Arguing that ecological thinking can animate an epistemology capable of addressing feminist, multicultural, and other post-colonial concerns, this book critiques the instrumental rationality, hyperbolized autonomy, abstract individualism, and exploitation of people and places that western epistemologies of mastery have legitimated. It proposes a politics of epistemic location, sensitive to the interplay of particularity and diversity, and focused on responsible epistemic practices. Starting from an epistemological approach implicit in Rachel Carson’s scientific projects, the book draws, constructively and critically, on ecological theory (...) and practice, on (post-Quinean) naturalized epistemology, and on feminist and post-colonial theory. Analyzing extended examples from developmental psychology, from medicine and law, and from circumstances where vulnerability, credibility, and public trust are at issue, the argument addresses the constitutive part played by an instituted social imaginary in shaping and regulating human lives. The practices and examples discussed invoke the responsibility requirements central to this text’s larger purpose of imagining, crafting, articulating a creative, innovative, instituting social imaginary, committed to interrogating entrenched hierarchical social structures, en route to enacting principles of ideal cohabitation. (shrink)

The essays in Rhetorical Spaces grow out of Lorraine Code's ongoing commitment to engaging philosophical issues as they figure in people's everyday lives. The arguements in this book are informed at once by the moral-political implications of how knowledge is produced and circulated and by issues of gendered subjectivity. In their critical dimension, these lucid essays engage with the incapacity of the philosophical mainstream's dominant epistemologies to offer regulative principles that guide people in the epistemic projects that figure centrally in (...) their lives. In its constructive dimension, Rhetorical Spaces focuses on developing productive, case-by-case analyses of knowing other people in situations where social-political inequalities create asymmetrical patterns of epistemic power and privilege. Framing all of the essays is the conception of rhetorical spaces which shows that prevailing intellectual-political climates can work to enhance or to thwart possibilities of establishing cognitive authority for the members of a society who belong to groups other than the dominant ones. Finally, bridging the gap between theory and practice, Lorraine Code shows how the issue of reconfiguring structures of authority and expertise are not just matters of individual responsibility, but require a radical restructuring of the communities and social orders in which people know and act. (shrink)

Naturalized moral epistemology eschews practices of assuming to know a priori the nature of situations and experiences that require moral deliberation. Thus it promises to close a gap between formal ethical theories and circumstances where people need guidelines for action. Yet according experience so central a place in inquiry risks "naturalizing" it, treating it as incontestable, separating its moral and political dimensions. This essay discusses these issues with reference to Margaret Walker's Moral understandings.

I evaluate post-Quinean naturalized epistemology as a resource for postcolonial and feminist epistemology. I argue that naturalistic inquiry into material conditions and institutions of knowledge production has most to offer epistemologists committed to maintaining continuity with the knowledge production of specifically located knowers. Yet naturalistic denigrations of folk epistemic practices and stereotyped, hence often oppressive, readings of human nature challenge the naturalness of the nature they claim to study. I outline an ecologically modelled epistemology that focuses on questions of epistemic (...) responsibility and community, while refusing the reductivism of totalizing theory, and producing realistic moral-epistemic analyses of specific, local epistemic resources to ground its normative injunctions. (shrink)

: Naturalized moral epistemology eschews practices of assuming to know a priori the nature of situations and experiences that require moral deliberation. Thus it promises to close a gap between formal ethical theories and circumstances where people need guidelines for action. Yet according experience so central a place in inquiry risks "naturalizing" it, treating it as incontestable, separating its moral and political dimensions. This essay discusses these issues with reference to Margaret Walker's Moral understandings.

I offer an examination of trust relations in scientific inquiry as they seem to contrast with a lack of trust in an example of knowledge imposed from above by an unaccountable institutional power structure. On this basis I argue for a re-reading of John Hardwig's account of the place of trust in knowledge, and suggest that it translates less well than social epistemologists and others have assumed into a model for democratic epistemic practice.

