This book deals with the role of international standards for corporate governance in the context of corporate social responsibility. Based on the fundamentals of moral theory, the book examines governance and CSR in general, addressing questions such as: Is "good governance" not affected by moral concerns? How do the principles and practices of CSR standards adhere to or conflict with insights from business ethics and moral theory? To what extent do the standards and governance models provide normative guidance? Do the (...) standards and governance guidelines provide an adequate means of benchmarking and auditing? Are these standards a help or a hindrance to stakeholder engagement and transparency? The book provides insightful and thought-provoking answers to these and many other important questions concerning CSR standards, and offers a valuable resource for practitioners, academics and students at business schools and other institutions. (shrink)

The book deals with the notion of Downward Causation from a wide array of perspectives, including physics, biology, psychology, social science, communication studies, text theory, and philosophy. The book includes proponents as well as opponents discussing the validity of the notion.

Bibliographical Note Abstract Explaining things - introductory remarks General attitudes and the standard view Requirements for a definition Life as the natural selection of replicators Life as an autopoietic system Life as a semiotic phenomenon Downward causation Implicitly well-defined general objects Emergence as explanatory strategy: the observer reappears Concluding remarks Acknowledgements Notes References Bibliographical note: Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Princeton History of Science Workshop on "Growing Explanations", Princeton University, February 15, 1997; and at the meeting (...) in the International Society for the History, Philosophy and Social Studies of Biology (ISHPSSB) in Seattle, USA, July 16-21, 1997. Different parts were published in a modified form as 1) Emmeche (1997): "Autopoietic systems, replicators, and the search for a meaningful biologic definition of life", Ultimate Reality and Meaning 20 (4): 244-264 [the original title was: "Is the definition of life important?"], and 2) Emmeche (1998): "Defining life as a semiotic phenomenon", Cybernetics & Human Knowing 5 (1): 3-17. The present web version below contains the complete argument of both articles. A further thoroughly rewritten version, accessible also for non-specialists, was made in collaboration with Charbel Niño El-Hani, and translated by him into Portuguese as a contribution to a book (this version can be found at www.nbi.dk/~emmeche/coPubl/99.DefVida.CE.EH.html). (shrink)

What is it to judge something to be a natural end? And what objects may properly be judged natural ends? These questions pose a challenge, because the predicates “natural” and “end” seemingly can not be instantiated at the same time – at least given some Kantian assumptions. My paper defends the thesis that Kant’s “Critique of Teleological Judgment”, nevertheless, provides a sensible account of judging something a natural end. On the account, a person judges an object O a natural end, (...) if she thinks that the parts of O cause O and if she is committed to approach O in a top-down manner, as if the parts were produced in view of the whole. The account is non-realist, because it involves a commitment. With the account comes a characterization that provides necessary and sufficient conditions on objects that may properly be judged natural ends. My paper reconstructs the argument in CTJ, §§64-65 where the account and the characterization are derived. (shrink)

Karl Christian Friedrich Krause left an impressive oeuvre consisting of 256 books and articles, covering numerous branches of philosophy, the humanities, and science.[1] His Urbild der Menschheit, his Vorlesungen über das System der Philosophie and his Vorlesungen über die Grundwahrheiten der Wissenschaft are of particular pertinence for philosophers today. [1] See: E. M. Ureña and E. Fuchs, “Einführung in das Gesamtwerk”, in Karl Christian Friedrich Krause. Band 1: Entwurf des Systems der Philosophie, ed. T. Bach and O. Breidbach.

O advento da sociedade em rede promoveu mudanças significativas na experiência-com-o-mundo. Observa-se nos últimos anos a crescente toxidade no ambiente informacional, marcado tanto pela vivência tóxica da informação que circula legalmente nas redes sociais como por informações que intoxicam os indivíduos e grupos. O objetivo é discutir, em tempos de pós-verdade e da sociedade non-stop, o aspecto tóxico da informação, que ao tornar o ambiente informacional tóxico, adoece indivíduos e também as sociedades democráticas, ao esmaecer a empatia para com os (...) demais e de pôr em risco a própria ideia de democracia e de vida partilhada de modo democrático. A proposta é discutir a intoxicação pela informação não pelo excesso (infoxicação), mas pelo que nomeio informação tóxica, i.e., o aspecto tóxico da informação e de ambiente informacional tóxico tendo como referência os discursos de ódio. Para tanto serão consideradas a desconstrução de experiências de estados democráticos mediante o crescimento da circulação de discursos de ódio e de discursos de ódio fascistas; o crescimento da desinformação; o crescimento da circulação de notícias fraudulentas (Fake news) e de notícias falsas (por exemplo, as não endossadas pelos saberes científicos, como o terraplanismo, a ideia da supremacia branca); os robots e os algoritmos. (shrink)

Nietzsche filozofuje przy pomocy fikcyjnych postaci, aby naświetlić kontestacje problemów z różnych pozycji. To sprawia, że trudno przypisać mu jednoznaczne stwierdzenia, zwłaszcza jeśli chodzi o jego stanowisko wobec oświecenia. W niniejszym artykule autor stara się wykazać, na podstawie figury Nietzschego jako „wolnego ducha”, że ten rzekomy przedstawiciel oświecenia nie wydajesię bynajmniej konsekwentnie pozytywny, lecz jest krytycznie oceniany z różnych perspektyw, także przy bliższym poznaniu okazuje się bohaterem ogólnego samooszustwa, uwikłanym w iluzje.

