In this paper, we present a Capabilities-based Approach to the acceptability and the tolerability of risks posed by natural and man-made hazards. We argue that judgments about the acceptability and/or tolerability of such risks should be based on an evaluation of the likely societal impact of potential hazards, defined in terms of the expected changes in the capabilities of individuals. Capabilities refer to the functionings, or valuable doings and beings, individuals are able to achieve given available personal, material, and social (...) resources. The likely impact of a hazard on individuals’ capabilities should, we argue, be compared against two separate thresholds. The first threshold specifies the minimum level of capabilities attainment that is acceptable in principle for individuals to have in the aftermath of a hazard over any period of time. This threshold captures the level that individuals’ capabilities ideally should not fall below. A risk is acceptable if the probability that the attained capabilities will be less than the acceptable level is sufficiently small. In practice, it can be tolerable for some individuals to temporarily fall below the acceptable threshold, provided this situation of lower capabilities attainment is temporary, reversible, and the probability that capabilities will fall below a tolerability threshold is sufficiently small. This second, tolerable threshold delimits an absolute minimum level of capabilities attainment below which no individual in a society should ever fall, regardless of whether that level of capabilities attainment is temporary or reversible. In this paper, we describe and justify this Capabilitiesbased Approach to the acceptability and tolerability of risks. We argue that the proposed theoretical framework avoids the limitations in current approaches to.. (shrink)

The development of the curriculum for engineering education should be based on a comprehensive understanding of engineers’ responsibilities. The responsibilities that are constitutive of being an engineer include striving to fulfill the standards of excellence set by technical codes; to improve the idealized models that engineers use to predict, for example, the behavior of alternative designs; and to achieve the internal goods such as safety and sustainability as they are reflected in the design codes. Globalization has implications for these responsibilities (...) and, in turn, for engineering education, by, for example, modifying the collection of possible solutions recognized for existing problems. In addition, international internships can play an important role in fostering the requisite moral imagination of engineering students. (shrink)

Knowledge of the responsibilities of engineers is the foundation for answering ethical questions about the work of engineers. This paper defines the responsibilities of engineers by considering what constitutes the nature of engineering as a particular form of activity. Specifically, this paper focuses on the ethical responsibilities of engineers qua engineers. Such responsibilities refer to the duties acquired in virtue of being a member of a group. We examine the practice of engineering, drawing on the idea of practices developed by (...) philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre, and show how the idea of a practice is important for identifying and justifying the responsibilities of engineers. To demonstrate the contribution that knowledge of the responsibilities of engineers makes to engineering ethics, a case study from structural engineering is discussed. The discussion of the failure of the Sleipner A Platform off the coast of Norway in 1991 demonstrates how the responsibilities of engineers can be derived from knowledge of the nature of engineering and its context. (shrink)

The development of the curriculum for engineering education should be based on a comprehensive understanding of engineers’ responsibilities. The responsibilities that are constitutive of being an engineer include striving to fulfill the standards of excellence set by technical codes; to improve the idealized models that engineers use to predict, for example, the behavior of alternative designs; and to achieve the internal goods such as safety and sustainability as they are reflected in the design codes. Globalization has implications for these responsibilities (...) and, in turn, for engineering education, by, for example, modifying the collection of possible solutions recognized for existing problems. In addition, international internships can play an important role in fostering the requisite moral imagination of engineering students. (shrink)

