PARANORMAL IS ABNORMAL ACTION OF MIND ON MATTER.\\ ONE NEEDS FIRST A THEORY OF NORMAL ACTION OF MIND ON MATTER.\\ CLASSICAL THEORY INADEQUATE: NO `MIND' IN THE DYNAMICS.\\ QUANTUM THEORY IS FORMULATED AS A THEORY OF MIND-MATTER INTERPLAY!\\ SIMPLER THAN CLASSICAL PHYSICS!\\ I SHALL:\\ 1. SHOW HOW QUANTUM THEORY OF MIND-MATTER IS CONSTRUCTED.\\ 2. DO TWO IMPORTANT MIND-MATTER CALCULATIONS.\\ 3. LOOK AT RAMIFICATIONS FOR PARANORMAL.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:207 THE CARELESS SKEPTIC THE 'PAMPHILIAN' IRONIES IN HUME'S DIALOGUES In "Hume and the Legacy of the Dialogues" E. C. Mossner sets out a widely accepted interpretation of one of Hume's major intentions in that great work. He argues that Hume's main use of irony therein is to dissimulate with respect to his true religious convictions. The purpose is to provide Hume with a defense against the expected negative (...) reaction to the powerful attack on religion mounted 2 in the Dialogues. The attack, as is well known, is set out in the arguments of Philo against natural and revealed religion as espoused by Cleanthes and Demea, and Philo's views are taken to be those of Hume. It is argued or assumed that since such attacks were in Hume's day imprudent, they must be made by indirection, that is, by a device such as irony. Thus the Dialogues have surface meanings in which the religious views under attack are said (by Pamphilus) to win out; they also have other meanings, underlying or implicit, in which the religious views are conclusively refuted. That they are refuted is a conclusion drawn by the interpreters, in the present case Mossner and those who share his views. These destructive refutations are derived from explication and assessment of the ongoing argument as embodied in the explicit statements of the contestants, and are thus not explicitly linked to Hume. In consequence, quite often from one standpoint (a trivial one of external comment by an immature and prejudiced onlooker) the design argument wins; and from another, more sophisticated one, it loses. The upshot is that "Philo, who as Hume's spokesman for mitigated 208 skepticism will perforce be the victor in the philosophic debate, will nevertheless be 'artfully' depicted as being vanquished by the antagonist." The strategy Mossner finds in the Dialogues thus has the youthful Pamphilus, a ward of Cleanthes, and one who takes no actual part in the adversarial discussions, interposing (in brief asides) comments that superficially but subtly belittle Philo's philosophical position. Philo is characterized, for instance, as having a "careless scepticism," in contrast with Cleanthes, who has an "accurate philosophical turn [of mind]" (D 128). Similarly, at the end of the Dialogues, Pamphilus awards the victory to Cleanthes. In support of his thesis that Philo is a devious Hume's mouthpiece, Mossner brings forth two kinds of evidence, roughly characterizable as external and internal. One kind of external evidence is exemplified in Hume's correspondence with Gilbert 4 5 Elliot of Minto, and Adam Smith; the letters involved are interpreted as showing that Philo represents Hume. Another kind involves comparing the amount of space devoted to the arguments of the three adversaries. The internal evidence is derived from the explication and appraisal of the explicit statements of the contestants; and it is essentially identified with the arguments and conclusions of Philo, except where Cleanthes can be said to make claims which square with those made by Hume in other works such as the Treatise. Thus Hume's views and the related arguments are interpreted as those of Philo, in part because they are considered to be more valid and sound than those of Cleanthes, and in part because they are held to square with the views and arguments affirmed in Hume's other writings. Hume's views, as indicated above, are taken to be those of 209 Philo except where Philo appears to agree with Cleanthes and to accept a form of the design argument. Hume is Cleanthes when Cleanthes sets forth doctrines of the Treatise and the Enquiry that are in accordance with the received (more or less) positivistic interpretation of Hume's skepticism. It is this view that requires that in those places in Parts III, X, and XII, where Philo appears to avow a form of the design argument or to let it stand unrefuted, he be (ironically) dissimulating. Thus the surface victories of Cleanthes and natural religion, which the adversarial flow of the statements of Philo and Cleanthes exhibits, are refuted by the propositions derived from the assessed form and content of the philosophical debate. The basic irony, therefore, lies in aspects of the... (shrink)

