In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 25.1 (2001) 75-86 [Access article in PDF] Defending Logocentrism Clive Stroud-Drinkwater Postmodernists sometimes seem to think that they can find,support for their antirationalism and anti-objectivism in the work of Wittgenstein, Davidson, and Kuhn. 1 Even opponents of postmodernism occasionally see its central assumptions as allied somehow to the ideas of these three philosophers. 2 Given the revolutionary character and general difficulty of the thought of these (...) three philosophers, it would be hard to prove that all postmodern readings of their works are ungrounded. Davidson 3 does claim that the concept of reference is merely a "theoretical construct" and, at best, an "inscrutable" one within a holistic Tarski-style theory of a language. Wittgenstein 4 does suggest that rules are not like rails that guide us, but rather that they are holistic constructs out of rule-following action. And Kuhn 5 does argue that revolutionary changes in scientific outlook are not determined by rational scientific method.Elsewhere 6 I have expressed doubt about some of these specific views, but in this paper I shall not be directly concerned with either the validity of these ideas themselves, or the possible support such views offer for postmodern attacks on reason and objectivity. My concern will be to show that other, quite central ideas of these thinkers are directly inimical to the postmodern campaign against reason and objectivity. Since postmodernism accords with the poststructuralist assimilation of all language to literature, I shall begin with some remarks on literary criticism itself, setting out the foundation for a Wittgensteinean perspective on traditional issues in the field. [End Page 75] I The New Critics wished to regard a literary text as an object with secondary qualities in it. This theoretical assumption was regarded by some metacritics as hopelessly naïve, partly because different readers find different secondary qualities in the same text, and because it was thought that relativity to a subject is incompatible with externality. However, Einstein's theory of the relativity to a point of view of the primary properties of mass and length, which are clearly external properties, shows that externality and relativity are not necessarily incompatible properties. That purely logical point helps to prepare the conceptual ground for a theory of the externality of certain secondary qualities that exist only relative to a subject. Once the general logical compatibility of externality and relativity is established, what is then needed is a reason for thinking that the relevant secondary qualities in certain texts not only could be but also actually are outside us.Elsewhere 7 I have argued in favor of the externality of the secondary qualia of color by appealing to Grice's causal theory of perception, 8 but my argument there also appeals to the phenomenological givenness of the qualia of color, and hence it would not apply to the aesthetic secondary qualities that concern literary critics. There is, however, another sort of reason to suppose that certain aesthetic qualities not only could be but actually are outside us and in texts. The argument is Wittgensteinean; I believe that it supplies for certain aesthetic qualities that which my argument supplies for certain phenomenological qualities. Very roughly, my argument says that the qualia of color are in objects because that is where the causal story of their existence locates them, and therefore there is no better place to locate them; and, very roughly, the Wittgensteinean argument says that an aesthetic quality such as beauty is in a text because that is where the language game of literary criticism locates it, and there is no better place. For example, we say things like "There is dramatic irony in chapter 4," or "Line 37 is particularly lovely," and if a metaphysician asked, "Where is the loveliness or the irony really?," with special emphasis on the words "really" and "where," then we should answer, "I have already said--it is in chapter 4 and in line 37." If the metaphysician then said, "But different readers find different qualities in the same work--how can there be different aesthetic or literary qualities in the same text?", then we should... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 26.2 (2002) 346-353 [Access article in PDF] Stevens after Davidson on Metaphor Clive Stroud-Drinkwater IN "NOTES TOWARD A SUPREME FICTION" 1 Wallace Stevens suggests that the absolute as we imagine that an angel would experience it constitutes the supreme fiction. We conceive the experience of the angel only in a fantasy, but it is our fantasy, and therefore the experience of the angel and its absolute (...) are things that we comprehend in our imagination. Thus, in imagination we can apprehend that which we may at first suppose only angels can apprehend, since "the lapis-haunted air" of the angel's absolute is a creature of our own imagination and nothing more. When Stevens asks, "Is it he or is it I that experience this?," the question is rhetorical, since the angel's "experience" exists only within the poet's imagination. In "Sunday Morning," likewise, Stevens suggests that the concept of paradise is defined only within the limits of human imagination. It is a construct which people can comprehend only in the terms of their essentially finite "passions," "moods," "grievings," "elations," "remembrance" and "desire;" it is a construct which people create in "a chant of paradise, / Out of their blood, returning to the sky." Abstracting from our ordinary feelings will not leave us with a transcendent conception of paradise; on the contrary, it will deprive us of our sense of value. The image of the inhuman god ("Jove in the clouds" with "his inhuman birth") is sterile, remote from all human concern. For Stevens, "The ultimate value is reality." 