Discutir a potencialidade imagem em movimento no ensino de Filosofia e a compreensão do filme como discurso significante, conjugando as experiências desenvolvidas em pesquisas e sala de aula. Apresentar também recortes de disciplina ministrada que utilizou textos filosóficos e episódio de StarTrek Deep Space Nine. O filme é entendido como texto fílmico, um objeto em cuja materialidade estão inscritos diferentes códigos da linguagem cinematográfica, e como documento informacional, que comporta diferentes níveis de informações que necessitam ser reconhecidas e trabalhadas, a (...) fim de que o uso pedagógico seja satisfatório. Assim, para além do entretenimento, o texto fílmico tem a possibilidade de ser usado como recurso pedagógico e de análise social. Observa-se como constitutivos do universo Trek os filmes realizados para o cinema e as séries televisivas. (shrink)

The author examines the arguments for applicability of the limitation clause which specifies the requirements for limitation of constitutional freedoms and rights (Article 31 para. 3 of the Constitution) to the right to protection of life (Article 38). Even if there is almost a general acceptance of such applicability, this approach does not hold up to criticism based on the rule existing in the Polish legal order that treaty commitments concerning human rights have supremacy over national statutory regulations. Due to (...) an international pattern which does not provide application of the limitation clause to the right to life protection, despite the recognition — at the level of a constitutional standard — of applicability of the clause of Article 31 para. 3 to Article 38, and to protection of life in general, this will be made impossible at any attempt to formulate a statutory standard. He also points out the defectiveness of the reasoning leading to acceptance of certain limitations of a particular value (e.g. life) on the basis of the ex definitione exemptions existing in the international standard to the assumption of applicability of the limitation clause when shaping statutory standards in the Polish legal system. The discussed issues are related to the question of interpretation of the inviolability of human rights. This term takes different meaning in the context of: 1) inviolability of all human rights understood in abstracto as normative structures of a general and abstract nature; 2) right protecting certain values with no exception; 3) rights to which an application of the limitation clause is forbidden; 4) rights not subject to derogation; 5) inviolability of understood in concreto, as that is (here and now) due to the subject of dignity; 6) inviolable essence of freedoms and rights. One should also clearly distinguish between (7) the descriptive and (8) the normative meaning of inviolability. -/- Punktem wyjścia jest analiza argumentacji na rzecz tezy o stosowalności do prawa do ochrony życia (art. 38 Konstytucji RP), klauzuli limitacyjnej określającej warunki ograniczania konstytucyjnych wolności i praw (art. 31 ust. 3). Mimo niemal powszechnej akceptacji tej tezy, nie wytrzymuje ona krytyki opartej na pierwszeństwie, które w polskim porządku prawnym mają zobowiązania traktowe dotyczące praw człowieka, wobec regulacji ustawowych. Ze względu na wzorzec międzynarodowy, który nie przewiduje stosowania klasycznej klauzuli limitacyjnej do prawa do życia, mimo uznania - na poziomie standardu konstytucyjnego - stosowalności klauzuli z art. 31 ust. 3 do art. 38 i ochrony życia w ogóle, stosowalność tej klauzuli będzie uniemożliwiona przy każdej próbie formułowania standardu ustawowego. Autor zwraca uwagę na wadliwość wnioskowania prowadzącego od uznania dopuszczalności pewnych ograniczeń ochrony jakiejś wartości (np. życia) na podstawie wyjątków ex definitione obecnych w standardzie międzynarodowym, do tezy o stosowalności klauzuli limitacyjnej przy kształtowaniu standardu ustawowego w polskim systemie prawnym. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to analysis of co-called paradox of confirmation formulated by C. G. Hempel in the 1930s. In particular, the author proposes a solution of this puzzle. The proposal consists in refining the concept of confirmation by adding a clause that if A confirms a hypothesis h, the former must be a logical consequence of a latter, eventually derived with the help of additional assumptions. This leads to an additional constraint requiring that confirmations act relatively to sets of (...) reference. Finally, if h and h’ are logically equivalent, a sentence A confirms both to the same degree if and only if related sets of reference are the same. (shrink)

W NINIEJSZYM opracowaniu analizuję klauzulę dobra wspólnego zawartą w art. 1 Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z 2 kwietnia 1997 r., zmierzając do uwyraźnienia, w jakim sensie można mówić o jej prawnonaturalnym charakterze (zatem i do zarysowania możliwych znaczeń zwrotu "prawnonaturalny charakter klauzuli dobra wspólnego") oraz do ujawnienia „momentów" prawnonaturalnych, które mogą wchodzić w grę przy interpretacji tej klauzuli.

America frequently talks about impeaching a president, but the impeachment provisions of the American constitution are widely misunderstood. In High Crimes and Misdemeanors, constitutional scholar Frank O. Bowman, III offers unprecedented clarity to the question of impeachment, tracing its roots to medieval England through its adoption in the Constitution and 250 years of American experience. By examining the human and political history of those who have faced impeachment, Bowman demonstrates that the Framers intended impeachment to be a flexible tool, adaptable (...) to the needs of any age. Written in a lively, engaging style, the book combines a deep historical and constitutional analysis of the impeachment clauses, a coherent theory of when impeachment should be used to protect constitutional order against presidential misconduct, and a comprehensive presentation of the case for and against impeachment of President Trump. It is an indispensable work for the present moment. (shrink)

Greek literature embodies a number of instances of the optative in main clauses that are acknowledged either definitely or probably to have a reference to past time. These are mostly well known, but the object of this article is to reconsider them and to attempt an explanation. They are certainly commonest in the Homeric period, but later examples are by no means wanting.

