies of the early history of Daoism. In his view, these studies were hampered in their understanding of the contemplative foundations of Daoism by limits derived from a set of unreflective assumptions that restrict human cognitive possibilities to merely those that were deemed possible by European cultures. Some of the most deleterious of these assumptions were: "all human beings have a genetic predisposition to a belief in gods or other supernatural beings; veridical human cognition is restricted to either reason or emotion—categories established by the European Enlightenment" (p. 2). Roth argues that these products of unreflective Eurocentrism have largely contributed to a failure to recognize that early Daoist thinkers could possibly have derived their ideas about human psychology, human nature, and the nature of the cosmos through anything other than abstract rational thought or emotional responses (pp. 3-5). These unreflective thoughts have contributed to constructing the idea that contemplative experiences can never be epistemologically valid, and that, because of this non-veridicality, attempts to ascertain the contemplative foundations of classical Daoism are either unnecessary or deluded. The author also discusses the distinctive philosophical origins of classical Daoism. The first myth about the origins of classical Daoism revolves around beliefs that the Daoist tradition began with Lao Dan 老聃 in the sixth century BCE and his outstanding work the Daodejing 道德經. Further, Lao Dan founded a Daoist "school" that included Zhuang Zhou 莊周, the sole author of the Zhuangzi [End Page 1] 莊子, and other eponymous works created by later disciples such as Liezi 列子 and Wenzi 文子. Together they created and transmitted a Daoist school that developed a lofty mystical philosophy which accepted death as a natural transformation and maintained a cosmology of the Way Dao 道 and its Inner Power or Potency De 德. However, this tradition of "philosophical Daoism" or "Lao-Zhuang" 老 莊 became singularly corrupted through its contact with superstitious beliefs in longevity, immortality, and polytheistic deities to form the organized Daoist religion that emerged in the second century CE and that persists until today (p. 3). Roth argues that the contemplative foundations of classical Daoism are grounded in a distinctive form of practice that the author defines as "inner cultivation," neiye 內業, or "inward training" (p. 6). Roth provides a list of works that present surviving evidence for these practices. These include: the Laozi and the Zhuangzi, as well as other classical texts of mixed traditions, including the Lüshi Chunqiu 呂士春秋 and the Huainanzi 淮 南子. Contemplative Foundations is divided into two parts which present a more or less holistic view of the contemplative foundation of classical Daoism. Part I is dedicated to the careful textual analysis of the major surviving sources of classical Daoism to derive evidence for both its contemplative foundations and its historical and social context. First, the author examines the theories of the physiological basis of psychology and self-cultivation as discussed in three texts from the Guanzi 管子 and in the Huainanzi. Despite its apparent absence in the early Daoist tradition, the physiological basis of human psychology plays a major role in the theory and practice of neidan 內丹, or "physiological alchemy," which emerged somewhat later, when Daoism became institutionalized (p. 23). Roth tries to link the psychological experience to physiological conditions that make possible a whole range of neidan practices that seem to have preceded Daoist religion but became fully developed therein. Roth moves on to debunk the traditional... (shrink)

This monograph aims to uncover value-belief-systems underlying dominant narratives in modern IHEs, impacting the lives of many multidimensional adult learners. To do so, Eurocentrism and neoliberalism are used to analyze the socio-cultural-political movements of the U.S. and its influence on higher education trends. Then, models of adult consciousness and transformative approaches to adult learning are introduced to problematize dominant narratives and make the case for more complex epistemologies. With critical contemplation, acts of compassion for interdependence, self-compassion for intentionality, authentic relationships (...) for political consciousness, listening for non-duality, and mindfulness for impermanence (CALM) are introduced as ways to emphasize self-transformation and self-actualization. CALM practice is just one way to join others in the social justice work of wholeness and humanity to better support multidimensional adult learners. Along with this understanding comes the potential to disrupt dominant narratives with a moral stance, honoring innate human value and the diverse human condition. The future of institutions of higher education must be guided by a moral position in the name of healing and wellness. Together, we can transform higher education so that institutions are a place where adult learners create the conditions of freedom to actualize the right to self-worth, the liberty to connect with others, and the pursuit of personal fulfillment, honoring this nations guiding principles of life, liberty, and happiness. (shrink)

An exploration of the relationship between imagination and intuition and the workings of visual perception, in light of Polanyi’s epistemology, helps us to understand aesthetic seeing. The artist and contemplative learn to see anew and accordingly grasp extraordinary coherences of meaning.

