Results for 'Consciousness States'

1000+ found
Order:
  1.  47
    Phenomenality, conscious states, and consciousness inessentialism.Mikio Akagi - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (4):803-819.
    I draw attention to an ambiguity of the expression ‘phenomenal consciousness’ that is an avoidable yet persistent source of conceptual confusion among consciousness scientists. The ambiguity is between what I call phenomenality and what I call conscious states, where the former denotes an abstract property and the latter denotes a phenomenon or class of its instances. Since sentences featuring these two terms have different semantic properties, it is possible to equivocate over the term ‘consciousness’. It is (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Conscious states and conscious creatures: Explanation in the scientific study of consciousness.Tim Bayne - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):1–22.
    Explanation does not exist in a metaphysical vacuum. Conceptions of the structure of a phenomenon play an important role in guiding attempts to explain it, and erroneous conceptions of a phenomenon may direct investigation in misleading directions. I believe that there is a case to be made for thinking that much work on the neural underpinnings of consciousness—what is often called the neural correlates of consciousness—is driven by an erroneous conception of the structure of consciousness. The aim (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  3. Conscious states as objects of awareness: on Uriah Kriegel, Subjective consciousness: a self-representational theory.Brie Gertler - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):447-455.
    Conscious states as objects of awareness: on Uriah Kriegel, Subjective consciousness: a self - representational theory Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9763-9 Authors Brie Gertler, Corcoran Department of Philosophy, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  4.  68
    Conscious-state Anti-realism.Pete Mandik - 2015 - In Carlos Muñoz-Suárez & Filipe De Brigard (eds.), Content and Consciousness Revisited. Berlin: Springer. pp. 184-197.
    Realism about consciousness conjoins a claim that consciousness exists with a claim that the existence is independent in some interesting sense. Consciousness realism so conceived may thus be opposed by a variety of anti-realisms, distinguished from each other by denying the first, the second, or both of the realist’s defining claims. I argue that Dennett’s view of consciousness is best read as an anti-realism that affirms the existence of consciousness while denying an important independence claim.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  5.  92
    Minimally Conscious States, Deep Brain Stimulation, and What is Worse than Futility.Grant Gillett - 2011 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 8 (2):145-149.
    The concept of futility is sometimes regarded as a cloak for medical paternalism in that it rolls together medical and value judgments. Often, despite attempts to disambiguate the concept, that is true and it can be applied in such a way as to marginalize the real interests of a patient. I suggest we replace it with a conceptual toolkit that includes physiological futility, substantial benefit (SB), and the risk of unacceptable badness (RUB) in that these concepts allow us to articulate (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  6. Are conscious states conscious in virtue of representing themselves?: On Uriah Kriegel’s Subjective consciousness: a self-representational theory.Berit Brogaard - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):467-474.
    Are conscious states conscious in virtue of representing themselves? Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-8 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9762-x Authors Berit Brogaard, Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, St. Louis, 599 Lucas Hall, One University Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63121-4400, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  7.  94
    Minimally conscious state and human dignity.Jukka Varelius - 2008 - Neuroethics 2 (1):35-50.
    Recent progress in neurosciences has improved our understanding of chronic disorders of consciousness. One example of this advancement is the emergence of the new diagnostic category of minimally conscious state (MCS). The central characteristic of MCS is impaired consciousness. Though the phenomenon now referred to as MCS pre-existed its inclusion in diagnostic classifications, the current medical ethical concepts mainly apply to patients with normal consciousness and to non-conscious patients. Accordingly, how we morally should stand with persons in (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  8. Minimally Conscious State, Human Dignity, and the Significance of Species: A Reply to Kaczor.Jukka Varelius - 2011 - Neuroethics (Browse Results) 6 (1):85-95.
    Abstract In a recent issue of Neuroethics , I considered whether the notion of human dignity could help us in solving the moral problems the advent of the diagnostic category of minimally conscious state (MCS) has brought forth. I argued that there is no adequate account of what justifies bestowing all MCS patients with the special worth referred to as human dignity. Therefore, I concluded, unless that difficulty can be solved we should resort to other values than human dignity in (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Conscious states: Where are they in the brain and what are their necessary ingredients?William Hirstein - 2013 - Mens Sana Monographs 11 (1):230-238.
    One of the final obstacles to understanding consciousness in physical terms concerns the question of whether conscious states can exist in posterior regions of the brain without active connections to the brain's prefrontal lobes. If they can, difficult issues concerning our knowledge of our conscious states can be resolved. This paper contains a list of types of conscious states that may meet this criterion, including states of coma, states in which subjects are absorbed in (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10. Are our concepts CONSCIOUS STATE and CONSCIOUS CREATURE vague?Michael V. Antony - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (2):239 - 263.