In this paper, we present a Capabilities -based Approach to the acceptability and the tolerability of risks posed by natural and man-made hazards. We argue that judgments about the acceptability and/or tolerability of such risks should be based on an evaluation of the likely societal impact of potential hazards, defined in terms of the expected changes in the capabilities of individuals. Capabilities refer to the functionings, or valuable doings and beings, individuals are able to achieve given available personal, material, and (...) social resources. The likely impact of a hazard on individuals’ capabilities should, we argue, be compared against two separate thresholds. The first threshold specifies the minimum level of capabilities attainment that is acceptable in principle for individuals to have in the aftermath of a hazard over any period of time. This threshold captures the level that individuals’ capabilities ideally should not fall below. A risk is acceptable if the probability that the attained capabilities will be less than the acceptable level is sufficiently small. In practice, it can be tolerable for some individuals to temporarily fall below the acceptable threshold, provided this situation of lower capabilities attainment is temporary, reversible, and the probability that capabilities will fall below a tolerability threshold is sufficiently small. This second, tolerable threshold delimits an absolute minimum level of capabilities attainment below which no individual in a society should ever fall, regardless of whether that level of capabilities attainment is temporary or reversible. In this paper, we describe and justify this Capabilities -based Approach to the acceptability and tolerability of risks. We argue that the proposed theoretical framework avoids the limitations in current approaches to acceptable risk. The proposed approach focuses the attention of risk analysts directly on what should be our primary concern when judging the acceptability and the tolerability of risks, namely, how risks impact the well-being of individuals in a society. Also, our Capabilities -based Approach offers a transparent, easily communicable way for determining the acceptability and the tolerability of risks. (shrink)

Within philosophy there has been little discussion of the risks associated with natural events such as earthquakes. The first objective of this paper is to demonstrate why such risks should be the subject of more sustained philosophical interest. We argue that we cannot simply apply to risks associated with natural events those insights and frameworks for moral evaluation developed in the literature considering ordinary risks, technological risks and the risks posed by anthropogenic climate change. The second objective of this paper (...) is to identify and develop a framework for the moral evaluation of the source of the risks associated with natural events, or the actions which sustain and impact such risks. Our discussion concentrates on the ways the construction and modification of built and natural environments can alter the probability of occurrence of natural events and the character and magnitude of the impact that such events have. We then argue for the need to develop a standard of reasonable care for decisions about the built and modified natural environment, which accounts for technical and resource constraints, as well as the place of natural hazard mitigation in public policy. (shrink)

A capability approach has been proposed to risk analysis, where risk is conceptualized as the probability that capabilities are reduced. Capabilities refer to the genuine opportunities of individuals to achieve valuable doings and beings, such as being adequately nourished. Such doings and beings are called functionings. A current debate in risk analysis and other fields where a capability approach has been developed concerns whether capabilities or actual achieved functionings should be used. This paper argues that in risk analysis the consequences (...) of hazardous scenarios should be conceptualized in terms of capabilities, not achieved functionings. Furthermore, the paper proposes a method for assessing capabilities, which considers the levels of achieved functionings of other individuals with similar boundary conditions. The capability of an individual can then be captured statistically based on the variability of the achieved functionings over the considered population. (shrink)

This paper proposes a Capabilities -based Approach to guide hazard mitigation efforts. First, a discussion is provided of the criteria that should be met by an adequate framework for formulating public policy and allocating resources. This paper shows why a common decision-aiding tool, Cost-benefit Analysis, fails to fulfill such criteria. A Capabilities -based Approach to hazard mitigation is then presented, drawing on the framework originally developed in the context of development economics and policy. The focus of a Capabilities -based Approach (...) is protecting and promoting the well-being of individuals. Capabilities are dimensions of well-being and specified in terms of functionings. Functionings capture the various things of value an individual does or becomes in his or her life, including being alive, being healthy, and being sheltered. Capabilities refer to the real achievability of specific functionings. In the context of hazard mitigation, from a Capabilities -based Approach, decision- and policy-makers should consider the acceptability and tolerability of risks along with the affectability of hazards when determining policy formulation and resource allocation. Finally, the paper shows how the proposed approach satisfies the required criteria, and overcomes the limitations of Cost-benefit Analysis, while maintaining its strengths. (shrink)

