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  1.  47
    Isolated by Oneself: Ontologically Impossible Experiences in Schizophrenia.Clara S. Humpston - 2022 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 29 (1):5-15.
    In the field of clinical practice, there does not seem to be too much contention about what schizophrenia is, at least from a high level. After all, there are various diagnostic systems and guidelines, all of which point toward schizophrenia as a psychotic syndrome which likely forms a continuum with other psychotic disorders. It may sound obvious that, according to the current definitions, the major commonality between schizophrenia and all other psychoses is psychotic symptoms; more precisely, delusions and hallucinations. Any (...)
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  2.  81
    The Spectra of Soundless Voices and Audible Thoughts: Towards an Integrative Model of Auditory Verbal Hallucinations and Thought Insertion.Clara S. Humpston & Matthew R. Broome - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):611-629.
    Patients with psychotic disorders experience a range of reality distortions. These often include auditory-verbal hallucinations, and thought insertion to a lesser degree; however, their mechanisms and relationships between each other remain largely elusive. Here we attempt to establish a integrative model drawing from the phenomenology of both AVHs and TI and argue that they in fact can be seen as ‘spectra’ of experiences with varying degrees of agency and ownership, with ‘silent and internal own thoughts’ on one extreme and ‘fully (...)
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  3.  50
    The paradoxical self: Awareness, solipsism and first-rank symptoms in schizophrenia.Clara S. Humpston - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):210-231.
    Schizophrenia as a pathology of self-awareness has attracted much attention from philosophical theorists and empirical scientists alike. I view schizophrenia as a basic self-disturbance leading to a lifeworld of solipsism adopted by the sufferer and explain how this adoption takes place, which then manifests in ways such as first-rank psychotic symptoms. I then discuss the relationships between these symptoms, not as isolated mental events, but as end-products of a loss of agency and ownership, and argue that symptoms like thought insertion (...)
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  4.  28
    The relationship between different types of dissociation and psychosis-like experiences in a non-clinical sample.Clara S. Humpston, Eamonn Walsh, David A. Oakley, Mitul A. Mehta, Vaughan Bell & Quinton Deeley - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 41:83-92.
  5.  20
    Privileged Access and the Agent in the Thought-Insertion.Clara S. Humpston - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (3):165-167.
    In his paper, Young has eloquently put forward a novel account of how and why the phenomenon of thought-insertion seen in patients with schizophrenia does not contradict the immunity principle. He argues that, in TI, the problem lies not in misidentification but in mispredication: the individual with TI does not ascribe the right predicate to the wrong subject, but has misdetected the predicate in the first place. The author points out that an inconsistently formulated immunity principle could risk confusing the (...)
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