Departing from an epistemological tradition for which knowledge properly achieved must be objective, especially in eschewing affect and/or special interests; and against a backdrop of my thinking about epistemic responsibility, I focus on two situations where care informs and enables good knowing. The implicit purpose of this reclamation of care as epistemically vital is to show emphatically that standard alignments of care with femininity—the female—are simply misguided. Proposing that the efficacy of epistemic practices is often enhanced when would-be knowers care (...) about the outcomes of investigation, I suggest that epistemic responsibility need not be compromised when caring motivates and animates research. Indeed, the background inspiration comes from the thought, integral to feminist and post-colonial theory and practice that, despite often-justified condemnations of research that serves "special interests," particularities do matter, epistemically. Such thoughts, variously articulated, are integral to enacting a shift in epistemology away from formal abstraction and toward engaging with the specificities of real-world, situated knowledge projects. They are not unequivocally benign, for villains too care about the outcomes of their projects. Hence multi-faceted engagements with epistemic practices and processes are urgently required across the social-political world. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Loopholes, Gaps, and What Is Held Fast”Lorraine Code (bio)Keywordsepistemology, incredulity, knowing other people, memory, testimonyNancy Potter’s compelling essay points to some of the limitations of the theoretical apparatus that the post-positivist empiricist epistemologies of the Anglo-American mainstream make available for evaluating experiential memory claims in general, and “false memory syndrome” in particular. The loopholes and gaps in these theories of knowledge push urgent questions about testimony, trust, (...) and the politics of knowledge into a prominent place on the agendas of successor epistemology projects. These politics are enacted in societies whose dominant rhetoric privileges eye-witness evidence and “knowledge by acquaintance” as sources of objective knowledge, yet whose practices of incredulity—of granting and withholding acknowledgement to testimonial knowledge claims—expose power-saturated structures of dominance and subordination and of arbitrarily uneven distributions of epistemic authority. 1For classical empiricists and their successors, perception, memory and testimony, hierarchically ordered with perception on top, count as the principal sources of empirical knowledge. This ordering maps the relative reliability of the processes, with perception ranking as most stable, reliable and secure, memory coming second on all of these scores, and testimony ranking a poor third, closer to opinion, hearsay and rumor than to the other more respectable sources. Perception, for these theories, is “immediate” in that it is direct, bare, uncontaminated either by the particularities of the perceiving subject or of the perceptual event: from its presumed (but contestable) immediacy, all the rest follows. Memory counts as perception at one remove, its reliability a function of the relative “vividness” of the perceptions it commemorates. The esteem commonly claimed for eye-witness testimony derives from this conception of memory, which is believed to ground the testimony because of its presumed proximity to “immediate” perception. Yet testimony, even in its restricted “knowledge by description” form, tends by contrast with perception and memory to be a shaky affair; and as the temporal distance between event and testimony increases, so knowledge of matters unavailable to direct observation fares less and less well in classical and post-positivist epistemologies. A distrust of testimony is at once understandable and odd, because so small a proportion both of communal and of “individual” knowledge indeed derives from first-hand observations and experiences: most of it comes from testimony in an extended sense that encompasses books, teachings, media reports, all of the sources and resources on which both secular and scholarly knowledge relies for much of its substance. This expanded construction of the term runs alongside [End Page 255] the first-personal “testimonial” sense that is more plainly operative in discussions of false memory syndrome which, despite its experiential source, is often likewise contested on grounds that discredit the “privileged access” status that these same epistemologies claim for experience at first hand.Epistemologists commonly assimilate testimony to monologic, observational knowledge, deriving its constitutive features from instances where a testimonial utterance can pose as another perception—this time an auditory one—in a personal set of knowledge-producing observations (e.g., Fricker 1987). Because the speaker may be lying or mistaken, the process may fail to transmit knowledge; but this failure can be read as a simple perceptual error or a misremembering. Such approaches ignore the constitutive function of an interpreter/listener in fostering or thwarting testimonial knowledge to subsume it, too, much under an observational model. Indeed, not only do they separate the knower from the known and the process of knowing, as Potter observes, they also separate the knower from other knowers to guard against their influencing (= contaminating) the knowledge-production process. Experiences where an interlocutor actually enables the production of knowledge do not figure in such analyses, 2 whose effect is to suggest that giving or hearing testimony invokes no more significant moral-political issues than do acts of perceiving tables and chairs: that hearing, like seeing, is believing. (Norman Malcolm’s analysis of memory, which Potter cites, would also underwrite such a view of testimony.) Yet standard empiricist and post-positivist epistemologies generate an inquisitorial model of eliciting testimony in which the more generalized “testimony” in the knowledge that people acquire from books, media reports, conversation, reference sources recedes from... (shrink)

Naturalized moral epistemology eschews practices of assuming to know a priori the nature of situations and experiences that require moral deliberation. Thus it promises to close a gap between formal ethical theories and circumstances where people need guidelines for action. Yet according experience so central a place in inquiry risks “naturalizing” it, treating it as incontestable, separating its moral and political dimensions. This essay discusses these issues with reference to Margaret Walker's Moral understandings.

