93 found
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  1. Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism.Christopher S. Hill - 1991 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    This is a book about sensory states and their apparent characteristics. It confronts a whole series of metaphysical and epistemological questions and presents an argument for type materialism: the view that sensory states are identical with the neural states with which they are correlated. According to type materialism, sensations are only possessed by human beings and members of related biological species; silicon-based androids cannot have sensations. The author rebuts several other rival theories, and explores a number of important issues: the (...)
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  2.  73
    Consciousness.Christopher S. Hill - 2009 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    This book presents a comprehensive theory of consciousness. The initial chapter distinguishes six main forms of consciousness and sketches an account of each one. Later chapters focus on phenomenal consciousness, consciousness of, and introspective consciousness. In discussing phenomenal consciousness, Hill develops the representational theory of mind in new directions, arguing that all awareness involves representations, even awareness of qualitative states like pain. He then uses this view to undercut dualistic accounts of qualitative states. Other topics include visual awareness, visual appearances, (...)
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  3.  95
    Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain.Christopher S. Hill & Patricia Smith Churchland - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (4):573.
  4. Imaginability, conceivability, possibility and the mind-body problem.Christopher S. Hill - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 87 (1):61-85.
  5.  46
    The Nature of True Minds.Christopher S. Hill - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (4):721.
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  6. Hawthorne’s Lottery Puzzle and the Nature of Belief.Christopher S. Hill & Joshua Schechter - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):120-122.
    In the first chapter of his Knowledge and Lotteries, John Hawthorne argues that thinkers do not ordinarily know lottery propositions. His arguments depend on claims about the intimate connections between knowledge and assertion, epistemic possibility, practical reasoning, and theoretical reasoning. In this paper, we cast doubt on the proposed connections. We also put forward an alternative picture of belief and reasoning. In particular, we argue that assertion is governed by a Gricean constraint that makes no reference to knowledge, and that (...)
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  7.  79
    Meaning, Mind, and Knowledge.Christopher S. Hill - 2014 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    This volume presents a selection of essays by the leading philosopher Christopher S. Hill. Together, they address central philosophical issues related to four key concerns: the nature of truth; the relation between experiences and brain states; the relation between experiences and representational states; and problems concerning knowledge.
  8.  49
    Thought and World: An Austere Portrayal of Truth, Reference, and Semantic Correspondence.Christopher S. Hill - 2002 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    There is an important family of semantic notions that we apply to thoughts and to the conceptual constituents of thoughts - as when we say that the thought that the Universe is expanding is true. Thought and World presents a theory of the content of such notions. The theory is largely deflationary in spirit, in the sense that it represents a broad range of semantic notions - including the concept of truth - as being entirely free from substantive metaphysical and (...)
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  9. Perceptual Existentialism Sustained.Christopher S. Hill - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (6):1-20.
    There are two main accounts of what it is for external objects to be presented in visual experience. According to particularism, particular objects are built into the representational contents of experiences. Existentialism is a quite different view. According to existentialism, the representational contents of perceptual experiences are general rather than particular, in the sense that the contents can be fully captured by existentially quantified statements. The present paper is a defense of existentialism. It argues that existentialism is much better equipped (...)
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  10.  44
    Reasons and Experience.Christopher S. Hill - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (2):279.
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  11. New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical.Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.) - 2012 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    The type identity theory, according to which types of mental state are identical to types of physical state, fell out of favour for some years but is now being considered with renewed interest. Many philosophers are critically re-examining the arguments which were marshalled against it, finding in the type identity theory both resources to strengthen a comprehensive, physicalistic metaphysics and a useful tool in understanding the relationship between developments in psychology and new results in neuroscience. This volume brings together leading (...)
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  12. Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Christopher S. Hill - 2002 - Mind 111 (444):882-888.
  13.  46
    Perceptual experience.Christopher S. Hill - 2022 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
    This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations. Christopher S. Hill argues that perceptual experience constitutively involves representations of worldly items, and that the relevant form of representation can be explained in broadly biological terms. He then maintains that the representational contents of perceptual experiences are perceptual appearances, interpreted (...)
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  14. Perceptual Relativity.Christopher S. Hill - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (2):179-200.
    Visual experience is shaped by a number of factors that are independent of the external objects that we perceive—factors like lighting, angle of view, and the sensitivities of photoreceptors in the retina. This paper seeks to catalog, analyze, and explain the fluctuations in visual phenomenology that are due to such factors.
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  15. Impossible Worlds and Metaphysical Explanation: Comments on Kment’s Modality and Explanatory Reasoning.Nina Emery & Christopher S. Hill - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):134-148.
    In this critical notice of Kment's _Modality and Explanatory Reasoning_, we focus on Kment’s arguments for impossible worlds and on a key part of his discussion of the interactions between modality and explanation – the analogy that he draws between scientific and metaphysical explanation.
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  16.  62
    Cybernetics and the Philosophy of Mind.Christopher S. Hill - 1978 - Philosophical Review 87 (3):494.
  17. The mysterious flame: Conscious minds in a material world.Christopher S. Hill - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):300-303.
    As the subtitle indicates, this book is concerned with the relationship between consciousness and the physical world. It recommends a novel and disturbingly pessimistic view about this topic that it calls “naturalistic mysterianism.” The view is naturalistic because it maintains that states of consciousness are reducible to physical properties of the brain. It counts as “mysterian” because it asserts that the physical properties in question are entirely beyond our ken—that they lie well beyond the scope of contemporary neuroscience, and quite (...)
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  18. The perception of size and shape.Christopher S. Hill & David J. Bennett - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):294-315.
  19.  45
    Subject, Thought, and Context.Christopher S. Hill - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):106-112.
  20. (1 other version)Process reliabilism and cartesian scepticism.Christopher S. Hill - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):567-581.
  21.  38
    Mechanism, Mentalism, and Metamathematics.Christopher S. Hill & Judson C. Webb - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (2):276.
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  22.  56
    Appearance and reality.Christopher S. Hill - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):175-191.
    Philosophical Issues, Volume 30, Issue 1, Page 175-191, October 2020.
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  23. Tim Bayne on the Unity of Consciousness.Christopher S. Hill - 2014 - Analysis 74 (3):499-509.
  24.  47
    Susanna Schellenberg on perception.Christopher S. Hill - 2022 - Mind and Language 37 (2):208-218.
    Schellenberg's book The unity of perception is full of innovative ideas and challenges to preconceptions. This discussion endorses several of Schellenberg's main contentions, but it also challenges her handling of several key topics, such as hallucinations and perceptual awareness of particulars, and it expresses doubts about the informativeness of her main analytic tool, the notion of a perceptual capacity.
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  25. Introspective awareness of sensations.Christopher S. Hill - 1988 - Topoi 7 (March):11-24.
    My goal is to formulate a theory of introspection that can be integrated with a strongly reductionist account of sensations that I have defended elsewhere. In pursuit of this goal, I offer a skeletal explanation of the metaphysical nature of introspection and I attempt to resolve several of the main questions about the epistemological status of introspective beliefs.
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  26. In defense of type materialism.Christopher S. Hill - 1984 - Synthese 59 (June):295-320.
  27. The failings of functionalism.Christopher S. Hill - 1991 - In Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. New York: Cambridge University Press.
  28. Unity of consciousness, other minds, and phenomenal space.Christopher S. Hill - 1991 - In Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. New York: Cambridge University Press.
     
