We add a limited but useful form of quantification to Coalition Logic, a popular formalism for reasoning about cooperation in game-like multi-agent systems. The basic constructs of Quantified Coalition Logic (QCL) allow us to express such properties as "every coalition satisfying property P can achieve φ" and "there exists a coalition C satisfying property P such that C can achieve φ". We give an axiomatisation of QCL, and show that while it is no more (...) expressive than Coalition Logic, it is nevertheless exponentially more succinct. The complexity of QCL model checking for symbolic and explicit state representations is shown to be no worse than that of Coalition Logic, and satisfiability for QCL is shown to be no worse than satisfiability for Coalition Logic. We illustrate the formalism by showing how to succinctly specify such social choice mechanisms as majority voting, which in Coalition Logic require specifications that are exponentially long in the number of agents. (shrink)

We add a limited but useful form of quantification to Coalition Logic, a popular formalism for reasoning about cooperation in game-like multi-agent systems. The basic constructs of Quantified Coalition Logic (QCL) allow us to express such properties as “every coalition satisfying property P can achieve φ” and “there exists a coalition C satisfying property P such that C can achieve φ”. We give an axiomatisation of QCL, and show that while it is no more (...) expressive than Coalition Logic, it is nevertheless exponentially more succinct. The complexity of QCL model checking for symbolic and explicit state representations is shown to be no worse than that of Coalition Logic, and satisfiability for QCL is shown to be no worse than satisfiability for Coalition Logic. We illustrate the formalism by showing how to succinctly specify such social choice mechanisms as majority voting, which in Coalition Logic require specifications that are exponentially long in the number of agents. (shrink)

One of the classic formalisms for reasoning about multi-agent coalitional ability is coalition logic. In CL it is possible to express what a coalition can achieve in the next step no matter what agents outside of the coalition do at the same time. We propose an extension of CL with dynamic operators that allow us to grant dictatorial powers to agents or to revoke them. In such a way we are able to reason about the dynamics (...) of coalitional ability. We also discuss some logical properties of the proposed formalisms and compare their relative expressive power. (shrink)

In the paper, we study the dynamics of coalitional ability by proposing an extension of coalition logic (CL). CL allows one to reason about what a coalition of agents is able to achieve through a joint action, no matter what agents outside of the coalition do. The proposed dynamic extension is inspired by dynamic epistemic logic, and, in particular, by action models. We call the resulting logic coalition action model logic (CAML), which, (...) compared to CL, includes additional modalities for coalitional action models. We investigate the expressivity of CAML, and provide a complexity characterisation of its model checking problem. (shrink)

We continue the work initiated in Herzig and Lorini (J Logic Lang Inform, in press) whose aim is to provide a minimalistic logical framework combining the expressiveness of dynamic logic in which actions are first-class citizens in the object language, with the expressiveness of logics of agency such as STIT and logics of group capabilities such as CL and ATL. We present a logic called ( Deterministic Dynamic logic of Agency ) which supports reasoning about actions (...) and joint actions of agents and coalitions, and agentive and coalitional capabilities. In it is supposed that, once all agents have selected a joint action, the effect of this joint action is deterministic. In order to assess we prove that it embeds Coalition Logic. We then extend with modal operators for agents’ preferences, and show that the resulting logic is sufficiently expressive to capture the game-theoretic concepts of best response and Nash equilibrium. (shrink)

Qualitative coalitional games (QCGs) were introduced as abstract formal models of goal-oriented cooperative systems. A QCG is a game in which each agent is assumed to have some goal to achieve, and in which agents must typically cooperate with others in order to satisfy their goals. In this paper, we show how it is possible to reason about QCGs using Coalition Logic (CL), a formalism intended to facilitate reasoning about coalitional powers in game-like multiagent systems. We introduce a (...) correspondence relation between QCGs and interpretations for CL, which defines the circumstances under which a CL interpretation correctly characterises a QCG. The complexity of deciding correspondence between QCGs and interpretations for CL is shown to vary from being tractable up to Πp 2-complete, depending on the representation chosen for the QCG and interpretation. We then show how various properties and solution concepts of QCGs can be characterised as CL formula schemes. The ideas are illustrated via a detailed worked example, in which we demonstrate how a model checker can be deployed to investigate whether a particular system has the properties in question. (shrink)