Sarah Coakley, drawing on the insights of John of the Cross, has recently argued that God may have redemptive moral and epistemic purposes in remaining hidden from people during a “dark night of the soul,” and that experiences of spiritual darkness can be taken as a mode of religious experience. In this paper, I explore what sort of epistemic model of religious experience is needed to underwrite Coakley’s argument. I argue that one influential externalist model—that of William Alston—is unsatisfactory, and (...) advance in its place an internalist, phenomenal conservative approach bolstered by considerations from responsibilist virtue epistemology. I argue that such an approach can much more satisfactorily accommodate contemplative experiences than can that of Alston and thus can buttress Coakley’s response to the problem of divine hiddenness. (shrink)

Action, Contemplation, and Happiness (hereafter ACH) is a magisterial expo­sition of both central and obscure texts from throughout Aristotle's writings that aims to elucidate the terms in its title by showing their foundations in Aristotle's natural and metaphysical writings. Reeve assembles supportive texts from throughout the corpus in support of an interpretive holism, viz., one in which the various interpretations of a text are narrowed by drawing upon other texts in the corpus that shed light on the passage. Although holism (...) is not necessarily incon­sistent with developmental readings of Aristotle, Reeve at least initially claims that the texts he is concerned with provide little evidence of development. Reeve's current volume draws upon his previous books, Substantial Knowledge (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000), a holistic study of the problem of primary sub­stance in the Metaphysics, and his Practices of Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Uni­versity Press, 1992), a study of the epistemological bases of happiness 'in the Nicomachean Ethics. (shrink)

Today, philosophers interested in self-knowledge usually look to the scholastic tradition, where the topic is addressed in a systematic and familiar way. Contemporary conceptions of what medieval figures thought about self-knowledge thus skew toward the epistemological. In so doing, however, they often fail to capture the crucial ethical and theological importance that self-knowledge possesses throughout the Middle Ages. -/- Human beings are not transparent to themselves: in particular, knowing oneself in the way needed for moral progress requires hard and rigorous (...) work. Yet, medieval contemplatives insist, without this work we will never attain our final end. In this paper, I trace the connection drawn in this tradition between self-knowledge, humility, and self-fulfillment, arguing in section 1 that the humility that results from introspection needs to be understood in the context of contemplative expectations for eventual perfection. Self-knowledge is key for developing the relationship with God that leads to mystical union, but (as I show in section 2) in the affective tradition of the 13th-14th centuries, which emphasizes the role of emotion and the body, such union with God tends to restore rather than annihilate us. In fact, I argue in section 3, the outcome of such union even in this life is often knowledge that benefits not only the individual who experiences it but also their broader community. (shrink)

Radical personal and systemic social transformation is urgently needed to address world-wide violence and inequality, pervasive moral confusion and corruption, and the rapid, unprecedented global destruction of our environment. Recent years have seen an embrace of intersubjectivity within discourse on educational transformation within academia and the public sphere. As well, there has been a turn toward contemplative education initiatives within North American schools, colleges and universities. This article contends that these turns might benefit from openness to the ontologies, epistemologies, (...) and ethics of the ‘wisdom traditions’ from which many contemplative practices are drawn. To illustrate this point, we discuss the value of intercultural philosophy of education, and introduce Eastern philosophical ideas, specifically, the Shambhala Buddhist notion of the nondual ground and wisdom of basic goodness and related teachings. We detail how awareness of basic goodness and its holistic expression in the ground, path, and fruition of Shambhala teachings can open vital questions regarding intersubjectivity, challenge and reinvigorate aspects of current engagements with contemplative practices, and provide significant insights and educational paths for transformational endeavours in neoliberal times. Informed by our learning from Shambhala, we conclude with a deepened understanding of intercultural philosophy of education. (shrink)

