Online controlled experiments, also known as A/B tests, have become ubiquitous. While many practical challenges in running experiments at scale have been thoroughly discussed, the ethical dimension of A/B testing has been neglected. This article fills this gap in the literature by introducing a new, soft ethics and governance framework that explicitly recognizes how the rise of an experimentation culture in industry settings brings not only unprecedented opportunities to businesses but also significant responsibilities. More precisely, the article (a) introduces a (...) set of principles to encourage ethical and responsible experimentation to protect users, customers, and society; (b) argues that ensuring compliance with the proposed principles is a complex challenge unlikely to be addressed by resorting to a one-solution response; (c) discusses the relevance and effectiveness of several mechanisms and policies in educating, governing, and incentivizing companies conducting online controlled experiments; and (d) offers a list of prompting questions specifically designed to help and empower practitioners by stimulating specific ethical deliberations and facilitating coordination among different groups of stakeholders. (shrink)

Predicates like “coloring‐the‐star” denote events that have a temporal duration and a culmination point (telos). When combined with perfective aspect (e.g., “Valeria has colored the star”), a culmination inference arises implying that the action has stopped, and the star is fully colored. While the perfective aspect is known to constrain the conceptualization of the event as telic, many reading studies have demonstrated that readers do not make early commitments as to whether the event is bounded or unbounded. A few visual‐world (...) studies tested the processing of telic predicates during online sentence processing, demonstrating an early integration of aspectual and temporal cues. By employing the visual‐world paradigm, we tested the incremental processing of the perfective aspect in Italian in two eye‐tracking studies in which listeners heard durative predicates in the perfective form in a scenario showing a completed and a non‐completed event. Differently from previous studies, we compared telic durative predicates such as “coloring‐the‐star” to punctual predicates such as “lighting‐the‐candle.” While for punctual predicates, the inferences of telicity (the event has a telos) and of culmination (the telos is reached) are lexically encoded in the perfective verb, for durative predicates, the degree of event completion (visually encoded) needs to be integrated with perfective aspect (linguistically encoded) for the culmination inference derivation. By modulating the interaction of visual and linguistic stimuli across the two experiments, we show that the verb's perfective aspect triggers the culmination inference incrementally during sentence processing, offering novel evidence for the continuous integration of linguistic processing with real‐world visual information. (shrink)

In this paper I will present a puzzle about epistemic akrasia, and I will use that puzzle to motivate accepting some non-standard views about the nature of epistemological judgment. The puzzle is that while it seems obvious that epistemic akrasia must be irrational, the claim that epistemic akrasia is always irrational amounts to the claim that a certain sort of justified false belief—a justified false belief about what one ought to believe—is impossible. But justified false beliefs seem to be possible (...) in any domain, and it’s hard to see why beliefs about what one ought to believe should be an exception. I will argue that when we get clearer about what sort of psychological state epistemic akrasia is, we can resolve the puzzle in favor of the intuitive view that epistemic akrasia is always irrational. (shrink)

How do we transmit or distribute knowledge, as distinct from generating or producing it? In this book John Greco examines the interpersonal relations and social structures which enable and inhibit the sharing of knowledge within and across epistemic communities. Drawing on resources from moral theory, the philosophy of language, action theory and the cognitive sciences, he considers the role of interpersonal trust in transmitting knowledge, and argues that sharing knowledge involves a kind of shared agency similar to giving a (...) gift or passing a ball. He also explains why transmitting knowledge is easy in some social contexts, such as those involving friendship or caregiving, but impossible in contexts characterized by suspicion and competition rather than by trust and cooperation. His book explores phenomena that have been undertheorized by traditional epistemology, and throws new light on existing problems in social epistemology and the epistemology of testimony. (shrink)

The first handbook on the topic of religious epistemology introduces and discusses topics fundamental to the epistemology of religious belief.

Abstract:In his later writings, Althusser brings to light a repressed materialistic current in Western philosophy, ranging from Epicurus to Heidegger and Derrida. In this article, I argue that the comparison between Epicurus's conception of Nature and Heidegger's concepts of Geworfenheit and Es gibt allows Althusser to lay the foundation for a new notion of event. Through the analysis of this philosophical connection, Althusser aims both to think of Time and History in a non-teleological way and to create the conditions for (...) a political praxis that does not apply any kind of metaphysical principles to a constantly changing reality. (shrink)

This chapter reviews a number of related problems in the epistemology of testimony, and suggests some dilemmas for any theory of knowledge that tries to solve them. Here a common theme emerges: It can seem that any theory must make testimonial knowledge either too hard or too easy, and that therefore no adequate account of testimonial knowledge is possible. The chapter then puts forward a proposal for making progress. Specifically, an important function of the concept of knowledge is to govern (...) the acquisition and distribution of quality information within an epistemic community. Testimonial exchanges paradigmatically serve in the distribution role, but sometimes serve in the acquisition role. The resulting position, it is argued, explains why testimonial knowledge is sometimes easy to get, and sometimes much harder. (shrink)