The phrase “statements of fact” has a clear, unequivocal ring. It speaks of a stable place untouchable by contests in epistemology and in more secular places, around questions of constructivism, subjectivism, and the politics of knowledge. It offers fixity, a locus of constancy in a shifting landscape where traditional certainties have ceased to hold, maintains a vantage point outside the fray, where knowledge-seekers can continue to believe in some degree of “correspondence” between items of knowledge and events in the world. (...) Within the social institutions and practices where knowledge is an issue, it designates a secure starting place for deliberation, a way of ensuring that processes of decision-making remain cognizant of the “realities” they have to address.In the institutions of knowledge production and knowledgeable practice that generate the examples I appeal to in this essay – medicine and law – “statements of fact” appear to comprise an incontestable core around which interpretive strategies may indeed have to be enlisted, but which itself functions as a kind of interpretation-exempt zone. There are good reasons for its retaining that status, for resisting the instabilities and sheer whimsicalities that would follow from dislodging it. (shrink)

Images of and references to women are so rare in the vast corpus of his published work that there seems to be no "woman question" for Hans-Georg Gadamer. Yet the authors of the fifteen essays included in this volume show that it is possible to read past Gadamer's silences about women and other Others to find rich resources for feminist theory and practice in his views of science, language, history, knowledge, medicine, and literature. While the essayists find much of (...) value in Gadamer's work, he emerges from their discussion as a controversial figure. Some contributors see him as promoting genuine respect for and engagement with Otherness: others claim that in a Gadamerian conversation the Other has no voice. For some, Gadamer's immersion in tradition is an impediment to feminist inquiry; for others, cognizant of the need to understand tradition well in order to contest its intransigence or benefit from its insights, his way of engaging tradition is especially productive. Some contributors take issue with the separation he maintains between philosophy and politics; others find problems in his relative silence on matters of embodiment; still others maintain that a "fusion of horizons" amounts to a colonizing of difference. But a common aim of each of these controversies is to discern what feminists can learn from Gadamer as well as what limitations feminist reinterpretations of his work must inevitably encounter. Contributors are Linda Martín Alcoff, William Cowling, Gemma Corradi Fiumara, Marie Fleming, Silja Freudenberger, Susan Hekman, Susan-Judith Hoffmann, Grace M. Jantzen, Patricia Altenbernd Johnson, Laura Kaplan, Robin Pappas, Robin May Schott, Meili Steele, Veronica Vasterling, Georgia Warnke, and Kathleen Roberts Wright. (shrink)

I offer an examination of trust relations in scientific inquiry as they seem to contrast with a lack of trust in an example of knowledge imposed from above by an unaccountable institutional power structure. On this basis I argue for a re-reading of John Hardwig's account of the place of trust in knowledge, and suggest that it translates less well than social epistemologists and others have assumed into a model for democratic epistemic practice.

In a remarkable development, I have constructed a new definition for a self-delimiting universal Turing machine (UTM) that is easy to program and runs very quickly. This provides a new foundation for algorithmic information theory (AIT), which is the theory of the size in bits of programs for selfdelimiting UTM's. Previously, AIT had an abstract mathematical quality. Now it is possible to write down executable programs that embody the constructions in the proofs of theorems. So AIT goes from dealing with (...) remote idealized mythical objects to being a theory about practical down-to-earth gadgets that one can actually play with and use. (shrink)

This paper begins to develop a conception of ecological subjectivity and hence of social-political practice that can promote social justice across diverse populations and situations. It urges a provocative posing of the question “who do we think we are?” to direct attention to often unspoken assumptions about subjectivity and agency that tend silently to inform current philosophical inquiry. Drawing attention to the often-unconscious processes of “we-saying.” it aims to highlight and to prompt contestation of the silent assumptions that tend (...) to inform that “we.” In so doing, it appeals to humility as an epistemic and moral virtue. (shrink)

