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Clea F. Rees [8]Clea Frances Rees [1]
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Clea F. Rees
Cardiff University
  1. Better Lie!Clea F. Rees - unknown
    I argue that lying is generally morally better than mere deliberate misleading because the latter involves the exploitation of a greater trust and more seriously abuses our willingness to fulfil epistemic and moral obligations to others. Whereas the liar relies on our figuring out and accepting only what is asserted, the mere deliberate misleader depends on our actively inferring meaning beyond what is said in the form of conversational implicatures as well. When others’ epistemic and moral obligations are determined by (...)
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  2. Automaticity in Virtuous Action.Clea F. Rees & Jonathan Webber - 2014 - In Nancy E. Snow & Franco V. Trivigno (eds.), The Philosophy and Psychology of Character and Happiness. Routledge. pp. 75-90.
    Automaticity is rapid and effortless cognition that operates without conscious awareness or deliberative control. An action is virtuous to the degree that it meets the requirements of the ethical virtues in the circumstances. What contribution does automaticity make to the ethical virtue of an action? How far is the automaticity discussed by virtue ethicists consonant with, or even supported by, the findings of empirical psychology? We argue that the automaticity of virtuous action is automaticity not of skill, but of motivation. (...)
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  3. Constancy, Fidelity, and Integrity.Clea F. Rees & Jonathan Webber - 2013 - In Stan van Hooft (ed.). Acumen Publishing. pp. 399-408.
  4. A Virtue Ethics Response to Implicit Bias.Clea F. Rees - 2016 - In Michael Brownstein & Jennifer Saul (eds.), Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 2: Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 191-214.
    Virtue ethics faces two challenges based in ‘dual-process’ models of cognition. The classic situationist worry is that we just do not have reliable motivations at all. One promising response invokes an alternative model of cognition which can accommodate evidence cited in support of dual-process models without positing distinct systems for automatic and deliberative processing. The approach appeals to the potential of automatization to habituate virtuous motivations. This response is threatened by implicit bias which raises the worry that we cannot avoid (...)
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    Automaticity in Virtuous Action.Clea F. Rees & Jonathan Webber - 2014 - In Nancy Snow & Franco Trivigno (eds.), The Philosophy and Psychology of Character and Happiness. London, UK: Routledge. pp. 75-90.
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    Automaticity in Virtuous Action.Clea F. Rees & Jonathan Webber - 2014 - In Nancy Snow & Franco Trivigno (eds.), The Philosophy and Psychology of Character and Happiness. London: Routledge. pp. 75-90.
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  7. Reclaiming the Conscience of Huckleberry Finn.Clea F. Rees - 2006 - In Daniel Kolak & Raymond Martin (eds.), The Experience of Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    Huck Finn’s emotional responses constitute perfectly good moral reasons not to betray his friend, even though Huck is unable to recognise them as such.
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  8. Are Intelligible Agents Square?Clea F. Rees - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (1):17-34.
    In How We Get Along, J. David Velleman argues for two related theses: first, that ‘making sense’ of oneself to oneself and others is a constitutive aim of action; second, that this fact about action grounds normativity. Examining each thesis in turn, I argue against the first that an agent may deliberately act in ways which make sense in terms of neither her self-conception nor others' conceptions of her. Against the second thesis, I argue that some vices are such that (...)
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