2 [End Page 346]It is possible to regard this as a sad and resigned affirmation that we have at most this world and its parochial values, since God is "dead" and we cannot really have paradise at all, 3 but it is also possible to regard it as an affirmation of the genuine value of the ordinary and the human. On this interpretation of Stevens, "Sunday Morning" calls us from the shadows of a self-defeating attempt to transcend our own values to a consideration of the place of ordinary values in our conception of paradise: Shall she not find in comforts of the sun, In pungent fruit and bright, green wings, or else In any balm or beauty of the earth, Things to be cherished like the thought of heaven? The question, which is already rhetorical, is answered flatly in another poem, "The Rock"; the imagination can indeed find paradise in reality: In this plenty, the poem makes meanings of the rock, Of such mixed motion and such imagery That its barrenness becomes a thousand things And so exists no more. This is the cure Of leaves and of the ground and of ourselves. In this "cure" we imagine the world as paradise, or the rock as meaningful, or barrenness as a thousand things. There is, however, an unresolved tension between imagining one thing as another and recognizing that the things are, in fact, different. Max Black regards this tension as the greatest weakness in his "interaction" theory of metaphor. 4 In "Notes" Stevens addresses this problem: Fat girl, terrestrial, my summer, my night, How is it I find you in difference, see you there In a moving contour, a change not quite completed? The problem here is the general problem of metaphor: metaphors seem to constitute an "evasion" 5 since they are usually literally false. 6 For example, the "fat girl" is presumably not literally summer or night, and may not even be fat or a girl, metaphors being what they are. To the "fat girl," the poet says, [End Page 347] You remain the more than natural figure. You Become the soft-footed phantom, the irrational Distortion, however fragrant, however dear. His metaphors disguise the object; the object is represented in them as "more than natural"—in other words, not natural, not the thing as it is. "The very thing and nothing else" ("Credences") that Stevens, the poet of the real world, wishes to see thus becomes "obscure," a thing in "an obscure world / Of things that would... (shrink)

SummarySurely, we think, in some cases it is determinate which rules we follow . But what in the world could determine a rule for us in any case? First 1 consider five common, perfectly natural, but utterly inadequate sorts of answer to this question. Then I consider an account which would avoid the usual inadequacies but would leave rules radically indeterminate, a position which is utterly counter‐intuitive. Thus painted into a corner, I then step out with a prima facie queer, (...) but adequate and ultimately not terribly counter‐intuitive, solution to the puzzle: a sort of picture‐theory of understanding rules . Finally 1 show that the picture‐theory undermines the sorts of anti‐realism which would, if they were valid, undermine the picture‐theory.RésuméNous pensons que, dans certains cas, les règies que nous suivons sont sûrement déterminées. Mais qu'est‐ce au monde qui pourrait déterminer pour nous une règie dans tous les cas? Je considère d'abord cinq réponses communes à cette question, réponses très naturelles, mais absolument inadéquates. Ensuite, j'examine une réponse qui serait plus adéquate, mais laisserait les règies radicalement indéterminées, ce qui est très contraire a l'intuition. Je propose alors une solution qui paraît au premier abord saugrenue, mais qui est adéquate et pas tellement contraire à l'intuition: une sorte de theorie des images pour comprendre les régies . Finalement, je montre que cette théorie des images désarme les types d'antiréalisme qui, s'ils étaient valables, s'opposeraient à cette théorie des images.ZusammenfassungWir denken, dass in einigen Fällen bestimmt ist, wetche Regeln wir befolgen . Was aber in der Welt könnte eine Regel in einem beliebigen Fall bestimmen? Ich betrachte zunächst fünf gewöhnliche durch‐aus natürliche, aber völlig inadäquate Arten von Antworten auf diese Frage. Dann betrachte ich eine Behandlung , die die üblichen Mängel vermeidet, die jedoch Regeln radikal unbestimmt lässt, was unserer Intuition zuwiderläuft. So in die Enge getrieben suche ich einen Ausweg in einer Lösung, die prima facie zwar befremdlich erscheinen mag, die aber adäquat ist und nicht stark gegen die Intuition verstösst: eine Art von Bildtheorie des Verstehens von Regeln . Schliesslich weise ich nach, dass die Bildtheorie die Arten von Antirealismus unterminiert, die die Bildtheorie zerstören würden, wenn sie güitig waren. (shrink)

SummaryWe can find a relation in the world between perceivable objects like rabbits and uses of expressions, so we can define a determinate semantic relation between an expression and such an object. . The relation which we find in the world is such that some philosophers may say that we should not define any semantic relation in terms of it; but the dispute here is really verbal. We can admit that the relation in question is at all significant only because (...) other facts of a sort more familiar to philosophers of language obtain, without giving up the idea that the relation is significant.RésuméOn peut, quoi qu'en dise Quine, découvrir une relation dans le monde entre des objets tels que des lapins et l'usage de certaines expressions, et ainsi définir une relation sémantique entre une expression et un tel objet. La relation que nous découvrons dans le monde est telle que certains philosophes peuvent prétendre qu'elle ne permet pas de définir une quelconque relation semantique, mais la querelle est vraiment verbale. On peut admettre que la relation en question n'est véritablement signifiante que parce que se produisent d'autres faits qui appartiennent à un domaine plus familier aux pbilosophes du langage, sans cependant renoncer à l'idée que la relation est signifiante.ZusammenfassungWir können in der Welt eine Beziehung zwischen wahrnehmbaren Objekten wie Kaninchen und Verwendungen von Ausdrücken finden; wir können deshalb entgegen Quine — eine bestimmte semantische Relation zwischen einem Ausdruck und einem solchen Objekt definieren. Die Relation, die wir in der Welt finden, ist so geartet, dass einige Philosophen behauptet haben, dass wir keine semantische Relation vermittefst von ihr definieren sollten; der Streit ist jedoch in Wirklichkeit verbaler Natur. Wir können annehmen, die fragliche Relation sei überhaupt sinn‐voll, nur weil an deren Tatsachen einer den Sprachphilosophen vertrauteren Art bestehen, ohne die Aussicht, die Relation sei sinnvoll, aufzugeben. (shrink)