This chapter discusses and examines the deconstructive practice of Tiantai contemplation from a philosophical point of view. The scope of this examination embraces all the Tiantai doctrines that describe the dynamics and epistemological nature of ultimate realization, called “subtle awakening”, as well as all the relevant Buddhist sources based on which Tiantai master Zhiyi developed this type of “contemplation”. According to the Tiantai view, epistemological and ontological issues coincide with one another, since contemplation entails our insight that “truth and falsehood (...) are inseparable” concerning the way we relate to and exist in our world. Therefore, the introduction deals with the question of the specific sense in which Tiantai contemplation must be grounded in deconstructive practice. The subsequent two sections, and, elaborate the epistemological and soteriological implications of this Buddhist teaching; section and discuss its linguistic pragmatics; and highlight the ontological and hermeneutical issues, and elaborates on the Tiantai philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Art, as discussed in the third book of Arthur Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Representation, plays a double role in his philosophical system. On one hand, beholding an object of aesthetic worth provides the spectator with a temporary cessation of the otherwise incessant suffering that Schopenhauer takes life to be; on the other, art creates an epistemological bridge between ourselves and the world as it really is: unlike science which only studies relations between things, contemplation of art leads to (...) knowledge of that which is “alone really essential to the world, the true content of its phenomena.” (WWR1: 184) It is this second aspect of Schopenhauer's aesthetics that is both appealing and curious: while Schopenhauer's aesthetics and epistemology are both rooted in his picture of the world as Will, which is (taken at face value) deeply counter-intuitive, it yet seems to me that by assigning epistemic value to art, he manages to capture the quality of profundity with which certain works of art strike us – a profundity that is accounted for neither by reference to mere enjoyment nor by reference to paraphrasable, propositional knowledge. (shrink)

Social epistemology balances neoclassic and nonclassic, normative and descriptive, and veritistic and constructionist approaches. Among these approaches exist two terminologically different though (in fact) similar proposals: naturalization and socialization. Both proposals lead to a kind of interdisciplinary imperialism reducing epistemology to a ?positive science? like sociology of knowledge, social history of science, and science and technology studies. I call this attitude the ?strong version? of naturalism. How, then, can we save epistemology without indulging in purely transcendental contemplations (...) while simultaneously securing its connections to the empirical sciences that analyze knowledge in a social context? Can social epistemology be reduced to any one or to a set of special approaches to knowledge as a completely naturalizing program? If not, is social epistemology a kind of philosophical epistemology and what is its differencia specifica? And how is the social epistemology related to special approaches to knowledge? In proposing a ?weak version? of naturalism?an idea of the social epistemology based on interdisciplinary interaction?a reimagining of the concepts of ?interdisciplinarity? and ?context? is required. (shrink)

This reconciliation of the dialectical and contemplative approaches to the buddha-essence is related to and closely resembles Shakchok’s reconciliation of the two approaches to ultimate reality advocated respectively by Niḥsvabhāvavāda (ngo bo nyid med par smra ba, “Proponents of Entitylessness”) system of Madhyamaka and Alīkākāravāda (rnam rdzun pa, “False Aspectarians”) system of Yogācāra. These approaches in turn are connected respectively to the explicit teachings (dngos bstan) of the second dharmacakra (chos ’khor, “Wheel of Dharma”) and the definitive teachings (nges (...) don, nītārtha) of the third dharmacakra that he also presents in a reconciliatory manner. In the same way as the teachings of the last two dharmacakras, as well as the Niḥsvabhāvavāda and Alīkākāravāda systems that derive from them, come to the same point, the dialectical and contemplative traditions also come to the same point. This point is the above-mentioned naturally pure primordial mind luminous by nature, the ultimate reality. In Shakchok’s opinion, application of non-affirming negations is a powerful tool for accessing direct realization of that reality, while its identification as primordial mind (ye shes, jñāna) is important for maintaining that realization and turning it into the basis of unfolding positive qualities on the path to buddhahood. When in the passage above Shakchok says that the two traditions are not contradictory, and when he reconciles the two last dharmacakras together with Alīkākāravāda and Niḥsvabhāvavāda, he is not arguing that their words are non-contradictory. They obviously are! Nevertheless, those systems are non-contradictory in terms of complementing each other in getting access to and maintaining realization of the ultimate reality of primordial mind. (shrink)