Professor Cairns has suggested that the use of modo in Propertius 1.1.11, which has long been seen as problematic, can be understood in terms of some instances of the Greek modo, he says, here means not but, and the modo clause is prior in time to the clause that follows it just as, in his view, a Greek imperfect with can have the force of a pluperfect and refer to a time prior to that of the verb of a following (...) clause. (shrink)

Professor Cairns has suggested that the use of modo in Propertius 1.1.11, which has long been seen as problematic, can be understood in terms of some instances of the Greek modo, he says, here means not but , and the modo clause is prior in time to the clause that follows it just as, in his view, a Greek imperfect with can have the force of a pluperfect and refer to a time prior to that of the verb of a (...) following clause. (shrink)

This essay critiques Professor Martha Nussbaum's book, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America's Tradition of Religious Equality . Nussbaum's thesis is that the entire tradition of religious liberty in America can be both best understood and justified by recourse to the overarching principle of equal respect —that “[a]ll citizens have equal rights and deserve equal respect from the government under which they live.” Nussbaum insists that equal respect pervades the tradition and that all other values of religious liberty are (...) subordinate to it. She examines various free-exercise and establishment issues in light of this principle, concluding that the tradition of religious equality is under threat and calling for renewed vigilance in its defense. This essay criticizes Nussbaum's elevation of the principle of equal respect to supreme normative status. It claims that Nussbaum's single-minded focus on equal respect distorts and misunderstands the conflicts actually at issue in many religious liberty disputes. The essay focuses specifically on the inadequacies of her assessment of two prominent religious liberty cases, one in the free exercise and the other in the established context. This essay concludes that there are reasons for deep skepticism about Nussbaum's approach as a comprehensive theory of the religion clauses. (shrink)

resumo: Há uma solidariedade entre o estilo do L'Individuation à la Lumière des Notions de Forme et d'Information e os princípios teóricos que a obra toma como ponto de partida para sua investigação dos diversos processos de individuação. Essa solidariedade torna o estilo da obra um programa filosófico que responde a demandas precisas quanto ao papel das ciências da natureza, das ciências humanas e da técnica, sua classificação, sua história e sua consistência teórica, demandas que pretendemos especificar no artigo. Ao (...) mesmo tempo esse programa de Simondon requer que o autor recolha os princípios teóricos de sua análise em um corpo teórico cujas linhas gerais desenham a fisonomia de toda uma filosofia, de caráter peculiar. É isso o que justifica, e até mesmo exige, que Simondon tome por objeto o problema da individuação nos termos em que o faz, e que possa apresentar essa aproximação do problema como uma crítica cujo valor é ele mesmo filosófico: uma resposta peculiar ao positivismo, ao pragmatismo, ao estruturalismo e, sobretudo, às formas de compreensão das ciências e das técnicas que era hegemônica no final dos anos 50, no ambiente intelectual francês. abstract: There is a strict allegiance between the style present in L'Individuation à la Lumière des Notions de Forme et d'Information and the theoretical principles by which this work inquires the diverse individuation processes. That allegiance makes this style a whole investigation program on the role of natural sciences, humanities and technology in general, their classification, history and theoretical nature. The clauses of that investigation will be shown in its general lines by the paper itself. But the point is that, at the same time, this investigation program requires the specific theoretical principles adopted by Simondon in this work as a theory and in its development as a complete philosophy. Indeed this is the reason why Simondon takes the problem about individuation processes as the focus of his discussions. Such discussions offer a critique whose value is itself philosophical. That strategy results in a peculiar response to positivism, pragmatism, structuralism and the hegemonic way of thinking about sciences and techniques in the French fifties. (shrink)

Cet article, s’inscrit dans le cadre minimaliste de la syntaxe générative et étudie oui / non et wh-questions dans la langue Ǹjò̩-kóo, parlée dans l’état de Ondo au Nigeria. On observe que la particule interrogative pour des questions de type oui / non qui suit systématiquement le sujet DP se trouve également dans des clauses avec wh-questions. Cet article soutient que oui / non et wh-questions sont projetées par la même tête fonctionnelle Inter˚, et que wh-words ne participent pas à (...) la saisie de wh-propositions comme interrogative. L’article conclut que le mouvement de Wh-éléments vers la position initiale de la clause dans les langues à WH-mouvement n’a pas pour but l’interrogation mais plutôt pour la focalisation. (shrink)

Abduction is or subsumes a process of inference. It entertains possible hypotheses and it chooses hypotheses for further scrutiny. There is a large literature on various aspects of non-symbolic, subconscious abduction. There is also a very active research community working on the symbolic characterisation of abduction, which typically treats it as a form of hypothetico-deductive reasoning. In this paper we start to bridge the gap between the symbolic and sub-symbolic approaches to abduction. We are interested in benefiting from developments made (...) by each community. In particular, we are interested in the ability of non-symbolic systems to learn from experience using efficient algorithms and to perform massively parallel computations of alternative abductive explanations. At the same time, we would like to benefit from the rigour and semantic clarity of symbolic logic. We present two approaches to dealing with abduction in neural networks. One of them uses Connectionist Modal Logic and a translation of Horn clauses into modal clauses to come up with a neural network ensemble that computes abductive explanations in a top-down fashion. The other combines neural-symbolic systems and abductive logic programming and proposes a neural architecture which performs a more systematic, bottom-up computation of alternative abductive explanations. Both approaches employ standard neural network architectures which are already known to be highly effective in practical learning applications. Differently from previous work in the area, our aim is to promote the integration of reasoning and learning in a way that the neural network provides the machinery for cognitive computation, inductive learning and hypothetical reasoning, while logic provides the rigour and explanation capability to the systems, facilitating the interaction with the outside world. Although it is left as future work to determine whether the structure of one of the proposed approaches is more amenable to learning than the other, we hope to have contributed to the development of the area by approaching it from the perspective of symbolic and sub-symbolic integration. (shrink)