Changing Methods is a collection of original essays by feminist practitioners, scholars, and activists. The authors show why "the method question" has moved to the top of many feminist research and interpretive research strategies, and engage in thinking about how ideas and actions have developed within complex social circumstances. The essays in this book challenge the tradition that has allowed abstracted, formalized versions of the ideas and experiences of privileged white men to set standards for how everyone should conduct themselves. (...) The authors use new-found knowledge to displace the dominant ideology constructed around race, class, gender, and heterosexual privilege, and then propose innovative feminist-informed analyses of subjects as diverse as political change, critical linguistics, child care, religious studies, and violence against women. (shrink)

Richard Foley's theory of epistemic rationality specifies what a cognitive agent should believe, whose epistemic goal is now to believe truths and not to believe falsehoods. As the emphasis upon 'now' demonstrates, this is a synchronic, not a diachronic, theory. Foley acknowledges the importance of long-term intellectual goals in human lives--particularly in their practical aspect, and in scientific practice. But such goals are beyond the scope of a purely epistemic theory of rationality.

At the 1992 Women in the History of Philosophy Conference at Cambridge, the contestability of the title "philosopher" was a major item of discussion. Historically, it seemed, women could claim the title only if there was no doubt that their work was original, where originality had everything to do with producing writings that did not "merely" derive from, comment upon, contribute to, or critique the works of male philosophers. The requirement is odd in an intellectual discipline shaped and sustained by (...) critical-constructive debate that constitutes both its history and its substance, many of whose canonical participants have directed their major efforts to corroborating, refuting, and/or extending the ideas of their semblables elsewhere or in other times. The "merely derivative" criterion is difficult to credit when it merely confirms fixed assumptions about women's place in a social order where they had no audible public voice and achieved minimal wider acknowledgement for their private utterances. For, although no simple conspiracy theory could account for women's philosophical silence, the original-versus-derivative distinction has often functioned as a double standard, recognizing many men as philosophers because of their engagement with topics that preoccupied other, already established philosophers, denying women recognition because of equivalent engagements. The injustice of these practices prompts Linda McAlister's project of collecting these eighteen articles, which span the time period from the work of Hypatia in the fourth century BC to the late-twentieth-century work of Hannah Arendt and Angela Davis. Many of the essays first appeared in Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, some of them are reprinted from other journals, and five appear here for the first time. In presenting detailed, engaged philosophical analyses of the work of women philosophers, the essays begin to address the belief that women, "denied the opportunity to stand on the shoulders of their foremothers", have frequently had to enter philosophical discourse through the auspices of men. They attest to the contingencies of canon formation in determining who can claim a place in the lineage of the fathers. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This essay is an attempt to examine the idea that a professional code of practice can entail ethical conduct. It is focused around two differing perspectives on ethics. It will be argued that the professions have, perhaps too hastily, adopted one theory without considering the merits, or the objections offered by the alternative account. This alternative, a ‘cognitivist’ theory, is sketched, and the possible advantages of such an approach are discussed. Such a perspective means adopting a radically different (...) approach to the nature of ethics and what it is to be a moral agent, and could have interesting consequences for professional practice. Even if a cognitivist account is ultimately unconvincing, it does provide a number of worrying arguments for those professionals who believe that ethical conduct is generated by following a code of practice, and these arguments need to be addressed. (shrink)

The media, advertising and public relations are all regulated in some degree by ethical codes of practice, but do they work and do they help practitioners? The author is Senior Lecturer in public relations and philosophy at Leeds Business School, Leeds Metropolitan University, Leeds LS2 8AF. She is currently preparing material for a new MA in Business Policy and Ethics, to be offered jointly by Leeds Metropolitan University and the University of Leeds.

The media, advertising and public relations are all regulated in some degree by ethical codes of practice, but do they work and do they help practitioners? The author is Senior Lecturer in public relations and philosophy at Leeds Business School, Leeds Metropolitan University, Leeds LS2 8AF. She is currently preparing material for a new MA in Business Policy and Ethics, to be offered jointly by Leeds Metropolitan University and the University of Leeds.