A central theme in the Christian contemplative tradition is that knowing God is much more like ‘unknowing’ than it is like possessing rationally acceptable beliefs. Knowledge of God is expressed, in this tradition, in metaphors of woundedness, darkness, silence, suffering, and desire. Philosophers of religion, on the other hand, tend to explore the possibilities of knowing God in terms of rational acceptability, epistemic rights, cognitive responsibility, and propositional belief. These languages seem to point to very different accounts of how (...) it is that we come to know God, and a very different range of critical concepts by which the truth of such knowledge can be assessed. In this paper, I begin to explore what might be at stake in these different languages of knowing God, drawing particularly on Alvin Plantinga’s epistemology of Christian belief. I will argue that his is a distorted account of the epistemology of Christian belief, and that this has implications for his project of demonstrating the rational acceptability of Christian faith for the 21st century. (shrink)

Resumen: El objetivo de la investigación es describir las diferentes maneras de concebir el paisaje. Para ello, fueron analizadas, fichadas y discutidas múltiples fuentes de información, seleccionándose los planteamientos más expresivos de la racionalidad teórica desde la cual el paisaje es concebido. Se encontró que, habiendo nacido el paisaje de la pintura de la Edad Media, hoy día es estudiado como representación artística por la estética, como geosistema por la geografía, como ecosistema por la ecología y como apropiación subjetiva del (...) territorio por la sociología, la antropología y la semiótica. Pero la experiencia paisajística contemplativa realizada predominantemente bajo formas estéticas no es una perspectiva suficientemente atendida a pesar de que, junto con la representación artística del paisaje, constituye la perspectiva más fidedigna del concepto de paisaje.: The objective is to describe different landscape approaches. To carry this out, multiple information sources were analysed, recorded and discussed, selecting the most expressive approaches of the theoretical rationality from which the landscape is conceived. It was found that having the painting landscape born in the Middle Ages, it is studied today by aesthetics as an artistic representation, as a geosystem by geography, as an ecosystem by ecology and as a subjective appropriation of the territory by sociology, anthropology and semiotics. However, the contemplative landscape experience was predominantly carried out under aesthetic form, but it is not a perspective sufficiently attended. Alongside with the artistic representation of the landscape, constitutes the most reliable perspective of the landscape concept. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Book Reviews Plato's Later Epistemology. By W. G. Runciman. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1962. Pp. 138. $3.75.) Although this work may be regarded as the sequel to an earlier article by the author ("Plato's Parmenides," in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, LXIV [1959], 89-120), his argument in this volume does not hinge upon the earlier analysis of the Parmenides. What Runciman proposes to do (and not do) (...) is made clear enough both in the Introduction and in his concluding remarks. His purpose is "to consider the logic and epistemology of Plato's Theaetetus and Sophist" (p. 1), to "give a coherent interpretation of [these dialogues] as a whole" (p. 127), and to show something of Plato's later attitude to the general problem of knowledge and truth. But this is done within the context of a reading of Plato and of Plato's concern with knowledge, truth, and error, marked by the raising of two particular questions--of interest to Runciman and to a great many others belong-' 9 ing to the Anglo-American tradition in philosophy. Accordingly, the interpretation of these two dialogues is presented as an attempt to throw light on just "how far did Plato arri~,e at a distinction between knowledge that, knowledge how, and knowledge by acquaintance?" And secondly, "how closely did he approach a conscious formulation of the notion of truth-value?" (p. 1). The vantage point for Runciman's interpretation of these dialogues is the not unfamiliar view of Plato's "later" works as being marked by an increasing selfcriticism of his earlier theories, that it is by the method of Division (rather than the method of Hypothesis) that Plato now undertakes his exposition of the Forms. And the Forms are now seen, no longer "as the isolated objects of hypothesis and deduction... [but rather as] members of a complicated structure of mutual interrelations" (p. 128). Here then, for Runciman, Plato appears as the philosopher of later years, as more the dialectician, less concerned with contemplation of the Forms than with correlation and the knowledge of the relational properties which the Forms possess. Plato is thus seen by Runciman as coming of philosophical age in these, the "later" dialogues. And if Plato is not the forerunner of the contemporary philosophy-of-language school or a sainted forefather of those who are convinced that progress has been made in philosophy in the name of "logical analysis," at least these "later" Platonic dialogues show the brilliance of a philosopher, Plato, who could have said such new and interesting things for philosophers today, and yet "within the framework of his misguided... Theory of Forms" (p. 133). The important assumption, for Runciman, is to recognize the gradual development and modification of earlier views by a Plato grown more "sophisticated" by the maturity of his later years. And Runciman enters upon an interpretation of the Theaetetus and the Sophist with this clearly in mind, and with the comment that these dialogues may best be understood in this way: that--however crippled philosophically by his adherence to the Forms--Plato is latterly struggling with philosophical problems of logic and language. Runciman's argument, within such a context, emphasizes the role of the Sophist: had Plato but understood clearly his subject-matter, this dialogue pre-eminently suggests how he might have broken through to the full vigor of a [contemporary] concern with the nature and structure of language. "If a philosopher can be said to be doing logic without knowing it, then we may say that Plato in the Sophist is doing logic" (p. 126). Runciman's little book, thus primarily concerned, contains chapters on the logic and epistemology of the Theaetetus and the Sophist, and he raises some interesting questions. E255] 256 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY The book is both stimulating and provocative, and rather worth the reading, particularly by those who find Plato less philosophically "sophisticated" than Aristotle, less alert and relevant for some contemporary philosophical tastes. And it may be, of course, that some such readers will be led on to a larger sampling of the Platonic dialogues, with the result-doubtless pernicious---that their reading of Plato may corrupt their "understanding" of... (shrink)