Τ⋯ τε 'Ομ⋯ρον ⋯ξ ὑποβολ⋯ς γ⋯γραφε [σόλων] ῥαψῳδεῖσθαι, οἷον ὅπου ό πρ⋯τος ἒληξεν ⋯κεῖθεν ἂρχεσθαι τòν ⋯χ;óμεν㦿ν.It would be tedious to trace the course of the controversy about this phrase. Since Hermann showed that ύποβάλλειν means ‘subiicere alteri quod recordetur uel dicat’, the many conflicting interpretations have been obliged to resort to some device, more or less strained, in order to reconcile the natural sense of ύποβολή with what at least appears to be the explanatory clause added in the text (...) of Diogenes, and with the parallel phrase in the Hipparchus, 228d: ήνάγκασε τούς ῥαΨῳδοὺς Παναθηναίοις ⋯ξ ύπολ⋯ψεως ⋯φεξης α⋯τ⋯ διι⋯ναι. We should expect some term meaning performance by turns, and sufficiently technical to need the explanation given by Diogenes. Mr. Pallis has cut the knot in the Classical Quarterly by suggesting ⋯ξ ὺποβ⋯ς on the model of the pseudo-Platonic passage. There is, however, no classical authority for this word, and a change as small will restore a known technical word with the required sense. (shrink)

Τ τε 'Ομρον ξ ποβολς γγραφε [σόλων] αψδεσθαι, οον που ό πρτος ληξεν κεθεν ρχεσθαι τòν χ;óμεν㦿ν . It would be tedious to trace the course of the controversy about this phrase. Since Hermann showed that ύποβάλλειν means ‘subiicere alteri quod recordetur uel dicat’ , the many conflicting interpretations have been obliged to resort to some device, more or less strained, in order to reconcile the natural sense of ύποβολή with what at least appears to be the explanatory clause added (...) in the text of Diogenes, and with the parallel phrase in the Hipparchus, 228d: ήνάγκασε τούς αΨδος Παναθηναίοις ξ ύπολψεως φεξης ατδιιναι. We should expect some term meaning performance by turns, and sufficiently technical to need the explanation given by Diogenes. Mr. Pallis has cut the knot in the Classical Quarterly by suggesting ξ ποβς on the model of the pseudo-Platonic passage. There is, however, no classical authority for this word, and a change as small will restore a known technical word with the required sense. (shrink)

In the first section, I characterize skeptical theism more fully. This is necessary in order to address some important misconceptions and mischaracterizations that appear in the essays by Maitzen, Wilks, and O’Connor. In the second section, I describe the most important objections they raise and group them into four “families” so as to facilitate an orderly series of responses. In the four sections that follow, I respond to the objections.

As philosophers of mind we seem to hold in common no very clear view about the relevance that work in psychology or the neurosciences may or may not have to our own favourite questions—even if we call the subject ‘philosophical psychology’. For example, in the literature we find articles on pain some of which do, some of which don't, rely more or less heavily on, for example, the work of Melzack and Wall; the puzzle cases used so extensively in discussions (...) of personal identity are drawn sometimes from the pleasant exercise of scientific fantasy, at times from surprising reports of scientific fact; and there are those who deny, as well as those who affirm, the importance of the discovery of rapid-eye-movement sleep to the philosophical treatment of dreaming. A general account of the relation between scientific, and philosophical, psychology is long overdue and of the first importance. Here I shall limit myself to just one area where the two seem to connect, discussing one type of neuropsychological research and its relevance to questions in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of psychology. (shrink)

William Irwin é Professor de Filosofia no King's College em Wilkes-Barre Pensilvânia, nasceu em 1970 e residiu em Yonkers, New York. Entrou na Regis High School em Manhattan, uma instituição Jesuíta, graduando-se em 1988. Graduou-se em Filosofia na Universidade Fordham em 1992, tendo frequentado Fordham com uma bolsa presidencial completa. Ele recebeu seu Ph.D. em Filosofia pela Universidade de Buffalo, a Universidade Estadual de Nova York, em 1996, aos 26 anos. A dissertação de Irwin, Harmonizing Hermeneutics: The Normative and Descriptive (...) Approaches, Interpretation and Criticism, foi premiada com o Prêmio Perry para Dissertações Destacadas em Filosofia. Seu diretor de dissertação foi Jorge J. E. Gracia. E.D. Hirsch, Jr. foi seu avaliador externo. Publicou artigos e resenhas a respeitos de Hermenêutica, de Sartre, de Platão, de Filosofia da Lei e de Pedagogia Filosófica. O professor Irwin é mais conhecido por ter originado o gênero livro "filosofia e cultura popular", à qual se integram obra como Matrix – Bem-vindo ao deserto do real, Os Simpsons e Filosofia e Oh! De Homer. (shrink)

