This paper describes the professional ethical context behind the failure of Arthur Andersen’s audit of Enron. It is argued that the evolution of extreme industrial concentration in the accounting profession, and the subsequent unrestrained diversification of the “Big Five” accounting firms were the sources of multiple conflicts of interest that were unresolved by the time of the Enron debacle. In the post-Enron era, the problems of commercial conflicts of interest and of highly concentrated power in the profession remain important issues.

The marketing of infant formula in third-world countries in the 1970s by Nestlé S.A. gave rise to a consumer boycott that came to be a widely taught case study in the field of Business Ethics. This article extends that case study by identifying three specific individuals who were associated with managing Nestlé’s response to that boycott. It reveals their subsequent direct involvement in a number of additional “classic” 1980s business scandals (some of which ended with major criminal trials and the (...) imprisonment of eminent business figures)—and describes tangential linkages to other business scandals of the time. The article discloses a behind-the-scenes pattern of business villainy, adding both depth and breadth to previous accounts of these scandals. The article offers a conceptual framework that goes beyond personal greed as an explanatory factor for such unethical behavior in the business world, suggesting the presence of personal and organizational networks of intrigue and opportunity. The linkages between the scandals suggest an epidemiological process with the plotters acting as “virus” carriers contaminating various corporate cultures. (shrink)

In the late 1980s there was a series of sensational business scandals in the United Kingdom. There was particular public outrage at the plundering of pension funds by Robert Maxwell, at the failure of auditors to expose the impending bankruptcy of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, and at the apparently undeserved high pay raises received by senior business executives. The City of London responded by creating a special committee to examine the financial aspects of corporate governance. This paper (...) describes the resulting Code of Best Practice produced by the Cadbury Committee. To reduce the power of executive directors in the boardroom the Code recommends a greater role for non-executive directors, changes in board operations, and a more active role for auditors. The paper reviews the various published reactions to the Cadbury Report, and concludes that the Code is unlikely to halt the incidence of business scandals in the United Kingdom. (shrink)