Law is a specialized semiotic realm, but lawyers generally are ignorant of this fact. Lawyers may manage meaning, but they also are managed by meaning. Seemingly trapped by the weight of pre-existing signs, their attempts to manage these meanings generally are limited to technical interventions and instrumentalist strategies. Signs have power over lawyers because they are embedded in narratives, a semiotic economy that confronts the lawyer as “given” even though it is dynamic and constantly under construction. Most lawyers do not (...) make meaning through legal narratives; rather, they parrot bits of the controlling narratives in response to certain problems. Because clients often can achieve their objectives when their lawyers crudely manipulate the symbols of law, these endeavors pay very well. Well-paid lawyers tend not to ask too many questions. Consequently, semiotics is, at best, misunderstood by lawyers; more likely it is wholly unknown. A lawyer’s avowed instrumentalism is the very problem to be addressed in this regard. For the scope of discussion, I refer to Vico’s famous On the Study Methods of Our Time and draw my conclusion for the lawyer of our time. (shrink)

This is the third section of an article (each published in subsequent regular issues of EPAT) that explores the concept of participation. Section I: Introduction and Early Perspectives grounds our exploration of participation and explores definitions and early perspectives of participation we have identified as ‘historically original’ and ‘philosophical’. Section II: Participation as Engagement in Experience—An Aesthetics Perspective is a continuation of our conceptual exploration of participation that digs into the world of aesthetics. Finally, Section III: The Utilitarian Perspective and (...) Conclusion focuses on utilitarian meanings of participation from political and international development perspectives. Collectively, these sections focus on the meaning and deconstruction of the term, participation. By bringing attention to gradations in meaning, we hope to raise awareness of the superficial use of participation that is reflected in much of the educational literature and highlight possibilities that more thoughtfully formulated and consciously chosen meanings of participation could offer the field of education. (shrink)

Multiple -conclusion logic extends formal logic by allowing arguments to have a set of conclusions instead of a single one, the truth lying somewhere among the conclusions if all the premises are true. The extension opens up interesting possibilities based on the symmetry between premises and conclusions, and can also be used to throw fresh light on the conventional logic and its limitations. This is a sustained study of the subject and is certain to stimulate further research. Part I (...) reworks the fundamental ideas of logic to take account of multiple conclusions, and investigates the connections between multiple - and single - conclusion calculi. Part II draws on graph theory to discuss the form and validity of arguments independently of particular logical systems. Part III contrasts the multiple - and the single - conclusion treatment of one and the same subject, using many-valued logic as the example; and Part IV shows how the methods of 'natural deduction' can be matched by direct proofs using multiple conclusions. (shrink)

Background and aims: Recent investigations have highlighted the value of neuropsychological testing for the assessment and screening of Alcohol-Related Brain Damage. The aim of the present study was to evaluate the suitability of the Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination and the Repeatable Battery for the Assessment of Neuropsychological Status for this purpose. Methods: Comparing 28 participants with ARBD and 30 alcohol-dependent participants without ARBD we calculated Area Under the Curve statistics, sensitivity and specificity values, base-rate adjusted predictive values, and likelihood ratios for (...) both tests. Results: High levels of screening accuracy were found for the total scores of both the ACE-III and RBANS at multiple cut-off points. Removing participants with a history of polysubstance from the samples improved the diagnostic capabilities of the RBANS substantially, while only minor improvements to the ACE-III’s accuracy were observed. Conclusions: Overall, both the ACE-III and RBANS are suitable tools for ARBD screening within an alcohol-dependent population, though the RBANS is the superior of the two. Clinicians using these tools for ARBD screening should be cautious of false-positive outcomes and should therefore combine them with other assessment methods and more detailed neuropsychological testing before reaching diagnostic decisions. (shrink)

The publication of Mr. R. S. Bluck's stimulating Phaedo prompts me to ask the following questions concerning the traditional interpretation of the cosmographical passage beginning 108 e. Do the terms of 108 e-109 a in combination with 110 b 5 ff. and Timaeus 40 b-c and 62 d ff. prove conclusively that in the Phaedo Plato thinks of the earth as a spherical body? Granted that he does, need his description of the earth, as a setting for his eschatological myth, (...) conform with the spherical theory? (shrink)

The publication of Mr. R. S. Bluck's stimulating Phaedo prompts me to ask the following questions concerning the traditional interpretation of the cosmographical passage beginning 108 e. Do the terms of 108 e-109 a in combination with 110 b 5 ff. and Timaeus 40 b-c and 62 d ff. prove conclusively that in the Phaedo Plato thinks of the earth as a spherical body? Granted that he does, need his description of the earth, as a setting for his eschatological myth, (...) conform with the spherical theory? (shrink)