Authority in Morals: An Essay in Christian Ethics. By Gerard J. Hughes On Human Nature. By Edward O. Wilson Democracy and Ethical Life. By Claes G. Ryn The Foundations of Modern Political Thought. By Quentin Skinner. 2 vols. Phenomenology and the Social World: the Philosophy of Merleau‐Ponty and its Relation to the Social Conscience. By Laurie Spurting Philosophical Foundations of the Three Sociologies. By Ted Benton Christianity and the World Order. By Edward Norman. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979, £3.50. The (...) Stoics. Edited by John M. Rist Descartes. By Margaret D. Wilson Physicalism. By K.V. Wilkes Kierkegaard as Educator. By R.J. Manheimer Two Ages: The Age of Revolution and the Present Age. By Søren Kierkegaard, translated and edited by Howard and Edna Hong Parables of Kierkegaard. Edited by Thomas C. Oden Thomas Carlyle: ‘Cahinist without the Theology’. By Eloise M. Behnken The Praise of 'Sons of Bitches’. By James V. Schall The Inner Eye of Love. By William Johnston The River Within. By Christopher Bryant The Religious Imagination and the Sense of God. By John Bowker Old Testament Theology: A Fresh Approach. By Ronald E. Clements What is a Gospel? By Charles H. Talbert Urchristliche Prophetic. By Gerhard Dautzenberg Amphttochii Icontensis Opera. Edited by Cornells Datema Man and Nature in the Renaissance. By Allen G. Debus The Church in Late Victorian Scotland 1874–1900. By Andrew L. Drummond and James Bullock. Ppix, 342, Edinburgh, The St Andrew Press, 1978, £10.50. From Office to Profession: The New England Ministry 1750–1860. By Donald M. Scott Bemard‐Lazare: Anti‐Semitism and the Problem of Jewish Identity in Late Nineteenth Century France. By Nelly Wilson. (shrink)

This collection consists of a two-part Introduction by the editors Martha Nussbaum and Amelie O. Rorty ; nineteen articles, mostly published here for the first time, by M. F. Burnyeat, Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam, S. Marc Cohen, Jennifer Whiting, Michael Frede, K. V. Wilkes, Alan Code and Julius Moravcsik, G. E. R. Lloyd, Charlotte Witt, Gareth B. Matthews, Richard Sorabji, Cynthia Freeland, Malcolm Schofield, Dorothea Frede, Julia Annas, Franz Brentano, L. A. Kosman, Charles Kahn, and Henry S. Richardson ; an (...) extremely useful Bibliography of works cited in these twenty chapters with important additions; an Index Locorum; and a Name Index. (shrink)

We develop an exact truthmaker semantics for permission and obligation. The idea is that with every singular act, we associate a sphere of permissions and a sphere of requirements: the acts that are rendered permissible and the acts that are rendered required by the act. We propose the following clauses for permissions and obligations: -/- - a singular act is an exact truthmaker of Pφ iff every exact truthmaker of φ is in the sphere of permissibility of the act, and (...) -/- - a singular act is an exact truthmaker of Oφ iff some exact truthmaker of φ is in the sphere of requirements of the act. -/- We show that this semantics is hyperintensional, and that it can deal with some of the so-called paradoxes of deontic logic in a natural way. Finally, we give a sound and complete axiomatization of the semantics. (shrink)

We elaborate Weiermann-style phase transitions for well-partial-orderings (wpo) determined by iterated finite sequences under Higman-Friedman style embedding with Gordeev’s symmetric gap condition. For every d-times iterated wpo ${\left({\rm S}\text{\textsc{eq}}^{d}, \trianglelefteq _{d}\right)}$ in question, d > 1, we fix a natural extension of Peano Arithmetic, ${T \supseteq \sf{PA}}$ , that proves the corresponding second-order sentence ${\sf{WPO}\left({\rm S}{\textsc{eq}}^{d}, \trianglelefteq _{d}\right) }$ . Having this we consider the following parametrized first-order slow well-partial-ordering sentence ${\sf{SWP}\left({\rm S}\text{\textsc{eq}}^{d}, \trianglelefteq _{d}, r\right):}$ $$\left( \forall K > 0 (...) \right) \left( \exists M > 0\right) \left( \forall x_{0},\ldots ,x_{M}\in {\rm S}\text{\textsc{eq}}^{d}\right)$$ $$\left( \left( \forall i\leq M\right) \left( \left| x_{i}\right| < K + r \left\lceil \log _{d} \left( i+1\right) \right\rceil \right)\rightarrow \left( \exists i < j \leq M \right) \left(x_{i} \trianglelefteq _{d} x_{j}\right) \right)$$ for a natural additive Seq d -norm |·| and r ranging over EFA-provably computable positive reals, where EFA is an abbreviation for IΔ 0 + exp. We show that the following basic phase transition clauses hold with respect to ${T = \Pi_{1}^{0}\sf{CA}_{ < \varphi ^{_{\left( d-1\right) }} \left(0\right) }}$ and the threshold point1. If r < 1 then ${\sf{SWP}\left({\rm S}\text{\textsc{eq}}^{d}, \trianglelefteq _{d},r \right) }$ is provable in T. If ${r > 1}$ then ${\sf{SWP}\left({\rm S}\text{\textsc{eq}}^{d}, \trianglelefteq _{d},r \right) }$ is not provable in T.Moreover, by the well-known proof theoretic equivalences we can just as well replace T by PA or ACA 0 and ${\Delta _{1}^{1}\sf{CA}}$ , if d = 2 and d = 3, respectively.In the limit case d → ∞ we replaceEFA-provably computable reals r by EFA-provably computable functions ${f: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{+}}$ and prove analogous theorems. (In the sequel we denote by ${\mathbb{R}_{+}}$ the set of EFA-provably computable positive reals). In the basic case T = PA we strengthen the basic phase transition result by adding the following static threshold clause ${\sf{SWP}\left({\rm S}\text{\textsc{eq}}^{2}, \trianglelefteq _{2}, 1\right)}$ is still provable in T = PA (actually in EFA). Furthermore we prove the following dynamic threshold clauses which, loosely speaking are obtained by replacing the static threshold t by slowly growing functions 1 α given by ${1_{\alpha }\left( i\right)\,{:=}\,1+\frac{1}{H_{\alpha }^{-1}\left(i\right) }, H_{\alpha}}$ being the familiar fast growing Hardy function and ${H_{\alpha }^{-1}\left( i\right)\,{:=}\,\rm min \left\{ j \mid H_{\alpha } \left ( j\right) \geq i \right\}}$ the corresponding slowly growing inversion. If ${\alpha < \varepsilon _{0}}$ , then ${\sf{SWP}\left({\rm S}\text{\textsc{eq}}^{2}, \trianglelefteq _{2}, 1_{\alpha}\right)}$ is provable in T = PA. ${\sf{SWP}\left( {\rm S}\text{\textsc{eq}}^{2}, \trianglelefteq _{2},1_{\varepsilon _{0}}\right)}$ is not provable in T = PA. We conjecture that this pattern is characteristic for all ${T\supseteq \sf{PA}}$ under consideration and their proof-theoretical ordinals o (T ), instead of ${\varepsilon _{0}}$. (shrink)