Engineers must deal with risks and uncertainties as a part of their professional work and, in particular, uncertainties are inherent to engineering models. Models play a central role in engineering. Models often represent an abstract and idealized version of the mathematical properties of a target. Using models, engineers can investigate and acquire understanding of how an object or phenomenon will perform under specified conditions. This paper defines the different stages of the modeling process in engineering, classifies the various sources of (...) uncertainty that arise in each stage, and discusses the categories into which these uncertainties fall. The paper then considers the way uncertainty and modeling are approached in science and the criteria for evaluating scientific hypotheses, in order to highlight the very different criteria appropriate for the development of models and the treatment of the inherent uncertainties in engineering. Finally, the paper puts forward nine guidelines for the treatment of uncertainty in engineering modeling. (shrink)

There is a widely acknowledged need for a single composite index that provides a comprehensive picture of the societal impact of disasters. A composite index combines and logically organizes important information policy-makers need to allocate resources for the recovery from natural disasters; it can also inform hazard mitigation strategies. This paper develops a Disaster Impact Index (DII) to gauge the societal impact of disasters on the basis of the changes in individuals’ capabilities. The DII can be interpreted as the disaster (...) impact per capita. Capabilities are dimensions of individual well-being and refer to the genuine opportunities individuals have to achieve valuable states and activities (such as being adequately nourished or being mobile). After discussing the steps required to construct the DII, this article computes and compares the DIIs for two earthquakes of similar magnitude in two societies at different levels of development and of two disasters (earthquake and wind storm) in the same society. (shrink)

This volume identifies, discusses and addresses the wide array of ethical issues that have emerged for engineers due to the rise of a global economy. To date, there has been no systematic treatment of the particular challenges globalization poses for engineering ethics standards and education. This volume concentrates on precisely this challenge. Scholars and practitioners from diverse national and professional backgrounds discuss the ethical issues emerging from the inherent symbiotic relationship between the engineering profession and globalization. Through their discussions a (...) deeper and more complete understanding of the precise ways in which globalization impacts the formulation and justification of ethical standards in engineering as well as the curriculum and pedagogy of engineering ethics education emerges. (shrink)

In a world rife with civic failure, we've seen an increasing interest in the question of how to restore civic communities after they have failed. Much of that answer must come from the social sciences, of course, but philosophy has an important contribution to make: it can provide a normative theory of political community, one that outlines the characteristics of a good political community. Without such a theory, we have no basis for the claim that reconciliation is desirable in the (...) first place and no way to evaluate whether proposed efforts toward political reconciliation are moving things in the right direction. Colleen Murphy's A Moral Theory of Political Reconciliation provides exactly such a theory. (shrink)

ABSTRACTColleen Murphy’s impressive book presents a unified theory of transitional justice as a single, novel, distinct kind of justice, intended to guide normative evaluation of the choices transitional societies make in dealing with the past. I raise three central challenges to Murphy’s theory. First, how do we know that transitional justice is fundamentally a single special kind of justice that permits a grand unified theory? Second, is it plausible to hold, as Murphy claims, that societal transformation is (...) the overarching aim or objective of transitional justice? Third, is transitional justice convincingly explained as pursuing societal transformation ‘through’ or ‘by’ dealing with past wrongdoing? I argue that Murphy’s ambitious and finely detailed account does not fully reckon with dissensus about transitional justice in the field and does not adequately defend the central claim that transitional justice aims at societal transformation to be pursued by responding to past wrongs. (shrink)

In A Moral Theory of Political Reconilication, Colleen Murphy brings much-needed clarity to debates over political reconciliation by setting out plausible desiderata for a satisfactory theory. She responds to these desiderata by introducing three normative frameworks which, taken together, measure reconciliation: the rule of law, trust and trust responsiveness, and support for political capabilities. In my remarks, I raise two concerns about the relationships among these normative frameworks, and the extent to which they are emblematic of political reconciliation, (...) specifically, rather than political health more generally. (shrink)