Qualitative Coalitional Games are a variant of coalitional games in which an agent's desires are represented as goals that are either satisfied or unsatisfied, and each choice available to a coalition is a set of goals, which would be jointly satisfied if the coalition made that choice. A coalition in a QCG will typically form in order to bring about a set of goals that will satisfy all members of the coalition. Our goal in this paper (...) is to develop and study logics for reasoning about QCGs. We begin by introducing a logic for reasoning about “static” QCGs, where participants play a single game, and we then introduce and study Temporal QCGs , i.e., games in which a sequence of QCGs is played. In order to represent and reason about such games, we introduce a linear time temporal logic of QCGs, called ℒ. We give a complete axiomatisation of ℒ, use it to investigate the properties of TQCGs, identify its expressive power, establish its complexity, characterise classes of TQGCs with formulas from our logical language, and use it to formulate several solution concepts for TQCGs. (shrink)

There are several ways to quantify over public announcements. The most notable are reflected in arbitrary, group, and coalition announcement logics, with the latter being the least studied so far. In the present work, we consider coalition announcements through the lens of group announcements, and provide a complete axiomatisation of a logic with coalition announcements. To achieve this, we employ a generalisation of group announcements. Moreover, we study some logical properties of both coalition and group (...) announcements that have not been studied before. (shrink)

In Multi Agent Systems it is often the case that individual preferences are not compatible and coalitions compete to achieve a given result. The paper presents a language to talk about the conflict between coalitional choices and it expresses deontic notions to evaluate them. We will be specifically concerned with cases where the collective perspective is at odds with the individual perspective.

Coalition announcement logic is one of the family of the logics of quantified announcements. It allows us to reason about what a coalition of agents can achieve by making announcements in the setting where the anti-coalition may have an announcement of their own to preclude the former from reaching its epistemic goals. In this paper, we describe a PSPACE-complete model checking algorithm for CAL that produces winning strategies for coalitions. The algorithm is implemented in a proof-of-concept (...) model checker. (shrink)

We develop a conceptually clear, intuitive, and feasible decision procedure for testing satisfiability in the full multi\-agent epistemic logic \CMAELCD\ with operators for common and distributed knowledge for all coalitions of agents mentioned in the language. To that end, we introduce Hintikka structures for \CMAELCD\ and prove that satisfiability in such structures is equivalent to satisfiability in standard models. Using that result, we design an incremental tableau-building procedure that eventually constructs a satisfying Hintikka structure for every satisfiable input set (...) of formulae of \CMAELCD\ and closes for every unsatisfiable input set of formulae. (shrink)

In his classic monograph, Social Choice and Individual Values, Arrow introduced the notion of a decisive coalition of voters as part of his mathematical framework for social choice theory. The subsequent literature on Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem has shown the importance for social choice theory of reasoning about coalitions of voters with different grades of decisiveness. The goal of this paper is a fine-grained analysis of reasoning about decisive coalitions, formalizing how the concept of a decisive coalition gives rise (...) to a social choice theoretic language and logic all of its own. We show that given Arrow’s axioms of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Universal Domain, rationality postulates for social preference correspond to strong axioms about decisive coalitions. We demonstrate this correspondence with results of a kind familiar in economics—representation theorems—as well as results of a kind coming from mathematical logic—completeness theorems. We present a complete logic for reasoning about decisive coalitions, along with formal proofs of Arrow’s and Wilson’s theorems. In addition, we prove the correctness of an algorithm for calculating, given any social rationality postulate of a certain form in the language of binary preference, the corresponding axiom in the language of decisive coalitions. These results suggest for social choice theory new perspectives and tools from logic. (shrink)

Boolean games are a logical setting for representing strategic games in a succinct way, taking advantage of the expressive power and conciseness of propositional logic. A Boolean game consists of a set of players, each of which controls a set of propositional variables and has a specific goal expressed by a propositional formula. We show here that Boolean games are a very simple setting, yet sophisticated enough, for analysing the formation of coalitions. Due to the fact that players have (...) dichotomous preferences, the following notion emerges naturally: a coalition in a Boolean game is efficient if it has the power to guarantee that all goals of the members of the coalition are satisfied. We study the properties of efficient coalitions. (shrink)

The aim of this paper, is to provide a logical framework for reasoning about actions, agency, and powers of agents and coalitions in game-like multi-agent systems. First we define our basic Dynamic Logic of Agency ( ). Differently from other logics of individual and coalitional capability such as Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) and Coalition Logic, in cooperation modalities for expressing powers of agents and coalitions are not primitive, but are defined from more basic dynamic logic (...) operators of action and (historic) necessity. We show that STIT logic can be reconstructed in . We then extend with epistemic operators, which allows us to distinguish capability and power. We finally characterize the conditions under which agents are aware of their capabilities and powers. (shrink)