This book investigates the role of inference in argumentation, considering how arguments support standpoints on the basis of different loci. The authors propose and illustrate a model for the analysis of the standpoint-argument connection, called Argumentum Model of Topics. A prominent feature of the AMT is that it distinguishes, within each and every single argumentation, between an inferential-procedural component, on which the reasoning process is based; and a material-contextual component, which anchors the argument in the interlocutors’ cultural and factual common (...) ground. The AMT explains how these components differ and how they are intertwined within each single argument. This model is introduced in Part II of the book, following a careful reconstruction of the enormously rich tradition of studies on inference in argumentation, from the antiquity to contemporary authors, without neglecting medieval and post-medieval contributions. The AMT is a contemporary model grounded in a dialogue with such tradition, whose crucial aspects are illuminated in this book. (shrink)

When we say that someone knows something we are making a value judgment—we are saying that there is something intellectually good or right about the person’s belief, or about the way she believes it, or perhaps about her. We are saying, for example, that her belief is intellectually better than someone else’s mere opinion. Notice that we might make this sort of value judgment even if the two persons agree. Suppose that two people agree that the earth is the third (...) planet from the sun. Nevertheless, we might think that one person knows this while the other person merely believes it. If so, we are making a value judgment—we are saying that there is something intellectually better going on in the case of knowledge. Another way to put the point is to say that knowledge is a normative notion. There is something normatively better about the case of knowledge, as opposed to the case of mere opinion, or even the case of true opinion. Finally, saying that someone knows something is not the only sort of value judgment we can make about her belief. Even if we agree that some belief falls short of knowledge, we might nevertheless judge that it is justified, or rational, or reasonable, or responsible. In each such case, we are saying that there is something normatively better about the case in question, as opposed to the case of mere opinion, or even the case of true opinion. (shrink)

Recent interest in the epistemology of testimony can be traced to C. A. J. Coady's Testimony: A Philosophical Study (1992) and then a collection of papers edited by Bimal Krishna Matilal and Arindam Chakrabarti, Knowing from Words (1994). These two volumes framed several issues in the epistemology of testimony and largely set the agenda for work in that area over the next two decades. -/- One major issue in this literature is whether testimonial knowledge can be "reduced" to some other (...) kind of knowledge: Is testimonial knowledge sui generis, requiring its own distinctive treatment, or is testimonial knowledge merely an instance of, for example, inductive knowledge, requiring no special epistemology over and above that required for inductive knowledge in general? One way that testimonial knowledge might be special is that it involves social elements that make it distinctive. This possibility raises further issues that have been prominent in the literature: In what ways is testimonial knowledge a social phenomenon, and what are the consequences of this for the epistemology of testimony and for epistemology more generally? (shrink)

We propose various methods for combining or amalgamating propositional languages and deductive systems. We make heavy use of quantales and quantale modules in the wake of previous works by the present and other authors. We also describe quite extensively the relationships among the algebraic and order-theoretic constructions and the corresponding ones based on a purely logical approach.

In this paper we study interpretations and equivalences of propositional deductive systems by using a quantale-theoretic approach introduced by Galatos and Tsinakis. Our aim is to provide a general order-theoretic framework which is able to describe and characterize both strong and weak forms of interpretations among propositional deductive systems also in the cases where the systems have different underlying languages.

Objective: Mindfulness disposition is associated with various psychological factors and prevent emotional distress in chronic diseases. In the present study, we analyzed the key role of mindfulness dispositions in protecting the individual against psychological distress consequent to COVID-19 social distancing and quarantining. Methods: An online survey was launched on March 13, 2020, with 6,412 responses by April 6, 2020. Socio-demographic information, exposure to the pandemic, and quarantining were assessed together with psychological distress and mindfulness disposition. Multivariate linear regression analysis was (...) performed to study the influence of predictive factors on psychological distress and quality of life in Italian responders during the early days of lockdown. Pearson correlations were calculated to study the relations between mindfulness and psychiatric symptoms. Results: Multivariate linear regression run on socio-demographics, COVID-19-related variables, and mindfulness disposition as moderators of overall psychological distress showed that mindfulness was the best predictor of psychological distress (β = -0.504; p =.000). High negative correlations were found between mindfulness disposition and overall Global Severity Index (r = -.637; p =.000), while moderate to high associations were found between mindfulness and all SCL-90 sub-scales. Discussion: Findings showed that high dispositional mindfulness enhances well-being and helps in dealing with stressful situations such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Mindfulness-based mental training could represent an effective intervention to stem the post-traumatic psychopathological beginnings and preventing the onset of chronic mental disorders. (shrink)