Next SectionIn this remark, I first show that a Lewis–Kratzer–von Fintel style semantics of conditionals and modals (Lewis 1973; Kratzer 1991a, b; von Fintel 1994; a.o.) together with the downward-entailing-based (DE-based) approach to the licensing of negative polarity items (NPIs) incorrectly predicts that NPIs are ungrammatical in the if-clause of a conditional with a possibility modal in the main clause (i.e., a conditional of the form if p, ◊q; henceforth, CPM; e.g., If John has ever been to Paris, he might (...) become a good chef). I then list three possible solutions to this problem to be explored in future work. (shrink)

RESUMEN: En el presente trabajo se hará una crítica al enfoque de máquinas nomológicas desarrollado por Nancy Cartwright para el caso de las ciencias sociales. Se argumentará que los fenómenos sociales no responden a una lógica de "capacidades", sino de "árboles de posibilidades" o "resultados de final abierto". La estabilidad o invarianza, si bien es posible en el reino de lo social, parece ser más la excepción que la regla. Esto tiene consecuencias importantes para los propósitos de intervención y control. (...) De acuerdo con las corrientes manipulabilistas tradicionales la invarianza es una herramienta fundamental para cumplir cualquier propósito intervencionista, ya que permite prever con un buen grado de confianza el resultado de una manipulación. Sin embargo, en este trabajo se intentará mostrar que, a pesar de que no sea del todo plausible obtener un conocimiento invariante en el reino de lo social, las intervenciones pueden ser igualmente eficaces. Para ello, será fundamental reemplazar la noción "ex-ante" de intervención por una que involucre continuidad o sistematicidad. También será clave tener en cuenta aquellas cláusulas o condiciones especificadas dentro de los modelos, ya que estos últimos cumplen el rol de ser anteproyectos para la generación de resultados. ABSTRACT: In the present paper, a critique of Nancy Cartwright's nomological machines approach in the social sciences will be made. It is argued that social phenomena do not correspond to the logic of "capacities", but to the logic of "possibility trees" or "open-ended results". Stability or invariance, although possible in the social realm, seem to be more the exception than the rule. This has important implications for the purposes of intervention and control. According to traditional manipulabilistic accounts, invariance is essential for achieving any interventionist purpose, because it allows predicting the result of a manipulation with a high degree of confidence. However, in this paper it will be shown that even though the obtaining of invariant knowledge is not entirely plausible in the social realm, interventions may be effective. To do this, it will be necessary to replace the "ex-ante" notion of intervention with another notion that involves continuity. It will also be crucial to take into account the clauses or conditions specified in models, since such models play the role of being blueprints for generating results. (shrink)

This book answers the question of how soft factors such as corporate cultures and individual and corporate values can be transparently steered. With its C4 management tool and reflecting the seven driving forces of corporate culture, the Values Cockpit is a powerful solution designed to steer all dimensions and processes of a company, pursuing a lean approach. The book links strategic approaches on how to steer a company towards excellence with insights into the driving forces of human thoughts and actions. (...) It subsequently introduces the Values Cockpit, which allows individual corporate cultures to be developed and controlled on the basis of a rational approach. "This intriguing book breaks new ground in suggesting that values can be managed quite as systematically as any other centrally important asset" Rebecca Henderson, John and Natty McArthur Professor, Harvard University "... a deeply articulate, profoundly relevant explication of the role played by the culture of commerce... rich with actionable tools, insights and clear examples..." Richard J Hill IV, Founder, Gabriel Consulting Group, LLC "One seldom sees practical advice on HOW strong values can be automatically practiced on a daily basis by all concerned. That is what makes this remarkable book so refreshing... his book is taking the seminal findings of Jim Collins on building great companies a step further..." Julian Clarke, Chartered Accountant and Management Consultant, European Business Ethics Network Ireland "... a brilliant yet succinct guide to teach the significance of values-development in sustainable business management..." Professor Dr. Haifeng Huang, Assistant Dean, Peking University HSBC Business School, Shenzhen, China "He admirably rejects the fatalist interpretation of the immoral might of markets and replaces it with a counter-narrative of why and how companies can be part of the solution rather than part of the problem." Professor Dr. Claus Dierksmeier, Director of the Global Ethic Institute, Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen "The values cockpit gives readers a coherent and comprehensive toolkit to help them prepare their companies for lasting success." Dr. Kurt Schmalz, C.E.O and Managing Partner J. Schmalz GmbH, Glatten, Germany. (shrink)