As the editors of the series, New Literary Theory, proclaim in the preface of the book, the purpose of the series is to make more room in literary theory for playful and accessible approaches to li...

The Buddhist epistemologist Dharmakīrti (fl. ca. 7th century C.E.) developed a theory of yogic perception that achieved much influence among Buddhist thinkers in India and Tibet. His theory includes an odd problem: on Dharmakīrti’s view, many of the paradigmatic objects of the adept’s meditations do not really exist. How can one cultivate a meditative perception of the nonexistent? This ontological difficulty stems from Dharmakīrti’s decision to construe the Four Noble Truths as the paradigmatic objects of yogic perception. For him, this (...) ontological problem manifests in an epistemological corollary: “impermanence” (anityatā) and other features of the Noble Truths are conceptual, but the adept’s meditative perception of them must be nonconceptual. How can a nonconceptual cognition apprehend a conceptual object? A key aspect of Dharmakīrti’s theory of concepts provides a solution to this problem. Specifically, Dharmakīrti maintains that a concept, when taken as a mental event, can be considered a particular and thus an object of nonconceptual cognition. Taking this approach, Dharmakīrti downplays the notion that yogic perception is an encounter with real things in the world, in part because it is phenomenally akin to hallucination. Instead, what counts for Dharmakīrti—and what differentiates the adept’s realization from the madman’s hallucination—are the salvific effects induced by the meditative experience. (shrink)