In the literature on the recovery of societies from natural disasters, a dominant theme is the importance of pursuing and achieving sustainable recovery. Sustainability implies that recovery efforts should aim to (re-) build, maintain, and, if possible, enhance the quality of life of members of the disaster-stricken community in the short and long term. In this paper, we propose a capabilities-based approach to recovery and argue that it provides important theoretical resources for better realizing this ideal of sustainability in practice. (...) From a capabilities-based approach, the societal impact of a disaster is measured in terms of its impact on selected capabilities of individuals within society. Capabilities are constitutive elements of well-being and capture the valuable doings and beings individuals can achieve or become (e.g., being adequately nourished, and being sheltered). A proposed Disaster Impact Index (DII), we argue, can capture the societal impact of a disaster by measuring its impact on the well-being of individuals, as gauged by the changes in individuals’ capabilities. We discuss how to measure this impact in practice. Also, a proposed Disaster Recovery Index (DRI) measures the current level of individuals’ capabilities. It can provide important information on the degree to which capabilities have been restored and enhanced by comparing the DRI against a benchmark, or level of capabilities attainment, toward which recovery processes should strive. We argue that the DII and DRI provide critical information for policy- and decision-makers to use in order to practically implement the principles of sustainable recovery. Both can be used in the process of predisaster planning for recovery and in the period of recovery itself. (shrink)

ABSTRACTI examine some of the main philosophical, conceptual and normative issues in Colleen Murphy’s recent book The Conceptual Foundations of Transitional Justice. I am sceptical whether we need yet another theory of justice to fit particular ‘transitional circumstances’, as Murphy argues. Instead, before presenting an alternative normative, ‘moral’ theory, we need to re-examine the very concept of transitional justice. I examine particularly the following. Firstly, what we really mean by ‘transitional justice’ in various contexts; and I argue (...) that transitional justice is not, as Murphy argues, ‘a special kind of justice’ needed during certain periods of political and social change. Transitional justice is rather an escape route from difficult questions of justice that transitional societies must deal with to maintain the delicate balance between justice and peace. Currently, the concept of transitional justice refers most directly to the overarching and expanding ‘toolkit’ of various mechanisms and processes used in post-conflict reconstruction. It is not quite clear how this toolkit fits with current debates on global, international, regional and local justice. Indeed, I would have preferred that Murphy focus on the complex conceptual foundations of transitional justice, rather than build a theory that conceptually and foundationally remains complex and ambiguous. (shrink)

In A Moral Theory of Political Reconciliation Colleen Murphy develops a rich and potentially transformative account of political reconciliation. The potential of this account is not fully realized because of limitations in how Murphy conceptualizes political relationships. For example, group-differentiated integration into states opens up important questions about partial legality and group-differentiated experiences of repression that Murphy does not address. Murphy’s framework is well-suited to take up these questions, once they are acknowledged. But doing so (...) requires a revised understanding of how states’ relationships with individuals structure individuals’ relationships with one another. (shrink)

ABSTRACTColleen Murphy has argued that in circumstances of societal transition only one special type of justice is applicable: ‘transitional justice’, a type of justice not reducible to any other type or types. I take issue with Murphy’s conclusion, showing that retributive, distributive and corrective justice all feature as isolable component parts in her own positive account of transitional justice. I also argue that restorative justice is applicable and important in transitional societies when the state itself has perpetrated serious (...) wrongs. Murphy claims that each distinct type of justice is a response to a unique ‘basic problem of justice’, triggered by a background set of ‘circumstances’. However, I argue that identifying such a basic problem neither necessarily means the circumstances in question call for a unique type of justice, nor is sufficient to determine which type of justice is most salient in the circumstances. What is more, I show that Murphy applies her own methodology inconsistently in her treatment of transitional societies and stable democracies. I argue that what Murphy calls ‘transitional justice’ is composed of familiar types of justice as well as other moral values, but also regrettable – though often unavoidable – injustice. (shrink)