Resumo No segundo capítulo das Categorias, Aristóteles introduz um esquema conceptual de acordo com o qual, recorrendo a dois únicos critérios, “estar num sujeito” e “dizer-se de um sujeito”, é possível distribuir a realidade por quatro tipos de entes: as substâncias individuais, que nem estão num sujeito nem se dizem de um sujeito; as substâncias universais, que se dizem de um sujeito, mas não estão num sujeito; os acidentes individuais, que estão num sujeito, mas não se dizem de um sujeito; (...) e os acidentes universais, que estão num sujeito e se dizem de um sujeito. O problema coloca-se ao nível do terceiro tipo de entes, os acidentes individuais, em virtude, em particular, do modo como são definidos no texto, a saber, como algo que “não pode ser separadamente daquilo em que está”. Ora a importância desta cláusula, e, portanto, da sua correcta interpretação, vai muito para além de uma simples decisão em matéria textual ou mesmo doutrinária, se a restringirmos ao passo e à questão em apreço. Nela, joga-se todo o sentido que Aristóteles deseja atribuir à individualidade das inerências e, através dela, o modo como é por ele concebida a distinção ontológica entre substâncias e acidentes individuais, enquanto tipos diversos de itens individuais. Este, pois, o objecto do presente estudo: apreender o sentido e o fundamento da distinção entre substâncias e acidentes individuais em Aristóteles, a partir de uma análise do estatuto das inerências no segundo capítulo das Categorias. Palavras-chave : acidente, Aristóteles, Categorias, individual, inerências, substânciaIn the second chapter of Categories, Aristotle introduces a conceptual scheme in accordance to which, using only two criteria, “being in a subject” and “said of a subject”, it is possible to distribute reality over four types of beings: individual substances, which are neither in a subject nor are said of a subject; universal substances, which are said of a subject but are not in a subject; individual accidents, which are in a subject, but are not said of a subject; and universal accidents, which are in a subject and are said of a subject. The problem arises with the third type of entity, individual accidents, due to the way they are defined in the text, namely as something which “cannot exist separately from what it is in”. The importance of this clause, and therefore of its correct interpretation, goes far beyond the mere decision on textual or even doctrinal matters, if restricted to the passage and to the question under consideration. What is at stake here is the significance that Aristotle wishes to attribute to the individuality of inherences and, through that, the way in which the ontological distinction between individual substances and individual accidents – that is to say, between primary substances and their accidents as diverse types of individual items – is conceived by him. Here, then, is the scope of this paper: to grasp the meaning and the rationale of the distinction between individual substances and individual accidents in Aristotle, based on the analysis of the statute of inherences in the second chapter of the Categories. Keywords: accident, Aristotle, categories, individual, inherences, substance. (shrink)

En este trabajo se explora una conexión entre el contextualismo y el fiabilismo. El propósito es desarrollar las líneas centrales de un acercamiento contextualista para resolver la crítica internista de que las nociones fiabilistas de justificación y de conocimiento no son adecuadas porque no recogen las intuiciones correspondientes a que un sujeto que está justificado o que sabe es racional y epistemológicamente responsable. Se argumenta que esta crítica y el escepticismo pirrónico comparten un presupuesto común, a saber, la cláusula internista, (...) por lo que, si es posible limitar el alcance de esta cláusula a través del contextualismo distinguiendo dos contextos diferentes, entonces también es posible hacer uso de esta distinción para dar respuesta a la crítica internista al fiabilismo. In this paper, we explore a connection between reliabilism and contextualism. our purpose is to draw up a contextualist approach to solve the critique that the reliabilist notions of justification and knowledge are not satisfactory because there is no room for the intuitions that a subject who is justified or knows is rational and epistemologically responsible. We will argue that this critique and the Pyrrohnian skepticism share the same assumption, viz., the internalist clause. Thus, if it is possible to limit the scope of this clause using contextualism, making a distinction between two different contexts, then it is also possible to use this distinction to offer an answer to the internalist critique to reliabilism. (shrink)

In this paper we present a dynamic assignment language which extends the dynamic predicate logic of Groenendijk and Stokhof [1991: 39–100] with assignment and with generalized quantifiers. The use of this dynamic assignment language for natural language analysis, along the lines of o.c. and [Barwise, 1987: 1–29], is demonstrated by examples. We show that our representation language permits us to treat a wide variety of donkey sentences: conditionals with a donkey pronoun in their consequent and quantified sentences with donkey pronouns (...) anywhere in the scope of the quantifier. It is also demonstrated that our account does not suffer from the so-called proportion problem.Discussions about the correctness or incorrectness of proposals for dynamic interpretation of language have been hampered in the past by the difficulty of seeing through the ramifications of the dynamic semantic clauses (phrased in terms of input-output behaviour) in non-trivial cases. To remedy this, we supplement the dynamic semantics of our representation language with an axiom system in the style of Hoare. While the representation languages of barwise and Groenendijk and Stokhof were not axiomatized, the rules we propose form a deduction system for the dynamic assignment language which is proved correct and complete with respect to the semantics. (shrink)