This article provides a theoretical critique from a particular ‘ideal type’ ethical perspective of professional codes in general and the United Kingdom Central Council for Nursing, Midwifery and Health Visiting (UKCC) Code of professional conduct (reprinted on pp. 77-78) in particular. Having outlined a specific ‘ideal type’ of what ethically informed and aware practice may be, the article examines the extent to which professional codes may be likely to elicit and engender such practice. Because of their (...) terminological inexactitudes and confusions, their arbitrary values and principles, their lack of helpful ethical guidance, and their exclusion of ordinary moral experience, a number of contemporary professional codes in health and social care can be arraigned as ethically inadequate. The UKCC Code of professional conduct embodies many of these flaws, and others besides. Some of its weaknesses in this respect are anatomized before some tentative suggestions are offered for the reform of codes and the engendering of greater ethical awareness among professionals in the light of greater public ethical concerns and values. (shrink)

This highly original book_ _explores the idea and potential of psychology in the context of ethical theory, and the idea of ethics in the context of psychology. In so doing, it not only interrogates how we come to understand ethics and notions of right behaviour, but also questions the discipline of psychology and how it functions in the 21 st century. Neill turns psychology inside out, controversially suggesting that psychology no longer exists as we know it. He proposes a rebirth (...) of psychology based on an intricate and detailed examination of _who_ we really are, and how we come to structure this idea of ourselves. Taking the idea of ethics seriously, Neill allows us to see psychology in a totally new light, addressing key points, such as: The inadequacy of psychology to address the question of ethics throughout history. Why thinking through the question of ethics necessarily brings us into confrontation with a question of psychology. What we actually do when we do psychology and how, via a serious consideration of ethics we might do this differently and better. Ethics and Psychology presents readers with a new and potentially productive understanding of both ethics and psychology and will appeal to anyone active within and critically engaged with the field. (shrink)

The determination of death by neurological criteria remains controversial scientifically, culturally, and legally, worldwide. In the United Kingdom, although the determination of death by neurological criteria is not legally codified, the Code of Practice of the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges is customarily used for neurological death determination and treatment withdrawal. Unlike some states in the US, however, there are no provisions under the law requiring accommodation of and respect for residents' religious rights and commitments when secular conceptions of (...) death based on medical codes and practices conflict with a traditional concept well-grounded in religious and cultural values and practices. In this article, we analyse the medical, ethical, and legal issues that were generated by the recent judgement of the High Court of England and Wales in Re: A [2015] EWHC 443. Mechanical ventilation was withdrawn in this case despite parental religious objection to a determination of death based on the code of practice. We outline contemporary evidence that has refuted the reliability of tests of brainstem function to ascertain the two conjunctive clinical criteria for the determination of death that are stipulated in the code of practice: irreversible loss of capacity for consciousness and somatic integration of bodily biological functions. We argue that: the tests of brainstem function were not properly undertaken in this case; the two conjunctive clinical criteria set forth in the code of practice cannot be reliably confirmed by these tests in any event; and absent authentication of the clinical criteria of death, the code of practice wrongly invokes a secular definition of death based on the loss of personhood. Consequently, the moral obligation of a pluralistic society to honor and respect diverse religious convictions to the greatest extent possible is being violated. Re A is contrasted with the US case of Jahi McMath in which the court accommodated parental religious objection to the determination of neurological death codified in the Uniform Determination of Death Act. We conclude that the legal system in the United Kingdom should not favour a secular definition of death over a definition of death that is respectful of religious values about the inviolability and sanctity of life. We recommend the legal recognition of religious accommodation in death determination to facilitate cultural sensitivity and compassionate care to patients and families in a pluralistic society. (shrink)

Higher education institutions in the United Kingdom are increasingly demanding that social work lecturers are ?registered? with the UK regulatory body, the General Social Care Council (GSCC) as a requirement of appointment for the post of social work lecturer. There are many compelling reasons for such an expectation but this paper argues that such action should not be undertaken uncritically. Using Colnerud's five categories of norms a number of tensions for the lecturer are explored that indicate that the current GSCC (...) codes of practice do not fully recognize the role of the social work lecturer. (shrink)

Although both codes of practice and virtue ethics are integral to the ethos and history of “medical professionalism”, the two trends appear mutually incompatible. Hence, in the first part of the paper we explore and explicate this apparent conflict and seek a direction for medical education. The theoretical and empirical literature indicates that moral deliberation may transcend the incompatibilities between the formal and the virtuous, may enhance moral and other aspects of personal sensitivity, may help design and improve (...) other parts of the curricula, and may foster self-awareness and clarification of the professional role. Not only are these goals essential for good and conscientious doctoring, but they may also reduce physicians’ “burn-out”. We argue that medical education should focus on the ubiquitous practice of deliberation in contemporary medicine, and especially the practice of moral deliberation. (shrink)

This article is a response to the public consultation on the draft Code of Practice issued by the Human Tissue Authority on the import and export of human bodies, body parts and tissue. The question is whether the Draft Code and the Human Tissue Act go far enough to prevent the unethical acquisition and movement of human tissue. I conclude that the answer to this question is ‘no’ and go on to demonstrate how the identified deficiencies can be remedied.

