Im Zuge einer fortschreitenden Sakularisierung haben traditionelle religiose Weltbilder ihre Plausibilitat verloren. Knapp zeigt unter Heranziehung der Anerkennungstheorie, dass und wie eine christliche Gottesbeziehung auch in der Moderne gelebt und verantwortet und ein moglicher Gottesgedanke begrundet werden kann.

Does the decision to relax by taking a drive rather than by taking a walk cause harm? In particular, do the additional carbon emissions caused by such a decision make anyone worse off? Recently several philosophers have argued that the answer is no, and on this basis have gone on to claim that act-consequentialism cannot provide a moral reason for individuals to voluntarily reduce their emissions. The reasoning typically consists of two steps. First, the effect of individual emissions on the (...) weather is miniscule: the planet’s meteorological system is so large, and the size of individual emissions so tiny, that whatever impact an individual emission has on the weather must be vanishingly small. Second, vanishingly small impacts aren’t morally relevant because no one could possibly tell the difference between such an impact occurring and it not occurring. In this paper, we show why both steps are mistaken, and hence why act-consequentialism implies that each of us has an individual obligation to do what we can to stop damaging the climate, including by refraining from, or perhaps by purchasing offsets against, our own individual luxury carbon emissions. (shrink)

How cautious should regulators be? A standard answer is consequentialist: regulators should be just cautious enough to maximize expected social value. This paper charts the prospects of a nonconsequentialist - and more precautionary - alternative. More specifically, it argues that a contractualism focused on ex ante consent can motivate the following regulatory criterion: regulators should permit a socially beneficial risky activity only if no one can be expected to be made worse off by it. Broadly speaking, there are two strategies (...) regulators can use to help risky activities satisfy this criterion: regulators can mandate strict safety standards that protect those who would otherwise stand to lose, and they can require that some of the benefits of the activity be redirected to them. In developing these themes, the paper aims to provide a theoretical grounding for those who oppose using risk-cost-benefit analysis as the primary regulatory standard, and in particular, for advocates of the precautionary principle. (shrink)

New and experienced psychotherapists alike can find themselves overwhelmed by an ethical quandary where there doesn't seem to be an easy solution. This book presents positive ethics as a means to overcome such ethical challenges. The positive approach focuses on not just avoiding negative consequences, but reaching the best possible outcomes for both the psychotherapist and the client. The authors outline a clear decision-making process that is based on three practical strategies: the ethics acculturation model to help therapists incorporate personal (...) ethics into their professional roles, the quality enhancement model for dealing with high-risk patients who are potentially harmful, and ethical choice-making strategies to make the most ethical decision in a situation where two ethical principles conflict. Throughout the decision-making process, psychotherapists are encouraged to follow four basic guidelines: Focus on overarching ethical principles Consider intuitive, emotional, and other nonrational factors Accept that some problems have elusive solutions Solicit input from colleagues and consultation groups Numerous vignettes illustrate how to apply positive ethics to many different ethical challenges that psychotherapists will likely encounter in practice. (shrink)

Comparative pride—that is, pride in how one compares to others in some respect—is often thought to be warranted. In this paper, I argue that this common position is mistaken. The paper begins with an analysis of how things seem when a person feels pride. Pride, I claim, presents some aspect of the self with which one identifies as being worthy. Moreover, in some cases, it presents this aspect of the self as something one is responsible for. I then go on (...) to argue that when the focus of one's pride is comparative, things are never as pride makes them seem. The core problem is that if the performance in which one takes pride is really valuable, the fact that it is superior to the performance of others does nothing to contribute to that value. I conclude with a discussion of why so many are inclined to validate comparative pride and a response to those who claim that comparisons are essential to pride because they must be used to set standards of excellence. (shrink)

Envy of others' material possessions is a potent motivator of consumerism. This makes it a prudentially and morally hazardous emotional response. After outlining these hazards, I present an analysis of the emotion of envy. Envy, I argue, presents things in the following way: the envier lacks some good that her rival possesses; this difference between them is bad for the envier; this difference reflects poorly on the envier's worth; and this difference is undeserved. I then discuss the conditions under which (...) these presentations can be satisfied by differences in material possessions. My conclusion is that no difference in material possessions can simultaneously be all the ways envy presents it as being. Consequently, economic envy is systematically irrational: it is never a warranted response to the distribution of material wealth. Recognising this bolsters the prudential and moral case for reducing the degree to which we feel it and for resisting the inclinations it gives rise to when we do. (shrink)