From now on I intend to put aside history and exegesis of texts to take up as philosophical questions some matters which arise from Bayle's argument for toleration . In fact I believe that the main conclusions I argue for in the remaining essays are substantially Bayle's, but I am not concerned to show that they are, and have not adopted them out of any loyalty to him. This third essay is an analysis of the reciprocity argument as a type. (...) I have already discussed Bayle's version, but other versions are possible, and it seems worthwhile to analyse their common structure and consider their limitations. The fourth essay is a discussion of the ethics of belief and inquiry. This topic was touched on in connection with Fr Terrill's views on invincible ignorance (see above, Essay I, sect. 3), and again in connection with Bayle's views on culpable error, prepossession, opinionatedness and temerity (see above, Essay II, sect. 4.2). In the Philosophical Commentary see Supplement, ch. 17, "What judgement should be made of those who will not enter into disputes". But since Bayle's time a good deal has been written on the subject, and a discussion independent of his seems worthwhile. I will therefore put the texts aside and enter upon a consideration of some of the questions they have raised. (shrink)

This article is the third part of a trilogy investigating the relation between Merleau-Ponty and Foucault. All three essays are inspired by Foucault’s diagnosis of our epoch in terms of biopower. They therefore aim at the creation of a new concept of life. In ‘Un Ecart Infime (Part III)’, I lay out Foucault’s analysis, from the first chapter of The Order of Things, of Velázquez’s painting, Las Meninas. By stressing what Foucault says about the ‘sagittal lines’ exiting the painting, one (...) can show that that there are three major phases in Foucault’s analysis: locating the blind spot; multiplying the invisibility; and the diffraction of the multiplicity into singularities. More generally, we can see that Foucault’s analysis of the painting concerns the informal space in auto-affection; in other words, it concerns the ‘blind spot’ in the mirror relation, in the ‘psyché’. The blind spot in the ‘soul’ - and the ambiguity in the French word psyché between mirror and soul - is why we can say that Foucault’s analysis concerns life: being blind, life must be conceived as informal and unmappable. I show in the conclusion that the inability of mapping and of seeing this space in fact allows for the increase of power. (shrink)

This article is the third part of a trilogy investigating the relation between Merleau-Ponty and Foucault. All three essays are inspired by Foucault’s diagnosis of our epoch in terms of biopower. They therefore aim at the creation of a new concept of life. In ‘Un Ecart Infime (Part III)’, I lay out Foucault’s analysis, from the first chapter of The Order of Things, of Velázquez’s painting, Las Meninas. By stressing what Foucault says about the ‘sagittal lines’ exiting the painting, one (...) can show that that there are three major phases in Foucault’s analysis: locating the blind spot; multiplying the invisibility; and the diffraction of the multiplicity into singularities. More generally, we can see that Foucault’s analysis of the painting concerns the informal space in auto-affection; in other words, it concerns the ‘blind spot’ in the mirror relation, in the ‘psyché’. The blind spot in the ‘soul’ - and the ambiguity in the French word psyché between mirror and soul - is why we can say that Foucault’s analysis concerns life: being blind, life must be conceived as informal and unmappable. I show in the conclusion that the inability of mapping and of seeing this space in fact allows for the increase of power. (shrink)

This article describes some potential uses of Bayesian estimation for time-series and panel data models by incorporating information from prior probabilities in addition to observed data. Drawing on econometrics and other literatures we illustrate the use of informative “shrinkage” or “small variance” priors while extending prior work on the general cross-lagged panel model. Using a panel dataset of national income and subjective well-being we describe three key benefits of these priors. First, they shrink parameter estimates toward zero or toward each (...) other for time-varying parameters, which lends additional support for an income → SWB effect that is not supported with maximum likelihood. This is useful because, second, these priors increase model parsimony and the stability of estimates and thus improve out-of-sample predictions and interpretability, which means estimated effect should also be more trustworthy than under ML. Third, these priors allow estimating otherwise under-identified models under ML, allowing higher-order lagged effects and time-varying parameters that are otherwise impossible to estimate using observed data alone. In conclusion we note some of the responsibilities that come with the use of priors which, departing from typical commentaries on their scientific applications, we describe as involving reflection on how best to apply modeling tools to address matters of worldly concern. (shrink)

Kant’s views on the relation between freedom and moral law seem to undergo a major, unannounced shift. In the third section of the Groundwork, Kant seems to be using the fact that we must act under the idea of freedom as a foundation for the moral law. However, in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant claims that our awareness of our freedom depends on our awareness of the moral law. I argue that the apparent conflict between the two texts depends (...) on a reading of the opening paragraphs of Groundwork III, and on an interpretation of Kant’s claim that we “act under the idea of freedom”, that is implausible on textual and on philosophical grounds. I then present an alternative interpretation of what Kant means by “acting under the idea of freedom” and of the opening paragraphs of Groundwork III. I argue that the only substantive conclusion of these paragraphs is that no theoretical proof of freedom is necessary. Moreover I argue that although these paragraphs raise concerns about the validity of the moral law, these concerns and Kant’s answers to them, do not give rise to any significant conflict with his views in the Critique of Practical Reason. (shrink)