The determination of death by neurological criteria remains controversial scientifically, culturally, and legally, worldwide. In the United Kingdom, although the determination of death by neurological criteria is not legally codified, the Code of Practice of the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges is customarily used for neurological death determination and treatment withdrawal. Unlike some states in the US, however, there are no provisions under the law requiring accommodation of and respect for residents' religious rights and commitments when secular conceptions of (...) death based on medical codes and practices conflict with a traditional concept well-grounded in religious and cultural values and practices. In this article, we analyse the medical, ethical, and legal issues that were generated by the recent judgement of the High Court of England and Wales in Re: A [2015] EWHC 443. Mechanical ventilation was withdrawn in this case despite parental religious objection to a determination of death based on the code of practice. We outline contemporary evidence that has refuted the reliability of tests of brainstem function to ascertain the two conjunctive clinical criteria for the determination of death that are stipulated in the code of practice: irreversible loss of capacity for consciousness and somatic integration of bodily biological functions. We argue that: the tests of brainstem function were not properly undertaken in this case; the two conjunctive clinical criteria set forth in the code of practice cannot be reliably confirmed by these tests in any event; and absent authentication of the clinical criteria of death, the code of practice wrongly invokes a secular definition of death based on the loss of personhood. Consequently, the moral obligation of a pluralistic society to honor and respect diverse religious convictions to the greatest extent possible is being violated. Re A is contrasted with the US case of Jahi McMath in which the court accommodated parental religious objection to the determination of neurological death codified in the Uniform Determination of Death Act. We conclude that the legal system in the United Kingdom should not favour a secular definition of death over a definition of death that is respectful of religious values about the inviolability and sanctity of life. We recommend the legal recognition of religious accommodation in death determination to facilitate cultural sensitivity and compassionate care to patients and families in a pluralistic society. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to present a first list of ethical concerns that may arise from research and personal use of virtual reality (VR) and related technology, and to offer concrete recommendations for minimizing those risks. Many of the recommendations call for focused research initiatives. In the first part of the article, we discuss the relevant evidence from psychology that motivates our concerns. In Section “Plasticity in the Human Mind,” we cover some of the main results suggesting that (...) one’s environment can influence one’s psychological states, as well as recent work on inducing illusions of embodiment. Then, in Section “Illusions of Embodiment and Their Lasting Effect,” we go on to discuss recent evidence indicating that immersion in VR can have psychological effects that last after leaving the virtual environment. In the second part of the article, we turn to the risks and recommendations. We begin, in Section “The Research Ethics of VR,” with the research ethics of VR, covering six main topics: the limits of experimental environments, informed consent, clinical risks, dual-use, online research, and a general point about the limitations of a code of conduct for research. Then, in Section “Risks for Individuals and Society,” we turn to the risks of VR for the general public, covering four main topics: long-term immersion, neglect of the social and physical environment, risky content, and privacy. We offer concrete recommendations for each of these 10 topics, summarized in Table 1. (shrink)

Widespread enthusiasm for establishing scientific codes of conduct notwithstanding, the utility of such codes in influencing scientific practice is not self-evident. It largely depends on the implementation phase following their establishment—a phase which often receives little attention. The aim of this paper is to provide recommendations for guiding effective implementation through an assessment of one particular code of conduct in one particular institute. Based on a series of interviews held with researchers at the Department of Biotechnology of (...) Delft University of Technology, this paper evaluates how the Netherlands Code of Conduct for Scientific Practice is received by those it is supposed to govern. While respondents agreed that discussion of the guiding principles of scientific conduct is called for, they did not consider the code as such to be a useful instrument. As a tool for the individual scientific practitioner, the code leaves a number of important questions unanswered in relation to visibility, enforcement, integration with daily practice and the distribution of responsibility. Recommendations are provided on the basis of these questions. There is more at stake than merely holding scientific practitioners to a proper exercise of their duties; implementation of scientific society codes of conduct also concerns the further motives and value commitments that gave rise to their establishment in the first place. (shrink)