    Intuitively it has seemed to many that our concepts conscious state and conscious creature are sharp rather than vague, that they can have no borderline cases. On the other hand, many who take conscious states to be identical to, or realized by, complex physical states are committed to the vagueness of those concepts. In the paper I argue that conscious state and conscious creature are sharp by presenting four necessary conditions for conceiving borderline cases in general, and showing (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  11.  15
    Minimally Conscious State, Human Dignity, and the Significance of Species: A Reply to Kaczor.Jukka Varelius - 2011 - Neuroethics 6 (1):85-95.
    In a recent issue of Neuroethics, I considered whether the notion of human dignity could help us in solving the moral problems the advent of the diagnostic category of minimally conscious state has brought forth. I argued that there is no adequate account of what justifies bestowing all MCS patients with the special worth referred to as human dignity. Therefore, I concluded, unless that difficulty can be solved we should resort to other values than human dignity in addressing the moral (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12.  89
    Are conscious states conscious in virtue of representing themselves?: On Uriah Kriegel’s Subjective consciousness: a self-representational theory. [REVIEW]Berit Brogaard - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):467-474.
  13. The conscious state paradigm: A neurocognitive approach to waking, sleeping, and dreaming.R. Stickgold & J. Allan Hobson - 1995 - In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences. MIT Press.
  14. The timing of conscious states.David M. Rosenthal - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):215-20.
    Striking experimental results by Benjamin Libet and colleagues have had an impor- tant impact on much recent discussion of consciousness. Some investigators have sought to replicate or extend Libet’s results (Haggard, 1999; Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Haggard, Newman, & Magno, 1999; Trevena & Miller, 2002), while others have focused on how to interpret those findings (e.g., Gomes, 1998, 1999, 2002; Pockett, 2002), which many have seen as conflicting with our commonsense picture of mental functioning.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  15.  52
    The minimally conscious state: Definition and diagnostic criteria.Joseph T. Giacino & Childs N. Ashwal S. - 2002 - Neurology 58 (3):349-353.
  16. Consciousness: states, mechanisms and disorders.Andrea E. Cavanna & Andrea Nani (eds.) - 2014 - New York: Novinka.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17.  21
    Inferred conscious states and the equality axiom.A. H. Pierce - 1905 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (6):150-155.
  18. "The minimally conscious state: Definition and diagnostic criteria": Comments and reply.Diane Coleman, D. Alan Shewmon & J. T. Giacino - 2002 - Neurology 58 (3):506-507.
  19.  19
    Our conscious states picture and apprehend our nervous processes.Sidney E. Mezes - 1931 - Journal of Philosophy 28 (22):600-607.
  20.  84
    Neurostimulation and the minimally conscious state.Walter Glannon - 2008 - Bioethics 22 (6):337–345.
    Neurostimulation to restore cognitive and physical functions is an innovative and promising technique for treating patients with severe brain injury that has resulted in a minimally conscious state (MCS). The technique may involve electrical stimulation of the central thalamus, which has extensive projections to the cerebral cortex. Yet it is unclear whether an improvement in neurological functions would result in a net benefit for these patients. Quality-of-life measurements would be necessary to determine whether any benefit of neurostimulation outweighed any harm (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21. Minimally conscious states.Douglas Katz - 2001
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22.  15
    The conscious state paradigm: A neuropsychological analysis of waking, sleeping, and dreaming.J. Allan Hobson - 1998 - In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press. pp. 2--473.
  23.  2
    Inferred Conscious States and the Equality Axiom.A. H. Pierce - 1905 - Journal of Philosophy 2 (6):150.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Detecting awareness in the conscious state.Adrian M. Owen, Martin R. Coleman, Melanie Boly, Matthew H. Davis, Steven Laureys, Dietsje Jolles & John D. Pickard - 2006 - Science 313:1402.
  25. The vegetative and minimally conscious states: Current knowledge and remaining questions.Joseph T. Giacino & J. T. Whyte - 2005 - Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilation 20 (1):30-50.
  26.  2
    Is the “Minimally Conscious State” Patient Minimally Self-Aware?Constantinos Picolas - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    Patients in a Minimally Conscious State (MCS) constitute a subgroup of awareness impaired patients who show minimal signs of awareness as opposed to patients in a Vegetative State who do not exhibit any such signs. While the empirical literature is rich in studies investigating either overt or covert signs of awareness in such patients the question of self-awareness has only scarcely been addressed. Even in the occasion where self-awareness is concerned, it is only higher-order or reflective self-awareness that is the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. Dreaming and the brain: Toward a cognitive neuroscience of conscious states.J. Allan Hobson, Edward F. Pace-Schott & Robert Stickgold - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):793-842; 904-1018; 1083-1121.