Processes of transitional justice deal with large-scale wrongdoing committed during extended periods of conflict or repression. This paper discusses three common moral objections to processes of transitional justice, which I label shaking hands with the devil, selling victims short, and entrenching the status quo. Given the scale of wrongdoing and the context in which transitional justice processes are adopted, compromise is necessary. To respond to these objections, I argue, it is necessary to articulate the conditions that make a compromise principled. (...) I defend three criteria that distinguish principled from unprincipled compromises. (shrink)

Many countries have attempted to transition to democracy following conflict or repression, but the basic meaning of transitional justice remains hotly contested. In this book, Colleen Murphy analyses transitional justice - showing how it is distinguished from retributive, corrective, and distributive justice - and outlines the ethical standards which societies attempting to democratize should follow. She argues that transitional justice involves the just pursuit of societal transformation. Such transformation requires political reconciliation, which in turn has a complex set (...) of institutional and interpersonal requirements including the rule of law. She shows how societal transformation is also influenced by the moral claims of victims and the demands of perpetrators, and how justice processes can fail to be just by failing to foster this transformation or by not treating victims and perpetrators fairly. Her book will be accessible and enlightening for philosophers, political and social scientists, policy analysts, and legal and human rights scholars and activists. (shrink)

Transitional justice refers to the process of dealing with widespread wrongdoing characteristically committed during the course of conflict and/or repression. Examples of such processes include criminal trials, truth commissions, reparations, and memorials. Technology is altering the forms that widespread wrongdoing takes. Technology is also altering the form of processes of transitional justice themselves. This essay provides a map of these changes and their normative implications.

Following extended periods of conflict or repression, political reconciliation is indispensable to the establishment or restoration of democratic relationships and critical to the pursuit of peacemaking globally. In this book, Colleen Murphy offers an innovative analysis of the moral problems plaguing political relationships under the strain of civil conflict and repression. Focusing on the unique moral damage that attends the deterioration of political relationships, Murphy identifies the precise kinds of repair and transformation that processes of political reconciliation (...) ought to promote. Building on this analysis, she proposes a normative model of political relationships. A Moral Theory of Political Reconciliation delivers an original account of the failure and restoration of political relationships, which will be of interest to philosophers, social scientists, legal scholars, policy analysts, and all those who are interested in transitional justice, global politics, and democracy. (shrink)

Particular conceptions of reconciliation vary across a number of dimensions. As section 1 explains, the kind of relationship at issue in a specific context affects the type of improvement in relations that might be necessary in order to qualify as reconciliation. Reconciliation is widely taken to be a scalar concept. Section 2 discusses the spectrum of intensity along which kinds of improvement in relationships fall, and indicates why, in particular contexts, theorists often disagree about the point along this spectrum that (...) is morally or politically most significant. Section 3 provides an overview of the processes commonly cited as contributing to reconciliation. These processes are often controversial; those praised by some commentators as appropriate and constructive responses to past conflict are dismissed by others as undermining the moral or political conditions for just and peaceful relations. Section 4 concentrates on the relationship between reconciliation and justice. While some see these values as compatible and mutually supporting, others argue that, especially in the immediate wake of conflict, parties must often choose between reconciliation and justice. (shrink)

It is often argued that the rule of law is only instrumentally morally valuable, valuable when and to the extent that a legal system is used to purse morally valuable ends. In this paper, I defend Lon Fuller’s view that the rule of law has conditional non-instrumental as well as instrumental moral value. I argue, along Fullerian lines, that the rule of law is conditionally non-instrumentally valuable in virtue of the way a legal system structures political relationships. The rule of (...) law specifies a set of requirements which lawmakers must respect if they are to govern legally. As such, the rule of law restricts the illegal or extra-legal use of power. When a society rules by law, there are clear rules articulating the behavior appropriate for citizens and officials. Such rules ideally determine the particular contours political relationships will take. When the requirements of the rule of law are respected, the political relationships structured by the legal system constitutively express the moral values of reciprocity and respect for autonomy. The rule of law is instrumentally valuable, I argue, because in practice the rule of law limits the kind of injustice which governments pursue. There is in practice a deeper connection between ruling by law and the pursuit of moral ends than advocates of the standard view recognize. The next part of this paper outlines Lon Fuller’s conception of the rule of law and his explanation of its moral value. The third.. (shrink)