BackgroundEthics is the science of moral and ethical rules recognised in human life and attempts to verify what is morally right and wrong. Healthcare ethics is seen as an integrated part of the daily activities of health facilities. Healthcare professionals’ standardisation and uniformity in healthcare ethics are urgent and basic requirements. Therefore, this study aimed to assess the practice of the code of ethics and associated factors among health professionals in Central Gondar Zone public hospitals, Northwest Ethiopia, 2021.MethodsA facility-based (...) cross-sectional study design with a mixed method was conducted on 631 health professionals from Central Gondar Zone public hospitals. For the quantitative part, pre-tested self-administered questionnaires were used, and for the qualitative part, key informant interviews with a semi-structured questionnaire were used. Variables with a p value of < 0.2 in binary logistic regression entered into a multivariable logistic regression, then p value < 0.05 and AOR were used to declare statistically significant variables in quantitative data. A thematic content analysis was used for qualitative data analysis.ResultsThis study revealed that only 286 health professionals had good practice of the code of ethics. Good ethical knowledge, favourable attitude, and satisfaction of health professionals with their jobs were significantly associated with the practice of health care ethics.ConclusionsHealth professionals' overall level of practice of health care ethics in the Central Gondar Zone public hospitals was poor. This necessitates practical training, ongoing follow-up, availing of necessary medical equipment, a smooth working environment, and modification of the recognition system for health professionals. (shrink)

This discussion examines the emergence of professional codes of ethics, influences that shape contemporary midwifery ethics, and the adequacy of codes to actualize values embedded in the midwifery ethics discourse. It considers the traditions of professional practice, the impact of institutionalization on health care, the application of a code of practice as a recent addition to those traditions, and the strengths and weaknesses of codes of ethics as models for ethical responses. That is, it sets (...) out to articulate and deconstruct existing frames of ethical response. The ethics of strangers (normative theory and abstract principles) are rejected as inadequate, and the ethics of intimates (feminist-relational ethics) are proposed as a more adequate guide for well-woman centred midwifery practice. (shrink)

This article sets out a scenario highlighting some of the issues to be faced by NHS hospitals when dealing with patients who may require treatment under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. The article sets out matters to consider when dealing with patients in A&E, assessments of best interests, emergency treatment, lasting powers of attorney and transferring patients to nursing homes. All of these matters come under the remit of the Act.

Professional integrity is a fundamental principle of the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants Code of Ethics. This does not apply directly to members of a particular professional body, but rather member organizations from around the globe are required to adopt a code no less stringent than the principles in the IESBA Code. Hence, all professional accountants are required to possess integrity as a core ethical principle. In the USA, certified public accountants must, in addition, also adhere to the principle (...) of client advocacy in relation to their tax clients. Despite extensive prior literature on accounting ethics, firm culture, and ethical codes, no prior research has tested whether the communication of an Integrity ethical standard actually affects practitioners’ actual judgments and decisions. In this study, we use brief interventions to determine whether a prime of two ethical professional standards affects tax practitioners’ recommendations to their clients. One implication for professionalism in tax practice is our finding that a brief intervention of professional standards can directly impact on practitioners’ judgments. Most notably, a joint presentation of Advocacy and Integrity leads to contrasting results that depend on the order of the intervention. In sum, when the Integrity standard was presented before the Advocacy standard, tax practitioners were significantly less likely to choose a tax-favorable outcome. That is, the order of professional ethical standard intervention significantly affects tax practitioners’ judgments. (shrink)

Among the options of government for reducing negative environmental externalities from agriculture is the institution of a polluter statutory liability. An environmental duty of care imposes a statutory liability on agents who interact with the environment to avoid causing environmental harm. This paper documents environmental duty of care provisions governing landholders in Queensland, Australia, with specific reference to the 2007 Queensland State Rural Leasehold Land Strategy. The paper reports on a positive response by a group of leaseholders within the Northern (...) Gulf Region in Queensland who developed a prototype environmental code of practice for grazing—a land use not previously covered by such an institution in Australia. The paper concludes that (1) a statutory environmental duty of care and specific forms of leasehold tenure are elements of an effective strategy for implementing an agricultural environmental ethics in north Australia’s rangelands and (2) a grazing industry code of practice is a practical and important tool for the grazing industry to safeguard its social licence to operate. (shrink)