The article is primarily a study of Nietzsche’s unpublished fragments from the period spring-autumn 1881, in which Nietzsche first developed his thought of the “eternal recurrence of the same.” In the article, I attempt to accomplish two goals: the first goal is to explain Nietzsche’s theses on the eternal recurrence, which at that time were still remarkably clear and coherent. And the second goal is to try to find in these same theses an explanation for their future silence. In other (...) words, the article examines the relationship between Nietzsche’s theses that he developed in 1881 and his book _Thus spoke Zarathustra_, which, in Nietzsche’s own words, relies on these theses as their “grounding thought,” but nevertheless never fully reveals them. Both lines of inquiry lead to the conclusion that the core of Nietzsche’s introduction of the idea of eternal recurrence is his concept of _Einverleibung_ or embodiment. Indeed, the analysis shows that Nietzsche’s main concern with the thought of eternal recurrence was not to set forth its clear articulation within consciousness, but rather to construct it in such a way that it could become an unconscious instinct capable of gradually displacing the “embodied mistakes” that dominate our thinking from within itself. (shrink)

Henry Allison and Paul Guyer have recently offered interpretations of Kant's argument in Groundwork III. These interpretations share this premise: the argument moves from a non-moral, theoretical premise to a moral conclusion, and the failure of the argument is a failure to make this jump from the non-moral to the moral. This characterization both of the nature of the argument and its failure is flawed. Consider instead the possibility that in Groundwork III, Kant is struggling toward something rather different (...) from this, not trying to pull the moral rabbit out of the theoretical hat, but instead seeking a proto-phenomenological grounding of morality: a grounding that begins from first personal felt experiences that already possess moral content, and proceeds to its further practical claims via attentive reflection on these felt experiences. This paper brings this assumption to our reading of Groundwork III, showing that in doing so we acquire a deeper appreciation both of the argument, and the reasons it fails. Kant's argument is practical throughout. And the failure of the argument is the failure of Kant's nascent efforts to provide a new, phenomenological method for the grounding of practical philosophy. (shrink)

This paper offers an imminent interpretation of Kant's political teleology in the context of his response to Moses Mendelssohn in Theory and Practice III concerning prospects of humankind's moral progress. The paper assesses the nature of Kant's response against his mature political philosophy in the Doctrine of Right . In `Theory and Practice III' Kant's response to Mendelssohn remains incomplete: whilst insisting that individuals have a duty to contribute towards humankind's moral progress, Kant has no conclusive answer as to how (...) individuals might act on that duty. `Theory and Practice III' lacks a clear conception of the distinctness of political morality from the domain of virtue; Kant's resort to teleological argumentation is indicative of his lack of an account of instituting Right. The latter can be found in the Doctrine of Right —yet Kant's earlier teleological arguments contribute crucially to the development of his mature morality of Right. Key Words: inborn duty • moral progress • political teleology • principles of Right. (shrink)