Chrisoula Andreou argues that even if our happiness is determined by our material standard of living, our standard of living could be lowered without lowering our happiness. In this response, I show how this claim can be challenged on both conceptual and empirical grounds. Conceptually, how justified we are in believing her claim depends on how we conceive of the 'we' it refers to. Empirically, there is economic evidence in tension with each of the several interpretations her position admits of. (...) I conclude that Andreou has not provided an argument that can reasonably persuade committed materialists that reducing their standard of living will not reduce their happiness. And I suggest that the search for such an argument ought to include attempts to articulate and defend a theory of well-being that shows how tenuous the connection between material luxury and quality of life really is. (shrink)

Since materially opulent lifestyles are a significant cause of environmental degradation, environmentalists often call for us to live more simply. This call is typically focused on consumption. But our environmental footprint is a function of our paid work as well as our purchases. Consequently, environmentalists should also urge us to work less. Defending this claim is the project of this paper. Reducing our economic productivity, I argue, can often be expected to make both the world and our characters better. And, (...) contrary to what some have suggested, working less than is normal needn’t involve unfairly free-riding on the productive efforts of others. (shrink)

According to most contemporary theorists, free riding on the cooperative contributions of others is unfair. At the same time, obligations to contribute to cooperative schemes can compel conformity with conventional practices, and can do so to a degree that poses a real threat to individuality. This paper exposes this tension between fairness and individuality, and proposes a way to resolve it. The resolution depends on an alternative approach to understanding fairness—one that appeals to the relational goods fairness is meant to (...) maintain. In particular, norms of fairness protect against the interactions within a relationship becoming disrespectful. Many instances of free riding are indeed disrespectful and hence unfair. But this is not always so: one can choose to live a lifestyle that fails to return the benefits their community provides without disrespecting one's fellows. It is thus possible to free ride without being unfair, and so duties of fairness need not add to those already formidable forces that threaten to extinguish valuable individuality. (shrink)

This article develops and defends an account of prudential value that is inspired by ideas found in Thoreau’s Walden. The core claim is that prudential value consists in responding appropriately to those things that make the world better, and avoiding those things that make it worse. The core argument is that this is our aim in so far as we are evaluative creatures, and that our evaluative nature is essential to us in the context of inquiring into our good. I (...) also illustrate how the account can be developed to inform an intuitively plausible theory of well-being, and conclude by discussing its virtues relative to some contemporary alternatives. (shrink)

Background: Concern has been expressed about the process of consent to clinical trials, particularly in phase I “first-in-man” trials. Trial participant information sheets are often lengthy and technical. Content-based readability testing of sheets, which is often required to obtain research ethics approval for trials in the USA, is limited and cannot indicate how information will perform. Methods: An independent-groups design was used to study the user-testing performance of the participant information sheet from the phase I TGN1412 trial. Members of the (...) public were asked to read it, then find and demonstrate understanding of 21 key aspects of the trial. The participant information sheet was then rewritten, redesigned and tested on 20 members of the public, using the same 21-item questionnaire. Results: On the original TGN1412 participant information sheet, participants could not find answers and some of the found information was not understood. Six of 21 questions, including those relating to placebo, follow-up visits and the emergency phone number, were found by eight or fewer of 10 participants. The revised information sheet performed better, with the answers to 17 of 21 questions found and understood by all 20 participants. Conclusions: Tests showed that the TGN1412 participant information sheet may not inform participants adequately for consent. Revising its content and design led to significant improvements. Writers of materials for trial participants should take account of good practice in information design. Performance-based user testing may be a useful method to indicate strengths and weaknesses in trial materials. (shrink)

Seeking to explain the emergence of anti-trafficking initiatives, scholars have explored two sets of ideas—national security and gender equality—thought to shape policy. In this study, we examine whether such ideational influence accounts for Sweden's evolving anti-trafficking policy over the past decade. As powerful domestic ideas about gender inequality informed the adoption of an abolitionist prostitution policy in the 1990s, one would expect similar ideas to influence domestic responses to the related issue of cross-border trafficking.However, our case study shows that the (...) policy area of trafficking has largely followed a different ideational path. Gendered ideas, periodically nested in a human rights discourse, have been salient in the public debate on trafficking in human beings, especially during the campaign to boycott the 2006 FIFA World Cup. However, they have exerted substantially less influence on Swedish legislative initiatives to combat trafficking, with security concerns still holding sway. (shrink)

Can it make sense for someone who appreciates the explanatory power of modern science to continue believing in a traditional religious account of the ultimate nature and purpose of our universe?