European Journal of Political Theory, Volume 21, Issue 3, Page 608-614, July 2022. In The Shifting Border, Ayelet Shachar argues that the exercise of sovereign power through border regimes no longer tracks territorial boundaries. In my commentary, I first argue that Shachar’s analysis implicitly calls into question the legitimacy of the international order. I then raise the worry that the logic which severs the link between the exercise of sovereignty and territory is the same logic that can be used to (...) justify injustice and atrocity such as ethnic cleansing. Shachar’s normative proposals do not sufficiently recognize or guard against this risk. (shrink)

I argue that international criminal trials can contribute to political reconciliation by fostering the social conditions required for law’s efficacy.

In Our Moral Fate, Allen Buchanan defends an account of moral change that is grounded in evolutionary biology. His account offers resources for explaining the possibility of both moral progress and moral regression, where progress and regression are a function of moral inclusion and moral exclusion, respectively. In my commentary, I first offer a brief summary of Buchanan’s argument. I then examine Buchanan’s account from the perspective of transitional justice. Transitional justice provides confirming evidence for some of Buchanan’s substantive claims (...) and challenges the validity of others. I end with a discussion of power and time. Power plays a central role in Buchanan’s account of niche construction, but the locus of power is unspecified. Time scales for moral change are profoundly different for the timeline of transitional justice versus the timeline of evolutionary biology. My discussion of power and time raises questions the nature of the normative guidance Buchanan’s account offers in the short term. (shrink)

The category of jus post bellum is a welcome addition to discussions of the justice of war. But, despite its handy Latin label, we will argue that it cannot be properly understood merely as a set of corollaries from jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Instead, an acceptable theory of justice in the postwar period will have to draw on a broader set of normative ideas than those that have been the focus of the just war tradition. In this (...) paper, we will argue that norms of political reconciliation provide some of the resources we need to address postwar justice. (shrink)

Political reconciliation involves the repairing of damaged political relationships. This paper considers the possibility and moral justifiability of pursuing political reconciliation in the aftermath of systematic and egregious wrongdoing, in particular genocide. The first two sections discuss what political reconciliation specifically requires. I argue that it neither entails nor necessitates forgiveness. Rather, I claim, political reconciliation should be conceptualized as the (re-)establishment of Fullerian mutual respect for the rule of law. When a society governs by law, publicly declared legal rules (...) establish clear and practicable standards for behavior which are enforced in practice. Subjects of the law thus can form stable and reasonable predictions of how other citizens and officials will respond to their actions. After explaining why this analysis of political reconciliation is compelling, the third section spells out the implications of my analysis for determining the possibility of achieving and the justifiability of pursuing political reconciliation. (shrink)

Societies in transition from repressive rule or civil conflict to a just social order confront distinctive challenges. Many authors claim that the long-term stability of newly established democracies depends crucially upon the ability of former adversaries to reconcile. Interestingly, however, authors typically assume, rather than attempt to prove, the truth of this claim, thereby presupposing the moral value of political reconciliation. Similar assumptions underlie debates about whether truth commissions can be morally justified in granting amnesty to perpetrators of offenses against (...) human rights. A central issue in these debates is whether reconciliation or retribution should have priority. There is thus a general tendency to employ such central concepts as reconciliation without offering an adequate account of their meaning or moral and practical import. Until we adequately understand the concept of reconciliation, the goals of a wide range of policies and the issues at stake in important moral debates will remain unclear. ;In my dissertation, I offer a novel account of political reconciliation. The concept of reconciliation, I argue, implies both a goal and a means of pursuing it. The state of reconciliation is the goal ideally promoted by processes of reconciliation. In the context of transitional justice, this goal is to establish healthy democratic political relationships. I analyze such democratic political relationships in terms of two fundamental ideals of political morality: respect for the rule of law and equality of agency. My strategy is to discuss first the intuitively problematic aspects political relationships typical of societies in conflict or under repressive rule, drawing on empirical data from political science. I then provide a characterization of a philosophical ideal, which I use to offer a new interpretation of the empirical description of problematic political relationships. Finally, based on my account of the state reconciliation, I develop a set of criteria that we can use when judging the effectiveness of various processes in promoting reconciliation. (shrink)