This paper presents a logic of preference and functional dependence (LPFD) and its hybrid extension (HLPFD), both of whose sound and strongly complete axiomatization are provided. The decidability of LPFD is also proved. The application of LPFD and HLPFD to modelling cooperative games in strategic form is explored. The resulted framework provides a unified view on Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimality and the core. The philosophical relevance of these game-theoretical notions to discussions of collective agency is made explicit. Some key (...) connections with other logics are also revealed, for example, the coalition logic, the logic of functional dependence and the logic of ceteris paribus preference. (shrink)

We use Concurrent Game Models (CGM) in which simple conditional promises are assigned the role of negotiation steps aiming to represent the formation of temporary coalitions and their agendas. By transforming these extended CGMs into equivalent CGMs with incomplete information, established methods for rational synthesis become enabled. The interpretation of promises is compatible with that of announcements as in dynamic epistemic logics. To accommodate requirements on plays that are written wrt the runs of the original model, we use temporal projection (...) that hides negotiation steps. (shrink)

We introduce a reciprocity criterion for coalition formation among goal-directed agents, which we call the indecomposable do-ut-des property. It refines an older reciprocity property, called the do-ut-des or give-to-get property by considering the fact that agents prefer to form coalitions whose components cannot be formed independently. A formal description of this property is provided as well as an analysis of algorithms and their complexity. We provide an algorithm to decide whether a coalition has the desired property, and we (...) show that the problem to verify whether a single coalition satisfies the property is tractable. Moreover, we provide an algorithm to search all the sub-coalitions of a given coalition satisfying the new property. Even if this problem is not computationally tractable, we show that in several cases, also the complexity of this problem may decrease considerably. (shrink)

Logics of joint strategic ability have recently received attention, with arguably the most influential being those in a family that includes Coalition Logic (CL) and Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL). Notably, both CL and ATL bypass the epistemic issues that underpin Schelling-type coordination problems, by apparently relying on the meta-level assumption of (perfectly reliable) communication between cooperating rational agents. Yet such epistemic issues arise naturally in settings relevant to ATL and CL: these logics are standardly interpreted on structures (...) where agents move simultaneously, opening the possibility that an agent cannot foresee the concurrent choices of other agents. In this paper we introduce a variant of CL we call Two-Player Strategic Coordination Logic (SCL2). The key novelty of this framework is an operator for capturing coalitional ability when the cooperating agents cannot share strategic information. We identify significant differences in the expressive power and validities of SCL2 and CL2, and present a sound and complete axiomatization for SCL2. We briefly address conceptual challenges when shifting attention to games with more than two players and stronger notions of rationality. (shrink)

We consider systems of rational agents who act and interact in pursuit of their individual and collective objectives. We study and formalise the reasoning of an agent, or of an external observer, about the expected choices of action of the other agents based on their objectives, in order to assess the reasoner’s ability, or expectation, to achieve their own objective. To formalize such reasoning we extend Pauly’s Coalition Logic with three new modal operators of conditional strategic reasoning, thus (...) introducing the Logic for Local Conditional Strategic Reasoning \. We provide formal semantics for the new conditional strategic operators in concurrent game models, introduce the matching notion of bisimulation for each of them, prove bisimulation invariance and Hennessy–Milner property for each of them, and discuss and compare briefly their expressiveness. Finally, we also propose systems of axioms for each of the basic operators of \ and for the full logic. (shrink)

We study the logic of strategic ability of coalitions of agents with bounded memory by introducing Alternating-time Temporal Logic with Bounded Memory (ATLBM), a variant of Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL). ATLBM accounts for two main consequences of the assumption that agents have bounded memory. First, an agent can only remember a strategy that specifies actions in a bounded number of different circumstances. While the ATL-formula means that coalition C has a joint strategy which will make φ (...) true forever, the ATLBM-formula means that C has a joint strategy which for each agent in C specifies what to do in no more than n different circumstances and which will make φ true forever. Second, an agent has bounded recall—a strategy can only take the last m states of the system into account. We use the logic to study the interaction between strategic ability, bounded number of decisions, bounded recall and incomplete information. We discuss the logical properties and expressiveness of ATLBM, and its relationship to ATL. We show that ATLBM can express properties of strategic ability under bounded memory which cannot be expressed in ATL. (shrink)

I present a variant of with time, called, interpreted in standard Kripke semantics. On the syntactic level, is nothing but the extension of atemporal individual by: the future tense and past tense operators, and the operator of group agency for the grand coalition. A sound and complete axiomatisation for is given. Moreover, it is shown that supports reasoning about interesting normative concepts such as the concepts of achievement obligation and commitment.