Background Disclosure of obtaining informed consent from patients (ICP) and research ethics committee (REC) approval in published reports is sometimes omitted. To date, no disclosure data are available on surgical research. Objective Our aim was to assess whether REC approval and ICP were documented in surgical trials. Study design Overall, 657 randomised trials, published between 2005 and 2010 in 10 international journals, were included. We collected the report rate of REC approval and ICP and contacted the corresponding author when ethical (...) information was lacking. Results Among the 657 randomised controlled trials (RCT), 576 (87.7%) stated that an REC had approved the research, and 606 (92.2%) stated that ICP had been requested. Furthermore, 28 RCTs (4.3%) reported neither REC nor ICP. Conclusions The phase III randomised surgical trials that were analysed were shown to have respected fundamental ethical principles in approximately 90% of the cases examines. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:141. ON HARRISON'S INTERPRETATION OF TREATISE III ii 1 In Treatise III ii 1, Hume is concerned to argue that justice is an artificial virtue, not a natural one. Commenting on this Section, Jonathan Harrison has pointed out that, on his reading and interpretation, Hume's argument runs into many difficulties. I shall argue in this paper that a more sympathetic reading of Hume will show that his argument is (...) a whole lot more plausible than Harrison takes it to be. Harrison raises many separate points, but instead of taking up these points one by one, I shall concentrate on one that seems to be most serious, and to lie at the heart of his criticism. The point is as follows. Hume's argument, designed to prove that justice is an artificial virtue as opposed to natural, proves too much: '(It) proves that justice is not a virtue at all' (HTJ 6). According to Harrison, Hume's first premise is [1] That actions are not duties unless there is in the mind of man a motive which normally prompts him to perform them, and the second premise is [2] That there is in the mind of man no motive which normally prompts him to perform just actions ( ibid. ) Harrison goes on to argue that we can derive from these two premises the 'embarrassing conclusion' that 'it cannot be a duty to perform just actions,' or that 'justice is not a virtue at all.' If Hume did indeed assert [1] and [2], the embarrassing conclusion would seem to follow. I shall argue that there is more than meets the eye as regards [1], and that Hume does not assert [2], 142. It would appear that in attributing [1] to Hume, Harrison has the following passage in mind: (It) may be establish'd as an undoubted maxim, that no action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it, distinct from the sense of its morality (T 479). As I interpret this passage, the main point of the maxim is that the virtuousness of an action resides not in the sense of the morality of the action, as this is clearly circular, but in some other motive. This maxim does imply [1] above provided that we take Harrison's 'actions are not duties' to mean 'actions are not virtuous,' and his 'motive' to mean 'motive other than a sense of duty or morality.' In general, however, Harrison's way of rendering the passage above is quite unsatisfactory because it obscures what Hume means by 'duty' and what for Hume renders an action virtuous. To clarify matters, we need to look more closely at Hume's maxim. The first thing to note is that, while it is not clear what Harrison means by 'motive, ' Hume clearly uses the term 'motive' to mean 'passion.' Hume talks about 'the motives that produced' actions (T 477, my emphasis). Given Hume's psychology of actions, it is obvious that Hume is talking about the passions that produced actions. The sense of morality or duty, or the moral sentiment, is itself a passion which is capable of producing actions, and can do so 'without any other motive' (T 479). However, what Hume stresses in the passage above is that it is not the sense of duty that gives an action a good moral character, but some other motive, or passion. Hume is saying that the sense of duty is a derivative passion: an action has to 143, be established as virtuous in the first place for there to be a sense of duty concerning that action, or a sense of its morality; and it has to be so established by some other motive of which the sense of duty can be said to be derivative. Hume spells this out explicitly when he talks about humane actions. Thus, it is the humanity that 'bestows a merit on the actions' (T 478), not a regard to this merit, or a sense of duty concerning the actions, which is 'deriv'd from the antecedent principle of humanity' ( ibid., my emphasis). Now a sense of duty or obligation has to be distinguished from... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:298 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY has been able to read. The result here is a presentation which is inspired and meaningful itself, astonishing its contemporaries and impressing its deseendants. Now, thirty years later, anthropology and psychology have passed beyond L~vy-Bruhl and Spranger. The moderate idealist interpretation of religion as it is found in Parts IV and V, "The World" and "Forms," must give way to descriptive phenomenology and existential analysis, (...) taking into consideration the internal dialectics of religion as well as the dialectics between the religious and the secular. The domain of meaning (Sinnesreich) appears, upon closer consideration, to be a function of the domain of existence. Contemporary religious consciousness and the confrontation of different such consciousnesses would require a "Part Six." The necessarily brief methodology, attached as Epilegomeua to the substance of the book, only contains the remnants of phenomenological epistemology. Besides at least making the main work of Van der Leeuw more known to the Englishspeaking world, this edition may also stimulate phenomenological discussion where Geisteswissenscha /t has a different connotation than it does in continental Europe. In this discussion, several points will have to be made. Is this book a pure phenomenology, with its evaluative character, its tendency to psychological instead of philosophical foundation, and its lack of philosophy of human consciousness? It should be mid that, unfortunately, hardly any phenomenologist of religion has been philosophically trained. So questions like those of the relation between phenomenology and history, the nature of phenomenological objectivity, the premisses and limits of phenomenological understanding, not to say theological implications of any phenomenology of religion, remain open. Van der Leeuw himself, as a scholar and a man, touched on them, but they still have to be worked out. JACQUESWAARDENBURG University of California, Los Angeles Systematic Theology, III. By Paul Tillich. (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1963. Pp. 434. $6.95.) The publication of Tillich's Systematic Theology, Volume III, brings to completion the enterprise begun with Volume I in 1951 and Volume II in 1957. As the author tells us, the project of constructing a systematic theology began as far back as the 1920's at the University of Marburg. Suspended when Tillich fled Hitler's Germany in 1933, it was continued during his twenty years at Union Seminary and his years as a university professor at Harvard. Thus in a significant sense, Volume III completes the work of a lifetime. Yet in another equally important sense it marks the permanent incompleteness of this work. For while this is systematic theology in the sense that it acknowledges and works in terms of rationality or coherence, it is clearly not a system in any final, closed, or absolute sense. Not only does Tillich expressly deny any such aspiration, but his openness to facts and to other men's viewpoints, his mixture of humility and candor in the presence of large and difficult problems all make clear the validity of this denial. It is perhaps worth noting in the present context that at no point in Volume III or indeed throughout the whole Systematic Theology does Tillich appeal to any criterion of judgment other than reasoning from facts. At no point is the reader asked to accept any judgment "on faith" or on any extra-rational authority. To be sure, faith is a basic category for Tillich and a crucial one for the Systematic Theology. Indeed many pages are devoted to its exposition and explication, but never is it understood or used as a basis for accepting propositions beyond or against the evidence. Indeed that whole view of faith is abhorrent to Tillich, and a major theme of his work has been to seek an understanding of faith more adequate alike religiously and intellectually. Among contemporary theologians Tillich is preeminent for the seriousness of his commitment to philosophy. In an autobiographical sketch written many years ago, he placed himself on the border between philosophy and theology. As we read the present volume, the conclusion is borne home that he has continued to live on that border territory, maintaining BOOK REVIEWS 299 an active and significant relation to both adjoining realms. In a day of mutual isolation and often hostility between theology and philosophy... (shrink)