ABSTRACTTransitional justice encompasses a global body of scholarship and practice that concentrates on responses to large-scale wrongdoing in the context of an attempted shift from conflict and/or repression. In my book, The Conceptual Foundations of Transitional Justice I argue that transitional justice is a distinctive type of justice. Transitional justice requires the just pursuit of societal transformation. I define transformation relationally, as the terms defining interaction among citizens and between citizens and officials. Transformation is necessary because of the presence of (...) pervasive structural inequality and wrongdoing. Transformation is a practical possibility because of the uncertainty characteristic of transitions. Processes of transitional justice pursue transformation by dealing with past wrongs. The just pursuit of societal transformation requires heeding the moral claims of victims and moral demands on perpetrators. In this paper, I address four issues raised by Sirkku Hellsten, George Hull, Thaddeus Metz, and Margaret Urban Walker. I first discuss the methodological questions pressed. I then consider challenges to the substantive view of transitional justice I propose. I next turn to queries about the distinctiveness of transitional justice. Finally, I respond to skepticism about the necessity and value of a substantive normative theory of transitional justice. (shrink)

Transitional justice is broadly understood to refer to formal efforts to deal with past wrongs in the midst of a transition from an extended period of conflict or repression to democracy. In this paper, I consider the role of international criminal trials in transitional justice. I argue that such trials may contribute to transitional justice, but such contributions are conditional on two main factors. The first factor is time. The second factor is what other transitional justice responses are adopted domestically.

ABSTRACT Avner de Shalit’s central claim in “Political Philosophy and What People Think” is that political philosophers should take seriously the views of the public, but in practice philosophers do not do this. Moreover, philosophers lack adequate justifications for this lack of consideration. In my commentary, I first discuss de Shalit’s rebuttal of arguments that claim political philosophy searches for the truth and the truth is not empirical, which overlooks, in my view, a central debate among contemporary political philosophers as (...) to whether theorizing about principles of justice ought to be based on a consideration of empirical facts. I then articulate what I see as critical impediments to analytically trained political philosophers realizing the contributions to politics that de Shalit envisions, specifically in the form of identifying and constructively critiquing actual injustice. Finally, I suggest that even if the methodology of political philosophy is sufficiently revised to overcome methodological and training limitations, the notion of public will need to be complicated and the scope of critical examination expanded beyond the explicit arguments in favor of or against particular policies. (shrink)

Nir Eisikovits argues in A Theory of Truces that most contemporary conflicts wind down in a much more piecemeal fashion than our theorizing about the morality of ending wars suggests. Pauses in violence are achieved by securing agreement on narrow questions. Moreover, rather than hoping to do away with violence, theorizing would do best, he writes, to take as its starting point the fact of warfare as part of the human condition. Eisikovits aims to articulate the features of truce thinking, (...) a framework that is more descriptively accurate and normatively useful in navigating contemporary conflicts and promoting reconciliation. After summarizing his view, I argue that Eisikovits’ explanation of the contribution of truces to political reconciliation is too narrow; contrary to what he claims, truces can make an important contribution to the rule of law. I also challenge Eisikovits’ characterization of the first feature of truce thinking. I argue that while there is an important present focus on immediate benefits from temporary measures, the future looms much larger than Eisikovits recognizes. Truces matter not only for what they make possible now, but also for their ramifications for prospects for future peace. These ramifications go beyond creating conditions for hope or optimism. (shrink)