While dynamic epistemic logics with common knowledge have been extensively studied, dynamic epistemic logics with distributed knowledge have so far received far less attention. In this paper we study extensions of public announcement logic ( $\mathcal{PAL }$ ) with distributed knowledge, in particular their expressivity, axiomatisations and complexity. $\mathcal{PAL }$ extended only with distributed knowledge is not more expressive than standard epistemic logic with distributed knowledge. Our focus is therefore on $\mathcal{PACD }$ , the result of adding both (...) common and distributed knowledge to $\mathcal{PAL }$ , which is more expressive than each of its component logics. We introduce an axiomatisation of $\mathcal{PACD }$ , which is not surprising: it is the combination of well-known axioms. The completeness proof, however, is not trivial, and requires novel combinations and extensions of techniques for dealing with $S5$ knowledge, distributed knowledge, common knowledge and public announcements at the same time. We furthermore show that $\mathcal{PACD }$ is decidable, more precisely that it is $\textsc {exptime}$ -complete. This result also carries over to $\mathcal{S 5\mathcal CD }$ with common and distributed knowledge operators for all coalitions (and not only the grand coalition). Finally, we propose a notion of a trans-bisimulation to generalise certain results and give deeper insight into the proofs. (shrink)

Public announcement logic is an extension of epistemic logic with dynamic operators that model the effects of all agents simultaneously and publicly acquiring the same piece of information. One of the extensions of PAL, group announcement logic, allows quantification over announcements made by agents. In GAL, it is possible to reason about what groups can achieve by making such announcements. It seems intuitive that this notion of coalitional ability should be closely related to the notion of distributed (...) knowledge, the implicit knowledge of a group. Thus, we study the extension of GAL with distributed knowledge, and in particular possible interaction properties between GAL operators and distributed knowledge. The perhaps surprising result is that, in fact, there are no interaction properties, contrary to intuition. We make this claim precise by providing a sound and complete axiomatisation of GAL with distributed knowledge. We also consider several natural variants of GAL with distributed knowledge, as well as some other related logic, and compare their expressive power. (shrink)

We draw parallels between several closely related logics that combine — in different proportions — elements of game theory, computation tree logics, and epistemic logics to reason about agents and their abilities. These are: the coalition game logics CL and ECL introduced by Pauly 2000, the alternating-time temporal logic ATL developed by Alur, Henzinger and Kupferman between 1997 and 2002, and the alternating-time temporal epistemic logic ATEL by van der Hoek and Wooldridge (2002). In particular, we establish (...) some subsumption and equivalence results for their semantics, as well as interpretation of the alternating-time temporal epistemic logic into ATL. The focus in this paper is on models: alternating transition systems, multi-player game models (alias concurrent game structures) and coalition effectivity models turn out to be intimately related, while alternating epistemic transition systems share much of their philosophical and formal apparatus. Our approach is constructive: we present ways to transform between different types of models and languages. (shrink)

Boehm reasons that human morality began when several heads of households formed a coalition to limit the despotic bullying of an alpha male. The logic is clear and the argument is persuasive. The premises require that: dominant individuals behave like chimpanzees, bullying their subordinates, early humans somehow developed one-male units from a chimpanzee like society and, the power of a despot is limited by group consensus and political activities. Not all alpha males behave like chimpanzees; most primate societies (...) show little evidence of bullying. One-male units are formed by some monkeys but there is little evidence of such tendencies in chimpanzees and bonobos. Hamadryas males do not compete with familiar males for females or possessions regardless of their dominance relationships, but this inhibition is not based on group consensus or coalitions repressing alpha males. Boehm's argument is, nonetheless, possible and plausible but cannot be empirically tested. (shrink)