Background: The approval of a research ethics committee and obtaining informed consent from patients could be considered the main issues in the ethics of research with human beings. The aim of this study was to assess both methodological quality and ethical quality, and also to assess the relationship between these two qualities in randomised phase III cancer trials.Method: Methodological quality and ethical quality were assessed for all randomised controlled trials published in 10 international journals between 1999 and 2001 .Results: The (...) mean Jadad score was 9.86 ± 1.117. The methodological quality was poor in 75 RCTs . The mean Berdeu score was 0.42 ± 0.133. The mean ethical quality score for poor methodological quality RCTs was 0.39 ± 0.133; it was 0.43 ± 0.133 for good methodological quality RCTs . There was improvement in ethical quality according to the year of commencement of the trials . There was no correlation between methodological quality and the number of participating patients , between ethical quality and the number of participating patients , or between ethical quality and methodological quality . ICP and REC approval were not obtained for 21 and 77 trials respectively.Conclusion: The association between methodological quality and the reporting of ethical requirements probably reflects the respect shown for patients during the whole research process. These results suggest that closer attention to the conduct of clinical research, as well as the reporting of its ethical aspects, is needed. (shrink)

En el ámbito hispánico, la investigación sobre los marcadores discursivos ha experimentado un gran auge. Una parte del interés se ha centrado en la descripción de estas formas en variedades específicas del español. En este contexto, el objetivo central de este trabajo es caracterizar las funciones de _y así_ en el español de la Ciudad de México. Para tal fin, se consultaron tres corpus orales de esta variedad y se analizaron las ocurrencias de _y así_ en posición final de enunciado (...) o intervención. De acuerdo con el análisis, _y así_ puede cumplir cinco funciones: (i) apéndice de (in)conclusión, (ii) marca de final de cita, (iii) forma abreviada de _y así sucesivamente_, (iv) expletivo y (v) marcador de cierre. Todas estas funciones ya han sido descritas en otros apéndices, a excepción de la forma abreviada de _y así sucesivamente_, por lo que se considera particular del marcador que aquí se analiza. Por último, se destaca la necesidad de llevar a cabo el análisis de esta forma en otras variedades del español. (shrink)

Besides pure declarative arguments, whose premises and conclusions are declaratives, and pure imperative arguments, whose premises and conclusions are imperatives, there are mixed-premise arguments, whose premises include both imperatives and declaratives, and cross-species arguments, whose premises are declaratives and whose conclusions are imperatives or vice versa. I propose a general definition of argument validity: an argument is valid exactly if, necessarily, every fact that sustains its premises also sustains its conclusion, where a fact sustains an imperative exactly if it (...) favors the satisfaction over the violation proposition of the imperative, and a fact sustains a declarative exactly if, necessarily, the declarative is true if the fact exists. I argue that this definition yields as special cases the standard definition of validity for pure declarative arguments and my previously defended definition of validity for pure imperative arguments, and that it yields intuitively acceptable results for mixed-premise and cross-species arguments. (shrink)

The statistical evidence for the detrimental effect of exposure to low levels of lead on the cognitive capacities of children has been debated for several decades. In this paper I describe how two techniques from artificial intelligence and statistics help make the statistical evidence for the accepted epidemiological conclusion seem decisive. The first is a variable-selection routine in TETRAD III for finding causes, and the second a Bayesian estimation of the parameter reflecting the causal influence of Actual Lead Exposure, (...) a latent variable, on the measured IQ score of middle class suburban children. (shrink)