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  29.  47
    Can Carey answer Quine?Christopher S. Hill - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3):132-133.
    In order to defend her claim that the concept object is biologically determined, Carey must answer Quine's gavagai argument, which purports to show that mastery of any concept with determinate reference presupposes a substantial repertoire of logical concepts. I maintain that the gavagai argument withstands the experimental data that Carey provides, but that it yields to an a priori argument.
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  30. Chalmers on the Apriority of Modal Knowledge.Christopher S. Hill - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):20-26.
  31. There Are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmers’s Philosophy. [REVIEW]Christopher S. Hill & Brian P. McLaughlin - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):445-454.
    Chalmers’s anti-materialist argument runs as follows.
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  32. Gavagai.Christopher S. Hill - 1972 - Analysis 32 (3):68 - 75.
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  33. Ouch! An essay on pain.Christopher S. Hill - 2004 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
     
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  34.  46
    Replies to Byrne, McGrath, and McLaughlin.Christopher S. Hill - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):861-872.
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  35. Van Inwagen on the Consequence Argument.Christopher S. Hill - 1992 - Analysis 52 (2):49.
  36.  49
    Toward a theory of meaning for belief sentences.Christopher S. Hill - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 30 (4):209 - 226.
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  37.  55
    Truth in the realm of thoughts.Christopher S. Hill - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 96 (1):87-121.
  38.  41
    On Block's delineation of the border between seeing and thinking.Christopher S. Hill - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (4):1358-1366.
    This note is concerned with Ned Block's claim that cognition differs from perception in being paradigmatically conceptual, propositional, and non-iconic. As against Block, it maintains that large stretches of cognition constitutively involve, or depend on, iconic representations.
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  39. Concepts, teleology, and rational revision.Christopher S. Hill - 2013 - In Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), The a Priori in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.
     
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  40.  25
    Rudiments of a theory of reference.Christopher S. Hill - 1987 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 28 (2):200-219.
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  41.  16
    On a Revised Version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.Christopher S. Hill - 1982 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (3):236-242.
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  42. I love Machery’s book, but love concepts more.Christopher S. Hill - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):411-421.
  43. Intentionality downsized.Christopher S. Hill - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):144-169.
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  44.  25
    Replies to E. J. Green, Zoe Jenkin, and Jack Lyons.Christopher S. Hill - 2024 - Mind and Language 39 (1):102-108.
    I argue for three claims. (1) The phenomenology of visual experience is exhausted by awareness of appearance properties (i.e., certain constantly changing characteristics of external objects that are relational and viewpoint‐dependent). (2) Cognition differs from perception in that it has a purely discursive or linguistic dimension, whereas perception is pervasively analog and iconic; but this does not determine a border between the two domains, for cognition also has a massive iconic dimension. And (3) certain raging debates in teleosemantics can be (...)
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  45.  26
    The Logic of Mind. [REVIEW]Christopher S. Hill - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (4):626-630.
  46.  54
    Qualitative characteristics, type materialism and the circularity of analytic functionalism.Christopher S. Hill - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):50-51.
  47.  68
    Gupta has built a magnificent mansion, but can we live in it?Christopher S. Hill - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):236-242.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 104, Issue 1, Page 236-242, January 2022.
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  48.  38
    Conscious Experience: A Logical Inquiry, by Anil Gupta.Christopher S. Hill - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):251-259.
    This dazzlingly original and ambitious book challenges the epistemological and metaphysical preconceptions of contemporary philosophers on many fronts, and prop.
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  49. Of bats, brains, and minds.Christopher S. Hill - 1977 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (September):100-106.
  50.  29
    Neander on a Mark of the Mental.Christopher S. Hill - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (2):484-489.
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