La reciprocidad se revela como un principio social fundamental cuando se evidencia su estructura dual. Por un lado, el don desvía el valor de las cosas hacia una pretensión de reconocimiento y estatus, con lo que crea un contramundo social; por otro, tales pretensiones, muchas veces defraudadas, contrastan con las relaciones objetivas y éstas son criticadas sobre el trasfondo de la reciprocidad pretendida. En las Confesiones de Rousseau, el sentido del agradecimiento de los personajes jóvenes y marginales les confiere dignidad (...) y derecho a la crítica. Smith esboza un procedimiento de recontextualización afín al de las narraciones de Rousseau, pero en su teoría, el significado distinto que la reciprocidad da a los objetos y sujetos del intercambio tiene que descubrirse en un trasfondo social, como una realidad paralela. (shrink)

This paper advocates for a “social turn" in religious epistemology. Part One reviews some familiar skeptical arguments targeting religious belief (the argument from luck, the argument from peer disagreement, Hume's argument). All these skeptical arguments say that testimonial evidence cannot give religious belief adequate support or grounding, especially in the context of conflicting evidence. Part Two considers some recent work in social epistemology and the epistemology of testimony. Several issues regarding the nature of testimonial evidence are considered, and an account (...) of testimonial evidence as a means of distribution of information through the system is defended. Part Three uses the results of Part Two to reconsider the skeptical arguments in Part One. (shrink)

It's standard in epistemology to approach questions about knowledge and rational belief using idealized, simplified models. But while the practice of constructing idealized models in epistemology is old, metaepistemological reflection on that practice is not. Greco argues that the fact that epistemologists build idealized models isn't merely a metaepistemological observation that can leave first-order epistemological debates untouched. Rather, once we view epistemology through the lens of idealization and model-building, the landscape looks quite different. Constructing idealized models is likely the (...) best epistemologists can do. Once one starts using epistemological categories like belief, knowledge, and confidence, the realm of idealization and model-building is entered. We can object to a model of knowledge by pointing to a better model, but in the absence of a better model, the fact that a framework for epistemologizing theorizing involves simplifications, approximations, and other inaccuracies-the fact of its status as an idealized model-is not in itself objectionable. Once we accept that theorizing in epistemological terms is inescapably idealized, a number of intriguing possibilities open up. Greco defends a package of epistemological views that might otherwise have looked indefensibly dismissive of our cognitive limitations-a package according to which we know a wide variety of facts with certainty, including what our evidence is, what we know and don't know, and what follows from our knowledge. (shrink)

Fragmentalism allows incompatible facts to constitute reality in an absolute manner, provided that they fail to obtain together. In recent years, the view has been extensively discussed, with a focus on its formalisation in model-theoretic terms. This paper focuses on three formalisations: Lipman’s approach, the subvaluationist interpretation, and a novel view that has been so far overlooked. The aim of the paper is to explore the application of these formalisations to the alethic modal case. This logical exploration will allow us (...) to study (i) cases of metaphysical incompatibility between modal facts and (ii) cases of modal dialetheias. In turn, this will enrich our understanding of the role of impossibility in the fragmentalist framework. (shrink)

Este trabajo analiza las implicancias de la relación comprensión lectora y resolución de problemas en matemática por medio de un análisis detallado de la formulación lingüística de problemas matemáticos y su resolución en un manual de apoyo docente elaborado para este propósito. De esta forma, se detallan diferentes enunciados de problemas en matemáticas para analizar desde su estructura verbal -conforme a una complejidad creciente e integrada- a fin de exponer su impacto enlas posibilidades de resolución por parte de los estudiantes (...) universitarios de primeraño en la Facultad de Ingeniería de la UC Temuco. (shrink)

In his Cahiers , Valéry says that writing two of his major dialogues, Eupalinos and L’âme et la danse , was an antidote to his ravaging mood: literature and spirituality are the remedy generated by a necessary and not eliminable evil, particularly the one that shows itself as ‘rage’ in love. The essay investigates thoroughly this contradictory logic and focuses on the problem of sensitiveness in Valéry’s work, pointing out a twofold presence of the ‘body’. Preserving these two presences, the (...) writing incessantly tries to make up “une fureur intelligente et expérimentale” and to give a new form, without deleting it, to sensitiveness’ acute pain. (shrink)

According to a popular objection, Hume assumes that only deductive inferences can generate knowledge and reasonable belief, and so Hume’s skepticism can be avoided by simply recognizing the role of inductive inferences in empirical matters. This paper offers an interpretation of Hume’s skepticism that avoids this objection. The resulting skeptical argument is a powerful one in the following sense: it is not at all obvious where the argument goes wrong, and responding to the argument forces us to adopt a substantive (...) and even surprising position regarding the nature of knowledge and evidence. The main strategy is to draw a three way distinction among kinds of inferential support. Thus inferences can be deductive-supportive, inductive-supportive, or non-supportive. Hume does not assume that inductive inferences cannot generate knowledge or reasonable belief. Rather, he makes the more plausible assumption that non-supportive inferences cannot. (shrink)

Moses Dobruska, born as a Jew in Brno, Moravia in 1753, died on the guillotine in Paris in 1794. His life was adventurous, but the biography is not enough to understand the creative force of this atypical intellectual. Silvana Greco, sociologist of.