A. G. Greenwald and H. G. Shulman (1973) found that 2 tasks characterized by ideomotor (IM) compatibility could be perfectly timeshared (i.e., performed simultaneously without mutual interference). The 2 tasks were pronouncing “A” or “B” in response to hearing those letter names, and making a manual left or right response to seeing a left- or right-positioned arrow. M.-C. Lien, R. W. Proctor, and P. A. Allen (2002) did not replicate Greenwald and Shulman’s result, and concluded that their finding of perfect (...) timesharing of 2 IM-compatible tasks might not be replicable. In the present research, Experiment 1 replicated Greenwald and Shulman’s 1973 finding while also supporting the conclusion that Lien et al.’s nonreplication was due to their not instructing subjects to make 2 responses simultaneously in their timeshared task. Experiment 2 again replicated the perfect timesharing finding, using an alternative control procedure that mixed manual and vocal tasks in the same block. (shrink)

America frequently talks about impeaching a president, but the impeachment provisions of the American constitution are widely misunderstood. In High Crimes and Misdemeanors, constitutional scholar Frank O. Bowman, III offers unprecedented clarity to the question of impeachment, tracing its roots to medieval England through its adoption in the Constitution and 250 years of American experience. By examining the human and political history of those who have faced impeachment, Bowman demonstrates that the Framers intended impeachment to be a flexible tool, adaptable (...) to the needs of any age. Written in a lively, engaging style, the book combines a deep historical and constitutional analysis of the impeachment clauses, a coherent theory of when impeachment should be used to protect constitutional order against presidential misconduct, and a comprehensive presentation of the case for and against impeachment of President Trump. It is an indispensable work for the present moment. (shrink)

Besides pure declarative arguments, whose premises and conclusions are declaratives (“you sinned shamelessly; so you sinned”), and pure imperative arguments, whose premises and conclusions are imperatives (“repent quickly; so repent”), there are mixed-premise arguments, whose premises include both imperatives and declaratives (“if you sinned, repent; you sinned; so repent”), and cross-species arguments, whose premises are declaratives and whose conclusions are imperatives (“you must repent; so repent”) or vice versa (“repent; so you can repent”). I propose a general definition of argument (...) validity: an argument is valid exactly if, necessarily, every fact that sustains its premises also sustains its conclusion, where a fact sustains an imperative exactly if it favors the satisfaction over the violation of the imperative, and a fact sustains a declarative exactly if, necessarily, the declarative is true if the fact exists. I argue that this definition yields as special cases the standard definition of validity for pure declarative arguments and my previously defended definition of validity for pure imperative arguments, and that it yields intuitively acceptable results for mixed-premise and cross-species arguments. (shrink)

The third volume of Augustinus Magister, continuing the Acts of the International Augustinian Congress held in Paris in September 1954, completes a work which is both the most comprehensive account of and the most important contribution to Augustinian studies in our times. The first two volumes contained the individual papers contributed by members of the Congress. This volume contains the reports in which a number of distinguished scholars summed up these individual contributions and gave a general impression of the situation (...) in the various subdivisions of the vast territory over which Augustinian scholarship and speculation ranges. These reports are often important original contributions in their own right, not mere summaries of other peoples’ conclusions; and their value is enhanced by the printing of accounts of the often lively discussions to which they gave rise. The volume also contains a number of additional communications by distinguished scholars which could not be included in the first two volumes, the opening and closing addresses, and a list of the participants in the Congress. (shrink)

This study is the foundation of a new interpretation of the introduction and the three first books of Diophantus’s Arithmetica, one that opens the way to a historically correct contextualization of the work. Its purpose, as indicated in the title, is to renew the traditional discussion on the methods of problem-solving used by Diophantus, through the detailed exposition of a new analytical framework that aims to give an account of the coherence and progressive nature of the material included in the (...) three first books of the Arithmetica. One outcome of this new ‘toolbox’ is a new conspectus of the problems and solutions contained in the latter, which is presented in appendix. The first part of the article clarifies, as a necessary preliminary, the key notions and terminology underlying our analysis. Among these new concepts is the notion of “method of invention,” which accounts in general for any way, by which “positions” (hypostaseis) are used in the Arithmetica. The next part proposes a complete inventory of the various methods of invention found in the three first books. Finally the last part presents the above mentioned conspectus and proposes a series of preliminary conclusions that can be drawn from it. (shrink)