This chapter examines María Lugones’s germane and insightful attempt to theorize “intermeshed oppressions,” which, she argues, have been (mis)represented in women of color feminisms by the concepts of “interlocking systems of oppression” and, more recently, “intersectionality.” The latter, intersectionality, introduced by Black feminist legal scholar Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw as a metaphor (1989) and as a “provisional concept” (1991), has become the predominant way of referencing the mutual constitution of what have been theorized as multiple systems of oppression, constructing the multiplicity (...) of social identities. But Lugones’s analysis, which maintains subtle but important distinctions among the concepts of “intermeshed,” “interlocking,” and “intersecting” oppressions, shows that intersectionality theory often conflates fragmentation with multiplicity, and—by reifying “intersectional identities”—reproduces social-ontological fragmentation at the political and perceptual-cognitive levels of representation. Intersectional accounts redeploy unitary categories (for instance, race, gender, class, sexuality, disability) that are defined to the exclusion of each other by privileging the identities of normative group members. Consequently, they remain within what Lugones calls the “logic of purity,” which erases “curdled,” impure, category-transgressive, border-dwelling, mestiza subjects. Although, according to Lugones, intersectionality enables us to discern how the logic of purity produces “women of color” as impossible beings, she argues that the liminal identities of subjects dwelling in categorial interstices can only be made visible by conceptualizing oppressions as fused or “intermeshed.” However, as I interpret her, Lugones is not merely criticizing intersectionality or seeking to transcend its conceptual limitations by proposing an alternate concept. Rather, the concepts of “intermeshed,” “interlocking,” and “intersecting” oppressions do significantly different work in her account and illuminate different aspects of the social ontology, phenomenology, and epistemology of resistance to oppression. First, I situate Lugones with respect to the current conjuncture in intersectionality studies, in which some scholars are calling for a post-intersectional turn. Then, I reconstruct Lugones’s complex account of intermeshed oppressions, interlocking oppressions, and intersectionality. Finally, I discuss the status of intersectionality in the shift in Lugones’s work from “women of color feminisms” to “decolonial feminism.” Intersectionality is now routinely invoked as a representational theory of multiple identities, but Lugones’s heterodox interpretation helps us to see that it is best understood as a critique of representations based on the logic of purity: specifically, of how categorial axes of oppression (mis)represent intermeshed oppressions. Lugones’s triadic distinction (intersecting/interlocking/intermeshed) points toward a provisional usage of intersectionality, namely, to diagnose the fragmentation of social experiences of multiplicity (which, I would argue, is more consistent with the concept’s original aims). In her visionary philosophy, which attempts to theorize resistance against the grain of fragmentation from a conceptual space outside of the “logic of purity,” we find “glimpses” of a non-fragmented account of oppression, and praxical possibilities for liberatory, decolonial feminist coalitions. (shrink)

We investigate a series of logics that allow to reason about agents' actions, abilities, and their knowledge about actions and abilities. These logics include Pauly's Coalition Logic CL, Alternating-time Temporal Logic ATL, the logic of ‘seeing-to-it-that' (STIT), and epistemic extensions thereof. While complete axiomatizations of CL and ATL exist, only the fragment of the STIT language without temporal operators and without groups has been axiomatized by Xu (called Ldm). We start by recalling a simplification of the (...) Ldm that has been proposed in previous work, together with an alternative semantics in terms of standard Kripke models. We extend that semantics to groups via a principle of superadditivity, and give a sound and complete axiomatization that we call Ldm G. We then add a temporal ‘next' operator to Ldm G, and again give a sound and complete axiomatization. We show that Ldm G subsumes coalition logic CL. Finally, we extend these logics with standard S5 knowledge operators. This enables us to express that agents see to something under uncertainty about the present state or uncertainty about which action is being taken. We focus on the epistemic extension of X-Ldm G, noted E-X-Ldm G. In accordance with established terminology in the planning community, we call this extension of X-Ldm G the conformant X-Ldm G. The conformant X-Ldm G enables us to express that agents are able to perform a uniform strategy. We conclude that in that respect, our epistemic extension of X-Ldm G is better suited than epistemic extensions of ATL. (shrink)

We introduce Arbitrary Public Announcement Logic with Memory (APALM), obtained by adding to the models a ‘memory’ of the initial states, representing the information before any communication took place (“the prior”), and adding to the syntax operators that can access this memory. We show that APALM is recursively axiomatizable (in contrast to the original Arbitrary Public Announcement Logic, for which the corresponding question is still open). We present a complete recursive axiomatization, that includes a natural finitary rule, and (...) study this logic’s expressivity and the appropriate notion of bisimulation. We then examine Group Announcement Logic with Memory (GALM), the extension of APALM obtained by adding to its syntax group announcement operators, and provide a complete finitary axiomatization (again in contrast to the original Group Announcement Logic, for which the only known axiomatization is infinitary). We also show that, in the memory-enhanced context, there is a natural reduction of the so-called coalition announcement modality to group announcements (in contrast to the memory-free case, where this natural translation was shown to be invalid). (shrink)

