An attempt to show that the judgments of aesthetics are both objective and relative. The sense in which they are objective is established by reference to sartre's account of husserl's theory of intentionality. The key concept here is the non-Ecological nature of consciousness. On this view value predicates refer to the properties of objects. Such properties have certain presuppositions. Drawing on discussions by john laird and j.N. Findlay it is argued that a property is justified when its presuppositions are confirmed. (...) It is also argued that a property is appropriate at one level when its presuppositions are of a certain type and appropriate at a higher level when the type of presupposition can itself be characterized in certain specific ways. These ways are those built into the terms used to express or refer to the property in question. Since such terms are sociocultural objects they are tied to particular times and places. For this reason all aesthetic judgments are relative. This, However, Does not destroy their objectivity. (shrink)

Recent work in argumentation theory has emphasized the nature of arguers and arguments along with various theoretical perspectives. Less attention has been given to the third feature of any argumentative situation - the audience. This book fills that gap by studying audience reception to argumentation and the problems that come to light as a result of this shift in focus. Christopher W. Tindale advances the tacit theories of several earlier thinkers by addressing the central problems connected with audience considerations (...) in argumentation, problems that earlier philosophical theories overlook or inadequately accommodate. The main tools employed in exploring the central issues are drawn from contemporary philosophical research on meaning, testimony, emotion and agency. These are then combined with some of the major insights of recent rhetorical work in argumentation to advance our understanding of audiences and suggest avenues for further research. (shrink)

In this paper, I investígate a question in the Rhetoric surrounding the metaphorical sense of Aristotle’s topos: one can look to a location for “available means of persuasion,” evoking an image of seeing ; or topoi are viewed as “general lines of argument.” Are they places we go for arguments, or actual lines of arguments? The difference matters, given a propensity to view topoi as forerunners of argument schemes.

Although Pessoa, Teller & Noë make excellent points concerning the need for a mechanism of filling-in, they throw out the baby of neural specificity with the bathwater of isomorphism and the homuncular observer. The core act of perception is sensory processing by a stationary observer and does not require overt behavioral interaction with the environment. The complexity of intracortical interconnectivity does not preclude local specificity in the representation of higher-order stimulus properties.