    Sleep researchers in different disciplines disagree about how fully dreaming can be explained in terms of brain physiology. Debate has focused on whether REM sleep dreaming is qualitatively different from nonREM (NREM) sleep and waking. A review of psychophysiological studies shows clear quantitative differences between REM and NREM mentation and between REM and waking mentation. Recent neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies also differentiate REM, NREM, and waking in features with phenomenological implications. Both evidence and theory suggest that there are isomorphisms between (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   117 citations  
  28.  40
    When Does Consciousness Matter? Lessons from the Minimally Conscious State.Joseph Vukov - 2018 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 9 (1):5-15.
    Patients in a minimally conscious state (MCS) fall into a different diagnostic category than patients in the more familiar vegetative states (VS). Not only are MCS patients conscious in some sense, they have a higher chance for recovery than VS patients. Because of these differences, we ostensibly have reason to provide MCS patients with care that goes beyond what we provide to patients with some VS patients. But how to justify this differential treatment? I argue we can’t justify it (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  29. Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective.Graham A. Jamieson (ed.) - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    The phenomenon of hypnosis provides a rich paradigm for those seeking to understand the processes that underlie consciousness. Understanding hypnosis tells us about a basic human capacity for altered experiences that is often overlooked in contemporary western societies. Throughout the 200 year history of psychology, hypnosis has been a major topic of investigation by some of the leading experimenters and theorists of each generation. Today hypnosis is emerging again as a lively area of research within cognitive (systems level) neuroscience (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  30. Dreaming and the brain: Toward a cognitive neuroscience of conscious states.J. Allan Hobson, Edward F. Pace-Schott & Robert Stickgold - 2003 - In Edward F. Pace-Schott, Mark Solms, Mark Blagrove & Stevan Harnad (eds.), Sleep and Dreaming: Scientific Advances and Reconsiderations. Cambridge University Press. pp. 793-842.
    Sleep researchers in different disciplines disagree about how fully dreaming can be explained in terms of brain physiology. Debate has focused on whether REM sleep dreaming is qualitatively different from nonREM (NREM) sleep and waking. A review of psychophysiological studies shows clear quantitative differences between REM and NREM mentation and between REM and waking mentation. Recent neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies also differentiate REM, NREM, and waking in features with phenomenological implications. Both evidence and theory suggest that there are isomorphisms between (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   104 citations  
  31. The Chemistry of Conscious States: Toward a Unified Model of the Brain and the Mind.J. Allan Hobson - 1994 - Basic Books.
    Argues that the brain and the mind are one--that the thoughts, feelings, dreams, and memories that constitute our consciousness are in fact an amalgam of electrical impulses and chemical interactions.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  32.  20
    Mindmelding, Chapter 9: Sharing conscious states.William Hirstein - 2012 - In Mindmelding: Consciousness, Neuroscience, and the Mind's Privacy. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter explains how mindmelding — the direct experience by one person of another's conscious representations — is in fact possible. The temporal lobes causally interact with the prefrontal lobes by way of fiber bundles that run underneath the cortical surface. This provides the perfect first experiment in mindmelding: to ‘branch’ those fiber bundles and run the other end into the brain of another person. Evidence is provided that these bundles have close connections to consciousness, in that whatever affects (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  33. Paper: The right to die in the minimally conscious state.L. Syd M. Johnson - 2011 - Journal of Medical Ethics 37 (3):175-178.
    The right to die has for decades been recognised for persons in a vegetative state, but there remains controversy about ending life-sustaining medical treatment for persons in the minimally conscious state. The controversy is rooted in assumptions about the moral significance of consciousness, and the value of life for patients who are conscious and not terminally ill. This paper evaluates these assumptions in light of evidence that generates concerns about quality of life in the MCS. It is argued that (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  34.  98
    Conceiving of Conscious States.Christopher Peacocke - 2012 - In J. Ellis & D. Guevara (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
    For a wide range of concepts, a thinker’s understanding of what it is for a thing to fall under the concept plausibly involves knowledge of an identity. It involves knowledge that the thing has to have the same property as is exemplified in instantiation of the concept in some distinguished, basic instance. This paper addresses the question: can we apply this general model of the role of identity in understanding to the case of subjective, conscious states? In particular, can (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. 'Another I': Representing Conscious States, Perception, and Others.Christopher Peacocke - 2005 - In Jose Luis Bermudez & José Luis Bermúdez (eds.), Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    What is it for a thinker to possess the concept of perceptual experience? What is it to be able to think of seeings, hearings and touchings, and to be able to think of experiences that are subjectively like seeings, hearings and touchings?
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  36.  1
    Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective.Graham Jamieson (ed.) - 2007 - Oxford University Press UK.
    The phenomenon of hypnosis provides a rich paradigm for those seeking to understand the processes that underlie consciousness. Understanding hypnosis tells us about a basic human capacity for altered experiences that is often overlooked in contemporary western societies. Throughout the 200 year history of psychology, hypnosis has been a major topic of investigation by some of the leading experimenters and theorists of each generation. Today hypnosis is emerging again as a lively area of research within cognitive neuroscience informing basic (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  37.  36
    The minimally conscious state and treatment withdrawal: W v M.Emily Jackson - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (9):559-561.