The Software Engineering Code of Ethics and Professional Practice, intended as a standard for teaching and practicing software engineering, documents the ethical and professional obligations of software engineers. The code should instruct practitioners about the standards society expects them to meet, about what their peers strive for, and about what to expect of one another. In addition, the code should also inform the public about the responsibilities that are important to the profession. Adopted in 2000 by the IEEE Computer (...) Society and the ACM--two leading international computing societies--the code of ethics is intended as a guide for members of the evolving software engineering profession. The code was developed by a multinational task force with additional input from other professionals from industry, government posts, military installations, and educational professions. (shrink)

Does private regulation of workers’ rights in global value chains improve working conditions on the factory floor? Drawing on one of the first systematic longitudinal studies of supplier compliance with multinational corporation (MNC) codes of conduct, this paper finds—in contrast to previous research—substantial improvements over time. While in 2004, the four examined Chinese toy suppliers violated most of the evaluated code of conduct criteria and consciously decoupled the code of conduct policy from actual practices, by 2009 they had recoupled (...) policy and practice and complied with nearly all examined criteria (except working hours). The paper contributes to the private regulation literature by challenging previous research claims, identifying factors that could make private regulation effective, and outlining a research method for empirically studying the effects of codes of conduct over time. The paper also contributes to new institutional theory by discussing how recoupling could be influenced by two factors not identified in previous research: (i) trusting relationships between the organization and the stakeholder exerting pressure and (ii) factors unrelated to main external pressures leading to “accidental” recoupling. (shrink)

Although detailed studies of code adoption and impact have already been conducted in Hong Kong, there has as yet been no critical analysis of why there has been a gap between the normative and positive factors underlying codes of ethics in Hong Kong. The purpose of this paper is to consider why Hong Kong companies adopting codes of ethics have failed to adhere closely to the best practice prescriptions for code adoption when it would likely be in (...) their best interests to do so. This paper identifies some cultural factors, such as power distance and traditional Legalist assumptions approximating Theory X, that appear to be involved in creating this gap, and offers some practical recommendations for closing the gap, which are presented in the form of hypotheses for further testing. (shrink)

This book is a comprehensive and unique text and reference in medical ethics. By far the most inclusive set of primary documents and articles in the field ever published, it contains over 100 selections. Virtually all pieces appear in their entirety, and a significant number would be difficult to obtain elsewhere. The volume draws upon the literature of history, medicine, philosophical and religious ethics, economics, and sociology. A wide range of topics and issues are covered, such as law and medicine, (...) truth-telling by the physician, research, population policy, genetics, abortion, dying, and individual rights in medical care. The selections span the centuries, beginning with material from the works of Hippocrates, continuing through Thomas Percival, John Stuart Mill, and Claude Bernard, down to modern commentators like Henry K. Beecher, Walsh McDermott, David L. Bazelon, Paul Freund, H. L. A. Hart, John Rawls, Paul Ramsey, Richard McCormick, Rashi Fein, and Bernard Barber. The text has eight major divisions, beginning with sections on the ethical dimensions of the physician-patient relationship in history; the moral bases of medical ethics; and regulation, compulsion, and protection of the consumer in clinical medicine and public health. Each of these sections includes key essays that appear for the first time. All of the book's major divisions contain primary documents: codes such as the Hippocratic Oath, Medieval Law for the Regulation of Medicine, and the first as well as the most recent code of the American Medical Association; court decisions, including those on Karen Quinlan and on abortion in the United States and West Germany; government documents such as the statement of the National Commission on the Protection of Human Subjects, the Tuskegee Syphilis Report, the British Parliamentary debate on euthanasia, and the Council of Europe on rights of the sick and dying; and various published guidelines such as the Harvard Medical School brain death criteria, the American Hospital Association on patient's rights, and Pope Pius XII on the prolongation of life. Cases that illustrate moral dilemmas are provided for discussion purposes. Each section is preceded by a succinct editor's introduction. The documents and essays are of practical value for practitioners and students in medicine, law, ethics, and counselling, and for individual patients and groups concerned with medical care. Through encompassing divergent viewpoints, the essays and primary documents were selected to encourage humane practices and deepen understanding of the multiple traditions that shaped and do shape the development of medicine. (shrink)