A number of significant contributions in the last four decades show that non-normal modal logics can be fruitfully employed in several applied fields. Well-known domains are epistemic logic, deontic logic, and systems capturing different aspects of action and agency such as the modal logic of agency, concurrent propositional dynamic logic, game logic, and coalition logic. Semantics for such logics are traditionally based on neighbourhood models. However, other model-theoretic semantics can be used for this (...) purpose. Here, we systematically study multi-relational structures, whose investigation is still relatively underdeveloped. After a brief introduction to two different versions of multi-relational semantics – which we call strong and weak multi-relational semantics – we proceed to study several modal schemata. Special attention is paid to the schemata CON and D. Finally we offer completeness proofs for several systems using both strong and weak semantic tools: The proofs thus cover both classical system.. (shrink)

We present a variant of ATL with incomplete information which includes the distributed knowledge operators corresponding to synchronous action and perfect recall. The cooperation modalities assume the use the distributed knowledge of coalitions and accordingly refer to perfect recall incomplete information strategies. We propose a model-checking algorithm for the logic. It is based on techniques for games with imperfect information and partially observable objectives, and involves deciding emptiness for automata on infinite trees. We also propose an axiomatic system and (...) prove its completeness for a rather expressive subset. As for the constructs left outside this completely axiomatised subset, we present axioms by which they can be defined in the subset on the class of models in which every state has finitely many successors and give a complete axiomatisation for a “flat” subset of the logic with these constructs included. (shrink)

We study the logic of neighbourhood models with pointwise intersection, as a means to characterize multi-modal logics. Pointwise intersection takes us from a set of neighbourhood sets Ni (one for each member i of a set G used to interpret the modality □) to a new neighbourhood set NG, which in turn allows us to interpret the operator □G Here, X is in the neighbourhood for G if and only if X equals the intersection of some Y {Yi | (...) Yi ∈G}. We show that the notion of pointwise intersection has various applications in epistemic and doxastic logic, deontic logic, coalition logic, and evidence logic. We then establish sound and strongly complete axiomatizations for the weakest logic characterized by pointwise intersection and for a number of variants, using a new and generally applicable technique for canonical model construction. (shrink)

Alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) is a branching time temporal logic in which statements about what coalitions of agents can achieve by strategic cooperation can be expressed. Alternating-time temporal epistemic logic (ATEL) extends ATL by adding knowledge modalities, with the usual possible worlds interpretation. This paper investigates how properties of agents’ actions can be expressed in ATL in general, and how properties of the interaction between action and knowledge can be expressed in ATEL in particular. One commonly discussed (...) property is that an agent should know about all available actions, i.e., that the same actions should be available in indiscernible states. Van der Hoek and Wooldridge suggest a syntactic expression of this semantic property. This paper shows that this correspondence in fact does not hold. Furthermore, it is shown that the semantic property is not expressible in ATEL at all. In order to be able to express common and interesting properties of action in general and of the interaction between action and knowledge in particular, a generalization of the coalition modalities of ATL is proposed. The resulting logics, ATL-A and ATEL-A, have increased expressiveness without loosing ATL’s and ATEL’s tractability of model checking. (shrink)

In this paper we analyze how the semantics of the Alternating-time Temporal Logic ATL$^*$ deals with agents' commitments to strategies in the process of formula evaluation. In (\acro{atl}$^*$), one can express statements about the strategic ability of an agent (or a coalition of agents) to achieve a goal $\phi$ such as: ``agent $i$ can choose a strategy such that, if $i$ follows this strategy then, no matter what other agents do, $\phi$ will always be true''. However, strategies in (...) \acro{atl} are \emph{revocable} in the sense that in the evaluation of the goal $\phi$ the agent $i$ is no longer restricted by the strategy she has chosen in order to reach the state where the goal is evaluated. -/- Here we discuss some alternatives leading to amendments of that semantics. In particular, we consider variants of \acro{atl}$^*$ where strategies, on the contrary, are \emph{irrevocable}. Unlike in the standard semantics of \acro{atl}, memory plays an essential role in the semantics based on irrevocable strategies. -/- Further, we propose and discuss various syntactic and semantics mechanisms for handling commitments to strategies and release from such commitments in the semantics of ATL$^*$, leading to more expressive and semantically refined versions of that logic. (shrink)