Bruce Mitchell has observed that “It is not always possible to say with certainty whether clauses introduced by words such as þœr, þa, and þonne are principal or subordinate. The problem arises more often in the poetry, where the element order is a less certain guide than it is in the prose.” In prose the feature of the element order that usually sorts out clause-initial adverbs from conjunctions is the position of the finite verb. When the finite verb immediately follows (...) a clause-initial þœr, þa, or þonne, the initial word usually makes better sense as an adverb than as a conjunction. When one or more words intervene between the clause-initial word and the finite verb, the þœr, þa, or þonne often makes better sense as a conjunction, and S. O. Andrew therefore termed this “the conjunctive word order.” Elisabeth Traugott concurs with Mitchell's reservations about element order, writing that while differences in word order after these initial words “can often be used to distinguish a subordinate clause introduced by a conjunction from a main clause introduced by an adverb, … the distinction was never rigid, and can be regarded only as a tendency. … It certainly cannot be used as a sure test of main vs. subordinate clause status.”. (shrink)

Commentators from the Old Scholiast onward extract from these two clauses the one meaning that the pedagogue will not be recognized. They complain that a man's hair going white does not suffice to disguise him, and offer some unconvincing reinterpretations and emendations of The change of mood and tense is also odd; at O.C. 450 ff. which Jebb quotes in support, there is a change of meaning and intensity to justify it.

El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar los ejemplos que se dan en las obras tradicionales del denominado καί estructural con el fin de determinar sus características desde una perspectiva más actual. Este es uno de los tipos de καί adverbial que se distinguen, pero, como veremos, se trata de una categoría compleja en la que, sobre la base de su aparición en una oración subordinada, se han mezclado al menos tres usos más o menos habituales de καί adverbial: aditivo, (...) identificativo y corresponsivo. The aim of this paper is to analyse the examples of the so-called structural καί from a modern perspective. The examples are taken from the traditional grammars, in which this adverbial use of καί is usually distinguished. As it will be shown, this is in fact a complex category, established on the basis of its appearance in a subordinate clause and including three quite common uses of adverbial καί: additive, identificational and corresponsive. (shrink)

The use of the temporal augment in narrative we have found to be purely scansional. Scansional, too, is the use of the syllabic, though this has a grammatical restriction which is of some interest; indeed, next to the maintenance of type öρovδΕ, it is the most vital fact for the whole question. The unaugmented aorist is not felt as an inflection which has been docked of its first syllable; quite the reverse, the augmented tense is treated as a compound. For (...) example, é normally stands second in its clause; and so, if the syllabic augment was still consciously regarded as what it really is—viz. an adverb in composition—we should expect to see a great unwillingness to place Be after a tense thus augmented. Our expectation is fully borne out by the text; in the whole narrative of the Iliad there are only sixteen sure examples of é standing after the syllabically augmented aorist. (shrink)

The use of the temporal augment in narrative we have found to be purely scansional. Scansional, too, is the use of the syllabic, though this has a grammatical restriction which is of some interest; indeed, next to the maintenance of type öρovδΕ, it is the most vital fact for the whole question. The unaugmented aorist is not felt as an inflection which has been docked of its first syllable; quite the reverse, the augmented tense is treated as a compound. For (...) example, é normally stands second in its clause; and so, if the syllabic augment was still consciously regarded as what it really is—viz. an adverb in composition—we should expect to see a great unwillingness to place Be after a tense thus augmented. Our expectation is fully borne out by the text; in the whole narrative of the Iliad there are only sixteen sure examples of é standing after the syllabically augmented aorist. (shrink)

In Chapter V of Res Cogitans, Zeno Vendler argues that any analysis of “x knows that p” that has “x believes that p” in the analysans is incorrect. The reason he gives is that the “that p” in “x knows that p” is not the same grammatical object as the “that p” in “x believes that p”. As Vendler puts it, there are thats and thats. The view that there are two kinds of “that” clause, one which follows “know” and (...) another which follows “believe”, is attacked by O.R. Jones in his article “Can One Believe What One Knows?”. (shrink)

Lysias, describing how the Thirty were established in the government of Athens, begins with the sentence ναστς δ θηραμνης κλευσεν ὑμς τρι$κοντα νδράσιν πιτρΨαι τν πóλιν τῇ πολιτεᾳ χρσθαι ν Δρακοντδης πφαινεν Commenting on the last clause the judicious Thirlwall observes that ‘the precise meaning of these words is very doubtful. There is almost equal difficulty, whether we suppose that they refer to a proposition then made, or to one which was to be made, by Dracontides.’ Thirlwall has not expressed (...) his meaning as precisely as Lysias; the uncertainty lies, not in the words, nor in the reference intended by Lysias, but in the mind of the historian, who is conscious that, whether he refers the proposition of Dracontides to the occasion indicated by Lysias or to another, he will encounter almost equal difficulty. The difficulty however, arising from the apparent inconsistencies in the evidence of the ancient authorities on the date of the appointment of the Thirty, is not Thirlwall's only, and after a century of discussion it still vexes every student of the period. (shrink)

En este escrito se discutirá si tienen significado las oraciones que contienen nombres vacíos y si hay proposiciones verdaderas que contienen nombres vacíos. La respuesta a ambas preguntas parece ser positiva, cuyos casos paradigmáticos son enunciados como “Hamlet es un ser humano” y “Santa Claus vive en el Polo Norte”. Se asume, además, que estos enunciados expresan proposiciones distintas, pues su contenido semántico es distinto. Se argumenta que los nombres vacíos realizan una _contribución semántica degenerada _o no referencial a (...) las proposiciones en las que aparecen. Si ello es correcto, el problema de los nombres vacíos tiene una solución desde la teoría de la referencia directa. Se defiende además que un nombre vacío es un término singular rígidamente no referencial. (shrink)