This is a meta-reflection on the methodological and epistemological challenges of doing ethnographic theology in a context outside the church or religious communities. Particularly, it argues that in a multi- or inter-disciplinary setting theologians are placed in a precarious position when it comes to use of language, theories and concepts if they want to speak simultaneously to the people they encounter in the field and to their “own” scientific community. The article asks how a researcher can do theology in a (...) secular environment without doing violence towards ones interlocutors and still be considered to “belong” in the theological community? Based on the lived experiences of ongoing research and particularly concerning the gathering and telling the stories of Women in the Natural sciences, the author weaves together Eileen Campbell-Reed’s and Sarah Coakley’s methodological frameworks in order to present her own method of contemplative dance. The author uses rich metaphors and the sensory experience of “Home” and “Exile” in relationship to the movements in a foot to bring forth her embodied insights about dancing in the messy entanglement of ethnographic research. (shrink)

The discipline of nursing has long maintained that is has a unique contribution to make within the health care arena. This assertion of uniqueness lies in great part in the discipline's claim to a distinct body of knowledge. Nursing knowledge is characterized by diverse and multiple forms of knowing and underpins the work of all nurses, regardless of field of practice. Unfortunately, it has been challenging for the discipline to take full ownership of its epistemological diversity, largely due to factors (...) such as competing worldviews, and ideological and binary positioning. A philosophical middle ground stance is proposed as a way for the discipline to contemplate, discuss and develop nursing knowledge; a middle space that provides the freedom to consider competing worldviews while still allowing for the discipline to fully express itself in all of its epistemological diversity. In being able to enact its multiple forms of knowledge in a creative and open space that is open to different ideas and worldviews, not only can nursing take full ownership of its practice and its unique knowledge, it can also demonstrate how best to navigate an increasingly polarized world. In a world that is increasingly fixated on binary solutions and dualistic points of view, it is time for nursing to celebrate its epistemological diversity. (shrink)

This dissertation examines the theory of perceptual cognition laid out by the 7th century Buddhist scholar, Dharmakīrti, in his magnum opus, the Pramāṇavārttika. Like most theories of perception, both ancient and modern, the sensory cognition of ordinary objects is a topic of primary concern. Unlike other theorists, however, Dharmakīrti advances a technical definition of “perception” as a cognition which is both nonconceptual and non-erroneous. Dharmakīrti’s definition of perception is thereby deliberately inclusive of three additional types of “perceptual” cognition, in addition (...) to veridical sensory awareness: the nonconceptual mental apprehension of an immediately-preceding cognition (“mental perception”), the vivid appearance of soteriologically efficacious objects of contemplative practice (“yogic perception”), and the sheer unmediated presence of the contents of cognition—whatever these might be—to the cognizing mind (“reflexive awareness”). Through the logical examination of what it means to be aware of an object, Dharmakīrti demonstrates that the awareness of an object is just the awareness of a phenomenal form or cognitive image produced by that object. Pursuing this analysis further, however, Dharmakīrti argues that the very notion of an object of cognition that exists “externally” or outside the mind is incoherent. Additionally, Dharmakīrti maintains that the phenomenological structure of subject and object—that is, the “first-personal” sense of one’s own cognitions as pertaining to oneself (“for-me-ness”), together with the inseparably concomitant sense that the objects of cognition exist “out there” in an extramental world—is strictly a form of cognitive error. Therefore, because ordinary sensory cognition is inherently structured by this subject-object duality, ordinary sensory cognition must in the final analysis be understood as erroneous. According to Dharmakīrti, in other words, ultimately only the nondual “luminosity” of reflexive awareness is genuinely perceptual, because only reflexive awareness is undistorted by nature. In this way, Dharmakīrti’s epistemology provides a theoretical foundation for the advanced nondual contemplative practices of Indian and Tibetan Buddhism, particularly Mahāmudrā and rDzogs chen. (shrink)