    This short comment on the Court of Protection decision in W v M draws attention to the primacy the judge gave to the preservation of life and discusses the relative lack of weight accorded to M's previously expressed views.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  38.  56
    The minimally conscious state: Defining the borders of consciousness.Joseph T. Giacino - 2006 - In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.
  39.  54
    Diagnosing PVS and minimally conscious state: The role of tacit knowledge and intuition.Mary Terrell White - 2006 - Journal of Clinical Ethics 17 (1):62-71.
  40.  40
    A Plastic Temporal Code for Conscious State Generation.Birgitta Dresp-Langley - 2009 - Neural Plasticity 2009 (482696):1-15..
    Consciousness is known to be limited in processing capacity and often described in terms of a unique processing stream across a single dimension: time. In this paper, we discuss a purely temporal pattern code, functionally decoupled from spatial signals, for conscious state generation in the brain. Arguments in favour of such a code include Dehaene et al.'s long-distance reverberation postulate, Ramachandran's remapping hypothesis, evidence for a temporal coherence index and coincidence detectors, and Grossberg's Adaptive Resonance Theory. A time-bin resonance (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  41. The vegetative and minimally conscious states: A comparison of clinical features and functional outcome.Joseph T. Giacino & Kathleen Kalmar - 1997 - Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilation 12:36-51.
  42. Respect for autonomy, advance directives, and minimally conscious state.Jukka Varelius - 2011 - Bioethics 25 (9):505-515.
    In this article, I consider whether the advance directive of a person in minimally conscious state ought to be adhered to when its prescriptions conflict with her current wishes. I argue that an advance directive can have moral significance after its issuer has succumbed to minimally conscious state. I also defend the view that the patient can still have a significant degree of autonomy. Consequently, I conclude that her advance directive ought not to be applied. Then I briefly assess whether (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  43.  50
    The value of spontaneous EEG oscillations in distinguishing patients in vegetative and minimally conscious states.Andrew And Alexander Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi - 2013 - In Eror Basar & et all (eds.), Application of Brain Oscillations in Neuropsychiatric Diseases. Supplements to Clinical Neurophysiology. Elsevier. pp. 81-99.
    Objective: The value of spontaneous EEG oscillations in distinguishing patients in vegetative and minimally conscious states was studied. Methods: We quantified dynamic repertoire of EEG oscillations in resting condition with closed eyes in patients in vegetative and minimally conscious states (VS and MCS). The exact composition of EEG oscillations was assessed by the probability-classification analysis of short-term EEG spectral patterns. Results: The probability of delta, theta and slow-alpha oscillations occurrence was smaller for patients in MCS than for VS. (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  44.  87
    Kafka, paranoic doubles and the brain: hypnagogic vs. hyper-reflexive models of disrupted self in neuropsychiatric disorders and anomalous conscious states[REVIEW]Aaron L. Mishara - 2010 - Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 5:13.
    Kafka's writings are frequently interpreted as representing the historical period of modernism in which he was writing. Little attention has been paid, however, to the possibility that his writings may reflect neural mechanisms in the processing of self during hypnagogic (i.e., between waking and sleep) states. Kafka suffered from dream-like, hypnagogic hallucinations during a sleep-deprived state while writing. This paper discusses reasons (phenomenological and neurobiological) why the self projects an imaginary double (autoscopy) in its spontaneous hallucinations and how Kafka's (...)
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  45.  25
    Modeling the minimally conscious state: Measurements of brain function and therapeutic possibilities.Nicholas D. Schiff - 2006 - In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.
  46. Peacocke's 'Concepts of conscious states'.Benj Hellie - manuscript
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Cartography of conscious states: Integration of East and West.Roland Fischer - 1978 - In A. A. Sugarman & R. E. Tarter (eds.), Expanding Dimensions of Consciousness. Springer. pp. 24--57.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Corrigendum: Is the “Minimally Conscious State” Patient Minimally Self-Aware?Constantinos Picolas - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective.Tim Bayne - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
  50. EEG oscillatory states as neuro-phenomenology of consciousness as revealed from patients in vegetative and minimally conscious states.Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):149-169.
    The value of resting electroencephalogram (EEG) in revealing neural constitutes of consciousness (NCC) was examined. We quantified the dynamic repertoire, duration and oscillatory type of EEG microstates in eyes-closed rest in relation to the degree of expression of clinical self-consciousness. For NCC a model was suggested that contrasted normal, severely disturbed state of consciousness and state without consciousness. Patients with disorders of consciousness were used. Results suggested that the repertoire, duration and oscillatory type of EEG (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000