People inhabit a vast and intricate social network nowadays. In addition to our own decisions and actions, we confront those of various groups every day. Collective decisions and actions are more complex and bewildering compared to those made by individuals. As members of a collective, we contribute to its decisions, but our contributions may not always align with the outcome. We may also find ourselves excluded from certain groups and passively subjected to their influences without being aware of the source. (...) We are used to being in overlapping groups and may switch identities, supporting or opposing the claims of particular groups. But rarely do we pause to think: What do we talk about when we talk about groups and their decisions? At the heart of this dissertation is the question of collective agency, i.e., in what sense can we treat a group as a rational agent capable of its action. There are two perspectives we take: a philosophical and logical one. The philosophical perspective mainly discusses the ontological and epistemological issues related to collective agency, sorts out the relevant philosophical history, and argues that the combination of a relational view of collective agency and a dispositional view of collective intentionality provides a rational and realistic account. The logical perspective is associated with formal theories of groups, it disregards the psychological content involved in the philosophical perspective, establishes a logical system that is sufficiently formal and objective, and axiomatizes the nature of a collective. The first topic that is addressed is the ontology of collective agency, i.e., the question what exactly is collective agency. The philosophical discussion of collective agency centres around the reduction problem of the concept of a collective. Individualism and Cartesian internalism have long influenced orthodox theories and made them face the choice between an irreducible concept of a collective and ontological reductionism. Heterodox theories such as functionalism and interpretationism reinterpret the concept of agency and accept it as also realized on the level of a collective. To adequately explain social phenomena that are essentially relational in nature, we propose a relational, holistic account of collective agency and argue that functionalism and interpretationism can be integrated into such an account. While acknowledging the irreducibility of the concept of a collective, we find that there is a deep incompatibility between the concept of a collective and the concept of intentionality as the mark of the mental. To explain how collective intentionality nevertheless is possible and why we tend to use it analogously to how we use the concept of individual intentionality, we explore a dispositional account of intentionality which enables us to give an account of the concept of intentionality at both the individual and collective level. Specifically, we subdivide the dispositional account into three aspects: behavioral, purely mental, and cognitive. We then argue that collective intentionality is real by analyzing different forms of attributive judgments of intentionality and by introducing the perspective of indispensable collective responsibility. We also analyze how philosophical theories about collective agency relate to central features of formal theories about collective decisions, such as game theory. Although the two fields are both concerned with collectives, there are also differences that need to be addressed. For example, game theory is clearly anti-psychologistic since its aim is a formal and objective analysis. However, from the relational and dispositional perspective, intentionality at the individual level and collective intentionality as we analyze it, inevitably involve mental content. In order to explain this difference and identify where the boundary is, we analyze the relationships between the three basic concepts involved, namely intentionality, preference, and dependency, so as to provide a unified picture of collective theory across philosophical and formal theories. After paving the nexus between philosophical and formal perspectives, the logical perspective becomes the theme of our discussion. To be able to express game theoretical concepts and to connect them to our philosophical perspective, We present a logic of preference and functional dependence and its hybrid extension, and provide an axiomatization which is sound and strongly complete. The decidability of this logic is also proved. Its application to modeling non-cooperative and cooperative games in strategic form is explored. The resulting framework provides a unified view of Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimality, and the core. The philosophical relevance of these game-theoretical notions to discussions of collective agency is made explicit. Finally, we conclude and clarify the position of our theory in the broader field of research on the topics addressed in the thesis. Also, we point out many new questions and directions suggested by our analysis, including philosophical and logical open problems. (shrink)

Arrow’s axiomatic foundation of social choice theory can be understood as an application of Tarski’s methodology of the deductive sciences—which is closely related to the latter’s foundational contribution to model theory. In this note we show in a model-theoretic framework how Arrow’s use of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s concept of winning coalitions allows to exploit the algebraic structures involved in preference aggregation; this approach entails an alternative indirect ultrafilter proof for Arrow’s dictatorship result. This link also connects Arrow’s seminal result (...) to key developments and concepts in the history of model theory, notably ultraproducts and preservation results. (shrink)