It is alleged that the causal inertness of abstract objects and the causal conditions of certain naturalized epistemologies precludes the possibility of mathematical know- ledge. This paper rejects this alleged incompatibility, while also maintaining that the objects of mathematical beliefs are abstract objects, by incorporating a naturalistically acceptable account of ‘rational intuition.’ On this view, rational intuition consists in a non-inferential belief-forming process where the entertaining of propositions or certain contemplations results in true beliefs. This view is free of any (...) conditions incompatible with abstract objects, for the reason that it is not necessary that S stand in some causal relation to the entities in virtue of which p is true. Mathematical intuition is simply one kind of reliable process type, whose inputs are not abstract numbers, but rather, contemplations of abstract numbers. (shrink)

In this paper I examine three historically significant readings of the epochal transition from the Middle Ages to the modern world: that provided by Alexandre Koyré in From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe , that of Hans Blumenberg in The Legitimacy of the Modern Age and that of Hannah Arendt in The Human Condition . Each of these readings isolates crucial aspects of the epochal transition which contribute to an understanding of the loss or transformation of traditional measures (...) for knowing and doing consequent upon the shift from the contemplative to the active life. Blumenberg provides a philosophical explanation for the cosmological shift which Koyré describes, while Arendt thematizes the dangers inherent in the loss of an ethical measure which accompanies this transition. Yet both Blumenberg and Arendt conclude that the search for a world-immanent epistemological measure, which would allow us to gauge the adequacy of our descriptions of the world, is not simply a problem for the modern philosopher to address, but rather an impossibility already abandoned in the transition to the modern age. I argue that, on the contrary, such a measure is a requisite of the modern scientific enterprise. (shrink)

In Aquinas's account of the beatific vision, human beings are joined to God in a never-ending act of contemplation of the divine essence: a state which utterly fulfills the human drive for knowledge and satisfies every desire of the human heart. In this paper, I argue that this state represents less a fulfillment of human nature, however, than a transcendence of that nature. Furthermore, what’s transcended is not incidental on a metaphysical, epistemological, or moral level.

Schopenhauer’s concept of intuition (Anschauung) plays a fundamental roll in his philosophy: As pure intuition it addresses the forms of sensuality time and space. As empirical intuition it refers to the objects of the understanding (Verstand) and therefor to causal relations. But intuition is not only limited to Schopenhauer’s epistemology but is present in nearly every important aspect of his philosophical system. In his aesthetics Schopenhauer claims that every aesthetic cognition is necessarily intuitive, rendering every insight in the platonic (...) ideas through aesthetic contemplation as intuitive as well. Given that the understanding functions as the faculty of (empirical) intuition rather than reason, which is only the faculty of concepts, it seems at the first glance that Schopenhauer tries to exclude reason from any involvement in the aesthetic cognition of platonic ideas. But on closer examination Schopenhauer seems to argue for a rather fundamental involvement of reason in the fields of aesthetics as he insists on the importance of Besonnenheit (discernment, awareness, deliberateness). Aside from that only the participation of reason in the aesthetics could explain why animals, that share the same faculty of intuition as humans, are not capable of aesthetic judgement or producing art. In this article I argue that reason is a necessary condition for the possibility of aesthetic cognition but not as a theoretical faculty but in its practical function through Besonnenheit. While the platonic idea as well as every object of aesthetic contemplation must be given to our intuition, reason enables us to be besonnen and therefor gives us the possibility to suspend our actual willing for the sake of aesthetic contemplation. In this sense aesthetic cognition could be called besonnene Intuition. (shrink)

The Epistemology of dictatorship! This expression couples terms which seem to be utter strangers to each other. How could a political régime which is an eminently practical, often violent, hard-striking thing be concerned with a science which is an essentially unpractical, introspective business of secluded and subtle contemplation?