We are once again back to the faculty of arts and to Siger of Brabant, and we are concerned to set forth his attitude toward the problem of the soul in Aristotle, not paraphrasing it, as was done earlier, but giving it in terms of the analytical discussion of the preceding two sections. A vitally important point must be made at the outset: Siger is not consciously attempting to accommodate Aristotle to the Faith. He is interested only in reconstructing the (...) Stagirite's own argument in a systematic and coherent manner, regardless of whether the conclusions come into conflict with Christian doctrine or not. Admittedly, he recognizes that these conclusions are sometimes at variance with Christian teachings, and he makes no attempt to blink these variations, but there is not in Siger any of the Thomist conviction that reason, properly exercised, cannot do otherwise than confirm the truths of faith. No--Siger reluctantly finds that properly employed reasoning can sometimes produce conclusions in conflict with truths of faith. His analysis of the Aristotelian doctrine of the soul, as presented in his De anima intellectiva, leads him to conclude that the rigorous application of systematic reasoning to the given premisses could have led to no other answers than the ones that Aristotle seems to reach. Bonaventure, faced with this dilemma, assumed that Aristotle's reasoning was proper and therefore concluded that his premisses must have been wrong; Aquinas agrees with Siger that the premisses were correct and therefore decides that the reasoning was faulty or perhaps merely inadequate, since the conclusions reached fail to confirm the truths of the Christian Revelation. Siger, however, finds both the premisses and the reasoning proper, and thus he is ultimately forced to the device of calling the resulting conclusions only "philosophical" and saying that they are always replaceable by the apodeictic certainties of the Faith. The recent research on Siger--Gilson, Van Steenberghen, and Nardi--has recognized that he was by no means insincere, or deliberately controverting the Faith; these commentators well understand that he is trying carefully and dispassionately to set forth the Aristotelian argument in all its consistency. When the conclusions reached appear to be contrary to Christian doctrine, he can do no more than say, as he does. (shrink)

This paper presents the results of a study of the effect of a business ethics course in enhancing the ability of students to recognize ethical issues. The findings show that compared to students who do not complete such a course, students enrolled in a business ethics course experience substantial improvement in that ability.

Like many fields, bioethics has been constrained to thinking to race in terms of colorblindness, the idea that ideal deliberation would ignore race and hence prevent bias. There are practical and e...

Previous studies investigating reports of corporate or individual wrongdoing have failed to examine the effects of an organization's structure upon the decision to blow the whistle. This paper suggests that an organization's structure may perform a significant role in the decision to report versus not report an observed wrongdoing. Five organizational structures (that is, centralized, matrix, horizontal, hybrid, and divisional) were examined in regards to their effectiveness in encouraging or discouraging observers of unethical conduct channels for reporting such behavior. Discussion (...) and implications are provided. (shrink)

An eloquent introduction to the ethical and philosophical values at stake in biological conservation, this book familiarizes readers with the general issues and possible solutions to the problems societies face in simultaneously conserving nature and promoting culture.

Rather than being inherently evil, business lobbying is a socially responsible activity which needs to be restrained by ethical standards. To be effective in a business environment, traditional ethical standards need to be translated into language which business persons can speak comfortably. Economical explanations must also be available to explain why ethical standards are appropriate in business. Eight such standards and their validating arguments are proposed with examples showing their use. Internal dialogues regarding the ethics of lobbying objectives and tactics (...) will plausibly occur only in businesses which recognize social responsibility mandates. Public interest stakeholders could hasten this recognition by making use of information made available by the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 to institute external dialogues regarding lobbying by specific businesses and industry groups. Given practical ethical standards and the information on business lobbying provided by the law, the press, corporate activists, consumers, pension fund managers and the public can apply pressure for ethical lobbying practices. (shrink)

No one looking ahead at the middle of the last century could have foreseen the extent and the importance of the ensuing environmental crises. Now, more than a decade into the next century, no one can ignore it. A New Environmental Ethics: the Next Millennium for Life on Earth offers clear, powerful, and oftentimes moving thoughts from one of the first and most respected philosophers to write on the environment. Rolston, an early and leading pioneer in studying the moral relationship (...) between humans and the earth, surveys the full spectrum of approaches in the field of environmental ethics. This book, however, is not simply a judicious overview. Instead, it offers critical assessments of contemporary academic accounts and draws on a lifetime of research and experience to suggest an outlook for the future. As a result, this focused, forward-looking analysis will be a necessary complement to any balanced textbook or anthology in environmental ethics, and will teach its readers to be responsible global citizens, and residents of their landscape, helping ensure that the future we have will be the one we wish for. (shrink)

Teachers and teenage students are becoming involved in inappropriate sexual relationships, often leading to devastation and arrest. Teacher-Student Relationships: Crossing into the Emotional, Physical, and Sexual Realms addresses the reasons these relationships develop, considers the roles of modern technology in the development, and offers solutions from within the profession.