In seinem grossen Spätwerk »Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie« rekonstruiert Jürgen Habermas den Diskurs über Glauben und Wissen, aus dem nicht zuletzt die säkulare Welt resultiert. Ob und wie dieser Diskurs weitergehen kann, um die Moderne vor Entgleisungen zu bewahren, ist allerdings fraglich. Der Band setzt sich aus theologischer Perspektive kritisch und nach vorne gerichtet mit dem Werk auseinander. In einem eigenen Text antwortet Jürgen Habermas auf die Beiträge.

Christopher Southgate has made important contributions to theodicy and the theory of divine action in light of the contingency in evolution and the suffering of creation. What happens then when one thinks through the implications of contingency for Christology? One can admit that aesthetic and moral judgments are products of a contingent history and yet affirm that they really are valid. Similarly, we argue, one can acknowledge the contingency of Jesus’ existence, actions, and subsequent impact and still maintain that his (...) will was uniquely united with the divine will. Following a critical engagement with the recent work of Keith Ward, we argue that a high Christology is compatible with the actual contingencies of evolutionary and social history, without the necessity of interventionist divine action. (shrink)

Abstract. Over time scientists have developed an effective investigative process that includes the acceptance of particular basic presuppositions, methods, content, and theories. T he deeply held presuppositions are the philosophical foundation of scientific thought and do much to define the field’s worldview. These fundamental assumptions can be esoteric for many and can become a source of conflict when they are not commonly shared with other points of view. Such presuppositions affect the observations, the conclusions drawn, and the positions taken. Furthermore, (...) in some cases presuppositions in science have undergone important shifts in meaning, causing an increasing dissonance. We argue that disputes in religion and science often are due to these very basic differences in philosophy that are held by members in the different communities. To better understand the nature of science and its differences with religious views, presuppositions rather than conclusions should be articulated and examined for validity and scope of application. (shrink)

Women’s movements in Western Europe are not dead, but they have altered their strategies in ways that require adaptation of investigative repertoires. Recent research highlights women’s movements’ pathways into institutions as well as the transnationalisation of activism. This article focuses on the shifting public communication repertoire associated with these developments. Communication and movement outreach across Europe are increasingly constituted online. The authors investigate the degree to which women’s networks in Germany and the UK mobilise constituencies via online means. Utilising network (...) mapping tools as well as original data from women’s NGOs, they analyse the density and distribution of relationships in German and UK networks, as well as their interactive communication repertoires as indicators of their capacity to engage constituents. The findings show that information-focused means of communication are more prevalent than interactive mobilisation tools. Women’s NGOs in the UK utilise more public engagement features than those in Germany. The authors relate these findings to second-, third- and fourth-wave feminisms, focusing on their distinct mobilisation strategies. (shrink)

Dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) is a multi-modal logic for reasoning about the change of knowledge in multi-agent systems. It extends epistemic logic by a modal operator for actions which announce logical formulas to other agents. In Hilbert-style proof calculi for DEL, modal action formulas are reduced to epistemic logic, whereas current sequent calculi for DEL are labelled systems which internalize the semantic accessibility relation of the modal operators, as well as the accessibility relation underlying the semantics of the actions. We (...) present a novel cut-free ordinary sequent calculus, called |$ \textbf{G4}_{P,A}[] $|⁠, for propositional DEL. In contrast to the known sequent calculi, our calculus does not internalize the accessibility relations, but—similar to Hilbert style proof calculi—action formulas are reduced to epistemic formulas. Since no ordinary sequent calculus for full S5 modal logic is known, the proof rules for the knowledge operator and the Boolean operators are those of an underlying S4 modal calculus. We show the soundness and completeness of |$ \textbf{G4}_{P,A}[] $| and prove also the admissibility of the cut-rule and of several other rules for introducing the action modality. (shrink)

Continuing professional education in ethics for psychologists is becoming more common, as psychology licensing boards in 14 states now require continuing education in ethics as a condition of licensure renewal. This article suggests ways to improve the quality of ethics continuing education by diversifying the content and teaching methods.