“If you find it strange that, in setting out these elements, I do not use those qualities called heat, cold, moistness, and dryness, as do the philosophers, I shall say to you that these qualities appear to me to be themselves in need of explanation. Indeed, unless I am mistaken, not only these four qualities, but also all the others (indeed all the forms of inanimate bodies) can be explained without the need of supposing for that purpose any other thing (...) in their matter than the motion, size, shape, and arrangement of its parts.” So does Descartes, in his The World, or Treatise on Light [Le Monde ou Traité de la Lumière], express the uniphenomenal principle of the physical world, which is the basis - or foundation - of his great cosmic synthesis. The uniphenomenal character of Cartesian physics - namely, explaining all phenomena and appearances from a single primordial phenomenon (and substance) - has such a great semantic and intuitive value for the structure of the human mind that Plato, even before Aristotle’s hyle, had come to contemplate his concept of chora, the cosmic and universal matrix at the base of all phenomena, existing before and beyond the coming into existence of the elements and of sensible things. Even the physics of Democritus is uniphenomenal. A perfect example of uniphenomenal physics in our time is the Spacio-fluido-dynamics of the scientist Marco Todeschini (Bergamo, 1899 - 1988) who, with his monumental Teoria delle apparenze [Theory of Appearances] of ’49 tried to clear a path towards the hope of reaching a Cartesian kind of unified cosmic synthesis. (We accept only the fundamental concept of Todeschi’s theory here, that is, the uniphenomenal character of his physics, without occupying ourselves with criteria such as the value or the plausibility of his hypotheses.) This concept of uniphenomenal physics will serve as an ultra-clear instrument to dissipate the epistemological fog of AI (Artificial Intelligence). (shrink)

Lewis Hahn, Editor of Library of Living Philosophers, including Quine, Gadamer, Davidson, Ricoeur, writes: "Professor Allinson’s work [A Metaphysics for the Future] is impressive. I do not remember when in recent years I have read a more exciting systematic study. With a new phenomenology, a distinctive method and unique modes of validation for philosophy, and an extraordinary command of both Eastern and Western philosophy, Professor Allinson develops his own bold, imaginative and challenging system of philosophy". This work is intended to (...) serve not only as an expression of a new idea of a philosophy, but as an apologia for philosophy as a legitimate and independent discipline in its own right. It argues that in the 20th century, truth has not been abandoned, but merely modified. The text proposes a return to truth and suggests that it is only after apprehending the truths of consciousness that the philosopher's mirror may become a kaleidoscope through which reality may be contemplated. First order truth lies in the realm of discovery, and discovery takes place only within the moment of subjective re-enactment. It is through such a phenomenological criterion of validity that this work attempts to firmly ground an epistemology capable of paving the way for further substantive truth discoveries. As part of the philosophic stance advanced herein, however, epistemology and metaphysics are not developed in isolation. After analyzing other metaphysical approaches, the author utilizes the Chinese principle of complementarity to present his own conception of modified Hegelian dialecticism, as an account of systematic coherency and a backdrop to future philosophizing. (shrink)

Many people find sacred choral music profound and deeply evocative, even in societies that seem to be turning away from religious belief. In this book, Julian Perlmutter examines how, in light of its wide appeal, sacred music can have religious significance for people regardless of their religious convictions. -/- By differentiating between doctrinal belief and the desire for God, Perlmutter explores a longing for the spiritual that is compatible with both belief and 'interested non-belief'. He describes how sacred music can (...) elicit this kind of longing, thereby helping the listener to grow in religious openness. The work of Thomas Merton is also analyzed in order to show that musically-elicited desire for God can be incorporated into the Christian practice of contemplative prayer, aimed ultimately at a union of love with God. By exploring connections between desire, knowledge and religious practice, this engaging account illustrates how sacred music can have a transformative effect on one's wider spiritual life. -/- Of particular interest to philosophers and theologians, the book makes a novel contribution to several topics including religious epistemology, the philosophy of emotion and aesthetics. (shrink)

A perennial debate in the field of global ethics revolves around the possibility of a universalist ethics as well as arguments over the nature, and significance, of difference for moral deliberation. Decolonial literature, in particular, increasingly signifies a pluriverse – one with radical ontological and epistemological differences. This book examines the concept of the pluriverse alongside global ethics and the ethics of care in order to contemplate new ethical horizons for engaging across difference. Offering a challenge to the current state (...) of the field, this book argues for a rethinking of global ethics as it has been conceived thus far. (shrink)